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ABSTRACT 
In his The Nature of Doctrine (1984), George Lindbeck offered a culture-theoretical  approach to 
doctrine over against liberal and conservative approaches. Respondents to Lindbeck objected that he 
had misunderstood his opponents, but they displayed their own misunderstandings of his argument. I 
seek  a  more  fruitful  engagement  with  Lindbeck‘s  work,  proceeding  by  way  of  constructed 
‗conversations‘ between Lindbeck and some of those who made substantial responses to his work 
from liberal and conservative perspectives. Some underlying issues are clarified with the help of the 
older voices of F.D.E. Schleiermacher and Karl Barth. 
A  recurring  theme  in  these  conversations  is  the  nature  of  particularity  and  its  implications  for 
theology.  Lindbeck  criticises  liberal  theology  on  this  point,  yet  he,  like  Schleiermacher,  defines 
Christian particularity in terms of a ‗pretheological‘ social anthropology and on this basis asserts that 
Christianity is a comprehensive faith. To avoid such incoherence, theological accounts of particularity 
must attend to Christianity‘s own account of what its particularity is. 
Though labelled ‗conservative‘ by some, Lindbeck‘s theory of doctrine relies on philosophical argument 
rather than the usual conservative grounds in tradition and/or scripture. Yet all such foundations are 
problematic insofar as they ignore the priority of the Christian confession and its witness to the intrinsic 
vulnerability of tradition and its sources. Lindbeck‘s theory, and some conservative proposals, harbour 
ideological  intrusions  alien  to  the  Christian  confession,  thereby  illustrating  that  critique  is  needed 
precisely because of, and for the sake of, that confession. 
The  key  issues  emerging  from  these  conversations  with  The  Nature  of  Doctrine  are  the 
comprehensiveness of religious claims and the vulnerability of human discourse. To these I respond 
with a ‗confessional and therefore critical‘ theological hermeneutic: confession of Jesus Christ as Lord 
implicates its confessors, and therefore the confession itself, in the vulnerability of human finitude and 
fallenness, from which Christian tradition and scripture are not excepted. This hermeneutic avoids 
problems  noted  in  the  various  proposals  offered  by  Lindbeck  and  his  respondents,  and  poses 
challenges for future theorists of religion and doctrine.  
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MEANING TO BE HUMAN 
Conversations with George Lindbeck‘s  
The Nature of Doctrine 
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INTRODUCTION 
My attention was first drawn to George Lindbeck through references to his work in Lesslie 
Newbigin‘s writings on ‗gospel and culture‘ issues.1 Newbigin‘s approach to these issues was 
philosophically aware, but was not (and not intended to be) technically rigorous. Intrigued that 
Newbigin was open to the possibilities of Lindbeck‘s approach, yet guarded as to its actual 
achievements, I came to The Nature of Doctrine2 seeking more technical detail than Newbigin 
provided, and wondering about the basis of his reservations. 
With reading and re-reading Lindbeck I came to understand Newbigin‘s attitude towards him, 
and was stimulated to much wider reading and reflection. I have found ND and Lindbeck‘s other 
work  on  related  themes  highly  stimulating,  and  a  sense  of  unease  with  his  constructive 
proposals has continually goaded me to return to the issues with which he grappled, to examine 
and re-examine my misgivings concerning his solutions, to listen to the substantial responses of 
others who were provoked by his ideas, and gradually to find my own direction. 
That my assessment of Lindbeck‘s work is not more positive is a matter of regret, for it has 
contributed  significantly  to  my  theological  development,  for  which  I  am  grateful.  I  do  not 
expect  that  Lindbeck  will  welcome  my  criticisms,  but  perhaps  he  can  welcome  an 
acknowledgment of debt: in ways of which I am no doubt incompletely aware, he has been a 
crucial contributor to my appreciation of what it means for humans to presume to speak of God. 
Although I think my conclusions are firmly based, I cannot hope that they are entirely ‗right‘. 
Perhaps others may find in this study some lines of argument that offer the benefit I found in 
Lindbeck: that of fruitful provocation. 
1.1  THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
Lindbeck wrote ND in response to issues arising in his ecumenical work, and intended it mainly 
as a contribution to ecumenical theology, but much of its impact arose from the fact that he 
developed his proposal over against ‗standard‘ conservative and liberal approaches to doctrine, 
criticising them strongly. The ensuing debates had more to do with arguments between liberal, 
conservative, and Lindbeck‘s ‗postliberal‘ approaches to religion and doctrine than with the 
phenomena of ecumenical discussion that had prompted Lindbeck‘s thinking, and seemed to be 
richer  in  misunderstanding  than  in  genuine  engagement.3  Lindbeck‘s  respondents  were 
                                                       
1 See Newbigin 1986, 59-60; 1989, 24; 1991, 47; 1995, 72; 1996, 34-43. Newbigin‘s writings from 1984 onwards 
were the subject of my BD Honours thesis. 
2 Lindbeck 1984, abbreviated henceforth as ND. 
3 In the foreword to the German edition of  ND (ETs in Lindbeck 2003a and ND25, page numbers given for both), 
Lindbeck comments that ND ‗was captured by unanticipated interest groups who so shaped the public reception that 
even I, the author, now read it partly through their eyes‘ (p. 196/xxix). Whereas he ‗naïvely supposed it would be 2  INTRODUCTION 
distracted from his substantive argument by their desire to counterattack what they saw as his 
misrepresentations  of  liberal  and  conservative  positions.  There  was  truth  in  Lindbeck‘s 
critiques, and truth in the responses, but less real engagement than one might wish. I found 
myself sifting noisy polemics so as to hear the underlying issues, and imagining a conversation 
that could have taken place had those issues been more fruitfully engaged. 
In  this  study,  I  use  ‗conversation‘  as  a  kind  of  literary  conceit  for  structural  and  thematic 
purposes, partly because it reflects the way I responded to what I found in the literature, and 
partly  because  it  is  an  appropriate  response  to  one  aspect  of  my  conclusions.  In  this 
‗conversation‘ I am a self-appointed sympathetic listener. I think misunderstanding is occurring, 
and I want to know what could be achieved if the misunderstandings were clarified. In view of 
the perspectival character of knowledge, accepted by all parties to the conversation, it is better 
to seek clarification from within a given standpoint before venturing to offer correction from 
without. Critique from another standpoint already assumes the superiority of that standpoint, 
which  begs  another  question  (especially  in  these  kinds  of  debates).  Adopting  another‘s 
standpoint, one can perhaps show how it can meet a challenge; or why it can‘t do so without 
changing in certain ways. Therefore I rely mainly on immanent critique, and treat coherence as 
an important criterion. The conversation proceeds by listening to one speaker at a time, trying to 
appreciate the inner dynamic of each standpoint, and pausing occasionally to relate the different 
standpoints to each other in a way that is sympathetic to each. 
A potential difficulty with this approach is that, while Lindbeck‘s proposal can plausibly be 
called ‗a standpoint‘, the same cannot be said for ‗conservative theology‘ and ‗liberal theology‘, 
each of which is a complex movement encompassing many standpoints and many arguments. I 
hope it will suffice at this stage to say that the nature and identity of these movements are 
among the points at issue in this study, as indeed they were at issue in ND and the debates 
following its publication. Not only the underlying issues, but these movements also, will come 
into clearer focus as the conversation unfolds. 
‗Adopting another‘s standpoint‘ is not a way of making my own standpoint invisible, but an 
attempt to find out whether one can actually stand at the point occupied by the other; whether it 
is advantageous to do so, or whether it is rather uncomfortable. My standpoint will be visible 
everywhere, since I share it with Lindbeck and most of those with whom I engage: that Jesus‘ 
Lordship is the context in which Christians find themselves, and the light by which they see.4 
Because it is common ground, I neither justify it, nor even defend it very much. However,  the 
logic and basis of this confession, its basic content, its implications for theology, and the various 
protagonists‘ relations to it, are recurring themes. 
                                                                                                                                                             
interesting chiefly to doctrinally committed ecumenists‘, in the event ‗the discussion came to be dominated by non-
ecumenists‘ (p. 198/xxx). 
4 Lindbeck 1971, 232: ‗The affirmation of the Lordship of Christ is historically so thoroughly embedded in the very 
notion of Christian identity, that it is…cognitively dissonant to maintain one without the other.‘ Compare ND 94. 3  INTRODUCTION 
1.2  THE CONVERSATION IN OUTLINE 
Naturally enough, the way in which I have constructed the conversation is conditioned by the 
structure of Lindbeck‘s argument in ND. Even so, my own argument, which emerges as the 
conversation unfolds, takes some surprising turns, so it may help to orient the reader if I indicate 
the flow of the conversation and describe some of the major signposts along the way. Chapter 2 
begins with a detailed account of the origins, aims, argument and structure of ND, proceeding 
on that basis to a survey of the theory of religion—and the critique of liberal approaches to it—
that  comprise  its  first  half.  In  this  material  Lindbeck  develops  the  idea  of  religions  as 
intentionally comprehensive ways of life in terms of which adherents engage the world. On this 
basis  he  faults  ‗experiential-expressive‘  views  of  religion  for  not  taking  seriously  the 
comprehensiveness of religious claims, and for offering an allegedly greater comprehensiveness 
(and hence, covertly, a greater religion) in which religions with their practices and doctrines are 
treated as diverse expressions of underlying religious experiences that are essentially the same. 
In chapter 3 I attend to some liberal scholars (David Tracy, Delwin Brown) who responded 
mainly  to  this  aspect  of  Lindbeck‘s  argument,  consider  how  their  arguments  appear  from 
Lindbeck‘s perspective, assess their relative strengths and weaknesses, and identify agreements 
and divergences. I find that Lindbeck and liberal theology can learn much from each other, and 
indeed have already done so, inasmuch as they both define Christian particularity in terms of 
anthropologies derived independently of Christian tradition. This unexpected (if in hindsight 
rather  obvious)  agreement  prompts  me  to  turn,  in  chapter  4,  to  the  older  voices  of  F.D.E. 
Schleiermacher and Karl Barth, and to view Lindbeck‘s theory of religion in the light of their 
work. I find the roots of the agreement between Lindbeck and liberal theology in the work of 
Schleiermacher,  and  conclude  that  both  are  his  offspring,  with  Lindbeck  more  faithfully 
representing  both  Schleiermacher‘s  basic  orientation  and  his  incoherence.  Taking  up 
Schleiermacher‘s  and  Lindbeck‘s  methodological  assertion  of  the  comprehensiveness  of 
Christian faith (but not their practical denial of it), I explore in conversation with Barth the 
possibilities and pitfalls of a coherent Christian understanding of both Christian particularity and 
particularity in general, concluding that the confession ‗Jesus is Lord‘ must shape theological 
hermeneutics. Those who make this confession cannot be content to appropriate any ideology or 
technique without critically engaging it from the standpoint of the gospel of Jesus‘ Lordship. 
This gospel means inter alia that human beings with their actions and ideas find their true, 
though still vulnerable and provisional, standing only as they enter into Jesus‘ service. This 
point concludes discussion of the first of the underlying issues to emerge from the conversation, 
namely, the particularity and comprehensiveness of religious claims. 
The  second  part  of  Lindbeck‘s  proposal  is  his  ‗rule  theory‘  of  doctrine  and  the  case  for  its 
superiority over ‗propositional‘ accounts. In chapter 5 I describe this material and discuss some of 
its difficulties. Lindbeck‘s critique of propositional views of doctrine overlooks the possibility that 
such views could affirm the historicity of doctrine, its sources and its interpreters—matters on 
which his own theory is vulnerable—and his argument that rule theory is better than propositional 
views  does  not  succeed.  As  well,  the  rule  theory  harbours  philosophical  and  theological 
difficulties: it shares in some of the problems of propositionalism; it misconstrues Wittgenstein; 4  INTRODUCTION 
and it arises from a precommitment to the possibility of doctrinal constancy, a precommitment 
that not only pushes doctrine into an ahistorical realm but is in tension with confession of Jesus‘ 
Lordship. I argue that an account of doctrine informed by the Christian doctrines of Creation and 
Fall must see tradition (and hence doctrine) as fully implicated in creaturely finitude (historical 
particularity)  and  moral  frailty  (susceptibility  to  ideological  distortion).  Identifying  tradition‘s 
vulnerability  as  the  other  major  issue  underlying  the  debates  sparked  by  Lindbeck‘s  work,  I 
suggest that a robust approach to religion and doctrine must address both the comprehensiveness 
of religious claims and the vulnerability of human discourse, while recognising that it is itself 
comprehended within such claims, and is itself vulnerable as human discourse. 
Thus far in the conversation, I have welcomed Lindbeck‘s insistence on the comprehensiveness 
of religious claims, but have found that his proposal does not allow for it coherently, and is 
inattentive to tradition‘s vulnerability. The question then arises as to whether I can offer a 
proposal that meets these challenges while also accounting for the phenomena that prompted 
Lindbeck‘s original enquiry. The conclusions of chapters 4 and 5 point towards a confessional 
propositionalism that includes among its propositions the vulnerability of tradition and its own 
nature as traditioned inquiry. Chapter 6 takes this direction in dialogue with Alister McGrath, 
Karl  Barth,  and  Francis  Watson,  with  special  attention  to  ideology  as  an  aspect  of  the 
vulnerability of human understanding. I argue that, precisely because it confesses Jesus as Lord, 
Christian theology is obliged to engage ideology wherever it is recognised, be that in theological 
liberalism and conservatism, in traditional statements such as ‗the Bible is the Word of God,‘ or 
in ‗unredeemed tradition‘ in scripture itself. In this engagement, theology can never assume the 
high ground, for it shares in the vulnerabilities common to all human discourse, even as it seeks, 
in and through its own vulnerability, to bear witness to Jesus. 
The concluding chapter 7 reflects on the entire conversation in terms of its major issues: the 
comprehensiveness  of  religious  claims  (and  especially  the  universal  intent  of  the  Christian 
confession that ‗Jesus is Lord‘) and the vulnerability of human discourse (including religious 
discourse).  These  issues  can  be  addressed  through  a  theological  hermeneutic  I  describe  as 
‗confessional and therefore critical,‘ indicating the priority of confessional commitment and the 
fact  that  the  Christian  confession  comprehends  its  own  vulnerability.  Such  a  hermeneutic 
provides a stronger, if more challenging, basis for ecumenical engagement than that provided by 
Lindbeck in ND, and a more coherent and more reliable guide to the significance of liberal, 
conservative and ‗postliberal‘ approaches for Christian theology. 
Seeing that Lindbeck in ND engages first with liberals on the nature of religion and then with 
conservatives on the nature of doctrine, one might be tempted to read this study as a postliberal-
liberal debate balanced by a postliberal-conservative one. Though partly true, such a reading 
would be mistaken. My concern is less with reviewing and assessing debates arranged under 
customary categories than with uncovering and addressing the issues that lay dormant beneath 
them. Identifying writers as ‗conservative‘ or ‗liberal‘ and maintaining ‗balance‘ between them 
are  less  important  than  identifying  the  comprehensiveness  of  religious  claims  and  the 
vulnerability of human discourse as key issues in theological hermeneutics, and proposing a 
theological response in terms of confession, criticism and the relation between them. 5  INTRODUCTION 
1.3  THE SELECTION OF VOICES 
In  choosing  Tracy,  Brown,  McGrath  and  Watson  as  the  main  contemporary  speakers  in 
conversation  with  Lindbeck,  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  others  have  not  made  significant 
contributions, or that these four responses include the full scope of such reflection. Rather, their 
responses have been of most assistance in refining my own approach. Brown and McGrath are the 
most substantial contemporary conversation partners because their book-length arguments were in 
large measure written in response to Lindbeck, they offer their own treatments of the cultural 
processes that loom so large in ND, their theological orientations fall clearly within the two main 
streams of response, and they share my concern for the foundation and structure of argument. 
Tracy‘s early responses open up issues that receive fuller treatment in Brown‘s book, and Watson 
illuminates an important matter arising from engagement with McGrath and Barth. 
I was drawn to Schleiermacher and Barth because of the way their names were used in liberal / 
postliberal polemics. In the event, they not only helped to locate Lindbeck on the canvas of 
modern theology, but made profound contributions to the argument. I attend to them as to the 
other ‗speakers‘—by inhabiting their arguments and seeking out their tensions and coherences. 
Apart from these contemporary and older scholars, many others wrote articles and essays to 
which I refer at the relevant points. As a way of further orienting readers to my enquiry, I offer 
the following comments on monographs which, although they interact with Lindbeck, receive 
less attention from me than some might expect. 
John Milbank comments on Lindbeck in the final chapter of his Theology and Social Theory 
(1990). An outline of that chapter will help to set these comments in their context. Milbank argues 
that social theory is a covert theology and that Christian theology offers a true social science (pp. 
4, 6) which presupposes the true society it explicates (p. 380). This society arose as ‗a definite 
practice‘  in  certain  precise  historical  circumstances,  and  exists  only  as  a  particular  historical 
development (ibid.). Therefore Christian theology as social science requires a ‗counter-history,‘ 
i.e., a re-narration of world history from the viewpoint of the emergence of the church (381). It 
must  also  describe  the  emergent  ‗counter-ethics‘,  i.e.,  the  church‘s  distinctive  practice,  and 
provide a ‗counter-ontology‘ that provisionally articulates the framework of reference implicit in 
Christian story and action so as to clarify its total difference from all other cultural systems. 
Lastly, theology as social science must revisit counter-history with a view to self-critique: it must 
reflect on the fact that, ‗for the most part, the Church failed to bring about salvation, but instead 
ushered in the modern secular – at first liberal, and finally nihilistic – world‘ (381-2). 
Milbank engages Lindbeck as he begins his counter-history with a section on ‗Metanarrative 
Realism‘.5 He concurs with Lindbeck‘s rejection of foundationalism in its propositionalist and 
expressivist forms and his assertion that the entirety of Christian cultural practice, with all its 
images and actions, is a single performative proposition. Milbank maintains, however, that this 
implies  a  greater  role  for  propositions  than  Lindbeck  allows.  Firstly,  every  ‗performance‘ 
(including the articulation of theology) makes sense only within a historical and mythical setting 
that narrates reality and is thus ‗propositional‘ at the level of creative imagination. Propositions 
                                                       
5 Milbank 1990, 382-88. 6  INTRODUCTION 
arise inevitably at a theoretical level in response to questioning of the performative setting (383). 
Secondly,  doctrinal  reflection  is  not  just  a  more  exact  reading  of  preceding  practices  and 
narratives.  It  is  the  speculative  interpretation  of  the  implicit  assumptions  of  the  tradition.  Its 
interpretations are necessarily historically situated and contribute to the tradition they interpret. 
Hence, while doctrines do not ‗refer‘ on their own, they do so in conjunction with the interpreted 
tradition, contributing a propositional element to the overall ‗imagination of reference‘ (383-5). 
This leads to his deepest reservation—Lindbeck‘s treatment of scripture as a self-contained and 
world-containing  ahistorical  narrative  leads  not  to  metanarrative  realism  but  to  a  new 
narratological foundationalism (385-6). Against this, Milbank asserts the fundamental importance 
of understanding the Christian story as an open historical story. The church stands in a narrative 
relationship with Jesus and the gospels, in a story that subsumes both (387). It is the whole story 
of human history which is still being enacted and interpreted in the light of its central events (388). 
In summary, Milbank says that Lindbeck has replaced two illicit foundationalisms with another 
of his own devising, has not recognised the indispensability of doctrine‘s propositional aspect, 
and, most crucially, has insulated Christian narrative from its necessarily historical genesis and 
its intrinsic historical openness. This enquiry offers some similar observations, and also raises 
questions that may challenge two aspects of Milbank‘s constructive proposal: the idea that the 
church is ‗a distinct society‘ (p. 381), and the claim that the Christian ontology of harmonious 
difference is not vulnerable to deconstructive secular critique (376, 427-30). One might have 
expected  such  assertions  to  be  at  least  qualified  by,  and  preferably  fully  integrated  with, 
Milbank‘s narration of ecclesial history as largely a history of failure (432-4). One strand of my 
argument is that vulnerability belongs to the core of Christian thought, not only because God‘s 
vulnerability in the incarnation lies at the core of Christian faith, but also because all reflection 
upon this core is conducted by finite and fallen creatures. 
In Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the 
Theological  Agenda  (1996),  Nancey  Murphy  describes  liberalism  and  fundamentalism  in 
Anglo-American Christianity as responses to modern philosophical frameworks characterised 
by foundationalism, pursuit of objective verification and an account of the natural world that 
reduces causation to the laws of physics. Now, however, such frameworks appear vulnerable to 
‗postmodern‘ insights that emphasise the existence of knowledge in webs of interlocking ideas 
and practices, the possibility of verification only within traditions of enquiry that are communal, 
pragmatic and historically extended, and scientific acceptance of top-down causation and multi-
levelled explanation. In view of this, Murphy suggests that ‗it is time to ask how theology ought 
to be done in a postmodern era and to envision a rapprochement between theologians of the left 
and right‘ (p. 1). She hopes for answers in terms of fresh approaches in method rather than fresh 
starts in content (154). The distinction between method and content is important to Murphy‘s 
‗strong claims for the role of philosophy in theological development‘, namely, that theology‘s 
content comes from its own special sources (such as revelation), while its concepts and forms of 
argument are the province of philosophy (p. 4). These matters are of some importance in this 
study— the relation between philosophy and theology occupies much of chapter 4, and the 
distinction between method and content is addressed in chapter 5. 7  INTRODUCTION 
Murphy‘s  references  to  Lindbeck  are  positive.  She  gratefully  adopts  his  descriptions  and 
terminology for conservative and liberal approaches to Christian faith (p. 36n, 37, 41-2) and 
relates these approaches to options available in modern philosophy. Later she presents Lindbeck‘s 
cultural-linguistic proposal as an example of how theology can respond to postmodern insights 
(127-31, 154). The little critical engagement she offers is concerned with refinements rather than 
basic concepts (44, 52, 116n, 128, 130). Murphy‘s positive attitude to Lindbeck is due partly to 
her concern for ‗healing the…rift between Christians of the left and the right‘ (156), and to her 
belief that this healing can occur in the new philosophical environment. Thus her aim is less 
critical  engagement  than  proclamation  of  the  possibilities  created  by  the  new  situation,  and 
Lindbeck is something of a beacon of hope for her in this regard. Murphy‘s general support for 
Lindbeck also reflects basic resonances in their thinking on the matters mentioned above: the 
distinction between method and content, and the relation between philosophy and theology. I 
argue that these areas of Lindbeck‘s (and hence of Murphy‘s) thought are problematic, and that it 
is  theology  rather  than  philosophy  that  will  not  only  resolve  these  difficulties,  but  heal  the 
ideological wound of Christendom that is Murphy‘s concern. 
Like  Lindbeck,  Kathryn  Tanner  (Theories  of  Culture:  A  New  Agenda  for  Theology,  1997) 
believes that culture-theoretic concepts can be employed profitably in theology (p. x). Her work 
falls into the two parts indicated by her title: the first part provides a history of the idea of 
culture, an account of modern cultural anthropology, and a reconstruction of these ideas in the 
light of postmodern critiques; the second part uses the resulting postmodern view of culture as a 
basis for exploring some basic issues in Christian theology (p. 61). She finds Lindbeck‘s (and 
Milbank‘s) proposals indebted to modern concepts of culture and hence in need of reassessment. 
She notes that Lindbeck‘s rule theory of doctrine requires  rules that are insulated from the 
vicissitudes of history, and that postliberal appeal to Wittgenstein is problematic. I agree with 
many of Tanner‘s observations and conclusions, and will refer to some of them later, but we 
differ in mode and structure of argument. For reasons alluded to above I proceed by way of 
immanent critique, and for reasons that will emerge in the course of chapters 3 and 4 I am 
unwilling to base my critique on cultural theory, notwithstanding the undoubted advantage of 
several more decades of cultural-anthropological scholarship than were available to Lindbeck. 
The perspective that Tanner shares with Murphy, namely, that cultural theory and/or philosophy 
‗set the agenda‘ for theology is one of the points at issue in the post-Lindbeck conversation.6 
Paul Lakeland‘s concerns in Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age (1997) are 
similar to those of Tanner, but focus specifically on the ways in which postmodernity ‗informs the 
agenda for religion and theology‘ (p. ix). To this end he surveys the postmodern mood in popular 
culture  and  its  manifestations  in  critical  thought,  considers  the  interconnections  between 
postmodernity and religion, and offers ‗a theological apologetics for the postmodern world‘ (xiii-
xiv). Postliberals, he says, think that secular thought adulterates the gospel and that Christianity 
meets no other group on equal terms in open dialogue (43). Their fundamental motivation is to 
                                                       
6 This is not to deny that Tanner offers theological as well as cultural critique, or that she notes (as I do) that theology 
may have good reasons for ‗going along with‘ postmodern insights (e.g., p. 119). 8  INTRODUCTION 
‗stem and reverse the tide of theological liberalism‘ (65), and Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic model 
of the church suits the devolutionary and fragmented nature of the postmodern world (66). 
In his own proposal, Lakeland distinguishes between systematic and fundamental theologies. 
Systematic theology addresses ‗the clarity and consistency of the tradition‘s expression of its 
convictions‘ (82) in language ‗derived directly from revelation and the dependent narratives‘ 
(87). Such theology most closely approaches the postliberal claim that ‗the text absorbs the 
world‘ (85, 87). Fundamental theology is ‗quite a different enterprise, however‘ (87), which 
explicates ‗the plausibility and intellectual respectability of its worldview in categories which, 
while compatible with revelation, are not drawn from it‘ (82, 88).7 It mediates between tradition 
and  world  in  a  way  that favours  neither,  and is thus  a  correlational  theology  conceived  in 
Gadamerian  terms  (87-8).  For  Lakeland,  theological  engagement  with  the  world  is  to  be 
undertaken in fundamental, rather than systematic, theology (84, 85). 
Lakeland‘s proposal is problematic at several levels. I doubt that systematic and fundamental 
theology are separable to the extent his proposal requires, such that postliberal and correlational 
approaches can coexist as different departments in the same enterprise. How is fundamental 
theology ‗fundamental‘, or, as he prefers, ‗foundational‘ (87, 123n1)? It cannot be foundational 
for  systematics  without  contradicting  his  definition  of  that  discipline.  Again,  fundamental 
theology‘s task of representing the tradition to the world is in tension with the requirement that 
neither  tradition  nor  world  be  favoured  in  the  mediation.  Further,  Lakeland  approaches 
apologetic theology on the basis that ‗the fundamentals of Christian theology‘ are ‗the rhetorical 
background out of which the tradition encounters the world,‘ so that ‗theological statements are 
not  claims  about the  way  the  world  is,‘  but  claims  about  how  we  as  individuals and faith 
communities exist in it (91). Yet no religion is content to say ‗this is true for us.‘ Such problems 
make Lakeland‘s work less useful for this study than some others. 
David  G.  Kamitsuka  (Theology  and  Contemporary  Culture:  Liberation,  Postliberal  and 
Revisionary  Perspectives,  1999)  responds  to  the  unfruitful  debates  between  liberation, 
postliberal and revisionary theological movements in the 1990s. He identifies the core values of 
these  movements  as,  respectively,  solidarity  with  the  struggles  and  spiritualities  of  the 
oppressed, thick description of the habitable scriptural world which forms Christian communal 
character, and fully critical reflection in the public realm (pp. 3, 12). In his view, if theology is 
really to engage the contemporary situation, it needs to incorporate all three core values in a 
more  open  method  (p.  4),  which  he  pursues  by  means  of  non-foundationalist  apologetics 
(chapter 3) and a regulative-dialectical hermeneutic (chapter 4). Kamitsuka‘s approach is like 
mine insofar as he listens carefully to representatives of the various approaches and considers 
how  each  could  incorporate  the  others‘  values;  but  he  does  not  criticise  the  core  values 
themselves by asking how they are related to Jesus as the core of Christian faith. The result is an 
                                                       
7 Another point of distinction (raised specifically in the context of theology of religions) is that ‗while systematic 
theology necessarily proceeds on the assumptions of universality, it need never thematize these assumptions. But 
foundational theology, which is in the business of thematizing, cannot proceed on the unthematized assumptions of 
universality  that  are  proper  only  to  the  in-house  activity  of  the  systematician‘  (Lakeland  1997,  83).  I  do  not 
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insightful and sophisticated compromise which concludes with a mediation of methodological 
questions  using  as  criteria  the  core  values  with  which  he  began  (chapter  6).  I  agree  with 
Kamitsuka that all three movements offer genuine insights, but where he asks how each can 
integrate the others‘ core values, I interrogate the core values themselves. I also ask whether the 
arguments of Lindbeck and various others cohere with their own values, and whether in the end 
they lead to life in which those values are embodied. 
Shelia Greeve Davaney (2006) comments on Lindbeck in her introduction to historicism in the 
Guides to Theological Inquiry series, attending especially to those aspects of his proposal that 
are most relevant to her theme. Her understanding of his relation to historicism is similar to 
mine.8 By way of critique, she notes Lindbeck‘s view ‗that humans firmly reside within singular 
historical traditions, characterised by firm boundaries delineating insiders and outsiders, and 
structured by stable and unchanging cores that can be used to regulate the beliefs and practices 
of  a  tradition‘s adherents‘  (141).  Each of the  three  elements  in this  critique emerge  in  my 
enquiry through conversation with earlier writers. 
C. C. Pecknold (Transforming Postliberal Theology, 2005) sees in postliberal theology a vital 
and ongoing tradition of reflection. He wants to redirect postliberal thought along the path of 
what he calls ‗scriptural pragmatism‘, and in this sense offers to ‗transform‘ it. He promotes 
postliberal theology as a theology that serves the church conceived as a world-transforming 
practice responding to and furthering God‘s world-reparative action in Jesus mediated through 
the theosemiotics of scripture. Pecknold‘s description of postliberalism focusses on Lindbeck, 
with little mention of Hans Frei. He sees in Lindbeck ‗a new version of pragmatism‘ (13), or at 
least ‗implicitly pragmatic tendencies‘ that need ‗to be developed in an explicitly pragmatic 
way‘  (34).  He  finds  such  development  in  Augustine‘s  theosemiotics,  which  transform 
Lindbeck‘s intratextuality ‗into an outward movement that aims at an embodied replication of 
God‘s  work  of  repairing  the  world  where  it  has  been  broken‘  (59).  This  is  a  scriptural 
pragmatics—‘a programme of scriptural reasoning which follows a rule of love, a love that is 
known by its fruits‘ (59). Having set Lindbeck in an Augustinian context, Pecknold finds in 
Peter Ochs‘ work on C. S. Peirce‘s pragmatism a ‗logic of scripture‘ that ‗can help postliberals 
continue the work of reform‘ that Lindbeck began (62-3)—a reform aimed at repairing theology 
so that theology in turn can serve the church‘s calling to repair the world. 
Pecknold uses Augustine not only to develop Lindbeck‘s ‗intratextuality‘ into a transformative 
conversation with the world, but also to replace Lindbeck‘s ‗pretheological‘ cultural-linguistic 
theory with a semiotics rooted in incarnational and trinitarian theology. Despite these significant 
modifications, comments critical of Lindbeck are rare, apparently because Pecknold strongly 
identifies with Lindbeck‘s motivating concerns.9 Thus, Pecknold‘s reading of Lindbeck seems 
to  be  more  charitable  than  mine.  As  I  read  it,  Lindbeck‘s  argument  is  intentionally 
‗pretheological‘,10 carefully proceeds as such, and on this basis arrives at the comprehensiveness 
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9 For example, see Pecknold 2005, 34, 104, 108, 112, 116. 
10  The point is important to Lindbeck, who strongly reaffirmed it the Foreword to the German edition of  ND 
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of religious claims. But this same argument is motivated by theological and religious conviction 
(ND 10), so its destination does not cohere with its mode of travel. Where Pecknold charitably 
‗repairs‘ Lindbeck using Augustine‘s semiotics, I pursue the internal tensions of his argument 
until  they  yield  insight.  In  focussing  on  foundations  and  construction,  I  offer  a  different 
charity—that of carefully attending to Lindbeck‘s text, and heeding his advice that ‗motivations 
and  convictions…have  little  to  do  with  the  strength  of  arguments‘  (ibid.).  My  conclusion 
indicates that insight into foundations and construction may reshape our motivations. 
From its subtitle, Paul J. DeHart‘s The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal 
Theology  (2006)  appears  to  be  offering  graveclothes  rather  than  Pecknold‘s  therapeutic 
transformation, yet there is much more here than a prophecy of postliberalism‘s demise. DeHart 
does think postliberalism is in decline, but sees this not as the failure of a theological movement, 
but as the dispersal of a fog that has obscured what was really valuable in the work of Lindbeck 
and Frei (55). Like me, he notes that the heated debates over postliberalism in the 1980s and 
1990s left the deeper issues stubbornly elusive,11 and describes being motivated to write by a 
‗mixture of fascination and frustration‘ with this situation (xiv). Unlike me, DeHart deals with 
both Lindbeck and Frei at some length, introducing their work with a historical treatment of the 
sources of their thinking, the development of their thought in the course of their respective careers, 
the  debate  following  the  publication  of  ND,  and  the  subsequent  dissipation  of  postliberal 
momentum (chapter 1). He provides descriptive surveys of Lindbeck‘s and Frei‘s writing, drawing 
out  the  similarities  and  distinctive  elements  in  each  (chapters  2  &  3),  and  critically  engages 
important oppositions that structured their arguments (chapters 4 & 5). In conclusion (chapter 6), 
he suggests that the appropriate framework for understanding Frei and Lindbeck is not one of 
liberal/postliberal opposition, but one centred on witness, the people who are charged with it 
(Lindbeck‘s emphasis), and the object they attest (Frei‘s emphasis).12 
DeHart‘s interest throughout is in the nature and method of theology,13 and he goes to some 
trouble to identify the motivating dogmatic convictions of Lindbeck and Frei and the structural 
problems of the views of theology they espouse. He finds Lindbeck‘s work to be motivated by an 
ecclesiology of the people of witness (98), but flawed by his construction of ‗postliberal‘ theology 
in opposition to ‗liberal‘ theology (160-71) and by specification of theological faithfulness in 
terms of ‗intratextuality‘ over against ‗extratextual‘ translation (171-84). Frei‘s focus is on ‗the 
unique, personally concrete and scripturally rendered object of Christian witness: Jesus Christ‘ 
(142),  and  the  problematic  oppositions  in  his  work  concern  the  nature  of  theology  as  either 
dogmatic  description  or  apologetic  explanation  (217-25),  and  whether  correlation  between 
theological and non-theological discourses should occur in a systematic or an ‗ad hoc‘ manner 
(225-39). DeHart finds it more meaningful to ask how Lindbeck‘s work might fit into Frei‘s 
theological vision than to assume that Frei is ‗postliberal‘ in Lindbeck‘s sense. His proposal in the 
light of their work is that theology serves the ecclesial witness to Christ as that witness undergoes 
‗trial‘ through endurance, submission to judgement, and experimentation. 
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In preferring Frei to Lindbeck and placing theology at the service of an ecclesial witness that is 
fully engaged in the world, DeHart‘s conclusions are not so far from my own. Yet our treatments 
of  Lindbeck  differ  markedly.  Firstly,  I  refer  to  Hans  Frei  only  for  his  historical  work  on 
Schleiermacher and make no attempt to relate his work to that of Lindbeck. Secondly, I do not 
engage (or even define) postliberal theology as such, or analyse its problems. Thirdly, I do not try 
to discern the guiding motivation of Lindbeck‘s theological career so as to set ND in that context. 
Consequently, it may appear that my work, relative to DeHart‘s, lacks a sense of historical and 
contemporary context. I gratefully commend DeHart‘s book to those who seek such material.14 
As mentioned above, this enquiry will engage the arguments of Lindbeck and others largely in 
terms of the foundations they rely on and the constructions they present. Motivations and goals 
may explain why an argument takes a certain direction, but they tell us nothing about whether it 
does so successfully, i.e., so as to progress to a desired destination rather than into a cul-de-sac 
or some unintended outcome. In these terms, I find DeHart‘s discussion too much oriented to 
motives and goals: his own concern for the nature of theology, and Lindbeck‘s ecclesiological 
and Frei‘s Christological interests. The faulty oppositions he finds in Lindbeck—postliberal 
theology vs liberal theology and intratextual faithfulness vs extratextual translation—play little 
part in my inquiry, because both Lindbeck and I see them as the outworking of more basic 
issues,  and  because  they  appear  only  in  the  last  chapter  of  ND,  which  Lindbeck  calls  ‗an 
addendum to the main argument‘.15 As will become apparent in what follows, reading ND in 
terms of ‗the nature of theology‘ already reflects the terms of liberal polemic in the ensuing 
controversy,16  notwithstanding  that  DeHart  wants  to  recover  what  he  sees  as  Frei‘s  and 
Lindbeck‘s abiding strengths. I read and criticise ND as a treatise on the nature of doctrine. It 
has implications for theology, certainly, as does my critique, but this is a subsidiary motif rather 
than the main theme. 
Introducing the 25
th Anniversary Edition of ND17, Bruce Marshall summarised twenty five years 
of interpretation and criticism under three headings: 
Epistemically, Lindbeck‘s theology amounts to a biblical or ecclesial ―fideism‖ that fails to seek 
rational justification for Christian beliefs in an adequate way and may even be hostile to 
the good of created reason itself. 
                                                       
14 See also the biographical note comprising section II of Bruce Marshall‘s ‗Introduction‘ to ND25 (ix-xii). I live in 
Perth, Western Australia—about as far from New Haven, Connecticut USA as it is possible to be on this earth. 
Coverage of contextual detail is better left to those who know the context at first hand. 
15 ND 112. This chapter, titled ‗Towards a Postliberal Theology‘ discusses ‗the implications for theological method 
of  a  cultural-linguistic  approach  to  religion‘  (in  loc.).  For  Lindbeck,  then,  the  main  argument  of  ND  implies 
‗postliberal theology‘ and its associated ‗intratextuality‘. If these are problematic (as DeHart and I agree), then, as 
implications of an earlier argument, they are not the basic problem. If the earlier argument is faulty (as I maintain), its 
implications may be modified (or even dissolved) in the critique. 
16 DeHart‘s focus on the liberal/postliberal polemic is indicated by his definition of ‗postliberalism‘, which makes no 
reference to the conservative approaches with which Lindbeck engaged in ND (DeHart 2006, 1-2). This makes sense 
in  the  context  of  DeHart‘s  preference  for  Frei  over  Lindbeck,  but  detracts  from  Lindbeck‘s  intention,  and 
marginalises half of the substantive argument in ND. 
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Lindbeck counsels a social and political withdrawal of the church into a self-enclosed ghetto, 
isolated from the world. His theology is ―sectarian‖ in a bad sense, perhaps to the point of 
irresponsibility. 
Lindbeck is soft on truth, giving away too much to postmodern relativism and scepticism and 
thereby failing to account for the universality and objectivity of truth, in particular the 
truth of Christian doctrine.18 
Marshall finds all three lines of critique mistaken: acknowledgement that Christianity (and 
indeed any religion) has its own ultimate standards of truth neither results in ―fideism‖ (xiv) nor 
implies any deprecation of human reason (xvi); concerns about ‗ghettoisation‘ are based on a 
non sequitur (xvi); and perceptions of ‗softness on truth‘ arise from a ‗terminological infelicity‘ 
in Lindbeck‘s text that has since been clarified (xvii). From what follows, it will be evident that 
I agree entirely with these comments. My own engagement with Lindbeck relates to the first and 
third  of  Marshall‘s  headings.  Under  the  first,  I  am  less  concerned  with  ―fideism‖  (which 
Lindbeck already addressed sufficiently in  ND) than with the basis and implications of the 
comprehensiveness that  Lindbeck  rightly  sees  as intrinsic to  Christian  (and  other  religious) 
claims. Under the third, the important issue is not any alleged ‗softness‘ in Lindbeck‘s account 
of truth, but rather its inappropriate ‗hardness‘ or rigidity in two specific areas: the possibility of 
doctrinal constancy and the distinction between first-order and second-order discourse. 
Having now introduced the enquiry in terms of its origins, style, organisation and conclusions, 
and sketched its relation to some other recent works that engage with Lindbeck‘s seminal book, 
it is time to hear Lindbeck himself on what it means for humans to speak of God. 
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LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION 
Lindbeck‘s account of the nature of doctrine, or, as his subtitle has it, his vision of ‗religion and 
theology in a postliberal age‘ is a brief work, though dense and complex. To aid understanding, 
this chapter presents it in various ways, involving some repetition. The first main section is an 
overview. It describes Lindbeck‘s goals and the key ideas he drew on in writing ND, sets out the 
main  elements  of his  constructive  proposal and  how  they  operate to achieve  his  aims,  and 
comments  on  the  overall  structure  of  the  work.  The  second  section  presents  in  detail  the 
argument  in  the  first  half  of  ND  (for reasons that will become  clear,  the  remainder  of  the 
argument is dealt with later). A third section deals with the pivotal technical excursus in which 
Lindbeck clarifies the basic principles of his proposal and the inner logic of his polemics against 
what he sees as the main alternatives to it.  Finally, the polemic against liberal theology is 
followed  in  some  detail  in  preparation  for  the  following  chapter,  which  constructs  a 
conversation between Lindbeck and some liberal scholars on the topic of cultural theory. 
2.1  LINDBECK‘S PROPOSAL IN OUTLINE 
2.1.1  Overview: Lindbeck’s Goals and Conceptual Tools 
When ND appeared in 1984 it quickly became a defining document of what has become known as 
‗postliberal‘ theology. Indeed, the adoption of ‗postliberal‘ as the standard descriptive term for this 
theological stream arose largely from its use in the subtitle and argument of Lindbeck‘s book. Not 
that all theologians who could be called ‗postliberal‘ necessarily claim the appellation—far from 
it—but ND has become an important conversation partner for theologians concerned with the 
relation of religion and theology to contemporary philosophy and popular culture. 
The interest generated by ND arose from its use of then-contemporary intellectual tools to forge a 
significant  and  vigorous  vision  of  the  Christian  church  and  its  theology,  as  well  as  from 
Lindbeck‘s reputation as a serious and careful ecumenical theologian. But, on Lindbeck‘s account, 
ND had its genesis not in any overarching concern to forge new links between theology and 
philosophy, but in a desire to make sense of his own experience in ecumenical discussions.1 
Lindbeck observed that these discussions frequently uncovered large areas of inter-confessional 
doctrinal agreement, apparently without requiring modification, let alone retraction, of doctrinal 
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Kaufman, in his review of ND, saw Lindbeck‘s ‗clear exposition of the theological significance of the cultural-
linguistic  conception  of  religion‘  as  assuring  ‗the  lasting  significance  of  his  book.‘  Yet,  he  noted,  ‗one  might 
wish…that he had not been so intent to put his important insight exclusively into the service of the theologically 
conservative enterprise of ecumenical debate…‘ (Kaufman 1985, 241). This comment may say more about Kaufman 
than it does about Lindbeck. As will become clear in this study, Lindbeck‘s proposals have had, and can still have, 
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standards which had originally functioned as symbols of self-definition, distinction and division 
(ND 15). If this can be so, argued Lindbeck, it would seem that doctrine is not what we thought it 
was. What account of the nature and function of doctrine will be adequate to these phenomena? 
Lindbeck develops his answer to this question by applying to religion conceptual tools from the 
philosophy of science, philosophy of language and social anthropology. He begins by emphasising 
that cultures and languages function together as given conceptual and behavioural frameworks 
which shape the entirety of life and thought. That is, they function as a priori idioms in terms of 
which reality is construed and life is lived (ND 18). There is therefore no non-situated neutral 
vantage  point  available  to  humans  from  which  differing  cultural  construals  of  reality  can  be 
objectively compared. Lindbeck‘s exposition of the social construction of knowledge is essentially 
that of Thomas Kuhn, and significant debts to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (philosophy of 
language) and Clifford Geertz (social anthropology) are also acknowledged.2 
Lindbeck views religion as a ‗cultural-linguistic framework‘. That is, it provides the practices 
and conceptual categories through which its adherents construct reality. As with cultures and 
(especially) languages, the primary function of a religion is not to provide an array of beliefs or 
a symbolism for expressing basic attitudes, though it may do both of these. Rather, it is similar 
to an idiom that makes possible the description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the 
experiencing  of inner  attitudes,  feelings  and sentiments.  Like  a  culture  or  language,  it  is a 
communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than being primarily 
a manifestation of those subjectivities (ND 33, 47-8). 
For Lindbeck, Christian identity is formed within the Christian cultural-linguistic community, 
which construes the Bible as a complete semiotic system, projecting a world which frames the 
believing community‘s understanding of and interaction with reality. The biblical text is read for 
the  meanings  immanent  within  it,  and  these  become  the  hermeneutical  framework  for 
understanding reality. The communal hermeneutic is ‗intratextual‘, in that normative meanings 
are  derived  wholly  within  the  authoritative  text,  and  unidirectional,  in  that  the  community 
redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extra-
biblical categories.3 Lindbeck employs the metaphor of absorption: ‗the biblical world absorbs 
all other worlds‘.4 
                                                       
2 Lindbeck (ND 28 n28) notes that much of his understanding of ‗what is theologically important in Wittgenstein‘ has 
come through the work of Paul Holmer. Unfortunately, it would appear that Holmer‘s reading of Wittgenstein has 
missed some crucial emphases (see sub-section 5.3.1 Learning from Wittgenstein, commencing on p. 181 below). For 
Lindbeck‘s use of Geertz, see ND 37, 115. Some criticisms of Geertz, and of Lindbeck‘s adoption of his theory of 
cultures, are outlined below in chapter 3 (see 3.2.2 Tradition, Culture and Canon commencing on p. 66). 
3  ND  116-7.  Lindbeck  explicitly  contrasts  the  intratextual  reading  of  scripture  with  the  intertextual  approach 
employed in deconstruction. He notes that ‗for the deconstructionists there is no single privileged idiom, text, or text-
constituted world…they treat all writings as a single whole: all texts are, so to speak, mutually interpreting.‘ By 
contrast,  in  ‗an  intratextual  religious  or  theological  reading…there  is…a  privileged  interpretive  direction  from 
whatever counts as holy writ to everything else.‘ (p. 136 n5) 
4 This precise phrase is not from  ND but may be found in a number of Lindbeck‘s publications, most recently 
Lindbeck 1996a and 1996b. Close conceptual and verbal parallels occur at various points in ND. See pp. 80-1 on the 
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The  community‘s  expression  of  the  world  projected  by  the  Bible  is  a  ‗socially-embodied 
hermeneutic‘ reflecting its reading of the Bible as a single, interglossing, narrative whole. The 
importance of narrative as a way of understanding the Bible is that narrative renders the characters 
of unsubstitutable personal and communal agents, especially God, Jesus, Israel and the church. 
The narrative is open-ended and invitational, continually inviting the reading community to enter 
the story and make it its own, thus continuing the biblical narrative in its own story. 
The references to ‗the biblical world‘ and the singleness of the biblical narrative should not be 
taken as implying uniformity of historical expression, or even as requiring movement towards it. 
Rather, Lindbeck uses the linguistic metaphor as a way of imagining how one religion (e.g., 
Christianity) can be so fruitfully and perplexingly diverse, and yet be recognisably one religion. 
[Languages and religions, and to a lesser extent cultures,] are the lenses through which 
human  beings  see  and  respond  to  their  changing  worlds,  or  the  media  in  which  they 
formulate their descriptions. The world and its descriptions  may  vary enormously even 
while the lenses or media remain the same. Or, to change the simile, just as genetic codes or 
computer programs may remain identical even while producing startling different products 
depending on input and situation, so also with the basic grammars of cultures, languages 
and religions. They remain while the products change.5 
Thus, in widely differing circumstances, the particular embodiments of various communities‘ 
readings of the same scriptures may (and in fact do) vary enormously. 
Within this embodied hermeneutic, Lindbeck sees doctrine as having a regulative, rather than an 
assertive, function. That is, it functions as the ‗grammar‘ of the community‘s faith, providing a 
pattern for the expression of its life and thought, rather than defining in advance how to act or 
what to think. Similarly, theology, rather than defining and asserting foundational truths on 
which communal belief and practice are to be built, explicates and clarifies the rules underlying 
those beliefs and practices with a view to furthering their coherence and their faithfulness to the 
biblical world. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for all [scriptural religions] is the degree to which descriptions correspond to the semiotic universe paradigmatically 
encoded in holy writ.‘ On the canonical writings of religious communities, see p. 117: ‗For those who are steeped in 
them, no world is more real than the ones they create. A scriptural world is thus able to absorb the universe. It 
supplies the interpretive framework within which believers seek to live their lives and understand reality.‘ Or again, 
‗It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text‘ (p. 118). 
5 ND 83. Here, as often, Lindbeck borrows Calvin‘s metaphor of the Bible as eye glasses, taking it in much the same 
sense as his own ‗absorption‘ metaphor. He makes the equation explicit in a later article: ‗Scripture, in Calvin‘s phrase, 
could serve as the spectacles, the lens, through which faith views all reality; and, to change the figure, the world of the 
reader could be absorbed into the biblical  world‘  (Lindbeck 1988, 14). In fact, the theological import of  Calvin‘s 
spectacles  differs  from  that  of  Lindbeck‘s  sponge.  Lindbeck‘s  point  concerns  the  interpretation  of  reality  and  the 
construction of a worldview, but Calvin‘s point in Institutes I.6.1 is more focused. He says that Scripture clearly shows 
us the true God, thus bringing clarity and focus to the confused impressions of Deity that our minds otherwise form 
based on God‘s works of creation. He wishes to show that Scripture is needed so that we may reliably distinguish the 
true God from ‗the whole herd of fictitious gods‘, and avoid ‗wandering up and down, as in a labyrinth, in search of 
some doubtful deity‘. That is, Calvin‘s focus is on the construction of God (i.e., the avoidance of idolatry) rather than the 
construction of reality in general. At ND 90 n23 Lindbeck notes that Calvin‘s metaphor was ‗employed…with specific 
reference to Scripture‘, but the application concerning idolatry is probably the more important difference.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    16 
By proposing a theory of religion in which the primary metaphor is religion-as-language, with 
doctrine functioning as grammar, Lindbeck makes considerable progress towards his inclusive 
ecumenical  goals.  Indeed,  he  expands  his  horizon  beyond  Christian  ecumenism  to  include 
Islam, Judaism and, to a lesser extent, Hinduism as further examples of scriptural religions 
seeking to embody world-projecting texts. 
Lindbeck‘s vision is characteristically generous towards those who, in their differing religious 
traditions, think differently. His theory respects the integrity of each tradition by allowing that 
particular aspects of each are not easily translatable or comparable with ‗corresponding‘ aspects of 
the others. For some terms or practices there may well be no correspondence. For example, how 
will a Christian understand the Buddhist concept of compassion? How will a Muslim understand 
the Christian affirmation of the suffering love of God? Any particular aspect of a religion has its 
‗true‘ meaning only in relation to the religious tradition as a whole, and this means not only its 
teaching, but also its living, communal practice through history. Thus, in general, Lindbeck sees 
different religious traditions as being incommensurable. This does not mean that they cannot be 
compared, but it does mean that one should be able to speak the language fluently, or understand 
the religion from within, before assuming any confidence in making comparisons. 
But how exactly does Lindbeck‘s regulative theory explain the phenomenon of reconciliation 
without capitulation that prompted his inquiry? The rule theory of doctrine locates the doctrinally 
significant  aspect  of  a  religion  in  its  categorial  framework,  rather  than  in  propositions  to  be 
affirmed, or in inner experiences. For Christianity, ‗the framework is supplied by the biblical 
narratives interrelated in certain specified ways‘ (ND 80). Continuing the linguistic analogy, the 
vocabulary  of  the  faith  consists  of  the  symbols,  concepts,  rites,  injunctions,  and  stories  that 
comprise its concrete practice. In practice, these are highly variable, but the ‗lexical core‘ may be 
located in the Christian Scriptures, together with certain postbiblical traditions. In relation to this 
vocabulary, Lindbeck sees doctrine functioning in three different ways. It can function lexically in 
helping to determine the Christian vocabulary by delimiting the canon and relating it to other 
sources of authority; it can function syntactically in guiding the use of this material in construing 
world, community and self; and it may also function semantically in defining the referents of 
vocabulary terms.6 Lindbeck regards all three functions as ‗grammatical‘. 
It is important to recognise that when Lindbeck proposes that doctrines function grammatically, 
that is, as rules, he is not necessarily (and perhaps not even usually) referring to those statements 
of faith that are normally taken to be doctrines. While some doctrines, such as the Reformers‘ 
sola gratia or sola fide, are ‗explicit statements of general regulative principles‘, most doctrines 
are not actually rules but rather ‗exemplary instantiations or paradigms of the application of 
rules.‘  Having  embarked  upon  a  rule  theory  of  doctrine,  according  to  which it  is  only  the 
regulative or grammatical use of a ‗doctrine‘ which should be accorded the binding status of a 
communal norm (ND 80, 96, 106), Lindbeck goes on to indicate that most ‗doctrines‘ are not 
                                                       
6 ND 81. Lindbeck offers the ‗doctrine‘ that Jesus is the Messiah as an illustrative example. It ‗functions lexically as 
the warrant for adding the New Testament literature to the canon, syntactically as a hermeneutical rule that Jesus 
Christ be interpreted as the fulfilment of the Old Testament promises (and the Old Testament as pointing toward 
him), and semantically as a rule regarding the referring use of such titles as ―Messiah.‖ ‘   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    17 
rules at all. Rather, rules are most often implicit rather than explicit in doctrines, and we need to 
go behind the doctrines to uncover the rules which were followed in their formation. 
It is to these rules alone that Lindbeck will allow normative force,7 and it is to the uncovering of 
these implicit rules in the course of ecumenical discussions that Lindbeck attributes the surprising 
agreements which those discussions repeatedly bring forth, even in the face of unchanged 
‗doctrinal‘ positions.8 For him, such agreements consist precisely in the conscious or unconscious 
treatment of doctrinal statements as really different, socio-historically conditioned instantiations of 
underlying rules which are discovered to be really the same. In this light, ecumenical agreement 
over ‗doctrine‘ is less an agreement over particular doctrines, than over the ways in which the core 
traditions of the Christian church ought to be interpreted. That is, the fact of ecumenical doctrinal 
agreement arises from underlying agreements in respect of (i) the content and ‗deep grammar‘ of 
the core traditions of the church, and (ii) the range of ways in which those traditions can now be 
faithfully interpreted. In these terms, Lindbeck‘s ‗rules‘ constitute the ‗deep grammar‘ of the 
gospel, and as such they define operating principles according to which doctrines can faithfully 
develop. They are enduring principles that guide, rather than define in advance, the permissible 
construals of the Scriptures and early tradition in ever changing circumstances. 
These, then, are the main conceptual ingredients of Lindbeck‘s argument. We will now consider 
its structural aspects before embarking on a more detailed examination. 
2.1.2  A Comment on Structure 
In a polite (if often vigorous) conversation, one must listen to one speaker at a time, and it may be 
that subsequent speakers will respond only to that part of the first speaker‘s discourse that most 
interests them. In this chapter I take advantage of my self-appointed role as commentator on an 
overheard conversation by presenting, along with Lindbeck‘s introduction, only that part of his 
proposal that most concerns one group of respondents. Consideration of the remainder is deferred 
to a later chapter. While this may appear to be less than fair to Lindbeck (in that it might work 
against appreciation of his work as a whole), the division arises fairly naturally in Lindbeck‘s text. 
ND is laid out in six chapters, the first being a general introduction in which Lindbeck outlines 
the origins, content, and context of his proposal. At the other end, his final chapter is less a 
conclusion to the argument than an overview of what theology‘s role would be (and should be) 
if the preceding account of religion and doctrine were accepted. The intervening four chapters 
fall into two groups of two, and it is worth considering for a moment the various grounds on 
which this division may be made, and the relations between them. Lindbeck describes chapters 
two and three as presenting first nontheological and then theological (the order turns out to be 
                                                       
7 ND 19, 81, 94-6, 107. See especially the statements on pp. 95-6: The classic creedal terminology and concepts may 
be absent from new formulations, ‗but if the same rules that guided the formation of the original paradigms are 
operative in the construction of the new formulations, they express one and the same doctrine‘ (95). ‗…though the 
ancient formulations may have continuing value, they do not on the basis of rule theory have doctrinal authority. That 
authority belongs rather to the rules they instantiate‘ (96). 
8 Lindbeck gives examples of such agreements in detailed notes (ND 26 n1, n2).   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    18 
significant9) arguments for the viability (and perhaps superiority) of his proposa l vis-à-vis ‗one 
of the currently influential theological theories of religion‘ (ND 11). In these chapters the scope 
of the argument is wide, and is concerned with the nature of religions: how should religions, as 
human phenomena, be described and analysed? What kinds of things are they? What sense do 
they have and how is this sense communicated? How should one view the relations between 
them and the claims they make? These questions are considered ‗nontheologically‘ in chapter 
two, and then in chapter three Lindbeck asks whether the answers proposed in chapter two are 
such  that  Christianity  can  make  theological  use  of  them.  Finding  that  he  can  answer  this 
question affirmatively, he shifts his focus from religions (now seen as socio-cultural wholes) to 
the  doctrines  they  (and  Christianity  in  particular)  espouse.  This  shift  turns  on  Lindbeck‘s 
understanding of the relation between religions and their doctrines, which he lays out in an 
‗Excursus on Religion and Truth‘ at the end of his third chapter (ND 63-9). 
Thus, at the beginning of chapter four, the scope of the discussion contracts from interreligious 
to intrareligious concerns (ND 47, 69). But within this more specific focus we find that the 
fourth and fifth chapters exhibit the same first-nontheological-then-theological ordering that 
applies in the second and third.10 Chapter four sets out Lindbeck‘s proposal that the function of 
doctrine is essentially regulative rather than expressive or propositional, while the fifth chapter 
examines  the  application  of  this  proposal  to  three  specific  doctrinal  loci—christology, 
mariology  and  infallibility.  As  in  chapters  two  and  three,  the  later  chapter  takes  up  the 
theoretical proposal offered nontheologically in the earlier, and asks the same basic question: is 
this theory available to us (i.e., us Christians)? Does it, firstly, acknowledge the meaningfulness 
of what we traditionally say in our religion (chapter three) or in our doctrine (chapter five) and, 
secondly, provide a way in which we can imagine interreligious or ecumenical dialogue being 
fruitful in terms of both agreement and faithfulness? 
I can now offer a rationale for the way in which I present Lindbeck‘s text and the ensuing 
‗conversation‘.  As  indicated  above,  the  first  part  of  ND  (after  the  introductory  chapter)  is 
concerned largely with phenomenological questions about religion, or what might be called 
philosophy of religion. But the general question of the nature of religion is vitally important for 
only one of Lindbeck‘s two main groups of opponents, namely, those holding what he calls an 
‗experiential-expressive‘ view of religion.11 This being so, it is hardly surprising that Lindbeck‘s 
experiential-expressivist respondents, while not ignoring other aspects of the book, have taken 
particular exception to this part. Moreover, Lindbeck‘s argument in this first part of his text 
produces, as an important by-product, the judgement (repeated several times in the text) that the 
                                                       
9 Lindbeck‘s distinction between nontheological and theological argument is important and is mentioned on a number 
of occasions in ND. See especially his introductory remarks to chapters two and three (ND 30-1, 46-7). It is also 
important in my analysis of Lindbeck‘s argument and of the responses that are the subject of the material in the 
following two chapters of this work. 
10 While Lindbeck says at one point (ND 47) that the fourth chapter ‗continues the discussion of theological issues‘ 
begun in chapter three, in fact Christianity and its theology appear in chapter four neither as modes of argument, nor 
as premises from which to proceed, but as sources of examples that illustrate an otherwise nontheological argument. 
That is, the argument of the fourth chapter is in Lindbeck‘s terms rather more ‗nontheological‘ than ‗theological‘. 
11 Lindbeck‘s descriptions of the major rivals to his own proposal will be discussed shortly.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    19 
experiential-expressive view can be dismissed from consideration in the second part, in which 
doctrine,  rather  than  religion,  is  the  phenomenon  of  interest. There  the  discussion  revolves 
around whether and in what way doctrines concern reality, and this is naturally the part of 
Lindbeck‘s argument that causes most concern among the other main group of respondents, 
those holding a ‗cognitive‘ or ‗propositional‘ view of religion. 
To  summarise,  ND  consists  of  an  introduction  (chapter  one),  two  major  substantive  parts 
(chapters  two  to  five),  and  an  addendum  (chapter  six).12  Each substantive part  explores a 
metaphor, beginning with a ‗nontheological‘ presentation of Lindbeck‘s proposal in comparison 
with one major rival (while not entirely forgetting the other), and proceeding to an assessment 
of the proposal‘s suitability for use in Christian theology, and especially ecumenical theology. 
The first part develops the overarching metaphor of religion-as-culture, the main opponent holds 
an experiential-expressive view of religion, and theological suitability is assessed in relation to 
questions in the theology of religions. In the second part, the focus moves to the more specific 
metaphor of doctrine-as-grammar, the main opponent has a propositional view of doctrine, and 
theological  suitability  is  assessed  in  relation  to  the  needs  (and  observed  outcomes)  of 
ecumenical  dialogue  and  doctrinal  rapprochement.13  It may be objected that this structural 
outline is too neat. Lindbeck‘s text is a complex whole with many subtleties, and rarely focuses 
on one aspect of the argument, or one opponent, to the exclusion of others. Yet the structure has 
been read largely from Lindbeck‘s own connective comments, as well as from his substantive 
arguments, and in this sense arises from the text.14 I hope that, in spite of this analysis (and 
perhaps partly because of it), the  following description remains sufficiently sensitive to the 
interconnections and the wholeness of Lindbeck‘s work. 
2.2  RELIGION AS CULTURE: THE FIRST PART OF LINDBECK‘S PROPOSAL 
2.2.1  Theory, Ecumenism, and Culture: The Proposal in Context 
In  the  first  chapter  of  ND,  Lindbeck  sets  his  proposal  in  context  with  respect  to  ‗theory, 
ecumenism and culture‘, if not quite in that order. Section I, ‗The Ecumenical Matrix‘ (ND 15-
9) presents not only the ecumenical but also the basic theoretical framework of the inquiry. 
                                                       
12 The term ‗addendum‘ is Lindbeck‘s. See ND 112. 
13 The name ‗cultural-linguistic‘ might suggest taking the first part of Lindbeck‘s proposal as the cultural element and 
the second part as the linguistic, but the double-barrelled name is not used in this way. It is used in the absence of a 
single term that would adequately connote the structures of meaning that permeate human existence. Lindbeck is very 
aware that these structures are not simply linguistic, but include socio-cultural institutions, habits, practices, rituals 
and customs. At the same time, it is important to Lindbeck‘s proposal that the functions of some elements in this 
complex  can  be  distinguished  and  clarified  by  analogy  with  language:  some  function  as  grammar,  some  as 
vocabulary, some as lexicon, some as assertion, etc. Application of the labels ‗cultural‘ and ‗linguistic‘ to the two 
parts of Lindbeck‘s proposal might obscure the appropriateness of ‗cultural-linguistic‘ as the name of Lindbeck‘s 
single controlling metaphor. To the extent that two metaphors may be identified corresponding to the two parts of 
Lindbeck‘s argument, these would be, firstly, ‗religion as culture‘ (or, more strictly if more clumsily, ‗religion as 
cultural-linguistic phenomenon‘), and secondly, ‗doctrine as grammar‘ (understanding the corresponding ‗language‘ 
to be a religion taken as a whole). 
14 An exception among Lindbeck‘s connective comments is noted at n10 above.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    20 
Section II, ‗The Psychosocial Context‘ (ND 19-25) takes up the cultural context in terms of the 
psychosocial reasons for the ascendancy of experiential-expressivism at the time of writing. 
In section I, with respect to ecumenism Lindbeck notes the strange conjunction of ‗constancy 
and change, unity and diversity‘ that provoked his inquiry—‘once we disagreed; now we agree; 
yet none of us have changed our minds‘.15 Such reports are often greeted with scepticism, yet 
Lindbeck objects, as one who knows this puzzling phenomenon at first hand, that if reality 
seems unintelligible then we should not discard it, but seek better ways of understanding it. We 
should admit that it is not reality that is inadequate, but our theories concerning it (ND 15-6).16 
Concerning the theoretical context, Lindbeck divides the currently available theories into three 
main  types:  cognitive  (also  called  propositional)  approaches,  usually  associated  with 
traditionalist or biblicist orthodoxies, in which doctrines are propositional truth claims  about 
objective  realities;  experiential -expressive  approaches  in  which  doctrines  symbolise  inner 
feelings, attitudes or existential orientations (an approach typical of theological liberalism); and 
a hybrid approach that attempts to combine the emphases o f the first two. None of these can 
satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of ‗doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation‘ (ND 16) 
with which Lindbeck is concerned. The first two approaches simply deny the possibility. For the 
propositionalist, propositions are always what they once were—if they were once opposed, they 
must  always  be  so.17  For the experiential -expressivist, by contrast, the whole problem is 
vacuous, since religious agreement or disagreement really occurs at the level of the underlying 
experience rather than at the level of its symbolic expression which is in any case intrinsically 
highly variable.18 Theories of the third type appear to offer greater subtlety and flexibility but 
they have difficulty with coherence, and Lindbeck finds them too  complex and lacking in 
                                                       
15 ‗Dialogue members…say they have been compelled by the evidence, sometimes against their earlier inclinations, 
to conclude that positions that were once really opposed are now really reconcilable, even though these positions 
remain in a significant sense identical to what they were before‘ (ND 15). 
16 Where, as in this chapter, I describe a single work at some length, I have appended to each paragraph a reference to 
the range of pages that the paragraph surveys. These references are in addition to references for specific passages and 
quotations. 
17 ‗Agreement can be reached only if one or both sides abandon their earlier positions. Thus…doctrinal reconciliation 
without capitulation is impossible because there is no significant sense in which the meaning of a doctrine can change 
while remaining the same‘ (ND 16-7). 
18 ‗[Doctrines] are not crucial for religious agreement or disagreement, because these are constituted by harmony or 
conflict in underlying feelings, attitudes, existential orientations, or practices, rather than by what happens on the 
level of symbolic (including doctrinal) objectifications.‘ (ND 17) 
At ND 16-7 Lindbeck appears to neatly balance his comments on the conceptual shortcomings of the two main 
approaches:  faced  with  simultaneous  constancy  and  change,  propositionalism  denies  change,  while  experiential-
expressivism denies constancy. But the discussion and his later argument reveals a  more subtle—and more far-
reaching—distinction. Propositionalism sees the paradox but takes it as a simple contradiction and forces a choice: 
doctrines may be constant, or they may change, but not both at once. Experiential-expressivism may be more inclined 
than propositionalism to see doctrines as highly variable, but the crucial point is that, on this view, doctrines are not 
really religiously important, and the ‗paradox‘ of simultaneous constancy and change is not so much resolved as 
dissolved. In short, Lindbeck finds that propositionalism takes doctrine seriously while experiential-expressivism 
does not. As will become clear, this distinction is important for Lindbeck‘s own attitude to each of these alternatives.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    21 
criteria for doctrinal faithfulness.19 He would prefer an alternative in which concurrent doctrinal 
constancy and change are rendered intelligible without undue complexity (ND 16-7). 
Of course, Lindbeck wrote ND in order to propose just such an alternative, and this is the 
‗cultural-linguistic‘  approach  outlined  above.  This  approach  finds  the  essential  function  of 
doctrines  in  their  use,  not  as  expressive  symbols,  nor  as  truth  claims,  but  as  ‗communally 
authoritative  rules  of  discourse,  attitude  and  action.‘20  Lindbeck  finds  that  his  regulative 
approach to doctrine ‗has no difficulty in explaining the possibility of reconciliation without 
capitulation‘ (ND 18). The basis of this facility is the clear distinction Lindbeck draws between 
rules and the circumstances in which they are applied. He views the phenomenon that prompted 
his inquiry as arising from the application of invariant rules in varying circumstances.21 While 
the idea of doctrines as rules is hardly novel, as the notion of  regulae fidei reminds us, what is 
new in Lindbeck‘s proposal is the idea that the specifically doctrinal function of statements is 
entirely regulative.22 
Lindbeck commences section II with a programmatic observation concerning the current status 
of the three rival approaches.23 For a long time now, propositionalism has been on the defensive 
and  experiential-expressivism  has  been  dominant.  Cultural -linguistic  approaches,  though 
relatively new, are increasingly common in nontheological religious studies but general ly 
neglected by ‗those who are religiously interested in religion‘ (ND 19). What are the cultural 
factors that have encouraged the development of this situation? Well, the sheer novelty of the 
cultural-linguistic  approach  tells  against  it  to  some  extent,  and  the  success  of  experiential-
expressivism in supplanting ‗the earlier regnant cognitive-propositional views‘ (ND 20) partly 
explains the inertia of what has become an academic orthodoxy. But these factors are merely 
‗accidental‘. There are also systemic factors at work (ND 19-21). 
These factors include, firstly, ‗that ―deobjectification‖ of religion and doctrine which, from the 
perspective of the sociology of knowledge, is an inescapable consequence of the individualism, 
                                                       
19 For more details, see 5.2.1 Propositionalism and the ‘Third Approach’ commencing on p. 159 below. 
20 ND 18. Lindbeck‘s reference to the function of doctrine is significant. Propositionalism and expressivism tend to 
speak of statements as doctrines. In Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic view, doctrine does not name a kind of statement, 
but  a  particular  way  in  which  a  statement  may  be  used.  This  distinction becomes important  later,  especially  in 
Lindbeck‘s critique of propositionalism. 
21  ‗Rules,  unlike  propositions or expressive  symbols,  retain  an  invariant  meaning  under  changing  conditions of 
compatibility and conflict‘ (ND 18). This proposal is examined in detail in chapter 5 below. 
22 ND 17-20. Critics sometimes forget that Lindbeck is not saying that statements that make truth claims or fruitfully 
symbolise religious experience may not also function doctrinally. What he is saying is that these other functions are 
not doctrinal functions. Thus, although Lindbeck has been accused of emptying doctrinal statements of any reference 
to divine reality, he does not see himself as emptying statements of anything at all. Rather, he is in a sense wanting to 
target more precisely the meaning of the word ‗doctrine‘. This is apparent in his contention that ‗the Nicaenum in its 
role as a communal doctrine does not make first-order truth claims‘ (ND 19). Critics too easily neglect the qualifying 
phrase in this statement. Lindbeck does not say ‗the Nicaenum does not make first-order truth claims‘. 
23 That is, the propositional, the experiential-expressive, and the cultural-linguistic. Following Lindbeck, we will 
usually subsume the ‗hybrid‘ approaches mentioned above under either the propositional or experiential-expressive 
approach.  The  problems  of  this  tactic  are  discussed  below  in  chapter  5.  See  5.2  Lindbeck’s  Engagement  with 
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rapid  change,  and  religious  pluralism  of  modern  societies‘  (ND  21).  This  situation  makes  it 
difficult for people to see religion either in propositional terms (acceptance of objectively and 
immutably true propositions) or in terms which privilege the communal over the individual, as in a 
cultural-linguistic approach. But experiential-expressivism suits perfectly the commodification of 
religion in the religious smorgasbord of contemporary western societies, for it views religions as 
‗multiple  suppliers  of  different  forms  of  a  single  commodity  needed  for  transcendent  self-
expression  and  self-realization‘  (ND  22).  Secondly,  experiential-expressive  approaches  seem 
particularly well suited to inter-religious dialogue, in that they assume a common core experience 
of the Ultimate, and thus confer equal status on all participants. By contrast, a cultural-linguistic 
outlook privileges particularity, which may facilitate discussion within a single religion, but not 
between religions. Thirdly, since languages and cultures do not make truth claims, are relative to 
times and places, and are very much features of this-worldly existence, it is difficult to think of 
them  as  analogues  for  putatively  transcendent  religions.  Propositional  approaches  with  their 
transcendent truths, and experiential-expressive approaches with their transcendent inner-human 
religious depths, appear to be better placed in this regard (ND 21-4). 
Yet  there  are  some  countervailing  tendencies  against  experiential-expressive  dominance. 
Lindbeck acknowledges that classical propositionalism is by no  means extinct, that Barth‘s 
theology  ‗avoids  the  experiential-expressive  turn  to  the  subject‘,  and  that  ‗Wittgenstein‘s 
influence has been strong in some theological circles.‘24 In addition, there is the work of Rahner 
and Lonergan, who, while accepting some form of experiential-expressivism, insist that this by 
itself cannot account for the enduring self-identity and unity of (some) religions, and that some 
categorial or propositional element is required. However, the most significant factor working 
against  the  theological  hegemony  of  experiential-expressive  approaches  is  their  increasing 
isolation  in  the  academy.  ‗Historians,  anthropologists,  sociologists,  and  philosophers…seem 
increasingly to find cultural-linguistic approaches congenial‘, so that ‗experiential-expressivism 
has lost ground everywhere except in most theological schools and departments of religious 
studies where, if anything, the trend is the reverse‘.25 At this early stage of the book Lindbeck 
thinks it would be inappropriate to venture a value judgement on this situation. On the one hand, 
increasing isolation in the academy ‗tends to ghettoize theology‘ (ND 25). On the other hand, 
experiential-expressivism would seem to be so well suited to contemporary sensibilities that the 
case for the superiority of an alternative would need to be very strong indeed. To this end, the 
second and third chapters of ND are devoted respectively to the nontheological and theological 
cases for Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic proposal (ND 24-5). 
                                                       
24 ND 24. Unfortunately, neither here nor elsewhere does Lindbeck specify just what he thinks this influence is. His 
own rather uncritical appropriation of Wittgenstein is a recurring theme in this study. 
25 ND 25. Lindbeck opines that the reason for this gap is that ‗experiential-expressivism fits the religious needs of 
modernity, while…cultural and linguistic approaches are better suited to the nontheological study of religion‘ (in loc). 
Both parts of this statement become important in later chapters of this study. On the one hand Lindbeck hints that one 
is entitled to ask which agenda experiential-expressivism serves: that of religion or that of modernity. In his view its 
primary service is to the latter, and it is therefore theologically suspect. On the other hand, the reference to the 
nontheological study of religion, allied with Lindbeck‘s claim of neutrality for his cultural-linguistic approach, might 
lead one to wonder whether modernity‘s presumption of objectivity has really been vanquished.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    23 
2.2.2  Religion and Experience: a Pretheological Enquiry 
Lindbeck‘s second chapter sets out to substantiate the claim that ‗a cultural-linguistic approach 
is preferable to traditional cognitivist and experiential-expressive approaches, provided the aim 
is to give a nontheological account of the relations between religion and experience.‘26 In fact, 
the  chapter  is  an  extended  comparison  of  the  experiential-expressive  and  cultural-linguistic 
approaches,  and  the  propositional  alternative  temporarily  drops  out  of  the  picture.  For  his 
experiential-expressive exemplar, Lindbeck uses Bernard Lonergan, though specific reference 
to  his  work  is  limited  to  a  short  section  (ND  31-2)  from  which  a  few  crucial  theses 
‗characteristic of experiential-expressivism in general‘ are extracted. These theses are: 
(1)  Different  religions  are  diverse  expressions  or  objectifications  of  a  common  core 
experience. It is this experience which identifies them as religions. (2) The experience, while 
conscious, may be unknown on the level of self-conscious reflection. (3) It is present in all 
human beings. (4) In most religions, the experience is the source and norm of objectifications: 
it is by reference to the experience that their adequacy or lack of adequacy is to be judged.27 
Lindbeck  notes  that  Lonergan,  in  common  with  most  experiential-expressivist  theologians, 
assumes rather than argues the adequacy of the crucial affirmation of the basic unity of religious 
experience. Yet this assumption creates a nest of problems for critical thinkers, not least of 
which  is  that  of  providing  supporting  evidence,  which  is  surely  needed  to  counteract  the 
implications of our historical awareness. Lonergan grants that religious experience ‗varies with 
every difference of culture, class or individual‘, and admits the lack of clear cut evidence for his 
model of religious experience, but ‗nevertheless takes for granted that the model accommodates 
the evidence better than does any other‘.28 
Lindbeck‘s main exposition of his cultural-linguistic proposal comprises the second section of 
the chapter (ND 32-41). As already indicated in outline above, the cultural-linguistic proposal is 
that religion can be viewed as a cultural and/or linguistic framework that shapes the entirety of 
life and thought. Like culture and language, religion is quasi-transcendental (somewhat like a 
Kantian a priori), though it comprises a set of acquired skills that could have been different. It is 
not so much a set of beliefs or an expressive symbolism as an idiom that makes these possible. 
Like language, religion is a communal phenomenon. It comprises terms that may be likened to 
                                                       
26 ND 30. Why such a clear insistence on a prior nontheological assessment? Lindbeck explains that ‗this question 
needs  to  be  addressed  before  we  deal…with  the  theological  issues  raised  by  what  we  have  already  noted  is  a 
suspiciously secular-looking model of religion. If this model cannot handle the anthropological, historical, and other 
nontheological data better than do the alternatives, there is no reason to ask whether it can be religiously useful‘ (p. 
30). Perhaps Lindbeck means only that theology would have little use for a theory that was clearly flawed even 
before the question of its theological use was raised. Still, the priority accorded to nontheological judgement here sits 
oddly with the theme of intratextuality that will emerge later. 
27 ND 31. Discussion of other theses, in which ‗Lonergan is obviously speaking as a Christian theologian rather than 
simply as a theorist of religion‘ (in loc), is deferred to the following chapter. 
28 ND 32. Lindbeck also notes a logical difficulty, again acknowledged by Lonergan. ‗Because this core experience is 
said to be common to a wide diversity of religions, it is difficult or impossible to specify its distinctive features, and 
yet unless this done, the assertion of commonality becomes logically and empirically vacuous‘ (in loc).   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    24 
vocabulary and structures that may be compared to grammar, all of which are integrally related 
to its rituals, sentiments, actions and institutions (ND 33). 
Regarding  the  relation  between  religion  and  experience,  religion  as  an  a  priori  semiotic 
framework  defines  and  conditions  a  field  of  possibilities  available  to  us  for  the 
conceptualisation  of  our  experiences.  Thus,  by  comparison  with  an  experiential-expressive 
model, a cultural-linguistic one ‗reverses the relation of the inner and the outer‘ (ND 34). For 
experiential-expressivism, the inner experience is primary, and religious expression derivative. 
But in a cultural-linguistic approach, the outer religious semiotic framework has both temporal 
and conceptual priority, and our conceptualisation of experience (as it were, our experience of 
experience) is derivative—shaped, moulded and constituted by cultural and linguistic forms. 
Thus to become religious is not so much to have certain ineffable experiences but, as with 
cultural and linguistic competence, to interiorise a set of skills by practice and training.  In 
Christianity, for example, these skills will enable one to interpret and experience oneself and 
one‘s world in terms of the story of Israel and of Jesus. In this priority of the external, cultural-
linguistic  approaches  ‗resemble  cognitivist  theories  for  which  external  (i.e.,  propositionally 
statable) beliefs are primary, but without the intellectualism of the latter‘ (ND 35). A ‗language‘, 
a  semiotic  framework,  allows  propositions  to  be  formed  but  is  also  used  for  many  other 
purposes,  just  as  religion  is  more  a  medium  in  which  in  which  one  moves  than  a  set  of 
propositions  to  be  believed.  The  same  priority,  with  its  stress  on  the  code  rather  than  the 
encoded,29  and  on  encoding  as  an  acquired  skill,  means  that  cultural -linguistic  models 
acknowledge the importance of the experiential side of religion, though in a different way to 
experiential-expressive approaches. Moreover, on a cultural-linguistic view, the way a religion 
functions through these interiorised skills is much better described in expressivist than in 
cognitivist terms. So Lindbeck maintains that, precisely by acknowledging the priority of the 
external, his proposal gives full and proper recognition to the roles of cognition, experience and 
expression in religious life (ND 33-6). 
Having introduced the key features of his proposal, and indicated how its comprehensiveness is 
enhanced by a ‗reversal of the relation between the inner and the outer‘ relative to experiential-
expressivism,30 Lindbeck turns to a more analytical examination of the nature of experience and 
its relation to expression and communication. He finds the quite different construals of this 
relation in the experiential-expressive and cultural-linguistic approaches to be the major contrast 
between them, and so the ensuing discussion aims to bring this contrast into much sharper focus.  
Lindbeck  challenges  the  idea  that  ‗inner  experiences‘  can  be  ‗prior  to  conceptualization  or 
symbolization‘ (ND 36). His initial counter-argument is an adaptation of the theory-ladenness of 
knowledge: drawing on Noam Chomsky and Clifford Geertz, Lindbeck espouses the language-
ladenness of experience. He speculates that ‗language…shapes domains of human existence and 
action  that  are  preexperiential‘  (ND  37),  though  he  also  maintains  that  his  basic  thesis 
                                                       
29 Lindbeck‘s phrase at ND 35. One could equally say ‗the medium rather than the message‘, or ‗the form rather than 
the object‘, though this last may come too close at this stage to opening up the topic of Platonic (and Enlightenment) 
idealism, which will become a significant theme in chapters 5 and 6 below. 
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(‗language is a condition for religious experience‘) need not rely on such ‗perhaps empirically 
falsifiable speculations‘ (in loc). Rather, he prefers to rely on the assertion — 
that an experience (viz., something of which one is prereflectively or reflectively conscious) is 
impossible unless it is in some fashion symbolized, and that all symbol systems have their 
origin in interpersonal relations and social interactions. It is conceptually confused to talk of 
symbolizations (and therefore of experiences) that are purely private (ND 37-8). 
Lindbeck supports this claim in several ways. He cites Wittgenstein‘s contention that private 
languages are logically impossible, and sees a similar conclusion applying to the idea of private 
religious experiences. Although Lindbeck finds this argument telling, he neither develops nor 
assesses  it  in  his  text  (there  is,  however,  a  lengthy  note31). After all, an argument that 
ambitiously tries to ‗demonstrate the impossibility of unthematized yet conscious experience‘ 
(ND 38) is not really needed if one can succeed with another argument that more modestly 
concludes  that  the  hypothesis  in  question  is  simply  unnecessary.32  Lindbeck‘s  ‗modest‘ 
argument is an Ockhamist one which turns on a recognition that experiential-expressivism treats 
religious experiences as if they were different in kind from other more ordinary experiences. 
But if one‘s account of ‗ordinary‘ experiences could also serve for religious experiences then 
the hypothesis of a special kind of experience called ‗religious‘ would seem to be superfluous. 
Lindbeck maintains that cultural-linguistic insights offer just such a comprehensive account of 
experience.  He  makes  the  point  through  ‗the classic  medieval  distinction  between  first and 
second intentions‘, though contemporary philosophers (especially philosophers of science) offer 
some quite similar explanations.33 
As applied to objects (intentio objectiva), ―animal‖ in the first intention is this or that creature, 
Fido or Socrates, in its own actual or possible, imaginary or real being, while in the second 
intention it is a generic concept embracing many species such as the human and the canine. 
                                                       
31 In this note (n18 at ND 43-4, referenced on p. 38), Lindbeck briefly considers the various transcendental arguments 
offered by Karl Rahner, David Tracy and Bernard Lonergan. He notes some significant differences (especially that 
Lonergan‘s argument is theological, while Rahner and Tracy develop their positions on non-theological grounds), but 
sees all three as maintaining, as he puts it, ‗a kind of privacy in the origins of experience and language‘ (p. 38). 
Lindbeck  finds  Lonergan‘s  disagreement  with  Wittgenstein‘s  views  on  private  language  to  be  ‗based  on  the 
misapprehension that a denial of private languages entails a denial of mental acts‘ (p. 44). If this misunderstanding is 
allowed for, the private language argument against prelinguistic experiences may be less unacceptable to Lonergan 
than to Tracy or Rahner. In the end, ‗the crucial philosophical issue [for Lindbeck] is the validity of transcendental 
deductions of the necessary conditions of human knowing and willing. If the postulation of such conditions by means 
of transcendental arguments is valid, then it makes sense to say that one may experience these…prior to, even if not 
separable from, their thematization by linguistic or other conceptual systems‘ (in loc). Lindbeck clearly regards such 
transcendental arguments as invalid, but, as we shall see, the more important fact for him is that they are unnecessary. 
32 Because of its importance, the relevant passage is quoted at considerable length below, but I have provided the 
following outline because I do not think that Lindbeck‘s text makes the argument‘s logical structure very clear. In my 
initial readings of this passage, other interpretations, resulting in rather less successful arguments, seemed  more 
likely. I believe the reading I have adopted is that most favourable to Lindbeck. 
33 Candidates among twentieth century writers include Michael Polanyi (to whom Lindbeck refers here) with his 
distinction between focal and tacit awareness, Thomas Kuhn‘s work on scientific paradigms (also important for 
Lindbeck, but misappropriated in modernist vein in David Tracy and Hans Küng‘s Paradigm Shifts in Theology), and 
Gadamer‘s analysis of traditioned learning (to which we shall be referring again in the next chapter).   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    26 
As applied to mental activities (intentio formalis), the first intention is the act whereby we 
grasp objects, while the second intention is the reflex act of grasping or reflecting on first 
formal  intentions.  In  the  modern  philosophical  language  of  consciousness,  we  are  only 
unthematically (or, in Polanyi‘s terminology, ―tacitly‖) aware of first intentional activities 
while we are engaged in them: our attention is focused on objects, not on the subjective 
experience involved in knowing them. It is only in the second intention that we attend to this 
experience, that we are focally rather than tacitly aware of it. Yet this does not lead us to 
suppose that the first-intentional experiences of,  for example, attending to Fido or to the 
logical  characteristics  of  the  concept  of  animal  are  somehow  preverbal  or  linguistically 
unstructured. Surely…the same could be said of religious experiences. They can be construed 
as by-products of linguistically or conceptually structured cognitive activities of which we are 
not directly aware because they are first-intentional. The sense of the holy of which Rudolf 
Otto speaks can be construed as the tacit or unthematic awareness of applying a culturally 
acquired concept of the holy in a given situation. Similarly, concert pianists tell us that it is 
disastrous for them to become focally conscious of their fingers while they are playing, but 
nevertheless their playing (and their sometimes ecstatic experience of playing) depends on 
their fingering. It seems that the most economical hypothesis is to suppose that the relation 
between religious experiences and a given culture, language, and form of life is similar. If my 
application of the notions of first and second intentions is correct, then this is a thesis on 
which Thomas Aquinas and other medieval Aristotelians…agree with Wittgenstein against 
post-Cartesian philosophers of consciousness as well as against some professed Thomists 
such as Lonergan and Rahner. For the Aristotelians, affective experiences (in which would be 
included a sense of the holy or of absolute dependence) always depend on prior cognition of 
objects, and the objects available to us in this life are all in some fashion constructed out of 
(or,  in  medieval  terminology,  ―abstracted  from‖)  conceptually  or  linguistically  structured 
sense experience (ND 38-9). 
Lindbeck finds that abandonment of the notion that the source of religion is in prior experience 
has  implications  for  other  aspects  of  one‘s  theory  of  religion.34  The  first  of  these  is  that 
‗religious change or innovation must be understood, not as proceeding from new experiences, 
but as resulting from the interaction of a cultural-linguistic system with changing situations‘ 
                                                       
34 But, strictly, the abandonment that Lindbeck‘s argument justifies is not this one, and the ‗implications‘ he draws 
(and  his  language  elsewhere)  can  jump  too  easily  to  the  opposite  pole,  to  the  idea  that  religious  experience  is 
unilaterally ‗produced by‘ the religious framework in terms of which it is conceptualised. The terms of Lindbeck‘s 
argument  primarily  concern  the  relation,  not  between  experience  and  religion,  but  between  experience  and 
conceptualisation, and so its proper or direct effect is that it encourages us to abandon the idea that experience has a 
simple priority in this relationship. But abandonment of this idea would not imply the opposite conclusion (that 
conceptualisation is simply prior to experience); nor could it be used to imply anything concerning the relation 
between experience and religion without a further assumption that religion can be assimilated to conceptualisation in 
the primary argument. In other words, insofar as Lindbeck‘s argument here leads to conclusions concerning the 
relation between experience and religion, it implicitly assumes a more-or-less straightforward correspondence or 
analogy between religion and conceptualisation. Lindbeck goes to some trouble elsewhere to argue that a religion, 
though it may be a ‗system‘, is much more than a conceptual system. Although Lindbeck criticises propositionalism 
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(ND 39). Such change occurs because a religious interpretive scheme develops anomalies in its 
application in new contexts, forcing the discovery of new concepts that remove the anomalies. 
‗Religious experiences in the sense of feelings, sentiments, or emotions then result from the new 
conceptual patterns instead of being their source‘ (in loc). A second consequence is that one is 
led to question the idea of ‗an inner experience of God common to all human beings and all 
religions‘, the question being not merely whether this idea has any veracity, but whether it has 
any meaning.35 For Lindbeck, religion  ‗need not be described as something universal arising 
from within the depths of individuals and diversely and inadequately objectified in particular 
faiths; it can at least as plausibly be construed as a class name for a variegated set of cultural-
linguistic  systems  that,  at  least  in  some  cases,  differentially  shape  and  produce  our  most 
profound sentiments, attitudes, and awarenesses‘.36 
Lindbeck closes his second chapter with a short section headed ‗The Inconclusiveness of the 
Comparison‘. If this section is intended to be a kind of disclaimer or a cautionary note directed 
toward over-enthusiastic cultural-linguistic converts, then it is a rather curious one, as fully two-
thirds of it presents further reasons why cultural-linguistic theorists find the ‗common religious 
experience‘ hypothesis untenable. To begin with, Lindbeck cautions that a decision between 
                                                       
35 Lindbeck sometimes puts this point too strongly, e.g., ‗There can be no experiential core because…the experiences 
that religions evoke and mold are as varied as the interpretive schemes they embody. Adherents of different religions 
do not diversely thematize the same experience; rather they have different experiences‘ (ND 40). It seems to me that a 
cultural-linguistic view cannot rule out the possibility of a universal religious experience, but can claim, on the basis 
of  its  general  understanding  of  the  relation  between  culture,  language,  experience  and  knowledge,  that  such 
universality  would be (a) anthropologically extremely unusual, and (b) extremely difficult (if not impossible) to 
verify even it were the case. (Perhaps an advantage of a universal religious experience, if such were discovered to be 
actually the case, would be that it would fly in the face of everything we otherwise know about human experience, 
and must therefore be explained as an experience of the divine! Unfortunately, such a conclusion would be illogical, 
if rather tempting. It is just as illogical, though some have found the temptation irresistible, to argue in the reverse 
direction, that is, to argue that because an experience is of the divine, it must be universal, or to argue that in order for 
an experience to be of the divine, it must be universal.) In short, a cultural-linguistic approach highlights experiential-
expressivism‘s use of the hypothesis that religious experience is a special kind of experience which, unlike all other 
kinds of experience known to us, transcends human historicity. Having drunk deeply from the waters of the sociology 
of knowledge, the cultural-linguist feels obliged, (a) in the absence of very strong empirical support for such a 
hypothesis,  to  presume  it  to  be  false;  and  (b), in the  absence of  any  clear  idea  of  the  means  by  which  such  a 
hypothesis could be demonstrated even if it were true, to presume it to be meaningless. 
36 ND 40. This rather irenic expression, that a cultural-linguistic model is ‗at least as plausible‘ as the available 
alternatives,  is  consistent  with  Lindbeck‘s  stated  aim  of  making  this  model  ‗available‘  for  use  by  theologians, 
presumably alongside those models (mainly experiential-expressivist ones) already in use. But Lindbeck is quite 
capable of using rather stronger language and clearly believes his argument will support it. For instance, at the 
conclusion of the second section of his second chapter, looking back on the examples and arguments he has offered 
(and which have been summarised above) he remarks: 
In  the  face  of  such  examples,  it  seems  implausible  to  claim  that  religions  are  diverse 
objectifications of the same basic experience. On the contrary, different religions seem in many 
cases to produce fundamentally divergent depth experiences of what it is to be human. The 
empirically  available  data  seem  to  support  a  cultural-linguistic  rather  than  an  experiential-
expressive understanding of the relation of religion and experience (ND 41).   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    28 
‗all-embracing and fundamentally different notions of what religion is‘ cannot be made ‗on 
empirical grounds alone‘, since each approach ‗shapes the view of what is relevant evidence for 
or  against  its  own  truth.‘37  He  notes  Friedrich  Heiler‘s  case  for  ‗one  and  the  same  root 
experience of transcendence‘ being the common source of ‗the higher religions‘.38 Lindbeck is 
prepared to grant that Heiler ‗makes a plausible case that if one wants to find similarities in the 
world‘s  major  religions,  and  if  one  looks  at  them  through  Christian  eyes‘,  then  his  list  of 
common elements is defensible. ‗It seems certain, however, that an adherent of an Eastern 
religion embarked on a similar task would formulate a very different list that would make 
Christianity sound rather like Taoism or Buddhism, for example, rather than vice versa‘.39 
Moreover, if one compares languages, the fact that they may have common objects of reference 
that we identify by the English words mother, child, water, fire, etc is utterly unremarkable. 
What  counts  for  linguistic  comparison  is  the  relations  between  these  terms,  their  symbolic 
connotations, and the grammatical patterns, ways of referring, and semantic and syntactical 
structures of the languages. Similarly for religions. The fact that they may share objects that we 
might identify as ‗love‘ or ‗that which is taken to be ultimately important‘ is ‗a banality as 
uninteresting as the fact that all languages are (or were) spoken‘ (ND 41-2). 
Still,  cultural-linguistic  sympathisers  should  not  take  these  arguments  to  be  conclusive.  The 
argument shows only that an experiential-expressive position is unprovable, not that it is false; 
experiential-expressivism remains a (bare) possibility.40 Besides, even in the physical sciences, 
‗theories are abandoned, not so much because they are refuted (on their own terms, that is), but 
because they prove unfruitful for new or different questions…The old theories may still hold 
perfectly well in their primary areas of application‘.41 Similarly, says Lindbeck, ‗the inferiority of 
experiential-expressivism for the scientific study of religion may be quite compatible with its 
superiority for other purposes (for example, theological ones)‘ (ND 42).42 
                                                       
37 ND 41. Leaving aside the surprising implication that Lindbeck‘s argument to this point has been purely empirical, one 
can also note that this statement regarding the nature of evidence is already rather more in tune with a cultural-linguistic 
than an experiential-expressive view. The classic exponents of experiential-expressive theories were well aware of the 
theory-ladenness of others’ knowledge, but somewhat less inclined to acknowledge the relevance of this insight to their 
own  understanding.  One  might  expect  Lindbeck‘s  cultural-linguistic  model  to  be  more  aware  of  its  own  reflexive 
reference (though we shall have occasion to wonder whether Lindbeck appreciates the importance of this point). 
38 ND 41. The fact that such hypotheses nearly always include a qualifying adjective on ‗religions‘ (e.g., ‗higher‘, 
‗monotheistic‘, ‗scriptural‘, ‗great world religions‘, etc) already indicates that the thesis of universality is difficult to 
establish. Lindbeck notes that Heiler‘s list of ‗higher religions‘ includes Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Anti-universalists inevitably wonder what an indigenous Australian, a Native 
American, an animist, or a Shintoist would make of such a list, and of their own exclusion from the ‗higher‘ category. 
39 ND 41. That is, although Lindbeck has gone to some trouble to unfavourably compare experiential-expressive 
theories of religion with cultural-linguistic ones, experiential-expressivists should not despair. After all, there is (at 
least) one good cultural-linguistic reason why the comparison is inconclusive! 
40 Lindbeck seems not to recall his earlier suggestion that the experiential-expressive case is meaningless. See p. 27 
above, especially n35. 
41  ND  42.  Lindbeck  provides  an  example:  ‗mechanics,  for  example,  remains  to  this  day  entirely  Newtonian, 
untouched by Einstein‘s theory of relativity.‘ 
42  Lindbeck  shows  familiarity  with  the  work  of  Michael  Polanyi,  Thomas  Kuhn,  and  Imre  Lakatos,  but  his   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    29 
This caveat seems to do no more (and no less) than damn experiential-expressivism with faint 
praise, and the irenic tone may be a little disingenuous. Lindbeck‘s comments at the start of the 
chapter  indicated  that  the  argument  was  aimed  precisely  at  substantiating  the  claim  that  a 
cultural-linguistic approach is ‗preferable‘ to experiential-expressivism (and propositionalism) 
because it is ‗intellectually and empirically the most adequate‘ (ND 30-1). Now, at the end of 
the chapter, Lindbeck clearly thinks his argument has succeeded and he offers the possibility of 
experiential-expressivism‘s theological superiority as a consolation prize. Perhaps he wants to 
appear magnanimous in offering the hope that experiential-expressivism may still have some 
relevance (if only as a reasonable approximation) in its ‗primary area of application‘. But if 
experiential-expressivism  is  what  Lindbeck  says  it  is,  such  a  situation  would  be 
indistinguishable from complete failure. 
2.2.3  Many Religions and the One True Faith 
Lindbeck‘s third chapter begins an inquiry into the theological usefulness of his proposal, an 
inquiry  which  continues  in  subsequent  chapters.  Chapter  3  considers  cultural-linguistic 
perspectives  on  a  Christian  theology  of  religions,  while  chapters  4  and  5  focus  on  the 
‗intrareligious…problems  of  doctrinal  diversity  and  teaching  authority  within…Christianity‘ 
(ND 46). Issues in the theology of religions are important to Lindbeck because he considers that 
his ‗nontheological theory of religion‘ cannot be useful to those who are religiously interested if 
it excludes their religious claims a priori, or treats them as meaningless. In particular, Lindbeck 
wants to consider traditional religious claims to finality or unsurpassability. But, since we live 
in a world that values peaceful coexistence and mutual respect, can a cultural-linguistic theory 
admit  the  possibility  of  claims  for  supremacy  while  also  allowing  for  ‗the  desirability  of 
                                                                                                                                                             
extrapolations  from  the  philosophy  of  science  are  sometimes  unsatisfactory,  as  in  this  case.  Firstly,  Lindbeck‘s 
account of the relation between ‗scientific‘ (what he means by ‗nontheological‘) and theological scholarly disciplines 
is inconsistent. Earlier (ND 30), he asserted that a theory that is not scientifically viable need not be considered for 
theological use. On that basis there is no reason for him to give experiential-expressivism any further consideration, 
since he holds it to be scientifically unviable. But now he is saying that, even though experiential-expressivism is 
scientifically unviable, it may nevertheless be not merely viable, but superior, for theological purposes! 
Secondly, the example of Newtonian versus Einsteinian physics (see previous note) is hardly appropriate. If one is 
not  dealing  with  quite  extreme  space-time  dimensions,  densities,  and/or  velocities,  Einsteinian  physics  is  not 
practically distinguishable from  Newtonian. Einstein‘s is the more general theory, Newton‘s the special case. Is 
Lindbeck suggesting that experiential-expressivism is now eclipsed and encapsulated by the more general cultural-
linguistic theory? I think not. Other relationships are possible. The phlogiston theory of combustion was, simply, 
wrong. The discovery of ‗N-rays‘ by Blondlot in 1903 regrettably owed rather more to chauvinistic self-deception 
than to scientific method (N-rays being the Gallic answer to ‗Germanic‘ X-rays). 
Thirdly, what does Lindbeck have in mind for experiential-expressivism‘s ‗primary area of application‘? This theory 
was once dominant in the scientific study of religion, but science (here, the social sciences and the philosophy of 
science) has moved on. Should we now take its primary area of application to be the small scope to which it is now 
restricted, viz. Christian theology and Christian-oriented religious studies, or its original scope, viz. philosophy of 
religion  and  the  (social)  scientific  study  of  religion?  In  the  former  case,  experiential-expressivism  appears  as  a 
curiosity at best, its limited persistence perhaps telling us less about the nature of religion than about theology‘s place 
in  the  history  of  the  social  sciences.  In  the  latter  case  one  would  be  more  inclined  to  say  that  experiential-
expressivism had been discarded because some of its key assumptions turned out to be wrong. Lindbeck believes he 
has demonstrated the latter case, but now, for reasons that remain unclear, he wants to proceed with the former.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    30 
nonproselytizing interreligious dialogue and cooperation‘ and the possibility of the salvation of 
nonbelievers?43 Lindbeck devotes a section to each of these issues before concluding the chapter 
with a technical excursus on the notion of ‗truth‘ (ND 46-7). 
Just what is entailed in the idea of a religion‘s ‗unsurpassability‘ will vary according to what 
one takes the prime value of a religion to be, but Lindbeck‘s discussion, both on this issue and 
throughout  the  chapter,  assumes  that  ‗unsurpassable‘  means  ‗unsurpassably  true‘.44  Not 
surprisingly, the different models of religion Lindbeck has described relate differently to the 
idea of truth, let alone to the possibility that some formulation of it might be unsurpassable. For 
propositionalists, truth is ‗a function of the ontological correspondence or ―isomorphism‖ of the 
―structure of knowing and the structure of the known.‖‗45 This correspondence, or lack of it, is a 
property of each proposition or act of judgement, and is not a matter of degree.46 The truth of a 
religion as a whole depends on the mixture of false and true stat ements it makes, and so the 
comparative question for a propositionalist turns on which religion ‗makes the most significant 
veridical  truth  claims  and  the  fewest  false  ones‘  (ND  47).  By  contrast,  in  an  experiential-
expressive approach ‗truth‘ is a function of symbolic efficacy and religions may be compared in 
terms  of  how  effectively  they  articulate  or  represent  or  communicate  the  common  inner 
experience of the divine. A cultural-linguistic view presents a further contrast in that it views a 
religion less in terms of the truths it articulates or its symbolic expressions of experience, than 
as an idiom that enables that articulation, those expressions, and a way of ordering life. An 
                                                       
43  Lindbeck  asserts  that  ‗if  a  cultural-linguistic  approach  cannot  make  at  least  as  good  sense  of  [interreligious 
dialogue and the salvation of nonbelievers] as do alternative theories of religion, then it will be rightly regarded as 
theologically uninteresting‘ (ND 46-7). The logic of the chapter is (relatively) clear. Lindbeck is taking a step towards 
accommodating religions‘ traditional claims (rather than dissolving them as liberal approaches tend to do), but he 
wants to demonstrate that he can do this while continuing to uphold key liberal virtues. If his approach is rejected, it 
will not be because it endangers dialogue or denies that non-Christians can be saved. See also ND 57, and n60 below. 
44 Lindbeck slides quickly from the more abstract term ‗unsurpassable‘ to the slightly more concrete ‗unsurpassably 
true‘,  but  to  some  extent  this  prejudges  the  issue,  since  it  is  mainly  propositionalists,  and,  indirectly,  cultural-
linguistic theorists, for whom truth is a major religious criterion. Lindbeck‘s discussion of unsurpassability would 
have been improved, I think, had he stayed with the more abstract term until he had examined the various criteria 
according to which a religion might be unsurpassable. To illustrate, let us use the term ‗prime religious value‘ to 
denote the criterion that one finds most relevant to the question  of unsurpassability.  Although Lindbeck clearly 
accepts that prime religious value will vary according to one‘s view of what religion is, his assumption that truth is 
the value in terms of which unsurpassability should be assessed makes it implicit, rather than more properly explicit, 
that the standpoint from which he is examining the issue can only be one for which truth is a (or the) prime religious 
value.  As  we  shall  see,  this  choice  of  criterion  already  excludes  experiential-expressivism  from  Lindbeck‘s 
discussion, not because it is not interested in truth—far from it—but because its prime religious value is something 
more like ‗authentic expression‘ than ‗truth‘. None of this alters the outcome of Lindbeck‘s discussion, but simply 
makes clear that Lindbeck is considering things from a particular point of view: one that is shared (at least to some 
extent) by propositionalism and his own cultural-linguistic theory. 
45 ND 47, citing Lonergan. 
46 Lindbeck‘s amplification makes clear that he is speaking of a very absolute or extreme form of propositionalism. 
‗Each proposition or act of judgement corresponds or does not correspond, is eternally true or false; there are no 
degrees or variations in propositional truth‘ (ND 47). Although this extreme portrayal of propositionalism is not 
necessary to some aspects of Lindbeck‘s argument, we shall see later that several of what he takes to be his most 
telling criticisms of this view rely for their effectiveness on the absoluteness that he imputes to it.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    31 
idiom  is  neither  true  nor  false  in  itself,  but  the  categories  it  provides  for  articulation  and 
expression  may  be  more  or  less  adequate  to  reality.  ‗Adequate  categories…make  possible, 
though they do not guarantee, propositional, practical, and symbolic truth‘ (ND 48). A religion 
having such categories may be called ‗categorially true‘.47 
Because the idea of categorial adequacy has a certain novelty, Lindbeck provides some further 
explanation. Firstly, although an idiomatic system is in itself neither true nor false it enables 
both truths and falsehoods to be stated regarding objects that have a property corresponding to 
one  (or  more)  of  the  system‘s  categories.  Mathematics,  for  example,  enables  us  to  make 
meaningful statements about the quantifiable aspects of reality, but those statements may be 
either true or false. If a system lacks the appropriate categories then the statements it enables 
will be, strictly, neither true nor false but meaningless. Secondly, the crucial categories of one 
religion might have no equivalents in another. ‗The cultural-linguistic approach is open to the 
possibility that different religions and/or philosophies may have incommensurable notions of 
truth, of experience, and of categorial adequacy‘.48 With the help of this explanation Lindbeck 
feels  able  to  conclude  that  ‗unlike  other  perspectives,  this  approach  proposes  no  common 
framework such as that supplied by the propositionalist‘s concept of truth or the expressivist‘s 
concept of experience within which to compare religions‘.49 
                                                       
47 ND 47-8. In a later article, Lindbeck acknowledged that it may be better to speak of ‗categorial adequacy‘ than 
‗categorial truth‘, since he maintains that truth is not a function of categories, which by themselves affirm nothing 
either true or false. Rather, truth is a function of the affirmations that may be made using adequate categories. See 
Lindbeck 1989b, and also sub-section 5.1.1 The Nature of Truth commencing on p. 154 below. 
Lindbeck has identified propositional truth, expressive or symbolic efficacy, and categorial adequacy as being what I 
have  called  the  prime  values  of  religion  under  the  propositional,  experiential-expressive,  and  cultural-linguistic 
approaches respectively. The three models of religion will thus offer three different views of what it means for a 
religion  to be  ‗unsurpassable‘.  Interestingly,  Lindbeck  focuses on  how  these  prime  values might  differ  between 
models of religion, but disregards how they might differ between religions, apart from indicating that his cultural-
linguistic theory is open to this possibility. 
48 ND 49. Using Lindbeck‘s examples, ‗larger‘ cannot be translated by ‗redder‘; it may be impossible for adherents of 
Western religions to say anything meaningful about the Buddhist Nirvana; faith in the biblical God is logically 
independent of philosophers‘ arguments concerning the existence or otherwise of the philosophers‘ God (ND 48). 
49 ND 48-9. But what does Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory supply, if not a ‗common framework‘? Lindbeck and 
some others (e.g., Marshall 1990) explain their ‗no framework‘ framework by saying that a cultural-linguistic view 
recognises that each religion has its own criteria for evaluating its own success in relation to its own idea of what is 
most important. This reluctance to impose an alien common framework on others results in all participants being 
treated as ‗others‘. But if Christianity is also ‗other‘ from a cultural-linguistic viewpoint, then Lindbeck will surely 
refrain from recommending that Christian theologians adopt his cultural-linguistic proposal, as they will no doubt 
already have Christian ways of evaluating Christianity‘s ‗success‘. As Lindbeck himself explains: 
When affirmations or ideas from categorially different religious or philosophical frameworks 
are introduced into a given religious outlook, these are either simply babbling or else, like 
mathematical  formulas  employed  in  a  poetic  text,  they  have  vastly  different  functions  and 
meanings than they had in their original settings (ND 49). 
Granted, the common framework of the cultural-linguistic approach is more abstract than those of the alternative 
views Lindbeck considers. Perhaps it is more a ‗meta-framework‘ than a framework in the ordinary sense.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    32 
From this discussion Lindbeck returns to claims of unsurpassability. The propositional form of 
this claim is the most familiar. A propositionally unsurpassable religion would be free of error 
and would also contain all those religiously significant truths susceptible of being revealed to 
human beings.50 Most religions, however, are a mi xture of truth and error, and so even an 
erroneous religion might contain truths not initially present in the ‗highest‘ religion. In the 
experiential-expressive  model,  where  ‗religions  are  thought  of  as  expressively  rather  than 
propositionally true‘, the possibility of mutual enrichment is increased, but the meaningfulness 
of the designation ‗unsurpassably true‘ becomes problematic. The difficulty lies in the fact that 
‗when truth is understood in terms of symbolic efficacy it is a variable quality without  any 
logically intrinsic upper limit‘,51 as well as in the possibility that a comparison on these terms 
might produce a multiple tie rather than a clear victor.52 
The categorial form of the claim to unsurpassability may be, in different respects, both stronger 
and weaker than the propositional form. In the stronger case, if there is only one religion that 
has categories adequate to enable reference to the actual ultimate reality, then it would be the 
only one in which propositional and expressive truth could occur. Other religions, to the extent 
that their categories were inadequate, would not refer to ultimate reality, and would be 
propositionally and expressively neither true nor false, but meaningless. 53 The weaker aspect is 
that a categorially adequate religion enables false statements as well as true; in fact, only in such 
a religion is falsehood, as distinct from meaningless babble, possible. If this ‗sounds outrageous 
                                                       
50 The actual or possible exceptions prove the rule. A religion could be surpassed (1) if it actually contained error, or 
(2) if it did not contain all the truth it could contain. In the latter case it might be entirely yet incompletely true (as in 
one traditional Christian attitude towards Israel) and therefore surpassable (ND 49). 
51 ND 50. There is also the difficulty, alluded to in n44 above, that Lindbeck‘s discussion presumes that ‗truth‘ (in 
whatever sense) is the defining criterion in terms of which unsurpassability is to be measured. The real problem for 
the experiential-expressive approach in Lindbeck‘s analysis is that it does not see ‗truth‘ as a major religious virtue 
(this is not to say that experiential-expressivists place a low value on truth; the reverse is the case). In an experiential-
expressive view a more appropriate criterion might be symbolic efficacy. It is not that ‗truth is understood in terms of 
symbolic efficacy‘ (in loc). That is Lindbeck‘s imputation. Rather, truth and symbolic efficacy are different things, 
and Lindbeck‘s apostrophes and explanatory parentheses (see ND 47, 49-50) serve only to highlight the lack of fit 
between  these  concepts.  Experiential-expressivism‘s  preference  for  symbolic  efficacy  is  problematised  because 
Lindbeck  chooses  to  take  truth  and  not  symbolic  efficacy  as  the  primary  religious  value,  and  judges  the 
unsurpassability question on these terms. So he never considers that an experiential-expressivist might reasonably be 
able to (1) treat as meaningful (if somewhat pointless) various religions‘ claims to be the best actually available, 
while (2) devaluing the whole question of unsurpassability on the grounds that competition has little religious merit, 
and/or (3) finding the idea of unsurpassability entirely vacuous since we cannot know (except perhaps by revelation?) 
whether or not we now know everything that could possibly be revealed to us. 
52 ND 49-50. Lindbeck‘s actual text: ‗Secondly, there is no intrinsic reason why there should not be many equal but 
distinct  instances  of  the  highest  actual  degree  of  any  of  these  qualities  [redness,  strength,  beauty,  or  symbolic 
efficacy], including symbolic power‘ (ND 50). I do not see why this would not count as a point in favour of a view 
that could produce such an inclusive outcome. Moreover, since the possibility of equality says nothing about the 
possibility or impossibility of having a single ‗highest‘ religion, I do not see why this ‗secondly‘ appears at all, or else 
does not also appear (equally invalidly) against the other two approaches. 
53 The strength of this ‗stronger‘ aspect is a measure of the extent to which a religion might be able to assert itself 
against  its  ‗competitors‘.  Rather  than  treat  them  as  being  merely  ‗less  true‘  than  itself,  as  in  the  propositional 
approach, how much better to be able to treat them as to some extent lacking the means to speak even falsehood?   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    33 
to traditionally pious ears‘, this is because ‗ordinary common sense‘ regards truth in terms of 
propositional correspondence (ND 50). But in a cultural-linguistic view, truth as correspondence 
is not a property of particular propositions, nor even of a religion‘s categorial scheme. Rather, 
correspondence may (or may not) be a property of a religion insofar as, as a whole lived reality, 
it corresponds (or does not correspond) to ‗what a theist calls God‘s being and will‘ (ND 50-1). 
As actually lived, a religion may be pictured as a single gigantic proposition. It is a true 
proposition to the extent that its objectivities are interiorized and exercised by groups and 
individuals in such a way as to conform them in some measure in the various dimensions of 
their existence to the ultimate reality and goodness that lies at the heart of things. It is a 
false proposition to the extent that this does not happen (ND 51). 
This passage introduces important emphases which are taken up again in the ‗Excursus on 
Religion and Truth‘ that comprises section IV of Lindbeck‘s chapter. For now, let us note that 
Lindbeck takes truth-as-correspondence to relate less to ideas than to the people who have them; 
less to single ideas than to complex lived realities; less to statements than to the ways in which 
people  use  them;  less  to  agreement  between  idea  and  reality  than  to  agreement  between 
ourselves and ultimate reality. Amplifying the point with an extended cartographic simile in 
which  a  categorial  scheme  is  likened  to  a  map,  Lindbeck  concludes:  ‗the  categorially  and 
unsurpassably true religion is capable of being rightly utilized, of guiding thought, passions, and 
action  in  a  way  that  corresponds  to  ultimate  reality,  and  of  thus  being  ontologically  (and 
―propositionally‖) true, but is not always and perhaps not even usually so employed‘ (ND 51-2). 
In the following section, on ‗The Interrelationships of Religions‘, Lindbeck sets out to explain 
how the cultural-linguistic approach can accommodate the desire to affirm dialogue, which is ‗a 
major cause for the popularity of experiential-expressive approaches‘ (ND 53). He begins by 
noting various ways in which religions might understand their interrelations. They could be related 
as (1) the incomplete to the complete, promise to fulfilment; (2) diverse objectifications of the 
same or similar experiences; (3) complementary approaches to different but not incompatible 
dimensions of existence; (4) direct opposites; or (5) the coherent to the incoherent, the inauthentic 
to the authentic. Finally, Lindbeck notes that religions may well be comparable in more than one 
of these ways.54 All this is by way of introduction to Lindbeck‘s claim that a cultural-linguistic 
approach ‗can allow a strong case for interreligious dialogue, but not for any single type of such 
dialogue‘ (ND 53). Such a case begins from the assumption that each religion may (or, perhaps, 
may not) have its own grounds for engaging in dialogue, and avoids the disrespect inherent in the 
assumption that at their deepest level all religions are basically the same. Christians might wish to 
talk to adherents of other faiths because they desire to serve them, or in order to help them become 
better  Marxists,  Buddhists,  Muslims,  Jews,  etc,  and  so  make  ‗their  own  particular 
contributions…to the preparation for the Consummation.‘55 Thus, Christians have reasons for 
dialogue, but we must not presume to speak for others in this regard (ND 52-4). 
                                                       
54 Examples are provided for each case. See ND 52-3. 
55 That is, Christians may see that, in the providence of God, non-Christian traditions can bear witness to aspects of truth 
that are only poorly attested or exemplified in Christianity. They may therefore wish to contribute to the total witness to 
truth by helping others to become the best they can be in their own ways. Of course, there are other possible Christian   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    34 
From  a  cultural-linguistic  perspective,  experiential-expressivism‘s  assumption  of  a  common 
foundation for dialogue is not a strength but a weakness. The presupposition that the various 
religions‘ deepest experiences and commitments must somehow be basically the same runs the 
risks of (1) disguising the multiplicity of problems and motives; (2) forcing dialogue partners to 
think  of  themselves  as  representing  either  a  superior  or  inferior  articulation  of  a  common 
experience. In contrast, a cultural-linguistic approach recognises the integrity and particularity of 
each religion and allows the participants to regard each other as being simply different ‗without 
necessarily engaging in the invidious comparisons that the assumption of a common experiential 
core  make  so  tempting.‘56  Lindbeck  concludes  that  the  cultural-linguistic  view  allows  for 
dialogue, though it cannot itself provide reasons why dialogue should take place (ND 55). 
Concerning the salvation of those belonging to other faiths (the third section of the chapter), 
Lindbeck notes that it is usual for religious believers to be convinced that there is some value in 
being religiously right rather than religiously wrong. And if this means that those of other faiths 
(or none) are thereby hindered or even excluded from salvation (however defined), then out of 
sheer humanitarian concern one would wish to convert them to the true way. Thus, ‗the claim of 
superiority or unsurpassability, when combined with concern for fellow human beings, would 
seem  to  lead  almost  inevitably  to  polemics  and  proselytizing  instead  of  the  dialogical  and 
cooperative  attitudes  toward  other  religions  favored  officially…or  unofficially  by  a  large 
proportion of contemporary religious people‘ (ND 55-6). 
As with the issue of dialogue, so each religion has its own way of formulating this problem. 
Lindbeck sees the specifically Christian conundrum to be that of reconciling salvation  solo 
Christo with the salvation of non-Christians.57 There are two basic types of explanation: those in 
which salvation in Christ is effective in the present age for all human beings; and those in which 
the question of eternal destiny is decided at or beyond death in encounter with Jesus.58 Lindbeck 
finds the ‗currently most widespread‘ solution to be an experiential-expressive one in which the 
‗prereflective, inarticulate experience of the divine…at the heart of every religion‘ is identified 
with the saving grace of Christ (ND 56). All those who respond to the inward call share in the 
same salvation: Christians consciously through faith in Christ, non-Christians unconscious that 
Jesus Christ is ‗both the ultimate source and the only fully and finally appropriate objective 
                                                                                                                                                             
motivations for dialogue, such as evangelism, cooperation in common tasks, avoiding violence in multifaith societies, or 
helping others to better serve their own communities. Of these, evangelism might be problematic in a discussion of 
‗nonproselytizing interreligious dialogue and cooperation‘ (ND 48), but to exclude it a priori would presumably violate 
Lindbeck‘s desire to respect each religion‘s own reasons (if any) for engaging in dialogue. 
56 It seems that experiential-expressivism cannot win. Here, comparability, with its associated temptation to the 
assertion of superiority, is a serious fault. Previously, the likely  absence of a means of declaring one religion to be 
clearly superior appeared to be a fault (see n52 above). 
57 Lindbeck leaves to one side the views of those who deny the salvation of non -Christians (‗most Protestant and 
Catholic traditionalists‘, p. 56) or those who acknowledge the dilemma but refuse to explain it (the view that ‗we 
know of salvation in Jesus Christ; the salvation of others is God‘s concern not ours‘). 
58 Lindbeck observes that Western Christians have generally rejected both of these options on the grounds that 
‗explicit faith in the Triune God and/or membership in the visible church…is necessary now that the truth has been 
finally revealed in Jesus Christ‘ (ND 56). ‗The major doctrinal concern has been to preserve the Christus solus, not to 
deny the possibility of salvation to non-Christians‘ (ibid.).   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    35 
correlate of their inner experience of salvation‘ (ND 57). Thus salvation is only through Christ, 
yet also includes non-Christians. But this solution cannot satisfy either cognitivists or cultural-
linguists; cognitivists because a minimal, propositionally statable universal religious awareness 
seems to lead to a rationalistic deism rather than Christianity; cultural-linguists because they 
find untenable the basic premise of universal religious experience. Besides, the universalism 
behind the experiential-expressive approach is experiential, not propositional. So Lindbeck finds 
that ‗the only currently available alternative for those of a cultural-linguistic inclination is a 
prospective theory‘.59 
The theory Lindbeck favours abandons the notion of implicit faith in favour of honouring the 
traditional insistence on an explicit faith that comes ex auditu, from hearing.60 In other words, 
Lindbeck wants to combine not only salvation through Christ alone and the salvation of non -
Christians, but also the requirement for explicit faith that has histori cally been the factor 
creating tension between the first two, and this achieved by asserting ‗the possibility of a saving 
encounter with the risen Jesus Christ beyond the bounds of this present life‘ (ND 59). Seeking 
common  ground with some recent Roman Catholic authors, Lindbeck hypothesises that the 
ultimate fate of every human being is definitively decided at death, and only at death, and that 
this applies to believers as much as to non-believers.61 ‗All previous decisions, whether for faith 
or against faith, are preliminary‘.62 
Lindbeck has affirmed the possibility of religious superiority, and also the availability of salvation 
through Jesus Christ alone on the basis of explicit faith, but now he goes to some length to 
emphasise  that  his  cultural-linguistic  version  of  this  traditional-sounding  theory  removes  all 
ground for Christian boasting. Firstly, though Christians may think that theirs is the categorially 
true faith, they should remember that this advantage enables both truth and error, and that those of 
other religions not only lack the true faith, but also the means of knowingly rejecting it. Since both 
                                                       
59 ND 56-7, final quotation from p. 57. The logic required to reach such a conclusion would be (1) the two types of 
theory mentioned define the entire field of possibilities; (2) the first type are, without exception, theories that assume 
a universal religious experience (or a universal religion); (3) the universalist assumption is unacceptable on cultural-
linguistic grounds; and therefore (4) the acceptable theory (if there is one) must be of the second type. Unfortunately, 
Lindbeck‘s argument falls short of demonstrating (or even arguing) premises (1) and (2). It does, however, provide an 
opportunity for him to draw on and adapt some earlier work on this issue (see Lindbeck 1973 and Lindbeck 1974). 
60 Lindbeck pauses at this point to emphasise that the point under consideration is ‗whether a prospective fides ex 
auditu explanation of the salvation of non-Christians…is theologically as tenable as an ―anonymous Christian‖ one.‘ 
He thinks that both options ‗can be made consistent with scripture and tradition and with the contemporary need for 
interreligious dialogue‘, and so ‗the decision between them is likely to depend on the contemporary Zeitgeist (i.e., on 
nontheological factors) and therefore does not affect the issue of the Christian availability of the associated theories 
of  religion.‘  This  reminder  (see  also  n43  above)  provides  an  interesting  twist  to  the  theological/nontheological 
division in Lindbeck‘s thinking. Lindbeck is here foreshadowing the conclusions of the following argument, and he 
indicates that inner-Christian arguments do not allow a clear decision to be reached between the two views—both 
appear to be adequate. But this means, not that a decision cannot or need not be made, but that it may be made on 
other, nonreligious, grounds; and such a decision, because it is made on nontheological grounds, has no effect on 
theological assessments. It seems that the Zeitgeist is a world that has not been absorbed by the biblical world. 
61 Thus, in comparison with the experiential-expressive approach, Lindbeck transfers the possibility of a universal 
faith from this life to the transition between this life and the next. 
62 ND 57-9, final quotation from p. 59.   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    36 
truth  and  falsehood  are  open  to  Christians, their  situation is in  some  respects more  perilous. 
Judgement begins in the house of the Lord. In other words, Cyprian was only half right: not only 
is there no salvation outside the church, but no damnation either. Secondly, explicit faith is to be 
understood, ‗not as expressing or articulating the existential depths, but rather as producing and 
forming  them‘.63  Even  mature  Christians  are  beginners  in  this  process  of  formation.  ‗What 
distinguishes their love from that of the non-Christian is, not its present subjective quality, but 
rather the fact that it is beginning to be shaped by the message of Jesus‘ cross and resurrection‘ 
(ND 60). All human beings are like toddlers, but Christians have the advantage of beginning to 
learn the right language.64 Lindbeck wants us to see that his cultural-linguistic prospective view of 
salvation provides less reason for Christian boasting than does an experiential-expressive view 
invoking implicit without explicit faith.65 With such a wide and potentially all-embracing view of 
salvation, and with strong structural (cultural-linguistic!) reasons for religious humility, Lindbeck 
is satisfied that ‗the possibility of the salvation of non-Christians—while maintaining the solus 
Christus—can be affirmed with equal plausibility (or implausibility) from either an anonymous 
Christian or an eschatologically futuristic perspective‘ (ND 63).66 
                                                       
63 ND 60. For Lindbeck, Christians have just begun to have their ‗existential depths‘ produced and formed. However, 
in the following text it seems that Lindbeck is describing the production and formation, not of ‗existential depths‘, but 
of expressions of such depths. Lindbeck‘s ‗explicit faith‘ produces and forms ‗the existential depths‘, rather than 
expressing or articulating them. A third possibility, that faith might itself be the ‗existential depth‘, informed by and 
variably expressed in terms of a categorial framework, has been passed over. 
64 ND 61. Lindbeck downplays the ‗now‘ and emphasises the ‗not yet‘ of salvation, trading off the former against the 
latter: ‗The Holy Spirit which is in them is the pledge of, not the participation in, future glory.‘ ‗In short, every aspect of 
the new life exists in the modality of hope‘ (ND 60, emphasis added). The ‗presentness‘ of salvation is the merest 
beginning. Christians are outwardly undistinguished and boasting is therefore excluded: ‗Believers have by grace just 
begun to learn of the one in whom alone is salvation, but in moral and religious quality they are like other human beings, 
worse than some and better than others‘ (in loc). That is, since the fullness of salvation is the successful completion of 
learning (albeit practical and personal learning), the  mere beginning of learning is nothing to boast about. But by 
emphasising the futurity of salvation while merely mentioning grace, Lindbeck reverses the biblical priorities which 
exclude boasting, not because we have much to learn (which is true), but because salvation is God‘s gracious act of self-
giving to us, corporately and individually. It is a matter of how salvation is given rather how much has been received. 
Lindbeck‘s trading-off of the now and not yet of salvation is also unbiblical, in that New Testament writers see the Holy 
Spirit as both pledge and participation, while denying the possibility of a fully realised participation in the present age. 
65 ND 59-61. Lindbeck admits that ‗perhaps the greatest difficulty‘ with his view on the salvation of non-Christians is 
that ‗its prospective reference seems mythological or unreal to those who think science or philosophy  makes it 
impossible to affirm a temporally and objectively future eschaton‘ (ND 62). In response, he grants that this could well 
be a difficulty for those who are so inclined, but then, they have their own mythology—that of ‗an anonymously 
Christian preconceptual and prelinguistic experience of salvation‘ (in loc). The choice is less between myth and 
science, than between two mythologies, and Lindbeck thinks that ‗there is no specifically theological way of deciding 
between these competing charges of unreality‘ (in loc). So the prospective proposal looks unreal from an experiential-
expressive perspective, and the ‗anonymous Christian‘ proposal looks unreal on a cultural-linguistic view. Lindbeck 
has already indicated his belief that the witness of scripture and tradition on these proposals is ambiguous (ND 57-8). 
66 Lindbeck‘s ‗Afterword‘ in ND25 revisits the argument of ND chapter 3 so as to emphasise inter-religious questions 
and show that a cultural-linguistic approach does not foster isolationism and fideism as some critics fear (ND25 126). 
Lindbeck sees no need to change the basic argument of the original, but acknowledges that chapter 3 dwelt more on 
the particularity of religions than on their universal intent. He restores balance by referring to his basic definition of 
religions as ‗comprehensive interpretive schemes‘ (ND 32-33) and goes on to show that, with both particularity and 
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2.3  TECHNICALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS 
2.3.1  Excursus on Religion and Truth 
Lindbeck‘s ‗Excursus on Religion and Truth‘ appears as the final section of his third chapter, 
but its importance to his respondents, the significance of its technical detail, and its role as a 
hinge between the two major parts of his argument, all call for detailed treatment. Let us begin 
with  the  role  of  the  excursus  in  Lindbeck‘s  overall  argument.  To  this  point,  Lindbeck  has 
presented his cultural-linguistic theory of religion and justified it against its main rival. From a 
nontheological  standpoint  he  has  found  the  cultural-linguistic  view  to  be  superior  to 
experiential-expressivism, though there may be little difference in relation to their respective 
abilities to meaningfully accommodate Christian theology‘s traditional views of other religions. 
Propositionalism,  the  other  alternative  approach  considered  by  Lindbeck,  has  been  briefly 
described,  and  mentioned  at  various  points,  but  was  prominent  only  in  the  discussion  of 
unsurpassability.67 That discussion gave us the first example in  ND of a reasoning strategy 
which  becomes  sharper  in  the  second  part  of  the  book,  namely,  that  where  the  discussion 
concerns the truth content of religious affirmations Lindbeck effectively dismisses experiential-
expressive approaches from consideration in favour of contrasting his cultural-linguistic theory 
with propositionalism. We saw how, in relation to unsurpassability, Lindbeck took the issue to 
be about the unsurpassability of a religion‘s truth claims, and found experiential-expressive 
approaches problematic in this regard because they locate the specifically religious value of a 
religion not in its truth claims but in the evocative efficacy of its symbols. 
We must remember that one of Lindbeck‘s goals is to provide a theory of religion and doctrine 
that can be accepted by adherents of various Christian traditions (and perhaps by adherents of 
various religions) without requiring them to modify their existing beliefs. Such acceptability 
requires that a theory be compatible with the claims made in the various traditions—claims to 
truth, claims concerning themselves, and claims concerning other traditions. This is the basis of 
Lindbeck‘s claim that his cultural-linguistic proposal is religiously and doctrinally neutral—the 
truth or falsity of traditional claims about doctrine may be established through historical and 
theological  research,  but  the  proposal itself  can  accommodate  either  outcome  and  does  not 
prejudge the issue. To this extent it is therefore ‗available‘ to those traditions, i.e., there is no 
reason why they should not take it seriously. 
By contrast, experiential-expressivism requires subordination of traditional religious claims to the 
‗deeper truth‘ of the universality and commonality of religious experience; religion ‗expresses‘ or 
evokes this experience, but does not describe it, define it, or speak its true nature. All religions 
may be ‗true‘ precisely because they deal not in truth but in the aesthetic expression of human 
experience. Truth belongs to the realm of knowledge, of science, the realm to which experiential-
expressivism‘s  basic  assumption  (namely,  the  universality  and  commonality  of  religious 
experience) is assumed to belong. Thus, it is of the essence of experiential-expressivism that it 
                                                                                                                                                             
fideism (and associated religious imperialism) need not arise. Lindbeck‘s insight that religions are both particular and 
comprehensive is very important, and its implications are a major theme of this study. 
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cannot allow the possibility that traditional religious claims might indeed be ultimately meaningful 
as truth claims. Rather, experiential-expressivism already  knows the truth and rejoices in the 
richness of its many expressions—but what these really mean can now be articulated in other, 
more contemporary, terms. In short, because of this prior commitment, experiential-expressivism 
does not treat the traditional doctrines of Christianity (or of other religions) as serious truth claims, 
and  cannot  allow  itself  to  do  so.  Its  contribution  towards  doctrinal  reconciliation  is  the 
recommendation of a new faith in which doctrinal reconciliation does not matter anyway because 
doctrines do not matter. Hence, experiential-expressivism is not an option for those who take their 
own doctrinal traditions seriously. 
With experiential-expressivism eliminated, the field is left to the propositional and cultural-
linguistic approaches. Lindbeck‘s discussion of unsurpassability included a brief account of the 
way in which a cultural-linguistic view allows for the possibility of propositional truth, but, as 
he acknowledged, it is quite usual for religious adherents to treat their doctrinal affirmations as 
literally (i.e., propositionally) true. If the weekly recital of the Nicene Creed is an affirmation of 
what ‗we (Christians) believe‘ to be the case concerning the triune God and the life of the 
church, then it would seem that theories stressing the cognitive and/or propositional content of 
doctrine  have  an  advantage.  How  then  will  Lindbeck  ensure  that  his  own  proposal  is  not 
susceptible  to  the  kind  of  dismissal  already  meted  out  to  experiential-expressivism?  The 
excursus presents Lindbeck‘s more detailed case for the possibility of propositional doctrinal 
truth in a cultural-linguistic theory of religion. 
The great  strength of a  cognitive-propositional theory of religion is  that,  unlike a purely 
experiential-expressive  one,  it  admits  the  possibility  of  such  truth  claims,  and  a  crucial 
theological challenge to a cultural-linguistic approach is whether it also can do so (ND 63-4). 
The argument of the excursus begins with some further delineations of the concept of truth. In 
his  discussion  of  unsurpassability  Lindbeck  spoke  of  ‗propositional‘,  ‗symbolic‘  and 
‗categorial‘ truth, though we have seen (and Lindbeck readily admits) that ‗symbolic truth‘ is 
not really concerned with truth but with evocative efficacy. Moreover, since categories are not 
themselves affirmations but only enable affirmations to be made, one should perhaps speak (as 
Lindbeck sometimes does) of ‗categorial adequacy‘ rather than ‗categorial truth‘ (ND 47-9). 
There is also ‗ontological truth‘, understood as correspondence to reality, and Lindbeck has 
already hinted (ND 51) that this is to be distinguished from ‗propositional truth‘ understood as a 
propositionalist (or indeed common usage) might take it. It may be that for many purposes the 
two are the same, but there is a subtle and important distinction between them, and much of the 
excursus is taken up with expounding that distinction by means of another aspect of truth, what 
Lindbeck calls ‗intrasystematic truth‘, i.e., the truth of coherence. 
Utterances are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the total relevant context, 
which, in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-linguistic terms, is not only other 
utterances but also the correlative forms of life. Thus for a Christian, ―God is Three and 
One,‖ or ―Christ is Lord‖ are true only as parts of a total pattern of speaking, thinking, 
feeling, and acting. They are false when their use in any given instance is inconsistent with 
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―Christus est Dominus,‖ for example, is false when used to authorize cleaving the skull of 
the infidel (even though the same words in other contexts may be a true utterance). When 
thus employed, it contradicts the Christian understanding of Lordship as embodying, for 
example, suffering servanthood.68 
This passage, comprising a key sentence and an example that has subsequently attained a certain 
notoriety,  indicates  the  dual  importance  of  intrasystematic  truth  in  Lindbeck‘s  argument.69 
Firstly,  ‗utterances  are  intrasystematically  true  when  they  cohere  with  the  total  relevant 
context…‘. Cognitive-propositional theories of religion overlook the fact that our statements do 
not map directly onto reality, but only indirectly and always in terms of the categories available 
to  us.  We  have  already  seen  that  Lindbeck  holds  categorial  adequacy  to  be  a  necessary  if 
insufficient  condition  for  ontological  truth.  Now  the  same  statement  is  made  in  relation  to 
intrasystematic truth. It too is necessary though not by itself sufficient for ontological truth. A 
statement  that  is  intrasystematically  true  in  a  categorially  inadequate  system  is  merely 
meaningless, but it is ontologically true if the system is categorially adequate. Both categorial 
truth (adequacy) and intrasystematic truth (coherence) are necessary, and are together sufficient, 
conditions for ontological truth.70 
Secondly (and completing the sentence quoted above), Lindbeck draws attention to the nature of 
the ‗…total relevant context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-linguistic 
terms, is not only other utterances but also the correlative forms of life.‘ Religious utterance 
occurs in a more-than-linguistic context, the context of a whole religious way of life. Of course, 
not  all  meaning  systems  have  this  property.  Euclidean  geometry,  for  example,  is  a  purely 
conceptual system. From a cultural-linguistic perspective, a cognitive-propositional theory of 
religion  overlooks  the  crucial  difference  between  purely  conceptual  and  socially  embodied 
systems.71 Lindbeck develops this point into a modified definition of ‗propositional truth‘. 
For  propositionalists, truth  is  a property  of a  statement that corresponds  to  the  reality it is 
describing. Lindbeck can agree that such ‗ontological correspondence‘ is the ultimate criterion 
of truth, but he insists that, in the case of religious utterances, correspondence is not an attribute 
of statements in and of themselves, ‗but is only a function of their role in constituting a form of 
life, a way of being in the world, which itself corresponds to the Most Important, the Ultimately 
                                                       
68 ND 64. See also the discussion of this example in Marshall 2000, 191-4. 
69 Lindbeck himself weaves the two aspects together, whereas, for clarity and emphasis, I have distinguished them 
with ‗firstly‘ and ‗secondly‘. Nevertheless, both points emerge strongly in Lindbeck‘s text, serving to highlight what 
appear, from a cultural-linguistic perspective, to be shortcomings in the propositional approach. See ND 64-5. 
70 ND 64-5. Lindbeck finds that this analysis holds as well in religions as in geometry or the theatre, in which the 
‗truth‘  of  statements  can  only  be  appreciated  by  reference  to  the  existence  and  nature  of  a  particular  context. 
Statements in Euclidean geometry are intrasystematically true, but since Einstein indicated that the geometry of space 
is actually Riemannian rather than Euclidean, it is inappropriate to hold them to be ontologically true. Again, ‗the 
statement ―Denmark is the land where Hamlet lived‖ is intrasystematically true within the context of Shakespeare‘s 
play, but this implies nothing regarding ontological truth or falsity unless the play is taken as history‘ (ND 65). 
71 ‗It is unable to do justice to the fact that a religious system is more like a natural language than a formally 
organized set of explicit statements, and that the right use of this language, unlike a mathematical one, cannot be 
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Real‘ (ND 65). That is, Lindbeck goes beyond the medieval scholastic definition of truth as an 
adequation of the mind to the thing, and asserts that, ‗in the religious domain, this mental 
isomorphism of the knowing and the known can be pictured as part and parcel of a wider 
conformity  of  the  self  to  God‘  (ND  65).  Borrowing  from  J.  L.  Austin‘s  notion  of  a 
‗performatory‘ use of language, Lindbeck indicates that he will allow that a religious utterance 
‗acquires  the  propositional  truth  of  ontological  correspondence  only  insofar  as  it  is  a 
performance, an act or deed, which helps create that correspondence‘.72 
In something of an aside (but one which will have importance for us later) Lindbeck admits that 
this  ‗performatory  conformity  of  the  self  to  God  can  also  be  pictured  in  epistemologically 
realistic fashion as involving a correspondence of the mind to divine reality‘ (ND 66), but this 
concession  is  only  in  respect  of  a  ‗modest‘  propositionalism  that  conceives  of  ontological 
correspondence  in  a  quite  limited  way.  He  finds  such  an  approach  exemplified  in  Thomas 
Aquinas and some other ‗classical theists‘. Such a modest propositionalism acknowledges that 
we do not know what we mean by ‗God is good‘ apart from that ‗goodness‘ indicated in the 
biblical stories of creation, providence and redemption which shape believers‘ thoughts and 
actions. We might not know what ‗God is good‘ means in the being of God, but we can know 
what it means for us. ‗When propositionalism becomes as modest as in this ―agnostic‖ reading 
of Thomas Aquinas, it is no longer incompatible with the kind of ―performative-propositional‖ 
theological theory of religious truth that fits a cultural-linguistic approach‘ (ND 66-7). 
After this aside, Lindbeck gives further consideration to the specifically religious nature of the 
context within which religious utterances occur. This context is not abstract and static, as in 
mathematical systems, but concrete and dynamic—sentences are not simply there, they are used, 
with intent, by human beings. Religious sentences acquire propositional force not simply by virtue 
of containing terms referring to religious objects, nor merely through being used in a religious 
context, though both are necessary properties. It is necessary, in addition, that religious sentences 
be used religiously, that is, that they function in their context to further the speaker‘s (or, by 
extension, the community‘s) ontological correspondence to the reality to which they mean to refer. 
[Religious  sentences]  acquire  enough  referential  specificity  to  first-order  or  ontological 
truth or falsity only in determinate settings, and this rarely if ever happens on the pages of 
theological treatises or in the course of doctrinal discussions. The theological and doctrinal 
uses of, e.g., ―Christ is Lord‖ are important…but they are not propositional. For Christian 
theological purposes, that sentence becomes a first-order proposition capable…of making 
ontological  truth  claims  only  as  it  is  used  in  the  activities  of  adoration,  proclamation, 
obedience,  promise-hearing,  and  promise-keeping  which  shape  individuals  and 
communities into conformity to the mind of Christ (ND 68). 
                                                       
72  ND  64-5,  final quotation  from  p. 65.  At  this  point  Lindbeck  indicates  biblical  and  theological  parallels,  and 
concludes: ‗Paul and Luther…quite clearly believed that Christ‘s Lordship is objectively real no matter what the faith 
or unfaith of those who hear or say the words. What they were concerned to assert is that the only way to assert this 
truth is to do something about it, i.e., to commit oneself to a way of life; and this concern, it would seem, is wholly 
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This passage highlights a crucial point in Lindbeck‘s argument. Words in themselves, even whole 
sentences, are not, and do not become, affirmations or propositions apart from intentional acts 
occurring in determinate contexts. That is, affirmation or proposition is less a kind of sentence 
than a kind of use, a property not of words or sentences in themselves but of their function in a 
specific context. Lindbeck draws several implications from this. Concerning context, he reiterates 
the point made earlier regarding the salvation of non-Christians: ‗those unskilled in the language 
of faith not only fail to affirm but also cannot deny that ―Jesus is Lord‖‗ (ND 68). The occurrence 
of  meaningful  affirmation,  i.e.,  an  act  having  propositional  force,  depends  in  part  on  one‘s 
competence (skill) in the language and practice of the way of life that frames the act. And we have 
seen that ontological correspondence between statements and reality is also conditional on the 
categorial  adequacy  of  the  terms  employed.  So  Lindbeck  maintains  that  ontological 
correspondence (i.e., what propositionalists usually mean by ‗propositional truth‘) can only ever 
be indirect (rather than direct as propositionalists seem to assume), and that religious propositions 
should not be abstracted from their religious use by human beings (that is, they should not be 
treated as if they were simply a religious variety of the supposedly ‗purely rational‘ discourse 
beloved of Enlightenment philosophers). Yet Lindbeck wants to make clear that, despite these 
caveats,  where  categorial  adequacy  and  religious  skill  are  present,  ‗propositional  truth‘,  in 
something like the propositionalists‘ sense, can occur, and so a cultural-linguistic approach can 
very well accommodate the usual conviction of believers ‗that when they rightly use a sentence 
such as ―Christ is Lord‖ they are uttering a true first-order proposition‘.73 
Concerning  use,  Lindbeck  distinguishes  between  ‗first-order‘  religious  uses  which  are 
‗performance propositional‘ (as he puts it) and second-order uses which are not. First-order uses 
occur only when one is speaking religiously, that is, ‗when seeking to align oneself and others 
performatively  with  what  one  takes  to  be  most  important  in  the  universe  by  worshiping, 
promising, obeying, exhorting, preaching‘ (ND 69). ‗Technical theology and official doctrine, in 
contrast, are second-order discourse about the first-intentional uses of religious language‘ (in 
loc).  Here,  at  the  end  of  the  excursus,  the  metaphor  of  doctrine-as-grammar  comes  to 
prominence for the first time: 
Just as grammar by itself affirms nothing either true or false regarding the world in which 
language is used, but only about language, so theology and doctrine…assert nothing either 
true or false about God and his relation to creatures, but only speak about such assertions 
(ND 69). 
The conclusion to which the excursus leads, then, is that, on the one hand, a cultural-linguistic 
approach  shares  with  propositional  approaches  an  openness  to  epistemological  realism  in 
religious  affirmations.74  That  is,  Lindbeck‘s  proposal  can  provide  for  religious  affirmations 
being ‗propositionally true‘ in (roughly) the sense understood by propositionalists. On the other 
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74 Lindbeck also indicates in passing that the cultural-linguistic approach can be just as open to the possibility of 
nonrealism:  ‗There  is  nothing  in  the  cultural-linguistic  approach  that  requires  the  rejection  (or  the  acceptance) 
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hand,  the  nature  of  ‗propositional  truth‘  and  its  relation  to  doctrine  are  understood  quite 
differently in the two approaches, and with respect to these differences Lindbeck clearly finds 
the cultural-linguistic approach superior to the propositional. He has presented some general 
technical arguments to support this position in preparation for his fourth and fifth chapters, 
which go on to examine the relative merits of the two approaches in terms of their ‗availability‘ 
and usefulness for ecumenical discussions (ND 69). 
But that is a later discussion. In the excursus itself, the contrast that Lindbeck draws between 
these two views of doctrine and truth is as follows. In the propositional view, truth status is a 
property  of  sentences  (including  doctrinal  sentences),  and  the  truth  value  of  sentences  is 
evaluated in terms of their correspondence to reality—meanings of terms may be debated but 
are resolved by reference to other sentences that are evaluated in similar fashion. The task of 
doctrine is to state the truth, so that others may know it and affirm it in similar sentences. In the 
contrasting cultural-linguistic view, truth status is a property of affirmations, and the truth value 
of affirmations depends on both their coherence with the relevant categorial system and that 
system‘s adequacy with respect to the objects concerning which the affirmations are made. 
Moreover,  religions  as  cultural-linguistic  systems  are  primarily  concerned,  not  with 
correspondence between formal propositions and religious objects, but with enabling a growing 
conformity of persons to ultimate reality. Therefore, firstly, the context or categorial system 
relevant to the evaluation of the (intrasystematic) truth value of a religious affirmation includes 
not  only  other  utterances  or  sentences  but  a  whole  way  of  life;  secondly,  religious  truth, 
properly understood, is a property of acts of affirmation rather than of the sentence(s) used in 
those acts; and thirdly, doctrine does not make such ‗first-order‘ affirmations but belongs to 
‗second-order‘  discourse  concerned  with  the  ways  in  which  acts  of  affirmation  may  be 
appropriately made according to a particular religious way of life. That is, doctrine fulfils a 
‗grammatical‘ function in relation to the ‗language‘ of a religious tradition. 
Since most of the excursus compares conceptions of truth under the propositional and cultural-
linguistic approaches, my account of it could have been deferred until the ‗propositionalist side‘ of 
the conversation is more in view. Yet its inclusion here helps to explain the division that appears 
both in Lindbeck‘s book and in the ‗conversation‘ I am constructing. We have already seen that 
Lindbeck dismisses experiential-expressive views from his discussion of doctrine because those 
views dismiss doctrine from the realms of truth. In terms made clearer in the excursus, we can 
now see that Lindbeck‘s argument with experiential-expressivism is an argument over categories, 
or rather, categorial systems: the experiential-expressivist places religions in a wider categorial 
system according to which propositional truth is a property of scientific knowledge, the truth of 
religion lies in the common religious experience of humankind, and its varied expressions, which 
we know as ‗religions‘, have an aesthetic and evocative value akin to that of poetry, drama, and 
the arts. In this framework, talk of ‗doctrinal truth‘, or even of ‗doctrinal disagreement‘ is a 
confusion of categories, so Lindbeck‘s dismissal of experiential-expressivism from the doctrinal 
discussion may be after all a matter of little moment—an experiential-expressivist would not want 
to join a discussion on the terms Lindbeck has set. Experiential-expressivism cannot really be 
dismissed from the field, for it has already decided that the field is not worth contesting, or that the 
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it makes sense that he engages with experiential-expressivism in his discussion of religion, but not 
in his discussion of doctrine. 
By contrast, propositionalism does not encapsulate religion within, or absorb it into, a wider 
context, but rather takes the faith to be, simply, true—and in this sense its context of meaning is 
already  the  widest  possible.  Lindbeck  is  therefore  not  concerned  with  propositionalism‘s 
understanding of religion in general, for ‗religion in general‘ is not a category that features in 
propositionalism‘s self-understanding. Rather, Lindbeck is concerned with the nature of the 
truth  that  the  propositionalist  believer  espouses.  His  own  view  is  that  truth  in  general  and 
religious  truth  in  particular  are  not  what  propositionalists  take  them  to  be,  and  that  while 
religious affirmations may be true, they are never ‗simply‘ so. Consequently, as he goes on to 
argue and illustrate, a propositional approach to doctrine as religious truth is not adequate to the 
phenomena of doctrinal development or to the requirements of ecumenical negotiation. 
2.3.2  Lindbeck’s Last Word on Experiential-Expressive Theories 
The end of the ‗Excursus on Religion and Truth‘ marks the end of Lindbeck‘s third chapter and 
also  the  transition  from  his  dispute  with experiential-expressivism  concerning  the  nature  of 
religion to his argument with propositionalism concerning the nature of doctrine. If the logical 
structure of ND is as I have described it, we would not expect to find very much material 
relating to experiential-expressivism in Lindbeck‘s fourth and fifth chapters, and in fact, apart 
from scattered allusions to or repetitions of earlier comments,75 there is only one substantial 
passage, a long paragraph on socio-cultural aspects of the expressivist antipathy to doctrines as 
communal  norms  ( ND  77).  But  this  is  by  no  means  the  end  of  Lindbeck‘s  critique  of 
experiential-expressive ideas of religion. In his last chapter he turns from considering the nature 
of  doctrine  to  expounding  the  nature  of  theology,  and  how  its  methods,  sources  and 
responsibilities might appear if formed in a manner consistent with his view of religion and 
doctrine. This material has attracted close attention from experiential-expressivist theologians. 
In fact, for all that Lindbeck calls it an ‗addendum‘ to his argument, it is probably this chapter 
more than any other that has provoked the vigour of experiential-expressivist responses to ND.76 
But let us first consider the passage in chapter four. The argument of this chapter begins with a 
definition  of  doctrines  (here,  ‗church  doctrines‘)  as  ‗communally  authoritative  teachings 
regarding beliefs and practices that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the 
group in question‘ (ND 74). After making a series of clarificatory distinctions in preparation for 
his  discussion  of  theoretical  questions  about  the  nature  of  doctrine,  but  before  actually 
embarking on that discussion, Lindbeck finds he ‗must say a word about the difficulty in our 
day of taking doctrines seriously enough to try to understand them‘ (ND 77). The antipathy of 
the modern mood towards the very notion of communal norms can be seen as the product of 
religious and ideological pluralism and social mobility. Constantly faced with conflicting and 
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changing views, people lose confidence in all of them, even doubting that any of them might be 
true. In such an environment, doctrines no longer represent objective realities and are instead 
experienced  as  expressions  of  personal  preference.  Moreover,  in  their  role  as  communal 
standards of belief and practice, doctrines are experienced as an intolerable infringement on the 
liberty of the self. Such enduring value as may attach to the doctrines of the past lies in their role 
as  expressive  symbolisations  of  deeper  experiences  and  orientations  that  ought  now  to  be 
articulated in other and more contemporary ways. Thus, Lindbeck concludes, ‗an experiential-
expressive approach to religion can be easily, though not necessarily, used to legitimate the 
religious privatism and subjectivism that is fostered by the social pressures of the day‘ (ND 77). 
That is, experiential-expressivism accommodates contemporary culture and serves its agendas.77 
How can this ‗urge to accommodate‘ be countered? Perhaps partly by exposing ‗contemporary 
antidoctrinalism‘ as being no less a product of social processes than are the doctrines against 
which it is prejudiced (as Lindbeck has just done). Perhaps partly by arguing that the privatism 
and subjectivism underlying this prejudice tend to weaken ‗the social groups that are the chief 
bulwarks against chaos and against totalitarian efforts to master chaos.‘ But such intellectual 
arguments are relatively impotent in the face of the Zeitgeist of popular culture (ND 77-8). 
It may well be that some measure of what I have on other occasions called ―sociological 
sectarianism‖ is required. Religious bodies that wish to maintain highly deviant convictions 
in an inhospitable environment must, it would seem, develop close-knit groups capable of 
supplying the psychosocial ―plausibility structures‖ (as Peter Berger calls them) needed to 
sustain an alien faith. These groups need not withdraw into sociological ghettoes in the 
fashion of the Amish or the Hasidic Jews, but can rather form cells like those of the early 
Christian  movement  (or  of  the  more  recent  international  communist  one),  or  develop 
ecclesiolae in ecclesia similar to those of monasticism, early pietism, or some portions of 
the contemporary charismatic movement.78 
In short, Lindbeck feels that culture can be effectively opposed or criticised only by means of 
counter-culture, and that his intellectual arguments (including ND itself) will be of use only to 
the  extent  that  they  serve  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  vibrant  counter-cultural 
communities.79 Description of the kind of theology that will best fulfil this service is the burden 
of Lindbeck‘s last chapter. 
In  his  final  chapter,  having  completed  the  substantive  argument  for  his  cultural-linguistic 
proposal, Lindbeck explores its implications for theological method by means of an assessment 
                                                       
77 Lindbeck is well aware (as his ‗not necessarily‘ indicates) that this passage says nothing concerning experiential-
expressivism‘s truth or falsity. The argument here is purely a hermeneutic of suspicion in which Lindbeck casts 
himself in the role of a swimmer against the cultural tide. This also features among the outcomes of the discussion in 
the sixth chapter. 
78 ND 78. The ‗other occasions‘ to which Lindbeck refers are his earlier articles ‗Ecumenism and the Future of 
Belief‘ (Lindbeck 1968) and ‗The Sectarian Future of the Church‘ (Lindbeck 1971); see ND 89 n9, 28 n22. 
79 ‗The overcoming of the current aversion to doctrinal standards and its replacement by concern for correct doctrine 
depends much more on social and ecclesial developments than on the solution of the theoretical questions with which 
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of ‗the faithfulness, applicability and intelligibility of fundamentally different types of theology‘ 
(ND 112). The types of theology are those he associates with the various views of religion he 
has  considered:  ‗preliberal‘  or  traditionalist  theology  is  associated  with  propositionalism, 
‗liberal‘  theology  with  experiential-expressivism,  and  ‗postliberal‘  theology  with  his  own 
cultural-linguistic approach (ND 112). The introductory section of the chapter concludes with an 
acknowledgment  that  ‗each  type  of  theology  is  embedded  in  a  conceptual  framework  so 
comprehensive that it shapes its own criteria of adequacy‘, and so the most that can be done is 
‗to  comment  on  how  faithfulness,  applicability,  and  intelligibility  might  be  understood  in 
postliberal theologies, and then leave it to the readers to make their own assessments‘ (ND 113). 
The balanced and irenic discourse that this comment might lead one to expect never eventuates. 
Rather,  the  mood  of  the  first  few  chapters  returns,  as  postliberal  acceptance  of  Christian 
particularity is repeatedly contrasted with liberal theology‘s accommodation to the universalist 
presumptions of Western culture. Traditionalist (‗preliberal‘) positions are rarely mentioned. 
After prefatory remarks, the chapter proceeds in sections which explore the manner in which a 
postliberal theology might show itself to be faithful, applicable, and intelligible. In relation to 
faithfulness  (section  II,  ND  113-24),  postliberal  theology  is  ‗intratextual‘  in  that  religious 
meaning  is  taken  to  be  immanent  in  the  biblical  text,  and  the  faithfulness  of  theological 
descriptions may be measured by the degree to which they ‗correspond to the semiotic universe 
paradigmatically encoded in holy writ‘ (ND 114, 116). Meaning derives from the text and is 
applied to the world, so that Scripture functions as the lens through which Christians view the 
world. In contrast, the experiential-expressive and propositional approaches to religion use an 
‗extratextual‘ method insofar as they treat Scripture less as a way of seeing than as an object of 
study, and locate its religious meaning outside the text, either in the objective realities to which 
it refers (propositionalism), or in the experiences it symbolises (experiential-expressivism). As a 
result, they are preoccupied, not with the world depicted in the Bible, but with questions of 
facticity or experience (ND 114, 119). Nevertheless, Lindbeck has confidence in the power of 
Scripture to draw people into its world. There is no reason for surprise if the theology of an 
‗undoubted experiential-expressivist‘ such as Schleiermacher were in practice more intratextual 
than his theory of religion would seem to allow (ND 123). 
The manner in which postliberal theology will show its applicability is closely related to the 
manner of its faithfulness (section III, ND 124-8). A judgement of the relevance or practicality 
of an idea or course of action depends not only on knowledge of the concrete situation in which 
it will be applied but also on a vision of the end for which it will be applied. ‗A theological 
proposal is adjudged both faithful and applicable to the degree that it appears practical in terms 
of an eschatologically and empirically defensible scenario of what is to come‘ (ND 125). (On 
this  basis,  Lindbeck  titles  this  section  ‗applicability  as futurology‘.) The ‗crucial  difference 
between liberals and postliberals‘ in this area lies in ‗the way they correlate their visions of the 
present and of future situations‘ (ND 125). Liberals, says Lindbeck, ‗start with experience, with 
an account of the present, and then adjust their vision of the kingdom of God accordingly, while 
postliberals are in principle committed to doing the reverse‘ (ND 125-6). A liberal approach 
assimilates the kingdom of God to some construction of present trends, often in the name of 
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traditionalism  nor  to  progressivism,  but  to  an  intratextually  derived  eschatology  (ND  126). 
Lindbeck then includes another reflection on the culture of modern western societies, recycling 
earlier material to show how ‗the cultural climate is on the whole antithetical to postliberalism‘ 
and ‗favourable to liberalism.‘ Yet, he claims, although experiential-expressivism may have the 
advantage of being entirely at home in an economy of self-maximising individuals looking for 
the particular brand of transcendence that works for them, such atomistic individualism is self-
destructive in the end. The viability of a unified world of the future may depend on ‗communal 
enclaves‘ that ‗counteract the acids of modernity‘ by socialising their members into ‗highly 
particular  outlooks  supportive  of  concern  for  others  rather  than  for  individual  rights  and 
entitlements, and of a sense of responsibility for the wider society rather than for personal 
fulfilment‘. In this respect, ‗it may well be that postliberal theologies are more applicable than 
liberal  ones  to  the  needs  of  the  future‘.80  The  paradoxical  conclusion  is  that  ‗religious 
communities are likely to be practically relevant in the long run to the degree that they do not 
first ask what is either practical or relevant, but instead concentrate on their own intratextual 
outlooks and forms of life‘ (ND 128). The community is justified through its faithfulness. 
But  what  of  intelligibility  and  credibility  (section  IV,  ND  128-34)?  This,  surely,  is  liberal 
theology‘s greatest contribution, and it would seem to be postliberal theology‘s Achilles‘ heel. 
As Lindbeck puts the problem: 
First, intratextuality seems wholly relativistic: it turns religions, so one can argue, into self-
enclosed and incommensurable intellectual ghettoes. Associated with this, in second place, 
is the fideistic dilemma: it appears that choice between religions is purely arbitrary, a matter 
of blind faith (ND 128). 
Lindbeck is well aware that his proposal offends against liberalism‘s most basic apologetic 
inclinations. Liberalism has sought to make religion intelligible and credible ‗to the cultured and 
the uncultured among both its despisers and its appreciators‘ (ND 129). Its choice of expository 
categories has been apologetically motivated with a view to their clarity and communicability to 
the  modern  mind,  and  this  same  concern  ‗accounts  for  the  liberal  commitment  to  the 
foundational enterprise of uncovering universal principles or structures—if not metaphysical, 
then existential, phenomenological, or hermeneutical‘ (ND 129). Whether or not one sees ‗the 
liberal program‘ as an accommodation to culture, there is no question in Lindbeck‘s mind that it 
is  often  motivated  by  strong  ‗missionary  impulses‘.  But  if  his  own  proposal  respects  the 
motivation, it surely questions the value of the work in which it was expressed. As he says, 
‗postliberals  are  bound  to  be  skeptical,  not  about  missions,  but  about  apologetics  and 
foundations‘ (ND 129). Religions can no more be taught by means of translation than can a 
natural language. Like languages and cultures, religions can be understood only in their own 
terms, not by transposing them into an alien speech. Apologetic activity is not excluded, but it 
                                                       
80 ND 126-7. Lindbeck does not (quite) make the point, but he could also have argued that, if modernity‘s individualism 
and technological preoccupation corrode the societies on which it feeds, so nurturing the seeds of its own destruction, 
and if experiential-expressivism (theological liberalism) is in so many ways modernity‘s amiable fellow-traveller, then 
experiential-expressivism‘s lack of ‗otherness‘, of critical difference and distance, serves the destruction of the society to 
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‗must be of an ad hoc and nonfoundational variety rather than standing at the center of theology‘ 
(ND 129). This is not to ghettoise theology. On the contrary, liberal theology, with its apologetic 
focus  on  credibility  expressed  in  a  commitment  to  anthropological  universals,  ‗seems 
increasingly to be a nineteenth century enclave in a twentieth-century milieu‘. A postliberal 
approach,  with  its  commitment  to  intratextual  description,  may  well  have  interdisciplinary 
advantages in an academy where cultural-linguistic orientations hold sway.81 
But that argument concerns academic respectability, whereas, in the end, we are concerned with 
religious viability, and is this not endangered if, in a nonfoundationalist proposal lacking 
universal criteria of judgement, there appear to be no rational grounds for choosing between 
religions? In this respect at least, the cultural -linguistic proposal would appear to perfectly 
accommodate popular culture and deny what most religions traditionally affirm of themselves. 
Can  it  really  claim  any  advantage  over  experiential -expressivism  and  liberal  th eology? 
Lindbeck sees this as a crucial objection, and he faces it directly. 
Antifoundationalism…is not to be equated with irrationalism. The issue is not whether there 
are universal norms of reasonableness, but whether these can be formulated in some neutral, 
framework-independent language.…As T. S. Kuhn has argued in reference to science, and 
Wittgenstein  in  philosophy,  the  norms  of  reasonableness  are  too  rich  and  subtle  to  be 
adequately specified in any general theory of reason or knowledge.…Thus reasonableness in 
religion and theology, as in other domains, has something of that aesthetic character, that 
quality of unformalizable skill, which we usually associate with the artist or the linguistically 
competent.…In short, intelligibility comes from skill, not theory, and credibility comes from 
good performance, not adherence to independently formulated criteria. 
In this perspective, the reasonableness of a religion is largely a function of its assimilative 
powers, of its ability to provide an intelligible interpretation in its own terms of the varied 
situations and realities adherents encounter. The religions we call primitive regularly fail this 
test when confronted with major changes, while the world religions have developed greater 
resources for coping with vicissitude. Thus, although a religion is not susceptible to decisive 
disproof, it is subject…to rational testing procedures not wholly unlike those which apply to 
general scientific theories or paradigms (for which, unlike hypotheses, there are no crucial 
experiments). Confirmation or disconfirmation occurs through an accumulation of successes 
or failures in making practically and cognitively coherent sense of relevant data, and the 
process  does  not  conclude,  in  the  case  of  religions,  until  the  disappearance  of  the  last 
communities of believers or, if the faith survives, until the end of history.82 
                                                       
81 Lindbeck seems not to appreciate the irony here. So far as the quest for intellectual respectability is concerned, what is 
there that allows us to choose between postliberalism‘s ‗interdisciplinary advantages‘ and liberalism‘s appeal to the 
cultured despisers of religion? The major difference would seem to be about fifty years, that is, the change from late 
nineteenth-century universal anthropology to mid-twentieth century cultural anthropology. The appeal to the academy 
would seem to be much the same in each case: to put it crudely, ‗This is how the theorists think nowadays, and we 
should too.‘ The idea that postliberalism may in some respects be more liberal than ‗post-‘ turns out to be of some 
importance in this study. See Lindbeck as Schleiermacherian Theologian commencing on p. 127 below. 
82 ND 130-1. The typology of Lindbeck‘s argument may be (over)simplified as follows. Modern theologies have 
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In short, a religion‘s intelligibility is manifested primarily in the skill with which its adherents 
deal with life, and its credibility comes from the success of their dealing, but the particular skills 
involved and the measure of success are, ineluctably, products of the particular religion. On this 
view, the systematically prior and controlling apologetics of post-Cartesian natural theology and 
later liberal theology are simply an argument for one faith on the basis of another. And so 
Lindbeck draws on a very familiar argument: 
As Aquinas himself notes, reasoning in support of the faith is not meritorious before faith, 
but only afterward; or, in the conceptuality employed in this book, the logic of coming to 
believe, because it is like that of learning a language, has little room for argument, but once 
one has learned to speak the language of faith, argument becomes possible.83 
In other words, ‗I believe, with the result that I may understand‘.84 It is those who believe that 
can demonstrate understanding in the way that they deal with life. How then does one preach 
the gospel in a dechristianised world? This is a worthy problem. In Lindbeck‘s view, liberal 
foundationalists see this as the primary theological problem, while postliberals see it as the 
primary ecclesial (not ecclesiological) problem. That is, liberals will produce an apologetic 
theology, while postliberals will produce theologically informed catechesis aimed at building up 
the church to be the gospel‘s apologetic by demonstrating in life the comprehensiveness of its 
intratextual  reading  of  the  scriptures.  Unfortunately,  the  former  cultural  dominance  of 
Christianity  in  Western  societies  has  led  to  a  situation  of  Christianity  by  assumption. 
Widespread  Christian  nominalism  is  receptive  to  liberal  translations  of  the  gospel  into 
existential or psychological terms, but has immunised the unchurched masses against catechesis. 
This does not lead Lindbeck to shrink from his conclusions, but he ends on a rather depressing 
note. He doubts that a postliberal emphasis on building up the life skills of Christians through 
catechesis  can  succeed  until  the  dechristianisation  of  society  has  reached  a  point  where 
Christians are reduced to a small minority that, for the sake of survival, ‗form communities that 
strive without traditionalist rigidity to cultivate their native tongue and learn to act accordingly‘ 
(ND 133-4). Moreover, it is only in some (then) younger theologians that Lindbeck discerns the 
desire to serve the church by enabling Christians better to absorb the universe into the biblical 
world. He concludes with the hope, if not the confidence, that their tribe may increase (ND 135). 
In some ways, the material surveyed in this section is among the most interesting and important in 
ND,  for  it  draws  attention  to  ecclesiology,  and  especially  the  relation  between  theology  and 
church, as one of Lindbeck‘s primary concerns (and it is also a major concern of the broader 
postliberal movement in theology). Here, the implications of Lindbeck‘s notion of ‗intratextuality‘ 
                                                                                                                                                             
world and of humanity. The liberal strategy was to take science as truth and religion as aesthetics. The conservative 
(propositionalist) strategy was to take both science and religion as truth and seek to reconcile them. Lindbeck takes 
religions, like general scientific theories, to be large scale socio-cultural phenomena involving particular institutions, 
practices and ways of viewing the world. In short, in this aspect, religion is like science, but the popular view of 
science as a purely rational and empirical activity, a view commonly held among both liberals and conservatives, is 
an Enlightenment fairy tale. 
83 ND 132. Lindbeck notes the reference in Aquinas as ST II-II.2.10. 
84 A good argument for this translation of credo ut intelligam is given by Rogers (1998, 344).   LINDBECK‘S CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC VIEW OF RELIGION    49 
for the church‘s identity and particularity are of special interest. The questions raised include inter 
alia whether the church can draw its identity purely from the scriptures (‗intratextually‘) as he 
suggests, and articulate and demonstrate a distinctive vision for human flourishing on that basis; 
whether  the  strong  awareness  of  Christian  difference  implicit  in  Lindbeck‘s  ‗apologetics  by 
catechesis‘ might cause problems as much as solve them; and whether the effectiveness of his 
approach must really wait upon society‘s ‗dechristianisation‘. Concerning the relation between 
church and society, we might ask how the church can be considered a distinct cultural-linguistic 
entity when it is so intricately enmeshed in the wider societies in which it lives, and has only ever 
existed  in  symbiotic  (not  to  say  parasitic)  relation  with  them;  and  we  might  inquire  into 
Lindbeck‘s  conception  of  the  boundaries  between  church  and  non-church  cultural-linguistic 
systems. While such ecclesiological concerns are important to Lindbeck and other postliberal 
writers, I do not directly address those concerns in this thesis.85 Rather, as in  ND itself, they 
remain in the background, without ever being entirely absent. Lindbeck‘s opening and closing 
remarks  in  his  final  chapter  indicate  that  he  understands  that  chapter  to  be  presenting  the 
implications, the likely outworking, of the cultural-linguistic approach to religion and doctrine 
expounded in the body of the work, an approach that is rather more social-anthropological in 
character than theological or ecclesiological. He intends ND to be a kind of prolegomenon to 
ecclesiology, and indeed to theology in general.86 Its substantive argument concerns contemporary 
trends in social anthropology and their implications for our understanding of religion, doctrine, 
and theology. A properly attentive conversation with Lindbeck must walk the same ground.  
2.4  LINDBECK AND THE LIBERALS: REVALUING PARTICULARITY 
The heart of Lindbeck‘s anthropological critique of experiential-expressivism is his theorisation 
of  particularity  and  identity,  which  will  be  major  themes  in  this  study.  Lindbeck  accuses 
experiential-expressivism and liberal theology of treating particularity as an embarrassment, as 
something to be avoided, and which can be avoided, or, in more moderate formulations, at least 
ameliorated. In contrast, Lindbeck‘s postliberal theology not only accepts but embraces human 
particularity,  and  hence  Christian  particularity,  and  is  therefore  happy  to  contribute  to  the 
definition,  the  building,  and  the  deepening  of  Christian  identity.  Lindbeck  expected  that 
experiential-expressivists would find his view of the church and theology too suggestive of 
sectarianism, and he was certainly not disappointed in that regard.87 But the grounds of his 
                                                       
85 Later discussion will have implications for some of these questions. The idea of distinct cultural-linguistic systems 
will be considered in the next chapter. Intratextuality is problematic in view of the discussion of historicity in chapter 
6. The ‗boundary‘ between church and society is touched on in section 5.3.1 Learning from Wittgenstein. 
86 Concerning ND, Lindbeck remarks in his Foreword that ‗the theory of religion and religious doctrine that it proposes 
is not specifically ecumenical, nor Christian, nor theological‘ (ND 7), and that its pages are ‗intended as prolegomena to 
a book I have long been trying to write on the current status of the doctrinal agreements and disagreements of the major 
Christian traditions‘ (ND 8). In the concluding section of his final chapter, having emphasised that the ultimate test of 
theological viability is communal performance (ND 134), he comments that ‗the present chapter…is not a theological 
performance but at most a fragment of ad hoc apologetics. It discusses theology, but there is, by intratextual standards, 
scarcely a single properly theological argument in it‘ (ND 135). That Lindbeck‘s argument is pretheological, and hence 
not Christianly intratextual, is an important observation to which we shall repeatedly return. 
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proposal are less ecclesiological than anthropological: it is not so much that the church should 
embrace the particularity of a sectarian identity, as that all human understanding—be it religious 
or secular, liberal or postliberal, progressive or conservative, academic or commonsense—all 
human understanding is ineluctably particular and historically located; and no one, not even 
well-meaning Christian theologians, should pretend otherwise. 
Yet particularity itself is a multivalent and contested concept. Lindbeck takes particularity to be 
unavoidable; experiential-expressivism, on Lindbeck‘s account, thought it avoidable. Lindbeck 
embraces particularity, making a virtue of necessity; experiential-expressivism was embarrassed 
by particularity, and sought to subsume it under universality. But apart from its necessity and 
value, many different accounts of particularity have been offered. In what does particularity 
consist? How does it affect the production of meaning? How should we describe, and then deal 
with, the limitations it imposes, bearing in mind that our description and dealing will already be 
subject to those limitations? The crucial issue for Lindbeck may be the particularity of meaning, 
but this cannot be asserted without giving due attention to the meaning of ‗particularity‘, and 
reconsidering our basic attitudes to it. Not surprisingly, liberal scholars did not simply accept 
Lindbeck‘s account of particularity, and were not content to join the conversation on his terms. 
In the following chapter we will listen to some liberal contributions, and re-consider Lindbeck‘s 
proposal in their light, seeking a better understanding of particularity, and a genuine liberal-
postliberal engagement. 
                                                                                                                                                             
theology, the church and the university‘ (Gustafson 1985). By ‗sectarianism‘ in theology Gustafson means the isolation 
of ‗Christian theology and ethics from critical external points of view‘ or ‗the separation of theology from other ways of 
construing the world‘ (p. 83). Lindbeck is arguing that sectarianism may be less a temptation than a tactical necessity, 
and even a virtue, for the church and its theology. He fears that the counter-cultural resistance on which the church must 
embark for the sake of the world may be impossible without a sectarian stance, and his final chapter offers a theological 
approach that can support such a stance. He presents similar arguments in Lindbeck 1971 and 1989a. Apart from 
Lindbeck, Stanley Hauerwas is also commonly identified as relying on, or assuming, a sectarian position. For example, 
Gustafson (1985, 84-5, 88) identifies Hauerwas with ethical (as he identifies Lindbeck with theological) sectarianism. 
See also the articles in Miscamble 1987, which include a rejoinder by Hauerwas. 51 
3 
 
WITH RESPECT TO LEARNING: 
A LIBERAL–POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION 
After the publication of ND in 1984, criticism was quickly forthcoming, especially from those 
who felt themselves to be identified with the liberal theology that Lindbeck had criticised under 
the label of ‗experiential-expressivism‘. In this chapter I begin by surveying some early liberal 
responses, and especially that of David Tracy, with a view to clarifying misunderstandings and 
identifying the real issues at stake. Among other things, Tracy calls for due recognition of 
liberal theology‘s responses to the fact of particularity—responses which Lindbeck seems to 
have ignored. Partly in response to this call, the major part of the chapter examines Delwin 
Brown‘s  account  of  culture  and  theology.  Throughout  the  chapter,  Lindbeck‘s  critics  will 
prompt us to re-read ND, and ND will prompt us to put certain questions to Lindbeck‘s critics. 
This conversational reading will reveal strengths and weaknesses in both liberal and postliberal 
accounts of particularity, and identify areas in which the two approaches tacitly agree. These 
agreements will be further investigated in the following chapter. 
3.1  THE LINDBECK – TRACY ‗DEBATE‘ 
The first substantial responses to ND appeared in theological journals that devoted whole issues 
to discussion of its argument.1 Although David Tracy‘s was not the most substantial of the 
articles responding to ND in the July 1985 issue of The Thomist, Tracy was often mentioned as 
a protagonist with Lindbeck in the North American liberal-postliberal debate.2 
3.1.1  Tracy on the Nature of ‘The Nature of Doctrine’ 
Tracy finds two loosely-connected studies in ND: one dealing with the nature of doctrine and 
the rule theory; the other articulating the ‗cultural-linguistic‘ paradigm for theology over against 
‗propositionalist‘  and  ‗experiential-expressivist‘  alternatives.3  In  his  view,  Lindbeck‘s 
interpretations of doctrine and of religion and theology are coherent, but he does not see ‗how 
[a] grammatical reading of doctrine entails a grammatical reading of theology or a cultural-
linguistic reading of religion.‘ For Tracy, this is ‗the greatest puzzle of Lindbeck‘s argument as 
                                                       
1 In The Thomist 49:5 (July 1985) see Placher 1985, O‘Neill 1985, Buckley 1985, and Tracy 1985a. In Modern 
Theology 4:2 (January 1988) see Michalson 1988, Wainwright 1988, Phillips 1988, Barrett 1988, S. Williams 1988, 
Surin 1988. 
2  See, for example, Comstock 1987, Lints 1993, Stell 1993, and Holland 1994. The debate was often enough 
characterised as a tale of two cities (Chicago versus New Haven), or of two universities (Chicago versus Yale). 
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a whole‘—‘this question of ―coherence‖ or ―entailment‖ between the title and sub-title of this 
programmatic work‘.4 
Tracy appears to have misread Lindbeck on this point. Admittedly, Lindbeck can speak of ‗the 
theory of religion and doctrine that we have been exploring‘ (ND 108) and even of ‗a rule 
theory of doctrine and the associated cultural-linguistic view of religion‘ (ND 91-2). However, 
in his programmatic statements the direction of implication is consistently from the cultural-
linguistic theory of religion to the rule theory of doctrine, that is, from the larger frame to the 
smaller.  This  direction  is  controlled  by  the  linguistic  metaphor,  which  frames  and  unifies 
Lindbeck‘s whole argument: doctrine is to religion as grammar is to language (ND 18, 69, 80-1, 
84). Lindbeck sees his theory of doctrine as being entailed by, or implicit in, his theory of 
religion. The reverse relation is never contemplated. 
Tracy, however, apparently takes Lindbeck to be beginning from the rule theory of doctrine and 
somehow deriving theories of theology and religion from that. The absence of any such derivation 
in ND lets Tracy view these elements of Lindbeck‘s thesis in relative isolation and assess them 
separately.  While  Tracy  is  quite  positive  towards  Lindbeck‘s  exposition  of  ‗the  grammatical 
aspect of theology‘s wider task‘ and the rule theory of doctrine,5 he offers a decidedly negative 
evaluation of Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory as a potential new paradigm for religion and 
theology. But from the viewpoint of Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory, the very possibility of 
such separate consideration indicates a basic misunderstanding of the argument. 
Tracy seems not to appreciate that, as Lindbeck himself points out, the cultural-linguistic theory is 
not  really  a  theological  proposal  at  all,  even  though  it  is  theologically  motivated.6  Rather, 
Lindbeck wants to draw attention t o what have become standard conceptual tools in social 
anthropology and the philosophy of science, and then to apply these tools to the craft of theology 
(ND 17-8, 20, 25, 30-2). He then pursues the question of whether or not these tools are useful and 
appropriate for that craft (ND 46-7, 73, 91, 112). But new tools have a way of transforming the 
craft in which they are employed. Some objections to Lindbeck‘s proposal are most concerned 
with what Christian theology would become if the proposal were adopted, as in Tracy‘s putatively 
argument-closing accusations of ‗relativism‘, ‗confessionalism‘, ‗fideism‘, and ‗Barthianism‘.7 
That  such  epithets  are  employed  without  explanation  or  argument  concerning  their  content 
implies that, for Tracy, the extent of their truth is the extent to which Lindbeck‘s proposal lies 
beyond  the  theological  pale.  Such  terms  may  reveal  more  of  Tracy‘s  position  than  of 
Lindbeck‘s, for it is immediately apparent from the manner in which they are employed that the 
                                                       
4 Tracy 1985a, 461-2. 
5 Tracy 1985a, 471. Note that, while Lindbeck sees doctrine  qua doctrine as essentially grammatical in nature, and 
theology as disciplined reflection on that grammar, Tracy‘s reference to ‗theology‘s wider task‘ flags one of the 
major points of liberal/postliberal divergence: that of the scope of theology, its task and its audience. 
6 ND 7-8, 10, 32, 46. Several commentators have noted that the core of Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory is not 
theology, but anthropology (and not even theological anthropology). See for example Allik 1993a passim, and Higton 
1997, 85-6. In ND, Lindbeck is quite clear that his cultural-linguistic theory is a ‗pre-theological‘ or ‗non-theological‘ 
proposal, and he repeated the point in a later article (Lindbeck 1997, 448-9 n2). 
7 Tracy 1985a, 461, 465, 467-8, 469-70.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      53 
one making these charges is dedicated to making Christian faith intelligible by means of a 
common rationality. But the nature of intelligibility and rationality is framed by the nature of 
those who seek them, that is, by the nature of human beings, so a crucial difference between 
Tracy and Lindbeck lies in their respective anthropologies. From Lindbeck‘s viewpoint, Tracy 
has missed the essentially anthropological nature both of the cultural-linguistic theory and of 
Tracy‘s own objections to it, and so has not given content and clarity to what may be his deepest 
misgivings. From Tracy‘s viewpoint, Lindbeck‘s anthropological critique of the ‗experiential-
expressivist‘ paradigm mistook its target and failed to engage a worthier opponent. 
3.1.2  Experience and Expression in Lindbeck and Lindbeck’s ‘Liberalism’ 
In Tracy‘s view, Lindbeck‘s analysis of the liberal theological paradigm under the ‗experiential-
expressive‘ label is seriously, even fatally, flawed. This is a crucial point for Tracy, since a major 
element of Lindbeck‘s case (and certainly a major element in the interest stirred by the book) is 
the justification of the cultural-linguistic theory over against this ‗dominant‘ theological tradition.8 
Tracy  finds  Lindbeck‘s  account  wanting  in  its  description  of  liberal  theology  as  a  purely 
modernist theological version of the ‗turn to the subject‘. That is, Lindbeck sees liberal theology 
as  a  foundationalist  approach  based  on  an  assumed  universal  inner  experience  of  absolute 
dependence which is pre-reflective, pre-linguistic and non-discursive. Lindbeck, says Tracy, 
maintains  that  experiential-expressivists  ‗possess  a  ―unilateral‖  understanding  of  the 
relationship of experience and language as well as of experience and culture when what we need 
is a ‗dialectical‘ understanding of these complex relationships (1985a, 462). 
By including Lindbeck‘s passing mention of a dialectical experience-language relation (ND 33) 
in this summary of Lindbeck‘s critique, Tracy has been too kind. Lindbeck does see the liberal 
tradition as having a unilateral view of the relation between experience and its cultural-linguistic 
expression, but he does not develop a different kind of relation (such as a dialectical one)—he 
merely  reverses  its  direction.  For  Lindbeck,  a  cultural-linguistic  milieu  forms  the  idiom  or 
unconscious  a  priori  in  terms  of  which  experience  is  conceptualised  and  expressed.  In 
comparison with the experiential-expressive paradigm, the cultural-linguistic view proposes a 
‗reversal of the relation between the inner and the outer‘ (ND chapter 2, especially pp. 34, 36). 
Lindbeck allows that the relation between religion and experience is really dialectical rather 
than unilateral; but the cultural-linguist is simply not interested in this possibility: 
It  is  simplistic  to  say…merely  that  religions  produce  experiences,  for  the  causality  is 
reciprocal. Patterns of experience alien to a given religion can profoundly influence it. The 
                                                       
8 Lindbeck repeatedly describes the experiential-expressive tradition as ‗ascendant‘, ‗dominant‘, and ‗pervasive‘ (ND 
19, 21-3, 25, 29 n30, 31, 124). The frequency with which Tracy repeats and apostrophises the term ‗dominant‘ may 
be merely a rhetorical device (‗Brutus is an honourable man‘), or an indication of discomfort at being labelled a 
dominator. But the label is of doubtful value in any case.  While Lindbeck sees experiential-expressivism as an 
oppressor of religion and theology, his own cultural-linguistic theory derives from the social anthropology that he 
takes to be dominant in contemporary cultural studies. Is cultural-linguistic theory simply hoping for the triumph of a 
new oppressor over an older one? Or is it an opportunistic alliance by means of which oppressed traditionalists may 
resist the encroachments of ‗dominant‘ liberals? Answers to these questions will emerge in this chapter and the next.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      54 
warrior passions of barbarian Teutons and Japanese occasioned great changes in originally 
pacifistic Christianity and Buddhism. These religions were pressed into service to sanction 
the  values  of  militaristic  societies  and  were  largely  transformed  in  the  process.  Yet  in 
providing new legitimations for the ancient patterns, they also altered the latter. Presumably 
the inner experiences as well as the code of behaviour of a Zen samurai or a Christian 
knight are markedly different from those of their pagan or pre-Buddhist predecessors. Yet, 
as  this  illustration  shows,  in  the  interplay  between  ―inner‖  experience  and  ―external‖ 
religious and cultural factors, the latter can be viewed as the leading partners, and it is this 
option which the cultural and/or linguistic analyst favours.‘ (ND 33-4) 
The example Lindbeck employs here does not make the desired point. The situation depicts one 
of  the  ways  in  which  two  cultural-linguistic  systems  (a  pacifist  religion  and  a  militaristic 
culture) can interpenetrate to create a new cultural-linguistic framework (thereby serving, as 
well  as  baptising,  the  political  interests  of  ruling  elites).  It  does  not  depict  a  potentially 
dialectical or reciprocal  relation between religion (or  culture)  and experience,  in  which the 
religion  provides  the  framework  for  the  conceptualisation  of  experience,  while  the  actual 
experiences (as encounters with oneself or with the world) have the potential to resist a priori 
conceptualisations or to raise questions which may suggest modification of the framework. 
The element of arbitrariness in Lindbeck‘s discussion at this point is striking given the crucial 
role  of  the  hermeneutical  relation  between  experience  and  culture  in  his  cultural-linguistic 
theory. Lindbeck‘s view of this relation as essentially unidirectional—from cultural-linguistic 
framework to experience and conceptualisation—affects all the major elements of his position. 
For him, it is the truthfulness (or otherwise) of the available conceptual categories which creates 
(or frustrates) the possibility of ontological truth for actual affirmations. Moreover, he maintains 
a clear distinction between framework on the one hand and experience and conceptualisation on 
the other. Doctrine qua doctrine is framework—it specifies a grammar, a set of rules which 
enables affirmations to be made, and of itself affirms nothing. Theology is the ‗second-order‘ 
activity  of  reflection  on  doctrine,  and  makes  affirmations  concerning  only  the  grammar 
according to which ‗first-order‘ affirmations can be made (ND 69, 80). 
At this point Lindbeck and the liberal tradition he is criticising are similar, though the similarity 
is that of a mirror image in which right and left appear reversed. As noted above, Lindbeck is 
happy to describe the cultural-linguistic view of the experience/religion relation as a simple 
reversal of the ‗liberal‘ conception.9 In both cases the relation is unilateral, with one pole taken 
as a given (religious experience or location in a cultural-linguistic framework) and the other as 
its  variable  expression  (the  expression  of  religious  experience  or  the  conceptualisation  of 
experience). The task of theology is to inquire into and reflect on the nature of the given, and to 
demonstrate  or  call  in  question  the  coherence  of  the  variable  expression  with  the  given 
experience or framework that gave rise to it.10 
                                                       
9 Other commentators see much the same similarity. Stell (1993, 680-8) notes a ‗mirror-image reversal‘, documenting 
and discussing it at some length. 
10 The more dialogical nature of Tracy‘s conception of theology is evident in his ‗correlational‘ understanding of 
theological method, and this is clearly one of the ways in which he sees himself as having moved beyond a straight-  A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      55 
3.1.3  Lindbeck’s Account of Liberal Theology 
Regarding Lindbeck‘s analysis of liberal theology, Tracy objects that Lindbeck has completely 
ignored developments in the liberal tradition during the twentieth century. He acknowledges 
that Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory offers some insights that are not found in the work of 
liberals of a previous generation; but he will not allow Lindbeck to suppose he is successfully 
criticising the liberal tradition on anthropological grounds when he ignores the ways in which 
the contemporary heirs of that tradition have criticised their own forebears on the same grounds 
and sought to transform the tradition from within. It is not as though the liberal tradition has 
ignored or failed to recognise the recent developments in social anthropology and philosophy 
which Lindbeck assumes as the basis of his critique.11 
The force of Tracy‘s comments on Lindbeck‘s analysis of the ‗experiential-expressive‘ tradition 
must be admitted. Lindbeck has not given any attention to the effect on that tradition of the 
conceptual developments he is seeking to make theologically available (ND 47, 69, 91). Indeed, 
his claim to be making these insights ‗available‘ to theology is tantamount to a claim that 
theology, of whatever methodological persuasion, has not hitherto paid them any attention. It 
can hardly be expected that either of the alternative theological traditions criticised by Lindbeck 
would allow such a claim. 
But  does  the  transformed  liberal  tradition  in  fact  evade  or  adequately  counter  Lindbeck‘s 
criticism  of  the  earlier  liberal  position?  Tracy  is  cautiously  confident  that  it  does  and,  not 
unreasonably, he argues that it is this contemporary ‗hermeneutical-political‘ liberal tradition 
that Lindbeck must deal with if he is to make a case for his methodological proposal over 
against the liberal tradition. 
Tracy  sees  the  theological  tradition  stemming  from  Schleiermacher  and  continuing  in  this 
century  through  Tillich,  Eliade,  Rahner,  and  Lonergan  as  having  already  responded  to  the 
‗issues which Lindbeck announces as news‘ (Tracy 1985a, 463). Following the classic ‗turn to 
the  subject‘  of  nineteenth  century  theology,  these  new  ‗turns‘  respond  to  the  changing 
contemporary understandings of the nature of the subject, and how the subject knows and lives. 
Under the headings of a ‗turn to an explicitly hermeneutical position‘, and a ‗turn to a radical 
de-privatizing of the…tradition by political, liberation and feminist theologians‘, Tracy sees the 
liberal tradition as squarely facing, and transforming itself in response to, the same issues which 
Lindbeck sees as bringing its eclipse (Tracy 1985a, 463). 
The hermeneutical turn, arising largely from the work of Gadamer and Ricoeur, has rethought 
the  relation  between  experience  and  language  very  much  in  dialectical  terms,  ‗without 
abandoning  the  classical  liberal  insight  into  a  non-empiricist  notion  of  experience‘  (Tracy 
1985a, 463). Tracy is careful not to presume the final success of this hermeneutical rethinking 
                                                                                                                                                             
forward ‗experiential-expressivist‘ approach. Tracy‘s recasting of the liberal project is discussed below, but here we 
can note his view of theology  as working  with  two  givens or ‗constants‘ —the contemporary  situation and the 
Christian tradition—as it seeks to bring interpretations of these constants into mutually critical correlation. Most 
succinctly, see Tracy 1985b, 36, 52-9. 
11 Tracy 1985a, 462-7.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      56 
of experience, but he notes that it results in the abandonment of the earlier liberal ‗expressivist‘ 
understanding of language in favour of a new understanding which is far more dialectical than 
Lindbeck‘s mere reversal of the old formulation (Tracy 1985a, 463-4). 
Further,  although  Tracy  does  not  stress  the  point,  he  clearly  sees  the  new  hermeneutical 
understanding as leading the liberal tradition to abandon its earlier assumptions in relation to a 
universal inner-religious experience (Tracy 1985a, 467-8). The hermeneutical recasting of the 
language/experience  relation,  and  the  concomitant  abandonment  of  liberal  pretensions  to 
universal foundations, have resulted in a two-way movement within liberal theological method. 
‗Hermeneutically  informed  theologians…find  themselves  called  to  become  more  cultural-
historical-political‘  (Tracy  1985a,  464)  At  the  same  time,  political  theologians,  liberation 
theologians and feminist theologians have become more concerned with hermeneutics in order 
to achieve an adequate political theology. Tracy concludes that those who continue to identify 
themselves with the liberal tradition — 
should  hardly  feel  overwhelmed  by  [Lindbeck‘s]  charge  of  ‗experiential-expressivism‘ 
when their own work has challenged the ‗expressivist‘ and ‗privatist‘ tendencies of the 
earlier  liberal  experiential  traditions.  They  have  done  so  by  developing  explicitly 
hermeneutical-political  theologies:  theologies  critical  of  the  earlier  liberal  accounts  of 
language and experience and self-critical of some of their own earlier formulations. But 
they have also done so without abandoning the noble correlative enterprise of  the great 
liberals and their self-critical successors…(Tracy 1985a, 465) 
In short, Tracy maintains that the heirs of the liberal tradition have already learnt the lessons 
that Lindbeck wishes to teach, and have done so not by abandoning the liberal tradition, but by 
transforming it. Whereas David Ford suggested that ‗there could be a liberal Christianity in 
cultural-linguistic mode,‘12 Tracy argues that it already exists. The question is then whether the 
transformation of the liberal tradition is in fact adequate to the problems it sought to transcend. 
Even Lindbeck would perhaps answer this question hopefully, if not positively. After all, if both 
liberals  and  postliberals  are  responding  to  largely  the  same  challenges,  albeit  responding 
differently, this would be analogous to a situation of categorial adequacy, which for Lindbeck is 
a  precondition  of  genuine  engagement.  Such  a  situation  might  allow  the  identification  of 
illusory  disagreements  arising  from  misunderstandings,  enable  real  agreements  and 
disagreements to emerge with greater clarity, and thus lead to fruitful, if still energetic, debate. 
In preparation for such a conversation, I outline in the following sub-sections three issues that 
emerge  from  a  comparison  of  Lindbeck‘s  proposal with Tracy‘s  theological  method  of  the 
1980s.13 These are, firstly, intelligibility, which is important to both Tracy and Lindbeck but 
                                                       
12 Ford 1986, 281. Section 3.2 below will examine an example of such a theology. 
13 Developments in Tracy‘s account of theological method over about twenty years since 1975 have been the subject 
of several studies; see especially Thomas 1992 and Sanks 1993. In contrast, Lindbeck has not felt obliged to revise 
the proposals in ND, and in a recent article was content to refer readers to ND for his views on doctrine and theology 
(see Lindbeck 1997, 448-9 n2). My intention in the following pages is to compare two roughly contemporaneous 
bodies of work, and to this end I will concentrate on Tracy‘s work up to the late 1980s. I identify some tensions in 
Tracy‘s work—tensions that had some significance for the later development of his theology—but I do not address   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      57 
differently described in each case; secondly, the distinction between Christian tradition and the 
contemporary world; and lastly, the particularity and diversity of human understanding. The last 
two are problematic for both authors, though in different ways. All three issues will be recurring 
motifs in the remainder of the thesis. 
3.1.4  The Experience of Intelligibility 
Already in 1985, Tracy lamented that 
a  fruitful  and  critical  discussion  between  Lindbeck‘s  ‗cultural-linguistic‘  model  and  a 
‗hermeneutical-political‘ model has not yet been posed sharply by anyone—and surely not 
by Lindbeck‘s description of the alternative as ‗experiential-expressive‘.14 
Since the July 1985 issue of The Thomist in which Tracy‘s article appeared, a considerable 
number of articles have contributed to the ‗fruitful and critical discussion‘ sought by Tracy.15 
Some of these have highlighted the issue of the intelligibility of Christianity as an area of basic 
difference  between  Lindbeck‘s  proposal  and  liberal-revisionist  methodology.  For  example, 
Gordon Michalson, in his article introducing the responses to ND in the January 1988 issue of 
Modern  Theology,  muses  on  various  possible  reasons  why  Lindbeck‘s  book  attracted  the 
attention it did. After mentioning (and passing over) the theories of religion and doctrine, and 
‗Lindbeck‘s relative insouciance about ontological truth claims‘,16 Michalson suggests that 
the most sensitive nerve ending touched by Lindbeck concerns the question of the sheer 
intelligibility of the Christian faith, by which I mainly mean the degree to which Christian 
faith can be placed in correlation with natural modes of human consciousness.17 
Michalson sees Lindbeck‘s position on the intelligibility of the Christian faith as controlling his 
whole argument. In fact, he says Lindbeck ‗is not adopting [the cultural-linguistic] approach and 
then seeing where it leads him theologically; rather he is adopting it because, as theologian, he 
already  knows  where  he  wants  to  end  up.‘18  Michalson‘s  point  seems  to  be  that  Lindbeck 
adopted the cultural-linguistic theory because he found it congenial to the Barthian convictions 
                                                                                                                                                             
that development in any detail. In brief, Tracy‘s methodological thought showed a deepening recognition of the 
challenges of radical historicity and the insights of critical hermeneutics. For example, Tracy‘s earlier espousal of 
‗common experience‘ as the core insight of the liberal theological tradition in Blessed Rage for Order (Tracy 1975) 
was progressively modified in the light of the irreducible particularities of human experience emphasised by critical 
theorists. By the end of the 1980s, e.g., in Plurality and Ambiguity (1987), Tracy acknowledged the radical plurality 
of situations and theologies as a fundamental datum for theology. This is not to say that Tracy abandoned the quest 
for theological conclusions that are universal in scope, but he increasingly recognised that even putatively universal 
conclusions  are  nevertheless  particular  in  that  they  seek  to  survey  all  of  reality  from  one  vantage  point.  This 
recognition is evident in the evolution of Tracy‘s formulations of his basic ‗correlational‘ method. 
14 Tracy 1985a, 467. 
15 Notable among these are essays which seek to clarify or carry on the Lindbeck -Tracy debate (Michalson 1988, 
Lints 1993, Stell 1993, Holland 1994), comment on the liberal response to Lindbeck (Allik 1993b) or respond to 
Lindbeck from within particular revisionist theologies (Pauw 1993, Garrett 1997, Reynolds 1997). 
16 Here quoting Jackson in Wood and Jackson 1985, 241. 
17 Michalson 1988, 111. 
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that predetermined the goal of his argument. The new twist in the otherwise old conversation is 
Lindbeck‘s denial of the possibility of any inner experience which is not already framed in 
terms of the subject‘s cultural-linguistic tradition.19 
But such a hermeneutic of suspicion tells us nothing about the validity or otherwise of Lindbeck‘s 
argument.  Lindbeck  presents  the  issue  of  intelligibility  as  an  anthropological  issue,  not  a 
theological one (though it is certainly an issue which theology will want to address). It may well 
be, and indeed it could be hardly be otherwise, that Lindbeck‘s theological sympathies (‗Barthian‘ 
or otherwise) have influenced his appropriation of a cultural-linguistic approach to religion and his 
position on the intelligibility of the Christian faith. But to argue that the use to which an idea is put 
tells us anything about its validity or its appropriateness for other uses is a logical non sequitur. 
Nevertheless, Michalson‘s identification of intelligibility as the crucial arena in which liberal 
thinkers must resist Lindbeck‘s proposal is accurate, the degree of accuracy being indicated by 
the all but visceral quality of the negative reactions of some liberal theologians to Lindbeck‘s 
allegedly ‗Barthian‘ position on the intelligibility of Christian faith. The nature of this reaction 
indicates that the issue of intelligibility may be at least as determinative for their position as for 
Lindbeck‘s. Indeed, for liberal-revisionists, and especially those who, like Tracy, describe their 
method in terms of ‗correlation‘, it may not be an overstatement to claim that the intelligibility 
of religious faith functions as both presupposition and methodological guide.20 
To the extent that this is the case, the importance for liberals of Lindbeck‘s recasting of the 
experience-expression  relation  becomes  clear.  Tracy  points  out  that  the  classic  post-Kantian 
liberal tradition protected the notion of ‗non-empirical experience‘, and defended it again in the 
mid-twentieth  century  against  logical-positivism.  In  his  exposition  and  defence  of  the  liberal 
tradition against Lindbeck‘s misconceived critique, Tracy is at pains to stress the retention of this 
concept through the hermeneutical and political developments in liberal theology (Tracy 1985a, 
463-4, 466). For him, the concept of ‗non-empirical experience‘ functions as an intellectual basis 
for the intelligibility of religious faith, since the non-empirical ‗limit experiences‘ common to 
                                                       
19 Michalson 1988, 113-4. See also 114-5. Tracy‘s accusation of Barthianism has already been noted. However, 
Tracy and Michalson, together with Scott Holland, appear determined to see Lindbeck not merely as Barthian but as a 
kind  of  Barthian  Trojan  horse  (for  a  threatened  Barthian  revival?).  Tracy  (1985a,  465)  charges  Lindbeck  with 
producing ‗a methodologically sophisticated version of Barthian confessionalism‘ in which ‗the hands may be the 
hands of Wittgenstein and Geertz but the voice is the voice of Karl Barth‘. Holland (1994, 134 n15) characterises his 
reading of Lindbeck as ‗presenting him as a kind of radical Barthian merely hiding behind the theories of Geertz and 
others as a cover for his neo-orthodox ideology of the ―Word-Event.‖ ‘ In the same note Holland cites other similar 
readings of Lindbeck as if they lent support to his own reading and did not perhaps say as much about the readers as 
the read. We shall return to the revisionists‘ demonisation of Lindbeck as ‗Barthian‘ when considering the likelihood 
(certainty in my view) that Barth would not have been at all happy to acknowledge Lindbeck as a follower. 
20 That is, intelligibility has a ‗foundational‘ role in liberal theological inquiry, though I do not mean that term in the 
pejorative sense which has become common. I would maintain that some measure of foundationalism is unavoidable, 
and that Lindbeck himself is, in a sense, a foundationalist. In the terms of Imre Lakatos, liberalism and postliberalism 
are ‗research programs‘ which each have a ‗hard-core‘ of concepts and practices that define the problems of interest 
and the ways in which further enquiry will be conducted. ‗Hard-core‘ concepts and practices can reasonably be called 
‗foundational‘ to the research program which uses them, and the idea of intelligibility seems to work in roughly this 
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contemporary  humans  provide  significant  points  of  contact  between  ‗secular‘  existence  and 
religious faith. Tracy wants to argue that some kinds of common experiences are best understood 
from the standpoint of religious faith. Lindbeck‘s denial of the possibility of any inner experience 
which  is  not  already  framed  in  terms  of  the  subject‘s  cultural-linguistic  tradition  appears  to 
minimise, and perhaps deny, the possibility of such points of contact, thus holding out the prospect 
of a Christian religion and theology transformed into a postliberal ghetto.21 
For Lindbeck there is nothing special about Christian faith, or any fai th, in relation to the 
problem of intelligibility. Lindbeck is not addressing the question of the relation of Christian 
faith to empirical experience as if faith were an experience different in kind from experiences of 
the ‗empirical‘ type. Nor is he raising the issue of the relation of Christianity to other forms of 
knowledge, which can then become a matter of argument about sources of knowledge and ways 
of reasoning. Lindbeck‘s point is essentially, again, an anthropological one. All knowledge is 
traditioned knowledge. All experience is traditioned experience. And tradition, for Lindbeck, 
must be understood not merely as an historically extended body of knowledge, but rather, in 
Alasdair MacIntyre‘s phrase, as ‗a socially embodied and historically extended conversation‘.22 
That is, all human knowing and experience is unavoidably and inextricably embedded in and 
mediated  through  cultural  traditions  comprised  of  social  institutions,  customary  practices, 
rituals, art, politics, power and the intricate webs of family and social life. On this view, there 
are no ‗modes of human consciousness‘ that are not already artefacts of culturally embedded, 
socio-historically located traditions; no ‗natural‘ modes of human consciousness that are not 
already cultural (and therefore particular) ‗modes of human consciousness‘. 
But  knowledge is  not  only  particular, it is  embodied.  From  the critiques  of Enlightenment 
philosophy offered by Wittgenstein, the American empiricist tradition, and contemporary social 
anthropology, Lindbeck has learned that the nature of human beings as social bodily creatures 
means  that  human  reasoning  assumes  and  subtly  relies  on  the  specific  social  and  physical 
contexts in which it develops. Human rationality, conversation, understanding—all the activity 
of  the  mind  exalted  by  the  Enlightenment—are  bodily  and  social  activities,  inextricably 
entwined in the physical interaction with each other and the world that is everyday life. It is in 
the success and fruitfulness of such interaction, if at all, that intelligibility is demonstrated. 
Tracy  does  not  deny  the  importance  of  human  embodiment,23  but his is a conversational 
hermeneutic that emphasises an hospitable ‗openness to the other‘. He follows Gadamer in the 
metaphor of hermeneutics as a game, with its to-and-fro movement and its feeling of playing 
                                                       
21 And as we have seen, this is not an accusation that Lindbeck goes to any great pains to refute. For him, some kind 
of ‗whiff of the ghetto‘, some manner of ‗sociological sectarianism‘, may be necessary to the survival of Christianity 
and  its  witness  to  (and  sometimes  against)  contemporary  Western  societies.  See  p.  44  above,  especially  n78. 
Lindbeck continued to express similar thoughts, e.g., in Lindbeck 1989a, 54-5 and Lindbeck 1993, 99-100. 
22 MacIntyre 1984, 207. Lindbeck has indicated his general agreement with MacIntyre‘s understanding of tradition 
and epistemology (Lindbeck, Hunsinger et al. 1996, 252), and indeed, his exposition in ND of the way in which 
disparate  traditions  are  ultimately  vindicated  or  dissolved  is  very  similar  to  MacIntyre‘s  understanding  of  the 
vindication of a tradition. See ND 128-34. 
23  Tracy,  too,  calls  in  the  American  empiricist  philosophers  in  his  defence  of  the  concept  of  ‗non-empirical 
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and  being-played.24  Tracy  continued  to  develop  this  conversational,  dialogical  model  of 
hermeneutics through the 1980s as a way of explicating what happens when we encounter a text 
or situation that challenges our understanding. The ensuing conversation takes a form that has 
its natural habitat in the scholar‘s study or the academic seminar, being concerned throughout 
with standards of credibility and rationality accepted in other academic disciplines. 
For Lindbeck, pursuit of theological intelligibility through translation, correlation or conversation 
still  echoes  modernity‘s  vain  quest  for  a  rationality  that  rises  ‗above‘  the  body.  He  sees  the 
demonstration of intelligibility having less to do with the polite and elevated conversation of the 
seminar, and rather more to do with skilful dealing with the world enabled by the worshipping life 
of a local congregation. He asks, not ‗How can we implement the Enlightenment‘s vision of 
intelligibility?‘  but  ‗What  kind  of  intelligibility  is  available  to  us  humans?‘.  Tracy  offers  a 
conversational hermeneutic, Lindbeck a hermeneutic of social embodiment. 
3.1.5  Theologies of Distinction 
The tone and content of the early mutual critiques of liberals and postliberals point to a common 
belief that the other side just has not understood the nature of human beings and how they in fact 
make meaning and make their way in the world. But perhaps consideration of those aspects of 
anthropology on which these writers agree will help to bring more clearly into focus those aspects 
on which they differ. Lindbeck and Tracy, at least, have in common that their descriptions of the 
hermeneutic situation, and the theological methods they see arising from those descriptions, rely 
on a conceptual separation of the Christian tradition from non-Christian sources of interpretation.25 
For Lindbeck, this separation operates so as to enable the exclusion of non-Christian sources from 
any formative influence on the tradition. The theological task thus requires theol ogians to be 
continually  redescribing  the  world  in  biblical  terms  and  continually  cultivating  the  faith 
community‘s biblical vision so that it may practise the discernment necessary to the assertion of 
Christian  identity  in  the  world.26  For  Tracy,  the  faith   tradition  and  its  environment  are 
conceptually separated so that they may be clearly and systematically correlated in a mutually 
critical engagement. The theologian continually builds connections between the faith tradition and 
the  contemporary  situation,  discerning  and  interpreting  ‗those  fundamental  questions…that 
disclose a genuinely religious dimension in our contemporary experience and language.‘27 
In each case, there is a tendency to fix and hold pristine those fields of meaning or experience 
that  provide  the  source  material  for  theological  construction.  Perhaps  Lindbeck  and  Tracy 
                                                       
24 The Gadamerian hermeneutic led Tracy‘s theology into a strongly hermeneutic turn in The Analogical Imagination 
(Tracy 1981), a turn which was continued in postmodern vein in Plurality and Ambiguity (Tracy 1987). This direction 
developed an ethical/relational dimension  with a ‗turn to the other‘  in Dialogue With the Other (Tracy 1990a). 
Tracy‘s theology in the 1980s was hermeneutic, but never merely hermeneutic. 
25 Both Lindbeck and Tracy advance their proposals as general descriptions of the situation for any religion, Christian 
or otherwise, Lindbeck perhaps being more circumspect in this regard than Tracy. The shared hermeneutic strategy of 
distinguishing Christian from non-Christian sources is also noted and criticised by Kathryn Tanner (1997, 106-7). 
26 See above p. 45 and ND 113-20. 
27 Tracy 1985b, 53. The fundamental questions Tracy has in mind are ‗finitude, estrangement, alienation, oppression, 
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would  protest  that  they  do  not  mean  to  do  any  such  thing,  and  that  I  have  pressed  their 
metaphors too far. Yet the tendency towards (re)pristination of sources is not merely deduced as 
a logical corollary of their governing metaphors. Lindbeck continued to speak of ‗the biblical 
world‘ that becomes differently instantiated in the myriad differing circumstances encountered 
by Christian communities: 
[A hermeneutics of intratextual social or ecclesial embodiment] is intratextual in a double 
sense: first, Scripture is interpreted in the light of Scripture, and the biblical canon is read as 
a single, interglossing whole; and second, all reality is interpreted in this same scriptural 
light: the biblical world absorbs all other worlds.28 
More subtly, Tracy repeatedly refers to the two ‗constants‘ of situation and tradition, but equally 
emphatically cautions that ‗it is possible to distinguish, but not to separate‘ their respective 
interpretations, for each interprets the other.29 But two ‗constants‘ that are found only in an 
inextricably commingled state, and are ineluctably further commingled in our interpretation of 
them, may owe less to reality than to the needs of Tracy‘s ‗critical correlation‘ model.30 
The  maintenance  of  pristine  sources,  present  as  given,  subject  only  to  our  interpretive 
appropriation of them, functions differently for Lindbeck and Tracy, and becomes problematic 
for each in different ways. For Lindbeck, ‗the biblical world‘ defines the fixed identity of the 
Christian tradition. As such, it is pushed beyond the realm of human historicity so that, in 
dealing with the flux of historical existence, we can always know who we are by reference to it. 
This amounts to an implicit denial of the role of tradition in the formation of scripture, with the 
result that the God who comes to us within, and becomes vulnerable to, the vicissitudes and 
viciousness  of  human  history  becomes  strangely  disincarnated  into  a  pristine  and  idealised 
text.31 For Tracy, the language of distinct and pristine ‗constants‘ which emerged in his earlier 
writing came increasingly into tension with the growing hermeneutic awareness evident in his 
work  from  the  early  1980s  onwards.  Though  he  remained  an  ‗unrepentant  correlational 
                                                       
28 Lindbeck 1996b, 151. 
29 Tracy 1985b, 53. This chapter of  Tracy‘s on theological method is a most useful example.  The language of 
‗constants‘ appears throughout the last section of the chapter (pp. 52-9), in which we are also warned: ‗in interpreting 
either of these constants, the other constant is always already present: theologians…inevitably interpret…each reality 
in the light of the other‘ (p. 52); ‗we cannot simply separate these analyses, for…the theologian too is influenced by 
the history of…the Christian tradition‘ (p. 53); ‗As we saw above in the analysis of the inevitably hermeneutical 
character of any theological appropriation of either constant, every theological act of interpretation already involves 
some correlation of the two constants. It remains methodologically helpful to distinguish these two distinct acts of 
interpretation as distinct. At the same time, the interpreter cannot existentially separate the two acts‘ (p. 56). 
30  Tracy  emphasises  the  hermeneutic  inseparability  of  situation  and  tradition,  but  hardly  mentions  the 
anthropological fact that ‗situation‘ can be understood only by means of traditioned concepts and ‗tradition‘ can be 
perceived only in the context of some  situation. Other correlationists may be  vulnerable at the same point. For 
example, Werner Jeanrond points out in relation to Hans Küng: ‗the contemporary human world is already present, of 
course, in perspectives which guide our reading of the Bible, as indeed the history of effects of the biblical texts is 
always present in our Western interpretations of the world. Therefore Küng‘s ―fundamental trust in reality‖ is already 
socially and religiously conditioned, a fact which Küng has not yet explicitly stated‘ (Jeanrond 1989, 174). 
31 For more detail on these problems see section 5.3 The Pattern of Sound Teaching commencing on p. 181 below.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      62 
theologian‘,32 this was to some extent despite his adoption of hermeneutic principles that point 
towards abandonment of ‗constants‘ and their correlation.33 Thus, while Lindbeck‘s pristine text 
is in tension with that text‘s witness to the God of the gospel, Tracy‘s idea of anthropological 
‗constants‘ sets his methodological framework at odds with the hermeneutics he acquired from 
Gadamer and Ricoeur. The tension is located, in the one case, in the deep resistance of the 
biblical  text  to  Lindbeck‘s  methodology  for  reading  it,  and  in  the  other  case,  in  an  intra-
methodological inconsistency in Tracy‘s description of what reading is and how it occurs. There 
would seem to be little to choose between the two sets of difficulties. 
3.1.6  Experience, Expression and Particularity 
In the experience-expression relation, of which Lindbeck makes so much, Tracy and the more 
hermeneutically inclined among ‗liberal‘ theologians have exposed a major flaw in Lindbeck‘s 
proposal. A wholly (or even largely) unilateral construction of this relation is untenable. It may 
well  be  that  all  experience  is  traditioned  experience,  but  equally,  all  tradition is  experienced 
tradition. World and tradition(s) are ineffably there, patiently resisting our interpretations of them. 
The particularity of our experiences constrains us towards differing interpretations of world and 
tradition and the relation between them. In this light, a tradition is less an agreed vision of how to 
live in the world than an inherited consensus on what is worth arguing about as we attempt to 
make our way.34 There is some suspicion that Lindbeck sees intractable diversity as something to 
be explained away (as the result of the varied instantiations of the one biblical world in diverse 
circumstances) rather than embraced as intrinsic to the nature of tradition. The suspicion is 
encouraged by Lindbeck‘s description of Christianity as a tradition that seeks to socially embody 
‗the biblical world‘, as though the Bible did not provide sufficient evidence of its own genesis in 
traditioned experience and reflection, or did not reflect the complexity, argument, inspiration, 
fragmentation, innovation, reconstruction, and stubborn cohesion that characterise traditioned life. 
For its part, liberal theology realised the problems inherent in the idea of experience as a human 
universal, even if this idea has not entirely disappeared. As Tracy and others pointed out, the 
particularity of experience, as traditioned experience, is inescapable. What has been somewhat 
                                                       
32 Tracy 1990b, 36. I have not found Tracy moving away from correlational method, though he indicates in a later 
interview that he has become less concerned with methodological issues and more concerned with issues ‗within‘ the 
Christian  tradition—the  relation  between  spirituality  and  theology,  Christian  appropriation  of  postmodernity, 
recovery  of  marginalised  Christian  voices,  the  systematic-theological  understanding  of  God  (Breyfogle  and 
Levergood 1994, 302). In the same interview, Tracy reflects critically on his earlier work and its assumptions. He 
now sees the weaknesses, not only of ‗some of my own formulations in Blessed Rage for Order [Tracy 1975], but of 
the modern project itself, of which that book is representative‘. Nevertheless, there is much in Blessed Rage he would 
still wish to defend, ‗especially things like the reflections on limit language and the demand for the publicness of 
theology‘ (Breyfogle and Levergood 1994, 301). 
33 This is certainly the way it has worked for some others who also draw their hermeneutics largely from Gadamer 
and Ricoeur. See Brown 1994, chapter 2, and Brown‘s comment on Tracy (here linked with Langdon Gilkey, as well 
as with Lindbeck and ‗evangelical theologians such as Clark H. Pinnock‘) as one who presupposes a systematic 
disjunction between ‗the claims of modernity‘ and ‗the claims of revelation or tradition‘ (1994, 154 n13). 
34 In part, this reflects MacIntyre‘s understanding of the nature of tradition (see p. 59 above, with n22). Tanner (1997) 
offers  a  persuasive  exposition  of  Christian  identity  as  a  ‗community  of  argument  about  the  meaning  of  true 
discipleship‘; see especially pp. 151-5, and her concluding chapter (pp. 156-75).   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      63 
less  realised,  perhaps,  is  that  a  thoroughgoing  acknowledgment  of  particularity  calls  into 
question, at least to some extent, the usual liberal strategy of systematically relating (correlating, 
connecting,  translating)  Christian  tradition  to  the  wider  world  (or  better,  to  the  particular 
location) of experience. Granted, the proliferation of contextual theologies reflects an awareness 
of  human  particularity,  but  it  is  less  evident  that  the  consequences  of  this  awareness  for 
theological method have been adequately addressed. Lindbeck‘s proposal suggests that it is 
anthropologically inappropriate for such relating to form part of theology‘s systematic core, and 
that there is a basic tension between such a method and a tradition‘s identity as Christian. 
Liberals  may  find  such  suggestions  unwelcome,  and  may  view  them  as  ‗confessional‘, 
‗fideistic‘ and ‗Barthian‘, but these are not sufficient reasons for discounting them. 
This  brief  survey  of  ND‘s  reception  has  indicated  some  of  the  misunderstandings  and 
shortcomings on both sides. At that time (mid to late 1980s) a limiting factor on the liberal side 
was  the  dearth  of  liberal  proposals  that  fully  addressed  the  methodological  implications  of 
embodiment, particularity and the social construction of knowledge. Only by engaging these 
issues  could  liberal  theology  offer  substantial  criticism  without  resorting  to  labels  such  as 
‗confessionalism‘ or ‗sectarianism‘; labels that, from Lindbeck‘s viewpoint at least, did little 
more than indicate liberalism‘s own confession. 
3.2  A ‗CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC‘ LIBERAL THEOLOGY 
3.2.1  Position Vacant 
As mentioned above, in his review of ND David Ford claimed that ‗there could be a liberal 
Christianity in cultural-linguistic mode.‘35 Ford offered this opinion in support of an appeal that 
Lindbeck‘s proposal not be dismissed too quickly by liberal theologians who might see it as 
‗inevitably promoting too conservative a form of Christianity.‘36 We have seen that David Tracy 
wanted to show that liberal theology had already appropriated the insights Lindbeck castigates it 
for ignoring, albeit as a ‗hermeneutic-political‘ rather than a ‗cultural-linguistic‘ paradigm. But 
Tracy‘s  own  theological  methodology  shares  in  some  of  Lindbeck‘s  faults  without  really 
answering the basic anthropological critique—that liberal theology has not faced the implications 
of human particularity and communality for its interpretation of religion and reason. 
In  this  respect,  Delwin  Brown‘s  Boundaries  of  our  Habitations37  appears  to  be  a  suitable 
candidate for the vacant position advertised by Ford. In that Brown‘s primary metaphor for 
                                                       
35 Ford 1986, 281. See above p. 56. 
36 The fuller context is as follows: ‗From the experiential-expressive side the most telling criticisms might come from 
those who see the theory inevitably promoting too conservative a form of Christianity. Yet I think there could be a 
liberal Christianity in a cultural-linguistic mode. It would need to be rethought, but one hopes that Lindbeck‘s own 
rejection of much in liberal Christianity will not prevent others from reconceiving their positions in his terms.‘ Ford 
does not indicate what any substantive liberal critique might look like, but one would like to think that Ford had 
higher hopes for liberal theologians‘ critical abilities than that they would merely find Lindbeck ‗too conservative‘ 
for their liberal tastes. Such responses are really the same, and inadequate for the same reasons, as the question-
begging accusations of ‗Barthianism‘ or ‗confessionalism‘ noted earlier. 
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tradition  is  ‗culture‘,  it  is  tempting  to  describe  his  proposal  as  ‗cultural-linguistic‘,  though 
Brown‘s  understanding  of  what  culture  is  and  how  it  functions  is  significantly  different  to 
Lindbeck‘s,  and  Brown  would  prefer  the  ‗linguistic‘  reference  to  be absent from  any  label 
applied  to  his  position.  (He  himself  calls  it  ‗constructive  historicism‘.38)  Clearly,  however, 
Brown‘s approach to describing tradition and theology is formally similar to Lindbeck‘s—a 
general understanding of culture and tradition is developed from non-theological sources, and 
this  then  forms  an  interpretive  grid  for  understanding  the  Christian  tradition,  with  special 
reference to the nature and role of canon. 
To a significant extent, Brown‘s work is a response to Lindbeck‘s, though Brown acknowledges 
‗at least four motivations‘, which he describes in order of importance.39 The first motivation is 
dissatisfaction with the pervasive diminution of the past in liberal thought. The liberal exaltation 
of reason has typically regarded the past as an encumbrance to be shed as a butterfly sheds its 
cocoon. But in losing its past, liberal thought has lost its character, its identity, its direction. 
Brown‘s second motivation is ‗academic politics‘, under which heading he sets out to offer a 
substantial response to ‗the narrative or postliberal approach to theology‘ that he believes ‗is 
likely to dominate theological discussions for a significant time ahead‘. Brown considers this 
approach is both ‗extremely right and extremely wrong‘, and he writes to affirm the postliberal 
emphasis  on  ‗the  crucially  constructive  role  of  the  past  in  theology,  in  religion,  and  by 
implication, in culture for the viable conduct of human life.‘ But he also wishes to sharply 
question its ‗stifling and ultimately untenable repristination of the religious heritage‘. Brown‘s 
third motivation is his philosophical conviction that the ‗distinctively American tradition‘ of 
philosophical  empiricism  represented  by  Peirce,  James,  Dewey,  and  Whitehead  ‗is  more 
adequate than the Kantian perspective that now dominates theological analysis.‘ Thus, in part, 
Brown offers his work with a view to displaying that greater adequacy by showing that radical 
empiricism avoids the deleterious dualisms that plague Kantian approaches. Fourthly, Brown 
wants to address issues left unresolved in an earlier article on biblical authority, specifically, the 
role of canon in the formation of human identity, and the relation of this function of canon to the 
broader and generally more prominent formative role of the rest of a religious tradition.40 
A fifth motivation emerges in Brown‘s introduction, where he sets his proposal in the context of 
post-Enlightenment  attitudes  to  tradition  and  twentieth  century  critical  studies  of  its  cultural 
function. Brown wants to continue ‗a commitment to open inquiry‘ which has consciously moved 
beyond  ‗a  premodern  notion  of  a  tradition  as  a  repository  of  privileged  data  and  specially 
protected  criteria,‘41  thus  opposing  the  postliberal  view  that  criteria  of judgement  are  wholly 
                                                       
38 As we shall see, Brown specifically wants to correct what he sees as an over-emphasis on ‗linguisticality‘ in 
Gadamer  (BH  46-8),  and  also  (though  in  a  different  way)  in  Lindbeck.  His  correction  is  developed  through  a 
balancing emphasis on ‗bodily feeling‘ (BH 49-52) and takes the concrete form of a recovery of the importance of 
ritual in the life of traditions (BH 53, 92-109). 
39 The remainder of this paragraph draws on pp. ix-xi of Brown‘s preface. 
40 The article referred to is Brown 1985. 
41  BH  4.  Other  comments  in  loc  indicate  that  ‗the  examination  of  tradition  and  its  relationship  to  religious  and 
theological reflection undertaken here will draw upon extratheological resources, specifically those of philosophy and 
the social sciences, religious studies, and the history of religions. The assumption underlying this approach is that what   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      65 
intrasystemic. At the same time, Brown‘s procedural remarks explicitly eschew the older liberal 
reliance on anthropological universals.42 Rather, ‗criteria [of judgement and evaluation] overlap 
some standpoints—disciplines, cultures, religions, and so forth—even if no criterion overlaps 
them all‘ (BH 5-6). To the extent that such overlaps exist, and only to that extent, intersystemic 
reason-giving is possible. Brown ‗assume[s] that theology is obligated to give reasons whenever 
reason-giving is possible and that only in so doing can its claims gain credibility‘ (BH 6). Gaining 
credibility for theology thus emerges as a further motivation, its considerable importance being 
indicated most clearly in the concluding chapter. There Brown laments that ‗[i]n North America, 
academic and mainline theologies languish at the margins of religious and cultural influence‘ and 
offers  his  proposal  as  a  way  of  rescuing  contemporary  theology  from  ‗cultural  and  religious 
impotence‘.43 Credibility and the giving of reasons thus inform Brown‘s whole inquiry. 
Taken together, these motivations foreshadow a proposal that will seek to advance the liberal 
theological tradition through constructive criticism. At the same time, it will try to avoid the 
idealisation of tradition characteristic of postliberal (and conservative) theologies while dealing 
substantially with the nature and role of canon and with human particularity, which are also of 
great importance to Lindbeck. In short, we have good reason to expect a proposal that will reward, 
at point after point, a careful comparative analysis with respect to Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic 
theory. As much as a liberal theory can be, it will be in cultural (if not cultural-linguistic) mode. 
In view of the difficulties already indicated in the proposals of Lindbeck and Tracy, this is 
indeed a hopeful prospect. Brown wants to take seriously the fact of cultural inheritance and he 
understands  human  life  and  its  attempts  at  meaning  to  be  always  deeply  and  inextricably, 
though often critically, enmeshed in that inheritance. The following material displays what I 
believe to be the strengths of Brown‘s proposal, namely, that his account of culture and of 
religions (traditions) as cultural processes is preferable to that offered by Lindbeck. Attention 
will then be given to other areas of Brown‘s work that are less robust, with a view to exploring 
some tensions between his proposal and the liberal virtues that motivated it. After reflecting on 
                                                                                                                                                             
theology says about tradition and the relationship of tradition to the theological task must make sense in terms of the 
actual phenomena of Christian and other religious traditions, as these phenomena are delineated by other humanistic 
fields of scholarship‘ (emphasis added). It is only in the italicised clause that some difference from Lindbeck‘s approach 
is apparent, even if more apparent than real. Lindbeck draws on the same sources, but his rhetoric indicates an intention 
to make the resulting insights available for theology. This allows one to suppose that the desirability of what has thus 
been made ‗available‘ might then be assessed on intrasystemic grounds. The fact that Lindbeck actually argues for the 
superiority  of  his  cultural-linguistic  theory  on  extrasystemic  grounds  is  thus,  in  the  context  of  his  theory,  an 
inconsistency. Brown is more consistent in his advocacy and use of ‗extratheological‘ resources. 
42 Brown points out that if the hypothesis of anthropological universals has not been demonstrated, neither has the 
hypothesis of the complete absence of such universals. Nevertheless, in such a situation the most appropriate working 
hypothesis is that such norms do not exist (BH 5). 
43 BH 111-2. I would not wish to imply that this fifth motivation somehow constitutes a ‗hidden agenda‘ simply because 
Brown does not list it among the motivations acknowledged in his preface. Brown is quite clear and unapologetic about 
his interest in rescuing theology‘s credibility. Although, at BH 6, Brown ‗assume[s] that theology is obligated to give 
reasons whenever…possible‘, his repeated reference to theology‘s credibility in loc may indicate that this is the basis of 
the obligation (and hence of the assumption) to which he refers. Brown does not say so, but I think it reasonable to infer 
that concern for theology‘s credibility is the reason why he wants to be able to give reasons.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      66 
the strengths, weaknesses and possibilities of Brown‘s proposal, the chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the idea of a liberal theology in cultural-linguistic mode. 
3.2.2  Tradition, Culture and Canon 
The subtitle of Brown‘s work is ‗Tradition and Theological Construction‘, so it is no surprise that 
he, like Tracy,44 takes his hermeneutical lead from Gadamer. However, unlike Tracy, Brown is not 
content simply to appropriate the metaphor of the two horizons, and, far from coercing these 
horizons  into  ‗constants‘,  is  very  much  on  guard  against  the  temptation  to  reify  complex 
processes.45 Brown welcomes Gadamer‘s rehabilitation of tradition as mediator of knowledge, his 
emphasis on knowledge as participation rather than observation, and his exposition of learning as 
dialectical  play  rather  than  unilateral  mastery.  He  then  offers  two  extensions  of  Gadamer‘s 
hermeneutic, using resources that are present but undeveloped in Gadamer‘s analysis. 
In the first such extension, Brown finds Gadamer‘s view of tradition‘s historicality to be too 
closed,  the  mood  of  Truth  and  Method  too  much one  of ‗brooding…determination‘.  When 
considering  ‗the  question  of  truth  as  it  emerges  in  the  experience  of  art‘,  Gadamer‘s 
development of the game and play metaphors is preoccupied with an observer’s experience of a 
given artwork, and does not speak of the game and play that occur in a creator’s experience of 
producing art (BH 39-41). While Brown welcomes Gadamer‘s rehabilitation of tradition, he 
extends  it  by  emphasising  not  only  the  reception  and  use  of  tradition  in  our  dialectical 
engagement (game and play) with reality, but also the (re)construction and transmission of 
tradition that arises from, and indeed is, that engagement (BH 41-5). 
The other extension of Gadamer arises from Brown‘s perception that Gadamer‘s critique of 
modernity‘s illusion of objective reason does not utilise the full significance of his participatory 
metaphors—Gadamer‘s  hermeneutic  remains  largely  logocentric  and  cerebral,  and,  despite 
occasional glimpses, ignores the possibility that humanity‘s physical and sensual dimensions 
may be hermeneutically important (BH 46-8). Building on the hints Gadamer offers, Brown 
maintains  that  human  interpretive  understanding  is  not  only  conscious  and  linguistic,  but 
‗derives  from  and  continuously  interacts  with‘  human  experiences  ‗at  the  level  of  bodily 
feeling…embedded  in  the  larger  sphere  of  the  efficacies  of  the  natural  process‘  (BH  46). 
Brown‘s development of this theme draws on ‗the American philosophical tradition of ―radical 
empiricism‖‗,  especially  the  work  of  A.N.  Whitehead.46  The  chapter  concludes  by 
                                                       
44 For example, in Tracy 1985b. 
45 Brown accuses both Lindbeck and Tracy not so much of idealising sources in the sense of decomplexifying them 
(he makes this charge only of Lindbeck) as of idealising the  distinction that can be made between tradition and the 
claims of modernity. They do this in that they presuppose that one can say unequivocally what belongs to each. 
Brown acknowledges a difference, a boundary, but insists that it is fluid, as indeed are the boundaries between all 
arenas of discourse (BH 154 n13). 
46 BH 49-53. Brown names Jonathan Edwards, William James and John Dewey as other representatives of this 
tradition. Henry Nelson Wieman, Bernard Mieland, Bernard Loomer, William Dean and Nancy Frankenberry are 
mentioned as applying radical empiricism to the interpretation of religion. Brown summarises ‗radical empiricism‘ in 
four points: (1) ‗our primary connectedness with things is at the level of largely nonconscious feeling‘; (2) ‗feelings 
at the preconceptual and largely unconscious level are always weighted, patterned, or directional,‘ that is, they move 
us; (3) ‗the relationship of the human subject and her or his given environment is, in either case, neither simply   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      67 
foreshadowing  the  employment  of  these  developments  of  Gadamer‘s  work  in  two  key 
assertions: that change, transformation and novelty are just as essential to tradition as continuity, 
reception  and  conservation;  and  that  disciplined  action,  i.e.,  ritual,  is  as  important  to  the 
efficacious transmission of a tradition as disciplined reflection (BH 53-4). 
Moving on from his treatment of Gadamer in chapter 2, Brown‘s third chapter takes a cultural turn 
that brings him unequivocally into the same territory as Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory. 
Brown  provides  a  brief  history  of  concepts  and  theories  of  culture,  from  pre-  and  post-
Enlightenment ideas, through Vico and the organic metaphors of J.G. Herder and E.B. Tylor, to 
the more plural and conflictual understandings of culture among contemporary cultural theorists 
and anthropologists.47 Like Lindbeck, Brown gives honourable mention to Clifford Geertz‘s view 
of  cultures  as  socially  established  structures  of  meaning  in  terms  of  which  human  actions, 
understood broadly, gain their meanings. This is immediately recognisable as the view of cultures 
adopted by Lindbeck, though Brown mentions it only in order to immediately qualify it with later 
views that are more dynamic, process-oriented and conflictual. In these formulations, cultures are 
not well-defined unitary structures, and Geertz‘s view is regarded as a remnant of the ahistorical 
organic metaphors more common in the nineteenth century. Rather, to the extent that cultures are 
identifiably  distinct,  they  are  dynamic  processes  in  which  continuity  and  change  are  always 
dialectically related, in which order is always contested, in which cultural identity is constantly 
being  (re-)negotiated,  and  in  which  inheritance  cannot  be  reproduced  without  novelty  and 
transformation. To the extent that cultures are unities, they are complex, dynamic, permeable and 
tensive unities concerned with the negotiation of identity amid chaos and order (BH 67). 
This view of culture, which is far richer and rather more realistic than that which Lindbeck 
derives from Geertz, becomes Brown‘s interpretive key for understanding Christian tradition 
and theology‘s role within it. Tradition, he proposes, ‗is one type of cultural strategy, one way 
of negotiating chaos and order. Tradition…is the cultural negotiation of identity that takes place 
within,  and  with,  a  canon‘  (BH  67).  But  what  is  the  nature  and  role  of  canon,  tradition‘s 
allegedly fixed core, in such a dynamic process? Brown introduces this question by defending 
the idea of canon against political and philosophical critiques. He finds that, on the one hand, 
canons are not so unified as to be necessarily oppressive, but are sufficiently plural to facilitate 
the subversion of dominant ideologies. On the other hand, canons are not so diverse as to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
―causing‖ (creating, imagining, constructing) nor ―being caused‖ (receiving, picturing, corresponding).‘ That is, ‗the 
relationship  of  ―self‖  and  ―world‖  (both  social  and  natural)  is  best  described  as  interactive,  codeterminant,  or 
reciprocal‘; (4) ‗Feeling…permeates sensation and thought‘, and vice versa. There is therefore, for us, no such thing 
as pure experience. ‗All experience is perspectival. Interpretation refers to perspectival appropriation insofar as it is 
cognitive.‘ Though only tangential to Brown‘s thesis, it would be interesting to study the extent to which these 
insights were variously foreshadowed or actually developed by Schleiermacher. 
47 Among the latter Brown considers James Clifford, Roy Wagner, Marshall Sahlins, and Clifford Geertz (BH 59, 62-
6). It is Geertz that Lindbeck cites as his primary mentor on social anthropology. Clifford, Wagner and Sahlins 
engage  critically  with  Geertz,  and  on  the  basis  of  their  work  Brown  finds  that  Geertz‘s  position,  though  still 
important, is in need of modification. These modifications comprise much of the difference between Brown and 
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illusory, but exhibit a sufficient unity to be themselves, rather than something else or nothing at 
all.48 Thus, the ground is prepared for Brown‘s account of canon. 
In his fourth chapter Brown develops a list of characteristics of canons, each characteristic having 
a  parallel in  the  complex  life  of  traditions.  Shorn  of  the  richer  detail  Brown  provides,  these 
characteristics are as follows.49 Canon is bounded; tradition responds by using it creatively. Canon 
is  curatorial,  a  collection;  tradition  is  continually  goaded  to  unitary  construals.  Canon  is 
normative; it is these answers, points of view, claims to truth, ways of life, that together in their 
interplay are adequate to author lives lived within the tradition. Canon is contestable; it defines a 
field of negotiation or play and is itself a protagonist, both eliciting interpretations and resisting 
them. Canon is contemporary, presenting diverse resources with which people live their lives; but 
the adequacy of these resources is, and must be, continually tested and evaluated in arenas of 
contemporary discourse beyond canon‘s boundary. Canon is existential—in relation to canon, and 
within its field of play, personal and corporate identities are given and won; tradition can be 
considered as the process of this giving and winning, that is, tradition is canon lived. A more 
general description of the relation between tradition and canon according to Brown might be that 
canons are artefacts of traditional processes, and therefore reflect, insofar as may be possible in a 
(relatively) fixed form, the complexity, diversity, dynamism, conflict and tensive creativity that 
are characteristic of living traditions. At the same time, insofar as they are fixed, canons are able to 
exist over against the traditions from which they arose, and so they not only provoke but resist the 
interpretations  given  them—they  are  the  negotiable  reference  points  for  that  continual 
(re)negotiation of individual and corporate identity that is tradition.50 
Two features of Brown‘s proposal immediately attract attention. First, he is working with an 
understanding of tradition and canon that is broadly consistent with contemporary understandings 
of textuality and cultural processes. Second, he has coupled canon and tradition closely together in 
a  way  that  renders  their  similarities  and  differences  into  a  reasonably  coherent  complex  of 
historical forces. In both respects Brown‘s proposal is clearly an advance on Lindbeck‘s. Brown 
has had the advantage of reflecting on the work of theorists who have criticised and extended 
Geertz‘s social anthropology, and his understanding of culture reflects this. For him, a culture has 
                                                       
48 Brown promotes canons‘ diversity in response to the ‗political‘ charge, deriving from the work of Michel Foucault, 
that canonical unity is oppressive. It is interesting to juxtapose this defence with the traditional apologetic which sought 
to defend the Bible‘s status as revelation by displaying its otherwise inexplicable unity. Alongside the Foucauldian 
charge, Brown lays the ‗Derridaen‘ charge that canon is always an illicit attempt to fix meaning: canon fails because 
meaning ‗is in fact an endless play of difference admitting no privileged or continuing construals of the sort that canon is 
usually taken to imply.‘ His reply is that the meaning of the text is not anything we make it. The play of difference is not 
endless, though it is multiple and fluid. Rather, meaning arises interdependently from interaction between text and 
interpreter: the text can resist our interpretations of it (BH 69-70). But this does not constitute an argument that there is 
any meaningful unity to a canon‘s diversity. It merely argues that a canon is something, it is what it is, and we cannot 
really make of it anything that we want to. Apart from the fact that canons exist as collections, Brown offers no positive 
argument for the unity of canons in general, or for the unity of the Christian canon in particular. 
49 Brown develops the characteristics of canon at  BH 75-83. He then returns to considering tradition against the 
background of his earlier general characterisation of it as a cultural process, but now focusing on its relation to a 
canon (BH 83-9). The paired list of characteristics of canon and tradition is found at BH 89. 
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no one structure of meaning, but includes ongoing arguments and negotiations over what the 
structure of meaning is. The abandonment of the idea of a single socially agreed structure of 
meaning has helped Brown to move towards a view of canon that is far more historical. No longer 
is the biblical canon presumed to exist beyond history as seems to be the case for Lindbeck. Even 
less  can  Brown‘s  canon  be  envisaged  as  projecting  a  single  ‗world‘.  For  him,  canons,  like 
traditions, are by nature plural and conflictual. It is only our construals, partial and provisional 
though they are, that may appear to be unitary and thus ‗habitable‘. 
A third notable, if less successful, feature is Brown‘s notion of canonical diversity. For him, a 
canon  may  be  diverse  both  in  the  streams  of  thought  it  includes  and  in  the  media  which 
comprise it. A canon includes not only its tradition‘s holy scriptures, but also other texts such as 
creeds and confessions; and not only texts, but also myths, stories, rituals, doctrines, institutions, 
symbols, and ‗patterns of cultivated sensibilities‘.51 The conceptual and material diversity of 
canon has a special role in Brown‘s argument, and will be addressed at length below.52 
3.2.3  Discerning the Body 
Having expounded the receptivity and creativity of traditions, Brown develops his other extension 
of  Gadamer:  correcting  the  view  that  ‗the  essence  of  tradition  is  to  exist  in  the  medium  of 
language‘.53 He criticises the general ‗intellectualist bias‘ in studies that reduce the ‗affective 
elements of tradition‘—story, myth, symbol and ritual—‘to what they can become as exemplars or 
vehicles  of  belief‘,  and  introduces  an  account  of  ‗the  place  of  affectivity  in  the  dynamic  of 
tradition.‘ Brown‘s development of this theme comprises the third section of his fourth chapter. 
Taking  as  his  primary  datum  ‗[r]itual,  perhaps  the  most  obviously  affective  dimension  of 
traditions‘, he sets out to answer the question: ‗how and why does ritual—and, mutatis mutandis, 
other affective elements of tradition—contribute to the life of a tradition?‘ (BH 91) 
Beginning with a critical survey of anthropological studies by Jonathan Z. Smith and Victor 
Turner,54 Brown finds that rituals are more than expressions of belief. ‗Rituals do things:‘ they 
function both to continue (conserve, enhance, sustain) and transform (create, shape, change) 
their traditions and their participants (BH 97). To explain why and how rituals do this, Brown 
critically  extends  the  work  of  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  and  A.N. Whitehead  into  brief 
phenomenological  and  philosophical  explorations  of  the  connection  between  human 
embodiment  and  ritual.55  Merleau-Ponty‘s  work  on  the  phenomenology  of  behaviour  and 
perception points to a profound interpenetration of self and world that is mediated by the body, 
and indeed is the body. Brown finds this fully congruent with his view of ‗ritual action as a 
                                                       
51 See the lists Brown provides at BH 77, 90, 114. These lists, like St Paul‘s lists of spiritual charisms, are evidently 
meant to be exemplary rather than exhaustive. 
52 See A Diverse Canon commencing on p. 79. 
53 Gadamer 1989, 389; cited at BH 46. Brown gives further similar references on p. 165 n79. 
54 BH 92-7. Other scholars more briefly mentioned are Robertson Smith, J.G. Frazer, Bronislaw Malinowski, A.R. 
Radcliffe-Brown and Clifford Geertz (BH 94-5). 
55 BH 98-102 for Merleau-Ponty. BH 102-8 for Whitehead. For a summary of Brown‘s appropriation of Whitehead 
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carrier of tradition‘ (BH 102). Whitehead‘s process-relational ontology provides an interpretive 
context that is at once all-embracing and infinitely detailed, in which reality is viewed as a 
fantastically complex matrix of atomic events. This ontology allows for the directed relation of 
past  to  present  to  future,  the  potential  for  innovation  in  the  present,  the  formative  and 
transformative  possibilities  of  patterned  action,  the  basically  physical  character  of  our 
engagement with the world, the inseparability of the mental and physical aspects of human 
existence, and the dynamic interaction of all aspects of human functioning. Brown finds that 
these  more  theoretical  studies  provide  a  robust  intellectual  context  for  understanding  the 
anthropologists‘ conclusions. Ritual does things: reciprocally affecting not only the affections, 
but also the character and conclusions of reflection. 
Brown is careful not to claim too much for ritual: ‗rituals are neither the primary nor the privileged 
vehicles  of  tradition,  nor  are  particular  ritual  practices  indisputably  universal‘  (BH  108). 
Nevertheless, he concludes strongly: ‗If tradition is the negotiation with/in the dynamic space of 
canon, then ritual no less than conceptual analysis is a means of that negotiation.…In the play of 
ritual enactment we engage our canonical space…Without ritual, traditions perish‘ (BH 108-9). 
Brown‘s reclamation of ritual as vital to tradition, and hence as a worthy focus of theological 
attention, is very welcome, and I largely agree with his argument. What I find problematic lies 
not so much in the argument as around it: the scope of Brown‘s appreciation for humanity‘s 
affective and bodily life, and the use he makes of his conclusions. Because these aspects are 
related not only to each other but to other problematic areas in Brown‘s overall proposal, I will 
defer their further consideration until we have surveyed his concluding chapter. 
3.2.4  Integrating Imagination and Character: Brown’s Vision for Theology 
Having completed his survey and development of the necessary theoretical background, Brown 
can now present his vision of what ‗professional‘ theology must become if it is to emerge from 
its  present  ‗cultural  and  religious  impotence‘.56  From  the  results  of  the  earlier  chapters 
(summarised at BH 112-7), he draws two main implications. Firstly, if theology is to make a 
cultural and religious difference it must integrate character and imagination—receive inherited 
symbols and creatively reconstruct them. The way to the future lies through the imaginative 
reconstruction of the creatively appropriated past (BH 117-8). Secondly, the reconstructive task 
is inextricably tied to tradition‘s affective life: ‗the ongoing task of theological construction will 
falter  unless  it  somehow  has  vital  roots  in  practicing  religious  communities‘  (BH  118-9). 
Following this brief statement, Brown devotes a section of text to developing each implication. 
                                                       
56 BH 111-2, and see p. 64 above. In Brown‘s prefatory comments to this chapter, he variously denotes the object of 
his concern as North American ‗academic and mainline theologies‘, ‗―professional‖ American theologians‘, and ‗the 
dominant theologies in America‘. Preoccupation with the North American context is particularly evident in Brown‘s 
final chapter, both in this passage and in the selection of contemporary theologians with whom he engages. I have not 
specifically addressed Brown‘s North American focus in this study, and I offer no opinion of his reading of the North 
American situation. However, his concern for ‗academic‘ or ‗professional‘ theology, and its relation to church and 
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In the first of these (BH 119-37), he identifies the novelty of his proposal, not in the claim that 
Christian history is ‗a succession of communal reconstructions of the Christian past‘, but in the 
claim that this is as it should be. Even more so for theology, which ‗ought to be the community’s 
creative  reconstruction,  and  it  ought  to  be  the  creative  construction  of  the  community‘s 
canonical symbols‘.57 Yet Brown finds little evidence that contemporary theology shares his 
view, and he supports this assessment by comparing and contrasting his proposal with those of 
selected conservative, radical and liberal theologians.58 The comparative evaluation focuses on 
the  extent  to  which  each  theologian‘s  proposal  integrates  character  (inheritance)  and 
imagination  (creativity).  Brown  concludes  that  conservative  theologies  are  ‗theologies  of 
character‘  that  fail  ‗to  engage  adequately  and  openly  in  the  creative  reconstruction  of  the 
canonical  past‘  (BH  120-7);  radical  theologies  are  ‗theologies  of  imagination‘  that  valorise 
novelty  but  neglect  tradition‘s  ‗power  for  good  as  well  as  ill‘  (BH  127-32);  and  liberal 
approaches, having identified an interpretive centre for the canon, all too often go on to silence 
the  divergent  voices,  resulting  in  theologies  in  which  both  character  and  imagination  are 
‗diminished‘ (BH 132-5). While Brown finds all three theological approaches unsatisfactory,59 
he finds most affinity with the balance of character and imagination in liberal theology, which 
he hopes to reform by curing it of its habit of elevating an ‗authentic‘ interpretive core to the 
exclusion  of  the  canon‘s  diversity.  He  therefore  casts  his  own  proposal  as  a  revision  of 
liberalism rather than a fourth type of theology (BH 135-7). 
Brown‘s second implication was ‗that the effective reformulation of inherited symbols must be 
rooted in the affective dynamics of practicing communities‘ (BH 119). However, rather than 
focusing on this specific implication the next section of Brown‘s text takes the broader path of 
following up the preceding section‘s critical comments with a positive vision of theology as a 
whole, a vision in which affective and communal elements play a significant part. The new 
section,  entitled  ‗What  theologies  are  and  do‘  (BH  137-47),  begins  with  a  programmatic 
summary: ‗Theology should return to traditions‘ and accept the role of 
critical analyst and creative conveyor of the vast conceptual resources, actual and potential, 
of religious traditions. In thus critically and creatively reconstructing the past, a theology is 
a tradition‘s caregiver. That, indeed, is the vocation of theology.60 
                                                       
57 BH 120, original italics. This passage, to which we shall refer again, is notable for the prominence given to the 
religious community. 
58 The ‗conservatives‘ are Clark Pinnock and George Lindbeck, the ‗radical‘ is Mark C. Taylor, and the ‗liberals‘ are 
Schubert Ogden, Rosemary Ruether, Gordon Kaufman and John Cobb. 
59 Brown finds that radical theologies are ‗doomed to cultural and religious impotence by their neglect of tradition‘ 
(BH  132).  The  liberal  approach  defines  what  the  religious imagination ought  to  be  (the  interpretive  core),  thus 
diminishing imagination. Then, for its own creative stimulation, it finds itself looking to extra-traditional voices, 
which ‗have increasingly provided not only the catalyst, but also the content‘ of its  proposals, thus diminishing 
character. Therefore, ‗liberal theology is in grave danger of becoming in disguise what radical theology is openly—
creativity without the substance of inherited symbols.‘ Hence it receives a similar verdict: ‗culturally and religiously 
ineffective‘  (BH  137).  Brown  will  allow  that  conservative  theologies  can  be  ‗temporarily  effective‘  but  finds 
conservatism ‗stultifying because it fears the imagination‘ (BH 127). 
60 BH 137-8. A similarly programmatic statement, cited in full on p. 74 below, opens the section on ‗Theology‘s 
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This summary is expounded in three sub-sections that address theology‘s task (BH 138-40), its 
authority (BH 141-4), and its place in church and academy (BH 145-7). In a schema with clear 
links to David Tracy, Brown describes theological caregiving ‗diachronically, as a threefold 
activity‘.61 The first activity is the ‗systematic‘ task of inquiring into the meanings ingredient in 
a tradition. The second activity is the ‗empirical or political‘ activity of examining ‗the ways [in 
which] the conceptual forms of a tradition…are and might be related to actual and possible 
modes of life.‘ The third activity is evaluative, and comprises the derivation and application of 
criteria by which the tradition‘s ideas, in interaction with other ideas and with social realities, 
can be assessed. 
For Brown, as for Tracy, theologians‘ evaluative claims ‗must be open to public debate and 
vulnerable to criticism from all of the communities of contemporary discourse that collectively 
constitute the public sphere‘.62 The three activities of theology are inseparable (BH 140) yet also 
somehow distinct (theological caregiving is ‗diachronically…a threefold activity‘,  BH 138). 
Moreover, none 
is free of the fallibility and messiness of constant adjudication in our ever-changing and varied 
communities of contemporary discourse. Each—systematic analysis, empirical analysis, and 
evaluation—is a constructive activity rooted in the creativity of theologians in communities. 
And therefore each is conducted with risk, without reassuring guidelines or guarantees. 
Brown‘s acknowledgment here of the complexity and messiness of the hermeneutic situation is 
quite similar to the sentiments expressed by Tracy in some of his later work.63 
Brown expands on the idea of theological risk when addressing theology‘s authority (BH 141-
4). If theological caregiving is ‗the negotiation with/in canon of continuity and change‘, should 
the  negotiation  favour  either  of  these  poles?  The  traditional  preference  has  been  for  the 
tradition, i.e., for continuity, but this is misguided. Even if pure repetition were possible, it 
would offer no guarantees. Against recent French critical thought,64 Brown judges that neither 
relative change nor relative continuity should be privileged. Rather, 
[t]he only authorization of the theological reconstruction of a tradition is the tentative and 
fallible  affirmation  that,  for  some  times  and  for  some  places,  might  be  granted  by 
contemporary communities of evaluation, in which communities the varied voices of the 
tradition itself are entitled to full but unprivileged participation (BH 143-4). 
                                                       
61 Not that Brown‘s account necessarily shows direct dependence on Tracy or development of his method. In view of 
the  fact  that  both  make  substantial  use  of  Gadamer  in  developing  their  respective  hermeneutics,  a  lack  of 
correspondence would be very surprising. Brown‘s first two theological activities, the systematic and the empirical, 
immediately  suggest  Tracy‘s  two  ‗constants‘,  an  interpretation  of  the  tradition  and  an  interpretation  of  the 
contemporary situation. Brown‘s third activity, evaluation, roughly parallels Tracy‘s ‗mutually critical correlation‘ of 
the two constants, but Brown has provided a much fuller account of this aspect of the theological task. 
62 BH 139. Brown notes his affinity in this respect with ‗those who speak of theology as public discourse and those 
who emphasize the revisionary element in theological reflection‘. Compare Tracy 1985b. 
63 For example, in Plurality and Ambiguity (Tracy 1987) and some later short works and papers. 
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For  Brown,  neither  tradition  nor  canon  have  authority  in  the  sense  of  ‗that  which  norms  or 
authorises‘. They author, rather than authorise; their authority is formative, rather than normative. 
The authority of a canon is the creative power it manifests and therefore enables in those 
who inhabit it, and the authority of a tradition is the power of its canon again and again to 
author reconstructions, conceptual and affective, that yield viable individual and communal 
identities.65 
It is only when Brown speaks of theology‘s ‗place‘ (BH 145-7) that the affective vitalities of 
communal  practice receive  any  further  attention.  ‗Theological imagination is formed  in the 
emotional tones of patterned actions and felt relationships not fully rationalized.‘ And unless 
theology makes a difference to the kind of symbolic milieux that formed its own imagination, it 
will  in  the  end  make  little  difference  to  anything.  Brown‘s  vagueness  about  the  nature  of 
theology‘s relation to faith communities (it must be ‗somehow‘ vitally rooted in their affective 
dynamics) reflects the fact that this relation ‗cannot be governed by fixed rules of method or 
practice, only by the fluid and debatable judgements of common sense.‘ A theological caregiver 
need not be an adherent,66 but if the care offered is to be effective in the long run it must at least 
be ‗open‘ and ‗sensitive‘ (not indifferent or hostile) to communal feelings and practices, and let 
itself be held accountable for the contribution it makes to these communal vitalities. At the same 
time,  like  other  disciplines  in  the  humanities  and  social  sciences,  theology  is  ‗a  perfectly 
legitimate form of disciplined scholarly consideration, even within the secular university.‘67 
Theology, then, which ought to be part of and at home in the academy, should also be rooted in 
the vitalities of practicing religious communities. 
Brown‘s  concluding  section  on  ‗theology‘s  consent‘  to  tradition68  cogently  summarises  his 
proposal, before briefly sketching its place in the past, present and possible future of North 
American theology. Let Brown‘s own summary conclude this overview. 
                                                       
65  BH  144,  original  italics.  Brown  says  (in  loc)  he  has  rejected  the  Roman  model  of  authority,  which  guards 
foundations as sacred and eternally binding, in favour of ‗authority as ―exousia,‖ which in portions of the New 
Testament at least connotes the power and freedom given to the community of faith‘. 
66 I find it hard to describe a non-adherent as being ‗somehow vitally rooted‘ in the affective vitalities of communal 
practice.  Apart  from  the  organic  ‗vital  roots‘  metaphor,  Brown  describes  the  relations  between  theologian  and 
religious community in terms suitable to a well-conducted relationship between consultant and client. 
67 BH 146. In this section, Brown uses the scholarly study of human love as an illustrative parallel to the scholarly 
activity  of  theology.  In  both  cases,  scholarly  attention  neither  requires  nor  excludes  the  scholar‘s  personal 
involvement in the aspect of human life that is their object of study. Conversely, far from disqualifying a person from 
scholarly inquiry, personal involvement may support, or even be essential to, a properly open and sensitive stance 
towards the object of study. Brown sees this argument applying across a wide range of scholarly inquiry in the 
humanities and social sciences (BH 147). 
68 This neatly balances the brief mention of Cicero‘s consent to tradition with which Brown began his Introduction. 
While Cicero‘s consent was apparently comfortable (‗tradition is rather like our second nature‘), theology‘s consent 
must be both more informed as to the nature of tradition and more critically engaged in shaping its future. See BH 1-
2, 147-8. Earlier (BH 86), Brown usefully exploited the ambiguity of the phrase ‗to take on‘: theology ‗takes on‘ 
tradition by gratefully receiving it as a gift, and also ‗takes it on‘ as challenge and task. Brown wants theology to 
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The theologian—as analyst, critic, and artist—is a tradition‘s caregiver. Her or his task is to 
try  to  discern  the  varied  conceptual  possibilities  ingredient  within  a  tradition‘s  lived 
realities, to formulate and elaborate these potentialities, to evaluate them in relation both to 
the practice of the communities that house them, often unknowingly, and the critiques of 
the critical discourses that surround them, thus to advocate some conceptual possibilities 
over others, and finally, to serve as he or she can the integration of these reconstructions 
back into communal feeling, practice, and articulation. 
It is in light of this task that theology will ―consent‖ to tradition: Theology accepts as a 
starting point what a tradition has been and is, accepts as a goal what it might be and should 
become, and accepts as an obligation the advocacy of that potential realization.…Theology 
is the creative reconstruction of inherited symbols, the construction of a tradition‘s future 
from the resources of its past (BH 147-8). 
3.3  DELWIN BROWN‘S PROPOSAL: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
While Brown‘s proposal offers important insights into the nature of tradition and theology as 
cultural processes, it also has its weaknesses, some of which acquire greater importance when 
viewed  against  the  backdrop  of  Lindbeck‘s  cultural-linguistic  theory.  In  this  section  I  will 
consider the scope of Brown‘s appreciation of the affective dimension of human existence and 
the way he uses this insight, the strange diversity of his ‗canon‘, and the problem of ‗authority‘. 
3.3.1  A Disciplined Body 
We have seen that Brown develops his insights into the significance of bodiliness and religious 
affection in just two places: at the end of his treatment of Gadamer and in the section he devotes 
to ritual.69 The latter promotes ‗the realm of the affective, of which ritual is a conspicuous 
example‘ as worthy of theological attention, though this introductory comment already provides 
a hint that Brown‘s attention will be mainly on the disciplined form of ritual at the expense of 
the wider, less-disciplined affective realm.70 
To  help  redress  the  logocentric,  cognitive  bias  in  theology‘s  view  of  ritual,  Brown  calls  on 
Merleau-Ponty and radical empiricism (especially Whitehead). But in view of his description of 
the scope and profundity of their reflections, it is strange that Brown makes such strictly delimited, 
if  still  important,  use  of  their  insights  into  embodiment.71  Brown  sets  out  to  ‗correct‘  an 
overemphasis on disciplined, tradition-oriented reflection (theology and doctrine) by means of a 
balancing emphasis on disciplined action (ritual) and disciplined feeling (myth, story, symbol). 
Wild being, ordinary being, messy and undisciplined being—in other words, everyday human 
                                                       
69 For these, see BH 46-53 and p. 66 above; and BH 91-109 and pp. 69-70 above. 
70 Another way of putting it is that Brown focuses on the importance to tradition of  traditioned affective forms 
(ritual, story, symbol, myth) and neglects the possible significance of untraditioned (or less traditioned) affections 
and their complex interaction with the traditioned forms. 
71  Brown‘s  account  of  Merleau-Ponty  and  Whitehead  is  at  BH  98-106.  The  present  point  concerns  Brown‘s 
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life—seem  to  lack  importance  for  him.72  He appears not to realise that the scope of radical 
empiricism extends well beyond the manageably complex reality of disciplined forms. The whole 
of life in its unmanageable complexity—disciplined, ill-disciplined and undisciplined alike—is 
what radical empiricism tries to take seriously. For all that Brown wants to advance the cause of 
this philosophical stream, he does not fully appreciate its implications. Neither Merleau-Ponty nor 
Whitehead offer perspectives that are content to serve Brown‘s promotion of a polite bodiliness.73 
3.3.2  The Head of the Body 
Earlier, I welcomed Brown‘s conclusion that, along with textual and conceptual elements, and no 
less  than  these,  the  affective  realm  is  fundamental  to  the  negotiation  of  identity  within  a 
tradition.74 Unfortunately, the reinstated affective realm slips back into subservience to rationality 
during the course of Brown‘s final chapter. The reversion occurs in two related ways: descriptions 
of ‗theological caregiving‘ become more immediately concerned with a tradition‘s conceptual 
than its affective heritage; and the affective elements of tradition (even the disciplined forms of 
ritual, myth, etc) lose the canonical status Brown previously insisted was rightfully theirs. 
These trends emerge as Brown, having completed his critique of contemporary theologians, 
begins to present his vision of ‗what theologies are and do‘.75 As we have seen, Brown wants 
theology to ‗return to traditions‘ and accept the role of 
                                                       
72 This is in spite of the fact that Brown gives specific consideration to ‗wild being‘, a term taken from Merleau-
Ponty and mentioned more than once in BH (pp. 99, 102(bis), 104,(bis), 105, 142). Brown traces a late shift in 
Merleau-Ponty‘s  thought,  in  which  hermeneutic  primacy  is  no  longer  given  to  ‗the  body-subject‘  but  to  ‗the 
intersection of self and world wherein each comes into being‘. Merleau-Ponty‘s fundamental image for this formative 
milieu within which both the body-subject and its world are coformed was ‗flesh‘: ‗By this image he indicated a field 
of forces, ―wild, brute Being,‖ that throws forth both self and world…, even though each to some degree also forms 
and forces the movements of the other‘ (BH 99). Brown finds that Merleau-Ponty‘s later phenomenology of ‗flesh‘ 
indicates that ‗all structured behaviour, not merely speech, is the mark and carrier of meaning‘ and that ‗through its 
ritual enactments ―the body [serves] as the carrier…of our tradition, passing on its culture, its history, its life‖ ‘ (BH 
102,  citing  Levin  1985).  My  point  here  is  that,  while  Brown  thinks  that  ‗Merleau-Ponty‘s  analysis  of  human 
expression exhibits a curious neglect of…ritual action‘ (BH 100), his appropriation of Merleau-Ponty neglects non-
ritual action. The hermeneutic significance of the body includes ritual and non-ritual action. 
73 In other words, Brown‘s bodiliness is too neat. Lindbeck, too, harbours an incongruous neatness, though his is on 
the conceptual side (see Tracy 1985a, 466-8). In both Brown and Lindbeck, inappropriate neatness appears among the 
subservient: Brown‘s neat body serves an agenda delineated by an all-encompassing rationality; Lindbeck‘s neat 
(theological) rationality serves the agenda of the all-encompassing life of a tradition. 
74 Brown‘s summary concerning the affective dimension of tradition includes the following: ‗…playing the past, and 
being played by it, is far more than a merely conceptual activity. Inherited texts, beliefs, and doctrines are central to 
this process, but not exclusively so. The realm of the affective, of which ritual is a conspicuous example, is also 
fundamental to the negotiation of identity within a tradition.…it seems quite clear that feelings and actions, no less 
than ideas and analyses, are carriers of tradition and thus are essential to its effective continuation‘ (BH 117). 
75 BH 137-47, and see p. 71 above. Perhaps the diminution of the affective dimension can be seen earlier, in that this 
dimension makes no contribution to Brown‘s assessment of contemporary theologies. The omission seems strange, in 
that Brown could surely have made some comment on these theologies in terms of their acknowledgement of or 
attitude towards what is in his view a vital aspect of tradition. Also strange is the fact that, although the affective 
dimension is presumably intimately involved in the formation of traditioned ‗imagination and character‘, Brown‘s 
discussion of these remains firmly conceptual. However, while this argument from silence seems consistent with the   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      76 
critical analyst and creative conveyor of the vast conceptual resources, actual and potential, 
of religious traditions. In thus critically and creatively reconstructing the past, a theology is 
a tradition‘s caregiver. That, indeed, is the vocation of theology (BH 137-8). 
It seems that theological caregiving is fulfilled primarily in caring for a tradition‘s conceptual 
resources,76 and this impression is reinforced when Brown describes theology‘s task (BH 138-
40)  and  ‗authority‘  (BH  141-144)  without  mentioning  tradition‘s  non-conceptual  resources. 
These resources do not regain their voice until Brown discusses theology‘s place in church and 
academy  (BH  145-7).  Here,  he  stresses  that  ‗conceptual  construction  in  theology  has  its 
wellsprings in the affective vitalities of communal practice‘, and that theology‘s responsibilities 
include  making  a  difference  to  these  vitalities.  Brown‘s  point  is  essentially  that,  although 
theological construction is a conceptual activity, it cannot afford to live only in the sphere of 
concepts and cognition. Or rather, tradition cannot afford a theology that does only this, since 
such a theology would not be giving the care that a vital tradition requires. 
Brown wants to overcome what he sees as an ‗intellectualist bias‘ in studies of tradition‘s affective 
elements. As he defines it, this bias manifests itself in the assumption that what really matters 
about a tradition‘s affective elements is their cognitive meaning, and what really matters about a 
tradition is its beliefs, and so a tradition‘s affective elements are reduced to what they can become 
as exemplars or vehicles of belief. But in fact, traditions are not like that,77 and so, in his own 
proposal, Brown has the affective dimension of tradition entering into theology‘s caregiving in 
three  ways: theology  will acknowledge  the  full range  of tradition‘s  conceptual,  affective  and 
communal vitalities as the wellsprings of its own constructions; theology will continually re-
evaluate and re-imagine not only traditional concepts, but also the conceptual content implicit in 
tradition‘s  affective  heritage;  and  theology  will  contribute  to  faith  communities‘  affective 
integration of reconstructed concepts through appropriate use of myth, symbol and ritual.78 
An ‗intellectualist bias‘ is still quite evident here. Although theology at least recognises its own 
affective roots, thereby gaining a little humility, it nevertheless mines the tradition‘s affective 
dimension for conceptual content, evaluates and reconstructs that content, and gives further 
attention to the affective in order to further the integration of reconstructed conceptual content 
into the life of the tradition. The affective dimension is clearly important, but the conceptual 
content is still what really matters. Further, Brown primarily associates the affective dimension 
with tradition‘s vitality; theological attention to the affective will further the effectiveness of 
theology‘s creative reconstructions. This comes close to treating the affective as a mere vehicle 
for tradition‘s real (conceptual) substance. In this way, canon largely reverts to its more familiar 
                                                                                                                                                             
positive evidence in Brown‘s text, it cannot make the case that I am now presenting. 
76 The same impression of conceptual primacy pervades Brown‘s final summary, cited in full at p. 74 above. 
77 BH 91. Brown ironises the point: ‗in actual traditions the affective is not marginalized and the cognitive is not 
triumphant (except, perhaps, in the imagination of its specialized practitioners who in some traditions are called 
theologians)‘ (original italics). 
78 This paragraph combines material from  BH 145 (on theology‘s place) and BH 147-8 (Brown‘s final summary). 
Note the shifts in location: affective  cognitive  affective. Later, this pattern of psychological location will be 
paralleled by shifts in discursive location: community  academy  community.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      77 
conceptual (textual and doctrinal) description, and the affective dimension remains far more 
relevant to a tradition‘s vitality than to its identity.79 
3.3.3  Embracing the Body 
If Brown‘s acknowledgement of bodily and affective existence remains politely restrained, more 
like a nod than an embrace, how might his proposal change if it embraced a bodiliness that was 
less  disciplined  by  tradition  and  less  subservient  to  conceptual  analysis?  I  suggest  that 
perceptions of the locus of a tradition‘s vitality would expand to include the daily living of its 
adherents, and would in fact be weighted towards everyday life as this is shaped (or misshaped) 
and enabled (or disabled) by the tradition as a whole. I also suggest that theology‘s conceptual 
analysis would no longer constitute the evaluative task, though it would of course contribute to 
the religious community‘s evaluation of its traditional resources. 
We have seen that, when reclaiming the importance of ritual and the affective dimension, Brown 
focuses on disciplined affective elements as the locus of a tradition‘s vitality. But the insights of 
Merleau-Ponty and Whitehead, as Brown describes them, extend well beyond what he asks of 
them.80 In particular, they bring to attention the realm of undisciplined and ill-disciplined being, 
thus raising the possibility that a tradition‘s vitality resides, not in its affective elements as such, 
but  in  the  contribution  the  tradition  (including  those  elements)  makes  to  the  vitality  of  its 
adherents as it patterns their affections, thoughts and behaviours, continually (re)forming them as 
whole beings in every aspect of their lives. This bears some resemblance to Lindbeck‘s view that 
everyday life is the primary arena in which a tradition‘s adherents continually demonstrate its 
viability and vitality (to the extent that it is viable and vital) by living skilfully and successfully.81 
Lindbeck would not wish to deny the importance of the affective elements in which Brown lo cates 
a tradition‘s vitality—far from it—but he would find their importance in the contribution they 
make to a tradition‘s real vitality, namely, the vitality of its adherents, who live their lives in and 
through their tradition, and seek to engage the world using the concepts, stories, symbols, rituals, 
and affections in which it continually (re)forms them. 
The relocation of vitality can be seen as a matter of emphasis, but the relocation of evaluation is 
much more a matter of substance. Earlier, we noted that Brown‘s theological caregiving privileges 
the  cognitive:  theological  imagination  is  fed  by  the  affections;  proving  and  approving  is  a 
conceptual activity; appropriation occurs at the affective level. There is an ‗ascent and descent‘ 
movement here, in which the evaluative task draws on and feeds back into the affections, but 
remains, in itself, distinct from them. Brown has not allowed for the possibility that the bodily and 
affective dimensions of human life might contribute more directly to the evaluative task—the 
                                                       
79 The fact that Brown does not maintain the canonicity of the affective is more than a simple inconsistency, since it 
is related to the far more important matter of his view of canonical diversity, which I address below. 
80 See above p. 66 n46, p. 69, p. 75 n72. Again, I am not engaging Brown‘s account of these scholars. I am claiming 
that, if they say what he says they do, then the implications reach further than he allows. 
81 See Lindbeck‘s account of ‗Intelligibility as Skill‘ (ND 128-34) and p. 45 above. Admittedly, one could reasonably 
raise doubts about Lindbeck‘s appreciation of the body in that there is little mention of ritual in  ND. However, 
Lindbeck‘s  understanding  of  religion  as  a  semiotic  system  includes  an  awareness  of  the  importance  of  bodily 
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possibility  that  the  proving  that  really  matters  might  be  experiential  in  the  broadest  sense, 
happening as much through bodily and affective venture as through cognitive reflection. 
My point is not that the cognitive is relatively unimportant (a difficult point to argue in a 
doctoral  thesis),  but  that  the  proving  and  approving  of  ideas,  actions,  resources,  canons, 
traditions and many other aspects of our pasts that bear on daily life—to the extent that they are 
proved and not merely assumed—is conducted in a deeply dialectical and dialogical manner. 
We can reflect, ponder, argue, discern, and evaluate ideas against other ideas, form judgements, 
and so propose new possibilities (often not so new as we like to think). But we do not really test 
these possibilities until we venture them in life, until we declare ourselves in word and/or deed 
to others who may respond verbally and/or take up (their understanding of) our venture for 
testing in their own lives. The fundamental challenge for traditioned life lies in the question 
‗Can we really live this way?‘ Both the answer to this question and the means by which it is 
achieved are, at every point, more than conceptual just as life is more than conceptual.82 
As with the idea of vitality, the idea of bodi ly and affective involvement in the evaluative task 
moves us in the direction taken by Lindbeck, who argues that the primary measure of a 
tradition‘s success, coherence and intelligibility lies in its adherents‘ success (or otherwise) in 
dealing with life in all its fullness. In this endeavour, the role played by conceptual analysis and 
reconstruction is important, but not decisive by itself. Nor will the evaluative task belong solely 
to the academy as Brown seems to envisage, but will be a task of the religious community, 
drawing on all the resources available to it.83 
Taken together, the suggested modifications seem likely to bring Brown‘s proposal much nearer 
to fulfilling one of his goals: 
Theology  ought  to  be  the  community’s  creative  reconstruction,  and  it  ought  to  be  the 
creative construction of the community‘s canonical symbols.84 
But if embracing the body has led to reflection on the nature and location of reconstruction, 
making that reconstruction primarily the  community’s task rather than theology‘s alone, we 
must still consider the subject of the reconstructive enterprise: the ‗canonical symbols‘. 
                                                       
82 The idea of ‗proving‘ being used here is meant to be the one that is common in the Bible. Proving occurs as the 
proving of metal in the refining process, tempering, suffering, the gaining of experience. The key word group in the 
New Testament is  and its cognates (I Peter 1:7, James 1:3 etc. See the references and field of meanings 
given in BAGD 202-3 and MM 167-8). The expression ‗Proving is experiential; possibilities are conceptual‘, captures 
something of what I am trying to say. However, stated this simply, the distinction is too neat. Cognition is clearly 
important in experiential proving, and experience is clearly important to the imagination of possibilities. Another 
relevant  distinction  is  that  between  elites  and  broader  communities.  Possibilities  may  commonly  originate  from 
individuals or (intellectual) elites, but I suggest that their testing and proving belongs more to communities. 
83 The preceding discussion deals largely with cognitive/affective polarities, rather than academy/community polarities 
which were mentioned above (see p. 72) and are further addressed below (see Norming the Norm commencing on p. 81). 
84 BH 120, original italics. Perhaps the word ‗construction‘ should read ‗reconstruction‘, echoing the first clause.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      79 
3.3.4  A Diverse Canon 
Comparative  reading  of  Brown  and  Lindbeck  has  indicated  that  Brown  has  dealt  more 
adequately than Lindbeck with the culture-theoretical aspect of their common territory, while 
Lindbeck has a more robust appreciation of the significance of human bodiliness. Two further 
aspects of Brown‘s proposal have particular relevance to an assessment vis-à-vis Lindbeck‘s 
offering. These are Brown‘s view of the scope and diversity of canonical materials, and his idea 
of the relation between a canon and its non-canonical environment. 
The range of material Brown includes in canon is remarkably diverse. We noted earlier that texts, 
myths, stories, rituals, doctrines, institutions, symbols, and ‗patterns of cultivated sensibilities‘ 
may  all  be  canonical.85  This diversity of materials (as distinct from conceptual or narrative 
diversity) is introduced without discussion. These, we are told, are (some of) the materials found 
in the canonical field of play; within this field all elements are apparently equally canonical; and 
‗canon‘ in this broad sense seems to remain distinguishable from ‗tradition‘. 
It is entirely reasonable to consider non-textual material as having the nature of canon. Many 
Christian traditions may be distinguished from each other by just such non-textual matters as 
Brown mentions, and to the extent that Christians draw a sense of identity from these things and 
ascribe a normative status to them, they can be said to function in a canonical way. But if all 
these elements may be called canonical, then it must be insisted that no substantial Christian 
tradition  ascribes  canonical  status  equally  to  all  such  material.  Rather,  the  scriptures  reign 
supreme, both in official doctrinal standards and for many Christians simply as a matter of fact, 
whatever theologians may say. For example, in the Anglican tradition(s) one might say that the 
Thirty Nine Articles of Religion and the Book of Common Prayer of 1662 are ‗canonical‘ in 
that, if one did not hold them to be normative, then one could not meaningfully identify oneself 
without qualification as an Anglican.86 But the Anglican standards (like most other official 
doctrinal standards) hold themselves out to be authoritative only insofar as they truly reflect the 
teaching of the Christian scriptures. That is, they subordinate their own authority to that of the 
scriptures. Similarly, modern doctrinal standards that acknowledge contemporary sources of 
learning generally do so in a way that makes plain the supremacy of Holy Scripture (e.g., the 
Basis of Union of the Uniting Church in Australia). Brown‘s inclusion within canon of a wide 
diversity of materials could well describe the actual circumstances of Christian traditions if his 
account  allowed  for  gradations  or  degrees  in  canonical  status.  Unfortunately,  he  gives  no 
attention to the hierarchy of authorities acknowledged in most major doctrinal standards.87 
                                                       
85 See p. 69 above. 
86 The fact that many people identify themselves with Anglican Christianity while, at the same time, denying normative 
status to these standards raises the question of the nature and sources of such identification. If tradition is the process of 
negotiating identities with/in a canon (as Brown has it), then what is really functioning as canon in such cases? Do we 
need to expand ‗canon‘ beyond (even radically beyond) the official canons of particular traditions? Perhaps we need to 
distinguish between official canons (as defined in traditions‘ own accounts of their intentions regarding sources of 
identity) and empirical canons (the sources of identity that can be identified as actually operating in a tradition). 
87 It is tempting to think that the undifferentiated authority of Brown‘s canon derives from his metaphor of the galaxy 
(see BH 75-7). But, as with most metaphors, it is not the metaphor itself but what Brown sees in it that makes it 
fruitful for him. For Brown, ‗Just as a galaxy is composed of a vast and varying multiplicity of elements, a canon is   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      80 
If it is clear that different levels of authority attach to different officially recognised texts, let 
alone to other official media such as ritual, symbol and the like, what of the Christian scriptures 
themselves? Although Brown tries to develop a general idea of ‗canon‘, he uses these scriptures, 
and only these, to illustrate his claims. Perhaps within the Christian scriptures, at least, we could 
expect Brown‘s implicit assumption of undifferentiated canonical authority to apply reasonably 
well. After all, where the scriptures alone are accepted as canonical, are they not generally 
acknowledged (officially, at least) to have the same authority throughout?88 
However,  an undifferentiated  authority  cannot  be  said to apply throughout  the  Christian 
scriptures. It has always been the case that certain texts and textual t raditions within the 
canonical corpus have been privileged over others. In the Hebrew scriptures, Torah has 
traditionally been privileged over the Prophets and Writings. In the New Testament, we see the 
early Christians re-construing the Hebrew Bible in th e light of what they believed to be the 
definitive self-revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth. Precisely what the relation actually was 
between Jesus and the Hebrew scriptures became a matter of vigorous dispute, a dispute which 
is by no means exhausted even today. The early church, receiving the Septuagint as scripture 
and the apostolic witness to Christ as its authoritative interpretation, privileged the witness to 
Christ in what became the ‗New Testament‘ over the witness to God in the ‗Old Testament‘. In 
so doing, they typically reinterpreted the Old Testament as a witness to Christ and, to the extent 
of  any  conflict,  subordinated  it  to  the  New  Testament.  In  short,  the  early  church  received 
scripture as a witness to Jesus Christ; the authority of scripture was derived from that of Jesus, 
and, in consistent (if circular) fashion, scripture was both received as authoritative insofar as it 
bore witness to him, and (re)interpreted so as to bear that witness. 89 
This brief precis is hardly a fully nuanced account, but it may suffice for the limited purpose of 
indicating  that  the  authority  of  Christian scripture is  a  matter  of  complex  relations,  not  only 
between the scriptures and the extra-scriptural tradition, but within the scriptures themselves, and 
also ‗beyond‘ the scriptures in the sense that the scriptures bear witness to Jesus Christ, rather than 
                                                                                                                                                             
dynamic, richly plural, and pluriform. As a galaxy is nevertheless something of a unity, so a canon has enough unity 
and structure to be one thing rather than another.…Like a galaxy, a canon‘s rough unity translates at the broadest 
level of analysis into an identifiable ―gravitational pull.‖ Like that of a galaxy, the gravitational force of a canon, 
though real, is interactive.‘ Moreover, a galaxy is neither as arbitrary as a constellation (a human invention), nor as 
definite as a planet (a precisely circumscribed given object). Brown allows that ‗at any given time, and from any 
given perspective, canon has a coarse and practical unity, though that unity is always differently construed from 
different perspectives.‘ This comment could have been extended into considerations of a galaxy having both a centre 
and a periphery, as having not merely enough structure to be ‗one thing rather than another‘, but enough identifiable 
structure to be described as an ordered complex of things. But Brown does not take the metaphor in this direction. 
88 I believe this question must be answered in the affirmative, but it contains an unnuanced representation of the 
positions of major Christian traditions reg arding  the  scriptures.  Terms  such  as  ‗authority‘  and  the  role  of  the 
interpreting community would need further amplification in a satisfactory statement. 
89 This is not to suggest that the Christian Bible‘s internal privileging of some texts over others, and some meanings 
over others, is unequivocally clear, and that we should be able to identify the internal structure of canonical authority, 
or a canonical core or trajectory of meanings, as if these were entirely properties of the texts themselves. In this, as in 
all matters of meaning, we are faced with the possibility that the meanings or structures we find owe as much to our 
construals as to the object(s) construed. But this does not mean that all possible construals are equally possible, and 
that decisions between them are to be excluded a priori.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      81 
themselves, as the definitive revelation of God. Brown‘s account of the diversity of canons does 
not support an appreciation of the complex relations of authority within the Christian scriptures, 
even if the Christian canon is taken to include only those scriptures (as Brown would not wish). 
But if, as Brown proposes, ‗canon‘ also includes diverse non-textual elements, the complexity of 
these relations is all the greater, making Brown‘s silence in this regard all the stranger. 
For all its rich diversity—in doctrine, in narrative tradition, in types of material—when Brown‘s 
canon is viewed in terms of authority it presents a face that is curiously and unrealistically 
featureless.90 It turns out that this blank aspect plays an important part in Brown‘s argument 
concerning the renegotiation of canonical boundaries, which we will now consider. 
3.3.5  Norming the Norm 
When reflecting on the undifferentiated nature of authority in Brown‘s view of canon, it must be 
remembered that Brown invests the terms ‗authority‘ and ‗normativeness‘ with a very particular 
meaning. Consider the following passage: 
To assert the normativeness of a canon is not to make a claim about any particular construal 
of it. Given the diversity of canon, this must be the case. A canon is not an answer, a point 
of view, a truth, a way of life. It is many answers, points of view, claims to truth, ways of 
life. The normativeness of a canon, therefore, can apply to this diversity only taken as a 
whole.  The  claim  can  be  only  that  in  this  field  of  many  voices  viable  answers  may 
continuously be found and made. To assert the normativeness of a canon is to make a claim 
for the adequacy of these voices in their interplay.…The normative character of a canon is 
the depth of its fecundity (BH 80). 
The first sentence of this passage is consistent with the idea of a norm as a rule or guide. 
Brown‘s  earlier  comment  that  ‗to  speak  of  a  canon‘s  normativeness  is  to  speak  of  its 
gravitational pull‘91 seems to indicate the same sense, while allowing for a gravitational centre 
that is somewhat diverse rather than precisely defined. But by the end of the above passage, a 
canon‘s ‗normativeness‘ is expressed in terms of its adequacy and fecundity, which is Brown‘s 
preferred meaning.92 In a footnote to the same passage, Brown indicates that he speaks similarly 
of a canon‘s ‗authority‘. The ‗authority‘ of a canon, he explains, is ‗its power to author identity 
rather  than…its  entitlement  to  authorize  belief  and  action.  Authorizing  is  a  task  fallibly 
                                                       
90 Brown‘s canon, as a bounded field of authorised sources apparently lacking internal structure, seems to offer as 
canon  a  smaller  version  of  the  chaos that  exists  outside  the  tradition.  Such  a  canon  expresses  a  preference  for 
circumscribed, ‗authorised‘ chaos rather than the truly chaotic extra-canonical chaos. Thus the plurality of Brown‘s 
canon seems to be very like that of contemporary (post)modern Western societies, in which every acceptable view is 
equally acceptable, and acceptability is acceded to all views that accept (or at least don‘t question) that basic premise. 
91 BH 79, see n87 above. 
92 See also BH 81: ‗Canons present the diverse resources with which people live their lives. They employ these 
resources, elevating some to pre-eminence, subordinating others, dismissing others, and remaining oblivious to most. 
They presume the adequacy of this broad resource, and in this sense privilege it, not because it has come down from 
the past, but because through the ages it has seemed to prove its wisdom and, especially, its generativity.‘ Brown does 
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conducted through critical examination in the arenas of contemporary discourse.‘93 Thus, Brown 
uses ‗normativeness‘ and ‗authority‘ in similar ways, and the sense he gives them relates to 
(actual or potential) fecundity. 
The  ideas  of  ‗normativeness‘  and  ‗authority‘  are  more  commonly  taken  teleologically  and 
ontologically—a canon would be ‗normative‘ in that it calls us towards what we ought to be, 
and ‗authoritative‘ in that it tells us the truth.94 Brown has moved the ideas of ‗normativeness‘ 
and ‗authority‘ away from ‗rule‘ (i.e., the meaning of ) and towards creativity. For him, 
these terms are more concerned with the ability to produce possibilities than with defining or 
choosing  valid  possibilities.  But  if  the  meanings  of  ‗normativeness‘  and  ‗authority‘  are 
redirected  away  from  canon‘s  role  in  defining  the  content,  and  thus  the  boundaries,  of  a 
bounded set of possibilities, the question of ‗rule‘ must be addressed in other ways. What is 
Brown‘s account of canonical boundaries? How are these boundaries (re)negotiated? In short, 
and reverting to more usual meanings, what, for Brown, is the norm of a canon? 
Brown  mentions  the  negotiation  of  canonical  boundaries  several  times.  Firstly,  he  extends 
Gadamer‘s metaphor of play to include creative play that not only plays the game as given but 
plays with the rules themselves. It is not just that the players play the game and the game plays 
the players, but the players play with the game. Hence Brown‘s frequent recourse to expressions 
such as that canons are ‗the spaces with/in which adherents…negotiate who they are‘ (BH 90). 
Canons are not fixed, or at least, their fixity is only relative.95 
Secondly,  in  Brown‘s  understanding  of  the  dynamism  of  traditions,  change  is  generally 
provoked ‗by the interaction, usually conflictual, between a religious tradition and its socio-
political  environment‘;  but,  if  change  in  a  tradition  is  to  be  lasting  and  efficacious,  it  ‗is 
accomplished primarily by recovery and re-formation of elements internal to the tradition‘.96 
The viability of such a change seems to be related to a perception of continuity: ‗I know this 
seems different to what we did/said/thought before, but this is the course we must now follow if 
we  are  to  be  faithful  to  our  identity/roots/scriptures.‘97  If  this  principle  is  applied  to  the 
                                                       
93 BH 184 n13, original italics. Also on p. 144: ‗From this perspective the authority of a canon is the creative power it 
manifests and therefore enables in those who inhabit it, and the authority of a tradition is the power of its canon again 
and again to author reconstructions, conceptual and affective, that yield viable individual and communal identities.‘ 
94 Just how it can do so may be a matter of some complexity and subtlety. The nature of ‗truth‘, especially, moves 
towards the centre of the argument in chapters 5 and 6 below. 
95 In itself, this is unexceptionable. For example, Karl Barth, a great respecter of the scriptural canon, insists on 
leaving open the question of its scope and contents. For him, canon is a consensual acknowledgment by the church of 
the authority of certain texts as witnesses to the Word of God. This consensus is as historically situated, and therefore 
as provisional, as any other human agreement. Insofar as the responsibility of the church is not primarily to the 
scriptures but to the scriptures as witnesses to the Word, one must say that the question of ‗the concrete form of the 
Canon is not closed absolutely, but only very relatively‘ (CD I.2 476, and the whole argument on pp. 473-81). 
96 BH 26, 86-7. For his basic point about the provocation for and response to change, Brown may briefly say ‗the 
provocation for change is external, but efficacious response draws on internal resources,‘ but he can also be more 
equivocal about the source of provocation (e.g., BH 186 n31). The fuller expositions indicate that he does not rely on a 
strict sense of ‗inside‘ and ‗outside‘. For him, traditions are intrinsically porous, and their boundaries always negotiable. 
97 Brown makes clear his awareness of the importance of this perception  as perception. He notes that ‗explicit 
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negotiation of canonical boundaries, then, whatever the source of the provocation or question, 
one would expect a viable change to arise from (or at least, to be justified on the basis of) 
resources internal to the tradition, and especially canonical resources. 
Lastly, the testing of a canon‘s adequacy is discussed in the context of ‗contemporaneity‘, one 
of the six main characteristics of canon. ‗[C]anons present the diverse resources with which 
people live their lives‘. 98 Confidence in the present adequacy of the canonical resources for this 
purpose derives from the testimony of personal experience and the tradition itself concerning 
the  canon‘s  past  adequacy.  (As  mentioned  above,  this  functional  adequacy  is  what  Brown 
means by ‗normativeness‘.) From this, one might imagine drawing a conclusion that favours 
holistic justification, that is, that a tradition is tested and justified in and through the lives of its 
adherents.99 However, Brown insists that ‗the evaluation of canonical commitments as ways of 
life…must…take place outside the canon, in the arenas of contemporary discourse‘.100 
Let us first address the element of necessity in this prescription. Why must evaluation occur 
‗outside  the  canon‘?  Brown  is  not  insisting  on  a  supposedly  ‗objective‘  assessor  with  no 
personal attachment to the tradition. Rather, the necessity is a logical one arising from his view 
of canonical diversity. Having stressed the importance and necessity of testing and evaluating a 
canon‘s adequacy, Brown argues that – 
…those who inhabit a canon are inevitably driven to evaluate and justify their particular 
construals in relation to other visions, both inside and outside their canonical home. Canon 
cannot  provide  the  measure  in  terms  of  which  adherents  justify  their  commitments  or 
choices from within the diversity of a canon, however, because it is the canon that presents 
the diversity. The evaluation of canonical commitments as ways of life, thus, must in the 
nature of the case take place outside the canon, in the arenas of contemporary discourse. Of 
course, canonical voices, too, are to be full participants in this evaluative discourse. They 
are as entitled as any other to make their cases and proffer their challenges to rival visions. 
But here, in the evaluation of what is adequate and inadequate, true and false, redemptive 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whether the material drawn upon is ―really‖ canonical is, at this level of analysis, a moot point. 
Just as for the reader a particular text is in part the history of its interpretations as they affect the 
reader, so, too, a canon is in part the history of its interpretations through communal celebration, 
imagination, and explication as they impinge upon the adherent. Pressing the question of what is 
―really‖ canonical occurs, or may occur, as a strategy within the process of negotiating canon, 
but not in the process of characterizing that negotiation (BH 187 n32). 
We are about to see just why Brown holds that a canon cannot rule the (re)negotiation of its own boundaries. 
98 See p. 68 above. Brown‘s main treatment of the contemporaneity of canon is at BH 81-2. The remainder of this 
paragraph draws on these two pages. 
99 This was imagined in the section  Embracing the Body commencing on p. 77 above. The present point indicates 
another way in which Brown‘s proposal pulls in the direction of holistic justification without actually taking that turn. 
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and destructive, canon has no privilege. Canon is a contemporary, one alternative among 
others, one inquirer among others, in the tasks of assessment and validation.101 
Thus Brown argues that a canon cannot provide, from within its own resources, the (or even a?) 
measure that its adherents can use to justify their canonical choices and commitments. The reason 
for this is that ‗it is the canon that presents the diversity.‘ This is the featureless diversity noted and 
criticised earlier: a diversity apparently without internal structure, without stronger and weaker 
themes, without deeper and more superficial meanings; a diversity without any (or sufficient, or 
adequate) indication of criteria that could guide evaluation. Brown offers no other reason for 
locating the evaluative task outside the canon: evaluation of canonical claims must take place 
outside the canon because the canonical resources present ‗diversity‘. Earlier, I indicated that 
Brown‘s account of canonical diversity is untenable. Here, as a logical deduction based on a false 
premise, the necessity of extra-canonical evaluation may be likewise dispensed with. 
But if the necessity is discarded, the notion of extra-canonical evaluation remains. Brown wants 
evaluation of the canon to take place outside the canon, in ‗our common discourse‘ where the 
canon has no privilege. This is clearly in tension, even in contradiction, with his observation that a 
viable change in canonical boundaries will be one that arises from (or at least, is justified on the 
basis of) resources internal to the tradition, and especially canonical resources. Often enough, this 
prescription and observation are all but juxtaposed in Brown‘s text.102 If I understand him rightly, 
the manner of canonical evaluation he advocates is one that, on his own criteria, is unlikely to be 
viable  or  efficacious,  though  he  seems  unaware  of  this  difficulty.  I  assume  Brown  is  not 
suggesting that a recommendation for change issuing from extra-canonical evaluation should be 
justified on the basis of intra-canonical resources. Such a course would lack integrity. Our choices, 
then, are limited. If we are truthfully to justify a recommendation for change on the basis of intra-
canonical resources, our evaluative process will rely on those resources, or at least privilege them 
in some way. Or if, following an extra-canonical evaluation, we are to be truthful about the basis 
of our recommendation, we will frankly acknowledge that we have subjected the canon (and 
hence the tradition) to the judgement of another canon (and hence, another tradition). 
I think Brown is right to maintain that viable changes require intra-canonical justification, and I 
favour intra-canonical evaluation,103 the possibilities and pitfalls of which are discussed later in 
this work. But what follows from relying on extra-canonical evaluation, as Brown proposes? In 
his view, a canon‘s diversity requires that its interpreters look elsewhere for criteria that will 
allow decisions to be made concerning canonical boundaries. That is, the canon (and tradition) 
in question is inadequate to the task of choosing its own future and is obliged to seek what it 
                                                       
101 BH 82. Much the same point is made elsewhere. For example, at BH 88 Brown asserts that ‗the responsible 
habitation of a canon…cannot be viewed solely as the making of corporate and personal identity. It must also address 
the integrity of the space wherein identity making takes place.‘ This entails a negotiation in which ‗canon becomes a 
contemporary—one  alternative  among  others,  one  inquirer  among  others,  one  advocate  among  others,  in  the 
continuing, public task of assessment and validation.‘ See also BH 90-1, 115, 139. 
102 See BH 26-7, 86-7, 113, 116. 
103  Here, I am asserting only that intra -canonical justification is  consistent  with  intra-canonical  evaluation.  The 
question  of  logical  implication  (i.e.,  of  which  implies  the  other)  would  already  indicate  a  misunderstanding. 
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lacks in the resources of another, presumably more adequate, canon. But this is really the same 
as saying that the canon and tradition in question are, simply, inadequate. Inadequate traditions 
do not survive. But neither do they actually die. Rather, they are absorbed into more successful 
traditions, and this would be the outworking of what Brown proposes for the evaluation of 
canonical boundaries. For to the extent that religious traditions submit to evaluation according 
to the canons of ‗our contemporary discourse‘ they renounce their claims to a comprehensive 
vision and acquiesce in their domestication into the tame pluralism of late modernity.104 That is, 
Brown‘s proposal encapsulates tradition, as Lindbeck‘s encapsulates religion. Neither proposal 
can really be adopted by an adherent, for to the extent that one genuinely adopts either of these 
positions, one is no longer an adherent, or rather is already an adherent of the wider ‗common 
discourse‘. The stances they offer can be adopted consistently only by those who, while they 
may care about the tradition, have placed their faith in the ‗common discourse‘ that norms the 
tradition.105 Like Lindbeck, Brown seems unaware of this difficulty. 
3.3.6  Theology and ‘Our Common Discourse’ 
Interestingly, Brown‘s Introduction hints at another possibility. He maintains that ‗intersystematic 
reason-giving‘ can and should occur wherever criteria exist that are accepted beyond a tradition‘s 
boundaries  (BH  5-6).  For  Christians,  such  reason-giving  would  presumably  involve,  firstly, 
identification of criteria accepted within Christianity; secondly, identification of those ‗Christian‘ 
criteria that are also accepted in another tradition; and thirdly, the giving of reasons to adherents of 
that tradition in a manner consistent with those shared criteria. In fact, Brown does none of these 
things, but concludes that Christian theology must be ‗tested in the varied arenas of contemporary 
knowledge  and  experience‘.106  There  are  two  unargued  shifts  in  rhetoric  here.  Firstly,  the 
egalitarian language of ‗reason-giving based on shared criteria‘ has given way to the more power-
laden language of ‗testing‘;107 and secondly, what could have been a piecemeal process of seeking 
out points of contact that would enable Christianity to tell its story (and hear others‘ stories) in 
                                                       
104 That is, canons that need extra-canonical evaluation are not viable. Brown‘s concern for viability is mainly a 
concern for the viability of recommendations for canonical change. Yet Brown has these recommendations issuing 
from an evaluation that presupposes the non-viability of the canon itself. 
105 The main difference on this point is that, unlike Lindbeck, Brown does not at t he same time maintain that 
Christianity must live ‗intratextually‘. 
106 BH 6. Brown‘s argument in the wider context (BH 5-6) is as follows: (1) the claims that universals do, or do not, 
exist seem equally presumptuous; (2) ‗Whereas it may be the case that no criterion is universal…many criteria are 
common  to  sets  of  varied  perspectives‘,  and  this  is  ‗crucially  important‘;  (3)  ‗Reasons  can  make  a  difference 
intersystematically only if they may appeal to intersystematic criteria of adequacy‘; (4) ‗if there are intersystematic 
criteria, intersystematic reason giving is possible‘; (5) Brown assumes that ‗theology is obligated to give reasons 
wherever reason giving is possible‘, and thus (from 4), ‗providing warrants for our views, in theology…is a cross-
contextual obligation‘; (6) Therefore (Brown‘s word, my italics) ‗theology…must be tested in the varied arenas of 
contemporary knowledge…‘. Points (1) to (5) may not be entirely unproblematic, but they appear to me to be broadly 
consistent. However, they lead logically to a statement of truly intersystematic reason-giving, rather than a ‗testing‘ in 
which external criteria are privileged. That is, the ‗therefore‘ is a logical non sequitur. Brown‘s conclusion seems to 
follow less from the preceding argument than from his goal of bolstering theology‘s credibility in the academy. 
107 Or, as Brown puts it at BH 4, Christian theology is ‗answerable‘ to the common discourse.   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      86 
particular contexts108 threatens to become a wholesale process of determining (or knowing in 
advance) which criteria may be shared across a range of contemporary discourses. 109 Thus, the 
possibilities  for  genuine  ‗intersystematic  reason-giving‘  remain  unexplored.  In  Brown‘s 
judgement, Christian theology ‗is answerable to canons of critical inquiry defensible within the 
various arenas of our common discourse and not merely within those that are Christian‘ (BH 4-5). 
Brown‘s attachment to a normative and apparently singular ‗common discourse‘ resonates with 
the familiar echo of modernity‘s failure to imagine that it too might be a tradition. He offers no 
substantive argument for taking ‗our common discourse‘ to be the all-encompassing boundary 
of  discursive  possibilities for religious  canons,  and no  reason  for  not treating  it  as  another 
tradition. Rather, he begins, continues and ends his book in a committed stance which is never 
given  more  substance  than  an  assumption  or  a  priori  judgement:  ‗our  common  discourse‘ 
defines the terms in which theology must make sense and sets the canons to which theology is 
answerable  (BH  4-5);  since  religious  canons  are  necessarily  unable  to  answer  questions 
concerning  their  own  adequacy,  these  must  be  answered  in  ‗the  arenas  of  contemporary 
discourse‘.110 Thus Brown assumes a privileged (if not necessarily universal) Reason sitting in 
judgement on traditions. We may wonder, then, how the ‗canons of critical inquiry‘ of ‗our 
common discourse‘ might be evaluated. What criteria could be used, given that, due to its 
‗diversity‘, ‗our common discourse‘ could not provide criteria for its own evaluation? To what 
wider, more comprehensive discourse might ‗our common discourse‘ appeal if (Reason forbid!) 
faced with intimations of its own inadequacy? 
Without  addressing  such  questions,  Brown‘s  ‗common  discourse‘  assumes  the  position  of 
default evaluator, albeit a benevolently non-intrusive one. It allows the canon to exist as a 
protected space within which personal and corporate identities may be negotiated, stepping in 
when needed to resolve questions about the canon‘s own identity, but otherwise leaving canon 
to  its  own  devices  and  its  own  community.  But,  unlike  the  protected  canonical  space, 
‗contemporary  public  discourse‘,  in  which  Brown  locates  theology‘s  evaluative  task,  is  an 
unprotected space where tradition has no privilege (BH 90). Thus, when summing up theology‘s 
task in its three activities—systematic, empirical and evaluative—Brown says that each of these 
‗is a constructive activity rooted in the creativity of theologians in communities. And therefore 
each is conducted with risk, without reassuring guidelines or guarantees.‘111 
                                                       
108 This is not to say that a religion can have stories that are entirely its own and not, to some extent, also those of 
‗the world‘. The identification of stories as having ‗this identity‘ rather than ‗that one‘ is in any case problematic if 
we accept (as I do) Brown‘s point about the fluidity and fuzziness of boundaries. 
109 This (at BH 6) is Brown‘s closest approach to acknowledging that the pluralism of these discourses might result in 
piecemeal ‗intersystematic‘ conversations. For the most part, however, his appeal to ‗our common discourse‘ tends 
towards a more wholesale approach to determining criteria. 
110 BH 82. See also BH 143-4 and the passages cited in n101 above. That Brown is relatively content to leave this 
assertion unsupported is indicated at BH 4-6 (referred to in the text) and at BH 139: ‗The view here espoused—in 
fact, the view that underlies the study itself, as was indicated in the Introduction—is that the evaluative claims of 
theologian[s] must be open to public debate and vulnerable to criticism from all of the communities of contemporary 
discourse that collectively constitute the public sphere.‘ 
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I take Brown‘s point that, like any disciplined reflection, theological reflection involves taking 
risks and working without guarantees. But I doubt that it is ever undertaken ‗without reassuring 
guidelines‘ derived consciously or unconsciously from some community of inquiry, i.e., from a 
tradition. When Brown says that the activities ingredient in theological reflection are to be 
conducted  ‗without  reassuring  guidelines‘,  he  is  apparently  referring  to  guidelines  that  are 
inherent in a traditioned way of thinking, but absent from ‗our common discourse‘.112 This may 
be countered not only by recognising it as an example of Reason‘s failure to see itself as a 
tradition, but also by noting that the criteria of ‗our common discourse‘ appear throughout 
Brown‘s text precisely as ‗reassuring guidelines‘ which can reassure theologians that they are 
properly fulfilling their role. Thus, Brown casts theologians as natives of the modern academy, 
who are willing to care for a tradition whose canon is (regrettably, but necessarily) inadequate to 
the tasks of life, so that its adherents may, in time, become acclimatised to (the academy‘s 
construals of) contemporary life, and feel, at least to some extent, less chafed by the constraints 
of (the academy‘s construals of) their traditional identities.113 That is, Brown‘s theologians act 
as agents of ‗our common discourse‘, facilitating and maintaining the domestication of religious 
traditions by shaping religious canons according to the academy‘s ‗canons of critical inquiry‘.114 
Once ‗our common discourse‘ is recognised as tradition and Brown‘s argument from ‗diversity‘ is 
discarded,  we  can  be  open  to  the  possibility  that  Christian  traditions  might  have  significant 
criteriological resources that could be offered to assist ‗public discourse‘ with its own canonical 
inadequacies. But exposure of the myth of a non-traditioned ‗common discourse‘ does not provide 
Christianity with any reason for ignoring resources (including criteriological resources) that may 
be offered to it. On what basis could it claim to have nothing to gain from respectful attention to 
the best that other traditions can offer? If ‗our common discourse‘ is a tradition after all, then at 
                                                                                                                                                             
discourse‘, while the immediately following section speaks of theologians being ‗vitally rooted‘ in practicing faith 
communities. This leaves me unsure as to the meaning of the phrase ‗theologians in communities‘. Is Brown meaning 
‗theologians in communities of contemporary discourse‘ or ‗theologians in faith communities‘? I feel that the former 
is more likely here. 
112 Brown‘s reference to risk in the same context is taken up in his immediately following section on ‗the authority of 
theology‘ (BH 141-4). Here he speaks of the risk inherent in negotiating between continuity and change, order and 
chaos, (relative) stasis and (relative) novelty. He concludes that neither pole is entitled to privilege, and so the 
inherent risk of evaluation is not minimised by preferring either. Rather, ‗[t]he outcome of theological construction 
must always be carried into whatever the contemporary communities of evaluative inquiry, without special privilege 
because it changes or continues, because it orders or disorders,…[etc]‘. 
113 This point is to some extent implicit in Brown‘s view of theology‘s ‗place‘: theology is ‗at home‘ in the academy, 
but only ‗somehow‘ rooted in the affective vitalities of faith communities (BH 145-7). The tone of condescension 
reflects Brown‘s formulation: ‗The only authorization of the theological reconstruction of a tradition is the tentative 
and fallible affirmation that, for some times and for some places, might be granted by contemporary communities of 
evaluation…‘ (BH 144). 
114 That Brown privileges the academy is consistent with the fact that the credibility he seeks for theology is very 
much credibility in the academy‘s eyes. See his preface, Introduction, and introductory comments to chapter 5 (and 
see p. 64 above). However, if viable innovation is generally justified on the basis of resources internal to a tradition, 
as Brown maintains, then, insofar as theology seeks credibility, it should perhaps be more concerned for credibility 
among the adherents of its own tradition. This is not to say that credibility in the academy can be ignored, but that it 
should be of secondary importance in a successfully innovative tradition. (And I would add that the academy‘s terms 
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the very least it may be as deserving of respectful attention as any other tradition, and it may in 
fact have great riches to offer. But the manner in which the offerings of one tradition might be 
received—discerned, clarified, evaluated, modified, adopted, integrated—into another tradition is 
another matter, and will be addressed later.115 ‗Intersystematic reason-giving‘ should be more like 
the  giving  and  receiving  of  respectful  attention  between  traditions,  and  less  like  a  ‗common 
discourse‘ granting a tradition a circumscribed freedom within its own unquestioned hegemony. 
3.3.7  Brown’s Proposal in Review 
Earlier, I found that Brown‘s proposal faced difficulties in the form of an intellectualist bias and a 
preoccupation with disciplined forms of bodiliness, but I indicated that, if certain resources within 
his proposal were developed and allowed greater freedom, these problems could be overcome. 
That is, these criticisms were more like redirection than refutation. I do not think this option is 
available  in  respect  of  my  comments  on  canonical  diversity,  the  negotiation  of  canonical 
boundaries, and allegiance to ‗common discourse‘. For Christianity, at least, canonical diversity is 
not featureless as Brown assumes, so his argument that the negotiation of canonical boundaries 
necessarily  requires  outside  adjudication  does  not  succeed.  The  combination  of  external 
evaluation with internal justification seems incoherent, but, in any case, advocacy of external 
evaluation  is  already,  if  implicitly,  a  dual  confession:  a  confession  that  the  tradition  being 
evaluated does not really offer a comprehensive way of life, and a confession of faith in the 
greater adequacy of the extra-canonical context.116 That Brown does not acknowledge and address 
the traditioned nature of that context and of his own argument is a serious problem that leaves his 
proposal far too open to complicity in modernity‘s assertion of hegemony over ‗mere‘ traditions. 
In view of these difficulties, little remains of his case for extra-canonical evaluation. 
But this critique should not make us forget that there are at least five areas in which Brown‘s 
argument is clearly more robust than Lindbeck‘s. Firstly, his treatment of cultures seems far 
more viable than the idealised meaning-systems offered by Lindbeck. Brown‘s ‗culture‘ is a 
tensive, complex, dynamic, historical negotiation of identity. ‗Tradition‘ is a cultural process in 
which the negotiation of identity is conducted with reference to a canon which is itself an 
artefact of traditioned (i.e., cultural) processes. Considered against this background, Lindbeck, 
with Geertz, has remained wedded to nineteenth century organic metaphors of culture. 
Secondly, and notwithstanding my criticisms, Brown‘s appreciation of the diversity of canon is 
an  improvement  over  the  ahistorical,  idealised  canon  offered  by  Lindbeck.  If  canon  is  an 
artefact of traditioned processes, then we should not be surprised if it shows signs of the same 
characteristics—a  polyphony  of  voices,  conflicting  points  of  view,  arguments,  distinct 
theologies, intrusive ideologies, etc. The Christian canon is not only quite readily read in this 
way,  but  its  major  anthropological  themes  provide  a  conceptual  space  within  which  such 
                                                       
115 See sections 4.4.6 Reflections on a Christian View of Particularity commencing on p. 146 below, and 4.5.2 The 
Idea of Particularity in Christian Theology commencing on p. 150. 
116 I am not claiming that Brown intends such a confession, but that he is mistaken in advocating external evaluation 
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features  make  good  sense.  Moreover,  Brown‘s  inclusion  of  diverse  (especially  non-textual) 
materials in canon, though problematic, is valuable and potentially fruitful. 
Thirdly, Brown is aware of, and tries to resist, the temptation to idealise one‘s preferred sources 
(a problem he notes in both Lindbeck and Tracy). If, as Brown says, tradition is a complex 
negotiation, and if there is no resource available to tradition that is not already implicated in and 
mediated by tradition, then any tendency towards idealisation of sources must be regarded with 
suspicion. Regrettably, Brown‘s monolithic view of canonical authority, and his appeal to a 
singular ‗common discourse‘ apparently detached from tradition, indicate that his own proposal 
has not entirely avoided this problem. 
Fourthly,  Brown  has  resisted  Lindbeck‘s  linguistic  emphasis.  Nothing  in  Brown‘s  work 
compares with Lindbeck‘s extension of the metaphor of language into idealised distinctions 
between grammar (doctrine) and vocabulary (scripture), or between syntactical, lexical, and 
grammatical functions of doctrine. Brown acknowledges that language, as the prime bearer of 
culture‘s conceptual inheritance, is nevertheless enmeshed in all the dynamic complexity and 
bodily  and  affective  mediation  that  is  common  to  cultural  processes.  He  therefore  resists 
‗Lindbeck‘s assertion of the primacy of language‘ (BH 201 n39), which gives the cultural-
linguistic theory its reductionist cast. Unfortunately, Brown‘s resistance has not been sufficient 
to prevent him locating the evaluation of canons very much in the conceptual (linguistic) realm 
at the expense of the bodily existence of a tradition‘s adherents. 
Fifthly, although Brown‘s appreciation of human bodiliness and the affective life remains too 
disciplined and too subservient to intellection, he has displayed philosophical resources that can 
support a more robust and richly-textured account of the body‘s hermeneutical significance. Such 
an account would embrace the ‗wildness‘ of bodily existence and the ineffable interpenetration of 
mind  and  body  in  the  making  of  meaning.  These  resources  point  in  the  direction  taken  by 
Lindbeck on this issue, but they add a richness and depth lacking in Lindbeck‘s account. 
I  have  indicated  elements  in  Brown‘s  proposal  that  point  to  a  different  location  for  the 
evaluative task. Radical empiricist philosophy and a phenomenology of embodiment strongly 
suggest that evaluation is not solely (nor even primarily) a matter of conceptual analysis, but 
that it is broadly experiential, emerging in the daily lives of a tradition‘s adherents as these are 
informed  by  reflection  (including  the  reflections  of  specialists),  formed  in  ritual  and  other 
communal  practices,  and  continually  challenged  in  ongoing  encounter  at  the  margins  of 
traditioned life. Religious traditions‘ intrinsic claims to comprehensiveness, and the observation 
that viable change in a tradition is justified on the basis of internal resources, suggest that 
evaluation cannot be ceded to the agents of another canon, but must remain the task of the 
religious community as it continues to seek life in the canon that has given life in the past. In 
turn, the community‘s deliberations are evaluated indirectly in its own ongoing vitality, or even 
survival, as witness that their tradition is one in which life may be found. If the evaluative task 
were relocated in this way, Brown‘s proposal would be much closer to fulfilling one of his more   A LIBERAL – POSTLIBERAL CONVERSATION      90 
programmatic statements: that theology ought to be the community’s creative reconstruction of 
the community‘s canonical symbols.117 
3.4  CONCLUSION 
3.4.1  Liberal Virtues and the ‘Religion-as-Culture’ Metaphor 
Can there be a liberal theology in cultural-linguistic mode? Brown offers a much more robust 
and realistic view of culture than that adopted by Lindbeck, but we have seen that some of 
Brown‘s  advances  create  tensions  with  his  liberal  virtues.  But  what  is  ‗liberal  theology‘? 
Leaving confessional questions aside for a moment,118 Brown‘s liberal theology appears to have 
two virtues at or near its core. Firstly, it refuses to rely on mere tradition, and therefore seeks a 
stance  that  somehow  transcends  tradition,  is  somehow  objective,  somehow  privileges  no 
tradition, and is thus able and entitled both to evaluate the claims of traditions, and to arbitrate 
between claims. Secondly, liberal theology advances reason (or unconstrained critical inquiry) 
as the means by which transcendence of tradition may be achieved. Reason provides the ‗how‘ 
of the ‗somehows‘ and the basis of the ability to sift traditions for truth. However, in the light of 
anthropological  insights  gleaned  from  reason,  including  cultural  studies  and  empiricist 
philosophy (radical or otherwise), these liberal virtues have been sharply qualified as human 
possibilities. That is to say, reason has discovered its own nature as tradition; it has found that it, 
too, is only human. We no longer dare to know but to construct, and then always in and for 
particular places, times and peoples. 
But if certain aspects of classic liberalism‘s vision turned out to be mirage, this does not require 
the wholesale abandonment of liberal virtues. It is entirely reasonable for mere humans to refuse 
to rely on ‗mere tradition‘ and to use reason as a tool whereby that refusal may be crafted. But I 
find the set of virtues incomplete. Do we refuse to rely on ‗mere tradition‘? Yes—but we have 
learned that there is no knowledge available to us that is not mediated by tradition. Can we 
continue to use reason as a tool for transcending tradition? Yes again—but we have learned that 
reason cannot overcome tradition, because it is itself traditioned. Insofar as these two, once seen 
as antagonists, can be distinguished, reason may guide us in using tradition wisely, and tradition 
may guide us in reasoning wisely. But in fact we never have the one without the other. In short, 
reason  indicates  that  among  the  virtues  on  the  difficult  path  to  undistorted  construction, 
methodological humility may be just as important as reliance on reason. 
While in this somewhat homiletic mode, the discussion could be expanded to include experience 
and scripture. Experience is relatively unproblematic in the present context in that, as an object 
for  reflection,  it  is  another  learning  tool,  only  notionally  distinguishable  from  reason  and 
tradition. Each of these three tools can be said to be bound up with the other two, in that none is 
available without the others, and the relation between them can be described in terms of mutual 
                                                       
117 Adapted from BH 120, original emphasis. This statement of Brown‘s is not, of course, intended to be a complete 
statement of what theology is, yet, within the scope of what it addresses, it seems very serviceable. 
118 As will be clear later, I do not actually think confessional questions should be left aside, even  for a moment. But 
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(dialectical) guidance and correction.119 Of course, much more could be said in this regard, and I 
will be returning to the ‗special case‘ of scripture later.120 The point I emphasise here is that the 
ideas of a reason distinct from tradition, and of reason, tradition and experience as distinct 
‗sources‘ of knowledge, must be left behind entirely if we are to show we have gained anything 
from the work of cultural anthropologists and philosophers of culture.121 
One of the more important consequences of this situation is that reason cannot take an ‗outside‘ 
stance in relation to tradition. Methodological humility thus calls us to acknowledge that we 
cannot speak of tradition without speaking of ourselves. The point is simply that we, too, are 
human. Clearly, any proposal touching on hermeneutics or theological method should engage 
with the anthropological insights of contemporary hermeneutics and cultural studies. Just as 
clearly, any proposal that does not apply the outcome of that engagement just as rigorously to 
itself as to other proposals has to some extent forgotten its own humanity, and is, to the extent 
of that forgetting, weakened intellectually, epistemologically and morally. 
The intellectual weakness is incoherence. The situatedness of human knowledge applies to critics 
as much as to those on whom they presume to pass judgement. The (post)modern academy, just as 
much as religions and primitive cultures, is a repository of traditions and plausibility structures. 
This is not at all to say that judgement should be withheld, or that good reasons for preferring the 
academy‘s traditions do not exist. It is to say that, to the extent that a proposal  is based on 
uncriticised criteria, it has not shown itself to be anything more than mere presumption. 
                                                       
119 Not forgetting other alternatives, such as distraction, misdirection and distortion! In this light, the idea of reason 
as ‗unconstrained critical inquiry‘ should perhaps be modified. ‗Subtly constrained critical inquiry‘ might be a better 
description.  Later,  when  examining  Lindbeck‘s  (mis)use  of  Wittgenstein,  we  will  consider  the  problems  of  the 
invisibility of one‘s own perspective: the constraints on one‘s own reasoning elude complete specification. 
120 The second half of chapter 6 addresses the relation between scripture, tradition, history and the divine Word. 
121 Some of my fellow listeners to the liberal-postliberal conversation demonstrate a fine sensitivity to the experience-
tradition  dichotomy  present  in  both  Lindbeck  and  Tracy  (for  example),  but  tend  to  see  reason  or  ‗the  creative 
imagination‘ (a more Brownian phrase) as somewhat detached from the vicissitudes to which these two aspects of 
human discovery are subject. For example, Stephen Stell notes (as I have) that Lindbeck and Tracy share a bipolar 
understanding of the relation between experience and tradition, though they prefer opposite poles. But he comments, in 
relation to Lindbeck, ‗if one can be extricated from such a dichotomous hermeneutical structure, then the creative 
imagination is freed to discern the intrinsic interrelationships of experience and tradition‘ (Stell 1993, 683 n5). I am less 
confident of the ‗freedom‘ of the creative imagination in this regard. In the constructive section of his article Stell 
develops an interpretive framework in which experience, tradition and creative imagination are inseparably related and 
each is understood in the context of a vital interaction with the other two. Yet, for him, his proposal is ‗not a method 
imposed upon one‘s interpretive endeavors, but is itself determined by the internal perichoretic relationships which 
compose tradition, experience, and the creative imagination‘ (p. 697). As the allusion to ‗perichoresis‘ might lead us to 
expect, this ontological perspicacity very shortly turns out to be grounded on the certain foundation of the trinitarian 
reality of God and the consequent necessity of anthropological vestigia trinitatis : ‗As theological interpretation…[the] 
creative conjoining of tradition and experience is structured by its intrinsic relationship to God. Indeed, if [meaning 
‗since‘] God is the ―sole and single objective ground of all reality,‖ as Tracy suggests…, then theological understanding 
draws  upon  human  capacities  which  are  inseparably  related  to  divine  reality‘,  and  thus  ‗the  distinctions  and 
interrelationships of human religious understanding correspond to the distinctions and interrelationships of the divine life 
as it has been stretched out to humanity‘ (p. 698). This is the familiar story in which the creative imagination assumes the 
qualities of the object imagined, while implicitly shedding the qualities of the imagining human being. And this appears 
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Epistemological weakness appears as uncritical construction. A forgetful proposal is uncritical 
in that it harbours unexamined assumptions concerning the adequacy of its own point of view. I 
will be engaging this issue more substantially in later chapters. Suffice for now to foreshadow 
later conclusions by saying that the problem with uncritical construction is that it obscures the 
difference between knowledge and imagination. 
Moral weakness is evident in the facilitation of oppression. To the extent that a proposal forgets 
its own human frailty, it also forgets the practical importance of the virtue of methodological 
humility, and so succumbs to the vice of epistemological arrogance implicit in modernity‘s 
now-notorious ‗view from nowhere‘. A proposal that unconsciously relies on such a perspective 
is too easily implicated in the projection of power, and so its offering of knowledge, however 
well-intentioned, will serve the interests of entrenched paradigms. 
Brown‘s  proposal  has  highlighted  some  issues  that are  relevant  to  a  broad  range  of  ‗liberal‘ 
theologies. If, with Brown, liberal theology has overtly eschewed the Enlightenment‘s apotheosis 
of Reason (and of itself therewith), it has nevertheless generally continued worshipping in much 
the same way at much the same shrines, shrines of gods it now knows to be idols with feet of very 
human clay. Perhaps it has yet to take seriously the boundaries of its own habitations. 
3.4.2  Unfinished Agenda 
Apart from topics in which Brown‘s proposal can provide a corrective to Lindbeck‘s, and vice-
versa, there are areas in which the two are similarly problematic or incomplete. For example, 
both authors take religious traditions to be somehow distinct and identifiable, though Brown 
sees  the  boundaries  between  traditions  as  rather  more  fluid,  vague  and  porous  than  does 
Lindbeck. Yet neither author gives much attention to the nature of the boundaries between 
traditions, or between a particular tradition and the ‗wider culture‘. What is the nature and 
function of these boundaries? How do they actually work? If Christianity is (like) a culture, as 
both authors suggest, to what extent is it, to what extent can it be, and to what extent should it 
be distinct from ‗mainstream‘ culture? Since it arises from exploration of the cultural metaphor, 
the question of boundaries has naturally been of most concern to authors who are generally 
sympathetic to the direction indicated in Lindbeck‘s theory (if not always to the means he 
employs). Some insights into the boundaries between religious traditions will emerge in the 
course of the following chapters, though it will not be a major theme. 
Then there is the question of truth. Brown sees tradition as the cultural process of negotiating 
identity with respect to a canon. Lindbeck sees scriptural religions as semiotic systems that seek 
to instantiate scriptural worlds by socially embodying them. But both visions seem somewhat 
indifferent to reality. Are traditions merely vehicles for personal self-realisation? Are religions 
merely concerned with embodying biblical worlds? What are traditions/religions actually for? 
Usually, and always in their own terms, traditions refer beyond themselves. They refer to truth, 
to reality, and (for most religions) to God. The question of truth will come to the fore in chapter 
5,  as  we  critically  examine  Lindbeck‘s  ‗rule  theory‘  of  doctrine,  and  in  chapter  6,  as  we 
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But perhaps the most urgent question arising from the present chapter concerns the theorisation of 
particularity.  Both  Lindbeck  and  Brown  take  over  general  concepts  (culture,  religion,  ritual, 
canon, story) from non-theological disciplines without re-evaluating them in their application to 
the  particular  object  in  question,  namely,  Christianity.  Similarly,  they  both  see  cultures  as 
comprehensive mediators of meaning, yet neither attempts to assess his general theory in terms 
native to the ‗culture‘ to which he wishes to apply it, namely, Christianity. The significant point is 
not that Brown offers no advance on Lindbeck in this respect, but that Lindbeck shares this 
problem  with  much  liberal  theology,  and  especially  classic  liberal  theology  of  the  truly 
experiential-expressive type. Does this shared problem suggest that Lindbeck‘s proposal is not 
after all postliberal, but rather a modified liberalism—one more liberal response to the insights of 
cultural anthropology? The question of the identity of Lindbeck‘s proposal is opened up in the 
next chapter by way of an exploration of the theorisation of particularity in the work of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and Karl Barth. Against this background the character of Lindbeck‘s proposal will 
emerge more clearly, and we will progress towards a better account of Christian particularity. 94 
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LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 
If  the  previous  chapter  brought  into  sharper  focus  some  shortcomings  in  Lindbeck‘s 
appropriation  of  cultural  anthropology,  it  also  indicated  that  a  more  robust  and  realistic 
approach  to  culture  (such  as  Delwin  Brown‘s)  would  not  necessarily  alleviate  the  problem 
Lindbeck shares with his liberal critics: the encapsulation of religions within a universalising 
account of particularity.1 On first recognising the commonality of this methodological move, I 
researched its genealogy and found my attention drawn quickly to the seminal work of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. That Schleiermacher appeared to stand on  both sides  of the argument  was 
particularly intriguing, since Lindbeck‘s liberal critics would commonly trace their lineage to 
Schleiermacher,  while  identifying  Lindbeck  somewhat  pejoratively  as  ‗Barthian‘,  thus 
structuring the debate along the lines of a familiar argument. Consistent with this, Lindbeck 
generally  spoke  approvingly  of  Barth,  and  identified  Schleiermacher  as  ‗an  undoubted 
experiential-expressivist‘. It seemed to me that attention to the theologies of Schleiermacher and 
Barth might serve a dual purpose: shedding light on the strange coincidence in theological 
method noted above; and indicating to what extent the invocations of Schleiermacher and Barth 
were justified, and to what extent great names were being taken in vain. It turned out that 
Schleiermacher and Barth can contribute significantly to an appreciation of Lindbeck‘s work, 
and especially to an understanding of his place in modern theology. It may be true that we reach 
highest by standing on the shoulders of giants, but it would be sad to do so unawares. 
The all but universal recognition of Schleiermacher as ‗the father of modern theology‘ has 
resulted, on the one hand, in his idolisation by those who see themselves as standing in the 
‗modern‘ or ‗liberal‘ theological tradition, and, on the other hand, in his demonisation by those 
(usually labelled ‗conservative‘) who see themselves as standing for ‗the tradition‘ (however 
constructed) against the acids of modernity. However, idolisers and demonisers alike can easily 
forget that the immediate object of their adoration or abhorrence is, at least in part, a socially 
constructed image, and that such images have a way of reflecting the constructors as much as 
the reality. By means of an excursion through Schleiermacher‘s major works I hope to gain 
some critical distance from these constructions, and also to show how the reading of Lindbeck 
with Schleiermacher can be fruitful for our understanding of both writers. 
The  following  section  provides  a  survey  and  summary  of  Lindbeck‘s  comments  on 
Schleiermacher,  noting  the  work  of  some  scholars  who  have  offered  corrections  or 
clarifications. These preliminary enquiries raise the question of the relation between the views 
of Lindbeck and Schleiermacher on the nature of religion, theology and, especially, philosophy. 
                                                       
1  As  mentioned  above,  the  main  difference  between  Lindbeck  and the  liberals  on  this point  is that  the  liberals 
generally know what they are doing (that is, they seem more methodologically aware), while Lindbeck seems not to 
recognise this move for what it is, and hence does not see that it renders his methodology incoherent.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    95 
A survey of these issues in Schleiermacher‘s work enables a comparison with Lindbeck, leading 
to important conclusions regarding the identity of Lindbeck‘s proposal. The underlying theme 
of the comparison, and indeed of the whole chapter, is the theorisation of particularity. Our 
critical engagement with this theme in Schleiermacher and Lindbeck is supplemented with an 
excursion into the work of Karl Barth. These various threads are then drawn together in a 
reappraisal of Lindbeck against the backdrop of modernity‘s preoccupation with the necessary 
truths of reason and modern theology‘s ambiguous quest for freedom. 
4.1  AN EXPERIENTIAL-EXPRESSIVE SCHLEIERMACHER? 
4.1.1  Lindbeck’s References to Schleiermacher 
Lindbeck‘s references to Schleiermacher in  ND are few, and are not intended to show any 
substantial  engagement  with  Schleiermacher‘s  theological  writings.  Association  of 
Schleiermacher with ‗experiential-expressivist‘ approaches to religion and theology is evident in 
Lindbeck‘s  use  of  Schleiermacher‘s  name  to  identify  the  theological  tradition  to  which  the 
‗experiential-expressivist‘ tag refers. An ‗experiential-expressive‘ view of religion – 
…interprets  doctrines  as  noninformative  and  nondiscursive  symbols  of  inner  feelings, 
attitudes, or existential orientations. This approach highlights the resemblances of religions 
to aesthetic enterprises and is particularly congenial to the liberal theologies influenced by 
the Continental developments that began with Schleiermacher (ND 16). 
…when [Peter Berger] writes an apologetic for religion, his theory [of religion] is basically 
experiential-expressivist with strong affinities to that of Schleiermacher (ND 20). 
The ‗long and notable experiential tradition‘ stems from Kant‘s ground-clearing work, in which 
he  demolished  ‗the  metaphysical  and  epistemological  foundations  of  the  earlier  regnant 
cognitive-propositional views‘ (ND 20) and reduced God to ‗a transcendental condition (albeit a 
necessary one) of morality [that] seemed to the sensibilities of most religious people to leave 
religion intolerably impoverished‘ (ND 21). 
This breach was filled, beginning with Schleiermacher, with what I have called ―experiential-
expressivism,‖  but  this  comes  in  many  varieties  and  can  be  given  many  names.  In 
Schleiermacher‘s  case,  it  will  be  recalled,  the  source  of  all  religion  is  in  the  ―feeling  of 
absolute dependence,‖ but there are many and significantly different ways of describing the 
basic religious experience, as is illustrated by a succession of influential theories of religion 
stretching  from  Schleiermacher  through  Rudolf  Otto  to  Mircea  Eliade  and  beyond. 
Nevertheless, whatever the variations, thinkers of this tradition all locate ultimately significant 
contact with whatever is finally important to religion in the prereflective experiential depths 
of the self and regard the public or outer features of religion as expressive and evocative 
objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive symbols) of internal experience (ND 21). 
Thus, Lindbeck uncontroversially regards Schleiermacher as the father of the modern ‗liberal‘ 
theological tradition.2 But although Lindbeck identifies Schleiermacher‘s espoused theological 
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method  with  a  tradition  that  he  feels  must  now  be  seen  as  basically  wrong-headed,  he 
generously  opens  the  door  to  the  possibility  of  seeing  Schleiermacher‘s  actual  theological 
practice as postliberal. When Lindbeck expounds the typically postliberal theme of the world-
absorbing  character  of  ‗the  biblical  world‘,  Schleiermacher  appears  as  a  parallel  example 
alongside Aquinas and Augustine. Lindbeck describes Augustine‘s — 
progressive, even if not always successful, struggle to insert everything from Platonism and 
the Pelagian problem to the fall of Rome into the world of the Bible. Aquinas tried to do 
something  similar  with  Aristotelianism,  and  Schleiermacher  with  German  romantic 
idealism.  The  way  they  described  extrascriptural  realities  and  experience,  so  it  can  be 
argued, was shaped by biblical categories much more than was warranted by their formal 
methodologies (ND 117). 
Or again, in relation to the practice of intratextuality, by means of which the absorption of the 
world into the biblical world is achieved: 
…it  needs  to  be  reiterated  that  the  practice  of  intratextuality  is  only  loosely  related  to 
explicit theory.…There is no reason for surprise if an apparent propositionalist, such as 
Aquinas,  or  an  undoubted  experiential-expressivist,  such  as  Schleiermacher,  were  more 
intratextual  in  their  actual  practice  than  their  theories  would  seem  to  allow.  Their 
performance would perhaps have improved if their theories of religion had been different, 
but this is true only if other conditions remained equal (ND 123). 
From his training in medieval theology, Lindbeck has some claim to expertise as an Aquinas 
scholar,  and  I  leave  his  peers  in  that  field  to  assess  his  comments  on  Aquinas.3  For 
Schleiermacher the ‗undoubted experiential-expressivist‘, Lindbeck judges that his theological 
practice was inconsistent with his theological method by virtue of being more intratextual (i.e., 
more biblical) than his espoused theological method would allow, as though Schleiermacher, in 
spite of his deficient method, could not ultimately resist the gravitational pull of the biblical 
                                                                                                                                                             
exposition of this tradition in ‗experiential-expressive‘ terms that has proved to be problematic. Writers who have 
taken exception to Lindbeck‘s description of Schleiermacher as an ‗experiential-expressivist‘ are mentioned below. 
3 Lindbeck appears to be saying that Aquinas and Schleiermacher would perhaps have done better theology if they 
had adopted an explicitly cultural-linguistic theological method; but not to worry, their methodological shortcomings 
‗may be relatively harmless‘. In respect of Aquinas, at least, it may be that Lindbeck would now prefer to revise this 
opinion. Lindbeck‘s former student Bruce Marshall (Marshall 1989) has provided a detailed exposition of the relation 
between Lindbeck‘s and Aquinas‘ understandings of religious and theological truth. This is offered in response to 
criticisms  that  Lindbeck‘s  approach  on  this  point  is  incompatible  with  the  mainstream  of  Christian  tradition  in 
general, and with Aquinas in particular. After providing some minor correctives and clarifications of Lindbeck‘s 
argument, Marshall concludes that ‗Aquinas‘ views on truth are, as Lindbeck affirms, compatible with postliberal 
emphases‘ (Marshall 1989, 353). Lindbeck‘s response to Marshall (Lindbeck 1989b) indicates complete agreement 
with Marshall‘s exegesis of both himself and Aquinas, even going so far as to say that Marshall‘s work has prompted 
him  to  recognise  that  his  cultural-linguistic  theory  is  ‗in  part  a  clumsy  rendition  in  modern  philosophical  and 
sociological idioms of what Aquinas often said more fully and more precisely long ago‘ (p. 405). In view of this, and 
indeed in view of the ubiquity of references to Aquinas in support of the argument in ND (not all of which appear in 
the  index),  the  impression  given  (ND  123)  that  Aquinas‘  theological  method  was  not  really  adequate  to  his 
theological practice is surprising, and may now be a matter of regret for Lindbeck. More recently, Marshall provided 
further thoughtful defence of Lindbeck‘s reading of Aquinas: see ND25 xviii-xxi.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    97 
text. A little later, Lindbeck again sets Schleiermacher in exalted company by describing his 
theological outlook, alongside those of Augustine, Aquinas and Luther, as one that ‗proved to 
be conceptually powerful and practically useful‘, and thus became ‗established‘ as a ‗standard‘.4 
Lindbeck‘s later articles reflect a similar assessment of Schleiermacher‘s legacy.  In a 1988 
reflection on the role of the Bible and its interpretation in the life of the church, Lindbeck 
mentions Schleiermacher as the originator of the practice of ‗deliberately and systematically‘ 
translating  the  biblical  message  into  ‗contemporary  conceptualities‘.5  He  allows  that  such 
translation  does  not  necessarily  yield  unchristian  results,  and  that  it  can  ameliorate  the 
difficulties of ‗would-be believers‘, but he sees its apologetic value in our de-Christianised 
culture as doubtful, and its contribution to a biblically informed and communally unitive sensus 
fidelium as at best neutral and perhaps negative. This is close to his opinion in ND that, although 
Schleiermacher‘s theological method was defective, we should not be too concerned, since it 
probably did little harm. The only other mention of Schleiermacher in Lindbeck‘s published 
work is a passing reference to Schleiermacher‘s judgement that Judaism is religiously inferior to 
Christianity, and quite distinct from it.6 
Thus, Lindbeck acknowledges Schleiermacher among the theological greats, describing him 
quite conventionally as the original and quintessential liberal theologian, or, as he puts it, an 
‗undoubted experiential-expressivist‘. But this identification is qualified to some extent by a 
distinction between Schleiermacher‘s espoused theological method and his actual theological 
practice. Lindbeck‘s more nuanced view appears to be that, while Schleiermacher‘s espoused 
method  was  undoubtedly  experiential-expressivist,  his  actual  practice  tended  towards  a 
postliberal intratextuality. An excursus into Schleiermacher‘s work will allow us to assess this 
view, and also to return the compliment by assessing how Lindbeck‘s espoused method and 
actual practice relate to those of Schleiermacher. 
4.1.2  The Need for Reassessment 
Lindbeck‘s characterisation of Schleiermacher has been criticised not only by those who favour 
Schleiermacher‘s approach, but also by some who are sharply critical of it: Brian Gerrish and 
Alister McGrath agree that Schleiermacher is not really an ‗experiential-expressivist‘.7 Georg 
                                                       
4 ND 134. Lindbeck also published summaries of the description of postliberal theology contained in chapter 6 of 
ND. See Lindbeck 1993, where the same passages mentioning Schleiermacher occur on pp. 90-1 and 98-9. 
5  Lindbeck  1988,  14.  Lindbeck  also  uses  ‗nonbiblical  idioms‘  (p.  14)  and  ‗alien  idioms‘  (p.  15)  as  parallel 
descriptions of the translation target. 
6 Lindbeck 1997, 436. Lindbeck is here pursuing the ecclesiological interests that have lately been his focu s, and 
treating  at  this  point  the  theological  relation  between  the  Christian  church,  Israel  in  the  Old  Testament,  and 
contemporary Judaism. Schleiermacher is cited as an example of those who regard Christianity and Judaism as ‗two 
different religions with historical but no theologically significant connections.‘ Schleiermacher continued to hold this 
view from the early Speeches on Religion (Schleiermacher 1988, abbreviated henceforth as OR, pp. 211-3) to the end 
of his life (see CF §§8.4, 12), but it was by no means the comment of an ignorant Gentile. ‗The portrayal of Judaism 
as  no  longer  a  living  tradition  was  dominant  in  Berlin  Enlightenment  (Haskalah)  Jewish  circles  in  which 
Schleiermacher moved‘ (OR 211 n13). 
7 See Gerrish 1988 and GD 25-6.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    98 
Behrens  argues  that  neither  ‗cognitive-propositionalist‘  nor  ‗experiential-expressivist‘  aptly 
describes Schleiermacher, who combines strong elements of both, while differing in important 
ways from many of those who now espouse positions that could reasonably be described in 
these  terms.8  Gerrish and McGrath note the extent to which Schleiermacher recognises the 
believing community‘s role in the formation of doctrine, thus hinting that Schleiermacher may 
have more in common with Lindbeck than either Lindbeck or his critics have allowed. While 
this says nothing about Lindbeck‘s claim that Schleiermacher‘s theological practice showed 
postliberal tendencies, it does suggest a degree of methodological similarity: it may be that 
Schleiermacher sought to address some of the questions that preoccupy Lindbeck. 
Judging by the publication of journal articles and new critical editions and translations, there has 
been a renewed interest in Schleiermacher‘s work over the last 20 years or so. The renewal of 
Schleiermacher scholarship may be associated with a feeling of unease among scholars who see 
themselves as part of a tradition derived, at least in part, from Schleiermacher‘s ground-breaking 
work. It would be an overstatement to say that this unease is due to the rise of postliberal theology, 
but, clearly, liberal theologians see the need to meet squarely and realistically the challenges to 
which  both  postliberal theology  and  the  a/theologies  of  Mark  C.  Taylor  and  Don  Cupitt  are 
responses, albeit, in their view, inadequate ones.9 As Delwin Brown has reminded us, an important 
part of a tradition‘s response to external challenge is the re-examination of its sources with a view 
to finding and displaying resources with which the challenge can be met. 
The need for, and some pitfalls attending, a re-examination of Schleiermacher are apparent in a 
an  article  by  Georg  Behrens,  a  regular  contributor  to  Schleiermacher  studies.10  The article 
argues  an  exegetical  point  regarding  the  meaning  of  the  famous  phrase  ‗das  Gefühl 
schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit‘ (‗the feeling of absolute dependence‘). The argument includes 
Behrens‘ suggestion that one of Schleiermacher‘s goals in the Introduction to The Christian 
Faith11 was to develop a kind of proof for the existence of God. This is the now-conventional 
view  that  Schleiermacher  was  attempting  some  kind  of  transcendental  anthropological 
argument,  via  religious  experience,  for  the  existence  of  God  and  hence  for  the  validity  of 
theology as God-talk, a view that became so at home in scholarly folklore that Lindbeck appeals 
to a transcendental reading of Schleiermacher as to common knowledge.12 
Although Behrens presents some detailed work on the German text of CF, especially §§4 and 8, 
and has now published a series of articles on aspects of Schleiermacher‘s theology, he provides 
no warrant whatever for the suggested transcendental reading.13 The lack is particularly acute in 
                                                       
8 Behrens 1994. 
9 Jesse (1997, 25-9, section 2 on 'Remembering Our Past') is one example of a re-reading of Schleiermacher explicitly 
associated with re-evaluation (and, hopefully, redirection) of the liberal theological tradition. Rogers‘ (1998) title is self-
explanatory: ‗Schleiermacher as an Anselmian Theologian‘. See also the series of articles by Behrens. New translations 
of Schleiermacher‘s major works have recently appeared or are in preparation. 
10 The article under consideration is Behrens 1998. See also Behrens 1994 and Behrens 1996. 
11 Schleiermacher 1928, abbreviated henceforth as CF. 
12 As described in the previous sub-section. 
13 Behrens (1998) advances the proposal without discussion, on pp. 472, 478 and 481.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    99 
view  of  the  fact  that,  elsewhere  in  CF,  Schleiermacher  himself  dismisses  transcendental 
arguments  as  having  no  dogmatic  significance.14  It is also notable that Behrens finds the 
relevant context for his exegesis entirely within Schleiermacher‘s Introduction,15 and mentions 
neither Schleiermacher‘s own view of the Introduction,16 nor two highly relevant works—On 
Religion,17 Schleiermacher‘s famous apologetic work, and his  Brief Outline of the Study of 
Theology,18 an overview of the structure, content and aims of theology—which Schleiermacher 
revised together with CF in the late 1820s. BO in particular, was intended to be read together 
with CF, and vice versa, and the cross references between the two works are numerous. In short, 
substantial contextual resources for clarifying Schleiermacher‘s thought have not been used. 
The habits of viewing the Introduction in isolation from the rest of CF, and of viewing both the 
Introduction and OR in isolation from Schleiermacher‘s overall theological vision, are very little 
younger than CF itself. As regards CF, it is as though the Introduction stood independently of 
the rest of the work, or as if the relation of the rest of CF to the Introduction was one of absolute 
dependence, rather than reciprocity, or something more subtle.19 The first to object to such 
readings was Schleiermacher himself in his letters to Lücke, 20 which are largely devoted to 
consideration of the means by which he might dissuade his readers from reading  CF  in 
transcendental-cum-foundationalist  terms,  and  treating  it  as  though  it  contained  nothing  of 
interest after the Introduction. Unlike Schleiermacher‘s earliest critics, late twentieth century 
scholars  cannot  really  plead  ignorance  of  Schleiermacher‘s  strong  denunciation  of  such 
readings, or unfamiliarity with his other work. 
I shall argue that the idea that Schleiermacher was attempting a ‗transcendental argument‘ in the 
Introduction to CF is at odds with the text of CF itself, at odds with Schleiermacher‘s own 
reflections on the matter, and at odds with the overall theological vision set out in his major 
                                                       
14 As is well known, Schleiermacher remarks in CF §33 that recognition of the universality of the feeling of absolute 
dependence ‗completely replaces for the faith-doctrine all the so-called proofs of the existence of God‘. It is less well 
known that he almost immediately goes on to say that such proofs are entirely superfluous to dogmatics (CF §33.3). 
Appreciation of this point depends on the material in the following section. Some of the subtleties of argument in CF 
§33 are laid out in n65 on p. 116 below. 
15 Because much of the following material concerns the Introduction to  CF and its relation to the remainder of that 
work, I will often refer to it simply as ‗the Introduction‘ or ‗Schleiermacher‘s Introduction‘. 
16 In the second letter to Lücke, Schleiermacher considers an alternative arrangement of CF, one in which the present 
Introduction is placed at the end: ‗If I had separated the dangerous Introduction more clearly and sharply from the 
body of the work, I surely would have prevented that most serious and glaring misunderstanding that detects in my 
Glaubenslehre  a  speculative  tendency  and  a  speculative  foundation‘  (LL  58).  A  clearer  statement  of  what  the 
Introduction was meant not to be can hardly be imagined. 
17 Schleiermacher 1988, abbreviated henceforth as OR. 
18 Schleiermacher 1966, abbreviated henceforth as BO. 
19 An assumption that set in very early indeed, as it was already lamented by Schleiermacher before the second edition of 
CF was prepared! See the second letter to Lücke (LL 56): ‗Most of my critics began with the presupposition that a work 
organized as mine necessarily has an anticlimatic [sic] ending. Or is it not true that the Introduction has been regarded as 
the  main  subject  and  core  of  the  book,  although  it  was  intended  only  as  a  preliminary  orientation  which,  strictly 
speaking, lies outside of the discipline of dogmatics itself? And then what follows is obviously the first part!‘ 
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writings. But since my account of Schleiermacher is in part the story of my own puzzlement 
over  him,  it  may  be  as  well,  in  the  interests  of  clarity,  to  foreshadow  my  conclusion  that 
Schleiermacher‘s dogmatic practice does not in the end cohere with his vision of the nature of 
dogmatics. That is, Schleiermacher‘s vision of dogmatics, and his execution of that vision, are 
in tension, and I argue that that tension in fact amounts to incoherence. Moreover, I find that 
liberal and postliberal approaches to theology can both look to Schleiermacher as progenitor—
with liberals drawing on Schleiermacher‘s theological practice, and Lindbeck‘s postliberalism 
better reflecting his methodological prescription.21 
After surveying  the  political  and  intellectual  context  of  Schleiermacher‘s  work,  I  consider 
passages in which Schleiermacher insists that dogmatics must begin with and continue in piety, 
and  that  philosophy  must  be  excluded.  The  tensions  and  difficulties  of  this  position  are 
elucidated using material from Schleiermacher‘s theological and philosophical writings and his 
exchange  of  views  with  Jakob  Fries.  The  discussion  then  expands  into  a  more  general 
consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  one  might  attempt  to  keep  theology  independent  of 
philosophy,  using  some  hints in  Schleiermacher  and  an approach  found  in  the  early  Barth. 
Against this background, Lindbeck‘s relation to modern theology, and to Schleiermacher in 
particular, emerges in stark and perhaps surprising form. Regrettably, the following argument 
adds  to  the  all  but  universal  tendency  of  paying  greater  attention  to  Schleiermacher‘s 
Introduction than to his dogmatics proper, but even Schleiermacher was obliged to do this in 
order to clarify his thought in the face of what he saw as determined misreadings.22 
4.2  SCHLEIERMACHER AND THE FREEDOM OF THEOLOGY 
4.2.1  A Place for Theology in the Academy: Ist Theologie eine Wissenschaft? 
Hans  Frei, in  a  posthumously  published  collection of  papers,  has noted  the importance for 
Western high culture of the time and place in which Schleiermacher developed his thought and 
considered  the  relation  between  Christian-theological  and  other  modes  of  inquiry.23  The 
complex intellectual life of Berlin in the early nineteenth century was a rich fermen t of many 
influences:  a  general  mood  of  self -inclusion  in  the  Aufklärung  championed  by  the  new 
philosophy  of  Kant;  the  early  romantic reaction  against  rationalism,  seeking  to  reclaim  the 
integrity  of  the  human  as  spiritual  being;  the  external  (and  all  too  often  internal)  political 
ferment  occasioned  by  the  reverberating  echoes  of  French  revolutionary  upheaval;  the 
Napoleonic wars; and the redefinition of the power structures and bureaucratic apparatus of the 
Prussian state. Against this tumultuous backdrop, a concrete struggle took place which was of 
                                                       
21 This is much the reverse of the relation envisaged by Lindbeck, noted above. 
22 Schleiermacher himself contributed to this tendency, since, in seeking to make yet clearer the distinction between 
what was properly dogmatics and what was merely prolegomenon, he modified the second edition of  CF so that 
‗everything that introduces and specifies the organization of the work will be brought into close relationship to the 
account of dogmatics, and the Introduction will be rounded off into a self-enclosed whole.‘ He was doubtful as to 
whether he would find this arrangement any more pleasing (LL 80). 
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considerable  importance  for  Schleiermacher,  and  thus  for  our  understanding  of  him:  the 
foundation of the University of Berlin in 1809. 
This struggle is also important for us because of the enormous influence exerted by Berlin on 
universities elsewhere in Europe, and throughout the great imperial reach of Western culture. 
Indeed, soon after its establishment, ‗the University of Berlin became the prototypical German 
university and the model for many others on both sides of the Atlantic.‘24 But, although its 
influence  as  a  model  university  emerged  quite  early,  the  arguments  surrounding  its 
establishment,  like  those  brought  to  bear  in  any  concrete  struggle,  were  caught  up  in  the 
circumstances of time and place, particularly the parallel ascendancies of Wissenschaft and the 
bureaucratic state. These arguments concerned not only the general nature and aims of the 
university, but especially the organisation of its faculties.25 
The chief protagonists in the debate over the i nclusion or exclusion of disciplines and the 
relations between them included not only professional sages such as Fichte and Schleiermacher, 
but also representatives of the state, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt of the Prussian Ministry of 
the Interior. For all of them, the main criterion for the inclusion of disciplines in the university 
centred on ‗that untranslatable German word Wissenschaft, and all that it implies for cultural 
and  philosophical  argument.‘26  ‗Wissenschaft  was  the  tutelary  deity  present—blessed  and 
blessing—at  the  birth  of  this  new  university.‘27  Frei  does  not  say  so,  but  it  may  not  be 
overstating  the  case  to  suggest  that  the  extent  of  Berlin‘s  influence  in  Western  university 
education  was  largely  due  to the  comprehensiveness  and practical  outcomes  of  the  debates 
                                                       
24 Frei 1992, 97. Frei continues: ‗If one reads the history of Western universities in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, one repeatedly encounters lengthy references to the University of Berlin. Negatively as well as positively, 
its influence was great; it was a national institution of transnational cultural significance, nowhere more so than in 
American higher education.‘ 
25 See Frei‘s interesting account of the conflicts and paradoxes present in the complex relations between state power, 
Wissenschaft, and religion at the time, and the ways in which this particular context was reflected in the eventual 
outcome for theology‘s place in the university, and in its relations to the state and the church (Frei 1992, 99-116). 
26 Frei 1992, 97. Although Wissenschaft in current usage is commonly and straightforwardly translated as ‗science‘, 
Frei is more concerned with its use among intellectuals, and especially with the contraction in its meaning during the 
nineteenth century. He notes various English renderings, including ‗science‘, ‗knowledge‘, ‗philosophy‘, ‗theory of 
science or explanation‘, and ‗theory of reason or understanding‘, and goes on to point out that, especially in the 
nineteenth century, this complex of meaning was far from static: 
[I]t changed drastically from the vast sense that it carried at the time when the new university 
was  being  planned  and  begun,  to  a  much  more  limited  sense  two  generations  later.…But 
Wissenschaft was never confined to the natural or physical sciences; it always included the 
social sciences, whether behavioural or humanistic. Wissenschaft, then, is the inquiry into the 
universal, rational principles that allow us to organize any and all specific fields of inquiry into 
internally and mutually coherent, intelligible totalities; perhaps, if we just watch our language 
and do not try too hard for lucidity, it may be translated as ―an inquiry into the transcendental 
principles justifying all systematic method and explanation‖‘ (Frei 1992, 97-8). 
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surrounding its foundation. Here, for the first time, the plan of a university had been thought 
through on rational, philosophical (wissenschaftlich!) principles, and one of the outcomes of the 
debate  was  the  decisive  repudiation  of  a  Christian  confessional  basis:  ‗all  religious 
qualifications for teachers and students were abandoned right from the start.‘28 
The exaltation of an objective, putatively universal rationality as the core value of the academy, 
a  rationality  defined  precisely  by  its  freedom  from  tradition-bound  authorities  such  as  the 
church, made the place of theology in the academy highly problematic, to say the least: 
If indeed the intellectual idea of this university was totally wissenschaftlich and therefore 
secular, not only in the sense of being religion-neutral, but also of prohibiting any institutional 
or intellectual allegiance from inhibiting the free exercise of the critical faculty, then Christian 
theology was in principle, if not in fact, in the position of having to demonstrate that it was 
truly wissenschaftlich and had a right to citizenship in this university.29 
Schleiermacher‘s  approach  to  this  problem,  in  part  reflecting  a  long  tradition  of  regarding 
theology  as  practical  knowledge,  was  to  have  theology  seen  as  a  ‗positive‘,  rather  than  a 
normative, science. Theology did not pretend to objective, disinterested knowledge. Rather, it 
was  explicitly  interested,  professional  knowledge,  serving  and  guiding  the  practice  of  the 
Christian church much as medical knowledge served and guided the profession of medicine, and 
legal knowledge served and guided the profession of law.30 For Schleiermacher the particular 
interest  of  the  discipline  of  theology  was  ecclesial:  the  manifold  strands  of  theological 
knowledge were ‗as integrally related to the will to be effective in the leadership of the Church 
                                                       
28 Frei 1992, 99. The following pages of Frei‘s account indicate the extent to which, although the university  was 
officially free of confessional bias, it was certainly not free of interference from the continually encroaching bureaucratic 
state, and implication in its agendas. For Schleiermacher, this presented a second battle front for the church, since not 
only was the church‘s relation to the new university highly problematic, but the state already had virtually complete 
control of the church, and handed the monopoly for the training of ordained ministers ‗to the very institution, the 
university, which was bound to be most uneasy, perhaps even deeply skeptical, about the compatibility of such training 
with its own ideal of Wissenschaftlichkeit‘ (Frei 1992, 101). Schleiermacher saw the ‗fatal kindness‘ conferred by the 
state‘s official recognition of the church, with the corresponding expectation by the state that it had a right to the 
church‘s ‗active gratitude‘, as the source of the greatest corruption and degeneracy in the church‘s institutional and 
spiritual  life  (OR  177-84).  That  the  state  presumes  to  govern  the  church  is  certainly  bad  enough;  but  that  it  both 
guarantees  the  intellectual  freedom  and  institutional  independence  of  the  university  (thus  underwriting  its 
wissenschaftlich character) and requires that its captive church send all its ministers to be trained there (i.e., in an 
institution that, in its state-sponsored Wissenschaftlichkeit, is innately suspicious of their presence), poses very serious 
problems indeed. These problems concern the identity of theology as Christian, the acceptability to the church of having 
its ministers trained in a hostile environment, the acceptability to the university of having theology among its faculties at 
all, and the exacerbation of the church‘s corruption by the state through its bondage to the state‘s university. 
29 Frei 1992, 98-9. 
30  Tice,  in  his  ‗Editor‘s  General  Introduction‘  to  the  Brief  Outline  (BO  14)  remarks  that  ‗by  ―positive‖ 
Schleiermacher means studies which are not merely empirical or speculative or theoretical in character but rather (a) 
refer directly to actual or historical experience, (b) within a given social relationship, and (c) in order to serve a 
definite practical function.‘ Such a definition applies quite well to professional knowledge in medicine and law as 
well as to Christian theology. A similar, and similarly tensive, conjunction of the ideals of service, leadership and 
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as the body is to the soul‘.31 Other ways of talking about God might be interesting, but they are 
not Christian theology.32 
This ecclesial interest does not render theology  unwissenschaftlich, any more than medicine or 
law are rendered unscientific by their professional attachment to the agendas of society and 
state. Rather, Schleiermacher sees the essence of theology in its combination of ecclesiastical 
and scientific interests, and this is especially the case in dogmatic theology (BO §§1-12). The 
wissenschaftlich character of dogmatic-theological propositions lies in the clarity and coherent 
interconnection of their concepts and in their fruitfulness in opening up and cohering with other 
propositions (CF §17). As with the other professions, the primary context and datum with which 
theology is concerned is an aspect of human culture, in this case, religious piety. As such, if one 
considers theology‘s  place  among  the  conventional  Wissenschaften, it  appears  more  closely 
related to the social sciences than to philosophy and the natural sciences.33 
This view of theology‘s ‗place‘ and its basic nature as a particular form of disciplined inquiry is 
consistently  reflected  throughout  Schleiermacher‘s  systematic  work  beginning  from  the  first 
editions  of  the  Brief  Outline  and  The  Christian  Faith.  Indeed,  as  the  Letters  to  Lücke  make 
abundantly clear, the later revisions of these works were motivated in large part, not by any 
conscious  change  in  Schleiermacher‘s  views,  but  by  his  strong  desire  to  counter  the  many 
misunderstandings  by  making  yet  clearer  his  vision  of  theology  as  a  kind  of  ecclesial 
Geisteswissenschaft. Examination of the outworking of this vision in these core systematic works 
                                                       
31 BO §7, compare CF §19.ps: Scriptural exegesis and Church history, as major branches of Christian theological 
study, each has ‗its own peculiar value directly  for the advancement and guidance of the Church, which is the 
ultimate purpose of all Christian theology, Dogmatics included.‘ 
32 BO §1, and see Tice‘s ‗Editor‘s General Introduction‘ at BO 14. 
33 Frei (1992, 114-5) notes that ‗to the extent that Schleiermacher advocated the primacy of the practical aim of theology 
within the Church [i.e., its orientation towards church leadership], the nearest external discipline to it is a social science 
that describes, and in describing explains, the way theological language functions as a part of the web of relations 
constituting the community of which it is a part.‘ Although Schleiermacher was well aware of the need to give an 
account of theological language, I think the linguistic slant of Frei‘s comment misrepresents him. For Schleiermacher, 
although theology is expressed in language, it is not about language, but about communal piety. 
The linguistic slant in Frei‘s reading of Schleiermacher is pervasive, having already intruded into his comments on 
Schleiermacher‘s description of the proper place of the professional faculties within the university (Frei 1992, 112). 
Here, Frei notes Schleiermacher‘s assertion of ‗the need to found a (socially) indispensable practice through theory, 
through a tradition of Kenntnisse‘, and goes on to explain that the theory referred to is ‗obviously‘ not the explanation 
of the conditions for the possibility of the practice, but is ‗more like the grammatical remarks that further us in the use 
and informal reflection on the rules of the use of a language we are learning, to appropriate the language of the later 
Wittgenstein and his little flock‘. 
The linguistic turn of this exegesis, and especially the reference to Wittgenstein, might not be inappropriate if Frei 
emphasised the Wittgensteinian insight that language is a communal tool among other communal tools that we use in 
our  dealings  with  the  world.  (Postliberal  (mis)appropriation  of  Wittgenstein  in  support  of  an  understanding  of 
‗theology  as  grammar‘  will  be  given  attention  in  the  next  chapter.)  But  the  repeated  intrusion  of  linguistic 
preoccupations strains against Schleiermacher‘s real intention. All his care over properly dialectical language and 
systematisation  is  aimed  at  giving  Dogmatics  ‗the  scientific  form  which  is  essential  to  it‘  as  a  clear  and 
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will prepare the way for a better-grounded assessment of Lindbeck‘s criticism of Schleiermacher, 
and a more nuanced appreciation of their respective views of the nature of doctrine and theology. 
4.2.2  The Idea of Dogmatics in the Introduction to ‘The Christian Faith’ 
Beginning from §1, the reader of CF is left in no doubt that what Schleiermacher is writing is a 
work  of  dogmatic  theology,  an  account  of  Christian  faith.  Notwithstanding  the  moderate 
disclaimer in CF §1.1 to the effect that the Introduction will ‗go its own way independently‘ with 
respect to his Brief Outline, it is apparent to a reader familiar with both works that the Introduction 
to  CF  exactly  fulfils  the  description  given  in  BO  of  ‗philosophical theology‘.  In  this  regard, 
Schleiermacher first mentions ‗philosophy of religion‘ as the investigation of the necessity and 
nature of religious communities, and the differences and distinctions between them (BO §§22-3). 
‗Philosophical  theology‘  is  then  the  discipline  that  uses  this  framework  to  present  (i)  the 
distinctiveness of Christian faith, (ii) the form of Christian community, and (iii) the divisions and 
variations in Christian faith and community (BO §24). The other major divisions of theological 
study are ‗practical theology‘ and ‗historical theology‘. Practical theology is knowledge concerned 
with the ‗technology‘ by means of which the church‘s concerns are integrated and furthered. 
Historical theology is a knowledge of the whole community which is to be led, a knowledge 
embracing it in both its present and its past, for historicity is of the essence of the Christian church 
(§26).  Historical  theology,  the  core  and  crown  of  theological  study  for  Schleiermacher,  is 
connected with science by philosophical theology, and with the active Christian life by practical 
theology  (§28).  Within  historical  theology,  Schleiermacher  acknowledges  three  divisions: 
knowledge  of  primitive  Christianity  (exegetical  theology),  knowledge  of  the  total  career  of 
Christianity  (church  history  as  the  history  of  doctrine  and  the  history  of  community),  and 
knowledge of the present state of Christianity (dogmatics and church statistics). 
Before inquiring further into the relation between philosophical theology and dogmatic theology 
in  this  schema  of  disciplines,  it  will  be  helpful  to  focus  attention  for  a  moment  on 
Schleiermacher‘s delineation of their respective spheres of inquiry. His definition of dogmatic 
theology as ‗the systematic representation of doctrine which is current [in the church] at any 
given  time‘34  indicates  a  systematic  and  ecclesial  orientation  that  is  recognisable  in 
contemporary usage. However, his comments on ‗philosophical theology‘ show that his idea of 
that  discipline  may  be  rather  less  familiar.  For  example,  after  introducing  the  historical 
theological disciplines in the order just described, Schleiermacher notes — 
The proper order in which to study them, however, does not correspond to the order in 
which their derivation has been shown here. On the contrary, the knowledge of primitive 
Christianity, as most immediately connected with the work of philosophical theology, ought 
                                                       
34  BO  §97.  The  phrase  ‗at  any  given  time‘  should  not be  allowed  to occlude Schleiermacher‘s  acute historical 
awareness, which is the main reason for his preference for ‗dogmatic‘ rather than ‗systematic‘ as the appropriate 
adjective  for  this  discipline.  Although  the  term  ‗systematic  theology…rightly  stresses that  doctrine  is  not  to  be 
presented as a mere aggregate of propositions, whose coherent interrelation is not clearly shown‘, it nevertheless 
‗conceals, to the detriment of the subject, not only the historical character of the discipline but also its connection to 
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always  to  be  the  first  stage  in  one‘s  study,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  present  time,  as 
constituting the direct transition to practical theology, ought to be the final stage (BO §85). 
In contemporary parlance the term ‗philosophical theology‘ would generally be taken to refer to 
a  discipline  having  among  its  closest  relations  systematic  or  dogmatic  theology  (in  the 
theological sphere) and critical philosophy or hermeneutics (in the non-theological sphere). But 
Schleiermacher relates it ‗most immediately‘ to the knowledge of primitive Christianity, that is, 
exegetical theology and especially New Testament studies. What is the content of ‗philosophical 
theology‘ according to Schleiermacher? This discipline, as Schleiermacher conceived it, did not 
actually exist in the early nineteenth century.35 Yet that did not prevent Schleiermacher from 
seeing a need for it, not as a foundation for dogmatics, but as providing a context for it, and a 
link  between  dogmatic s  and  other  Wissenschaften.  Briefly,  philosophical  theology,  for 
Schleiermacher, is the application of ‗ethics‘ to the Christian community (BO §25). And what is 
‗ethics‘? Ethics is ‗that speculative presentation of Reason, in the whole range of its activity, 
which runs parallel to natural science‘ (CF §2.ps2), or ‗the science of the principles of history‘ 
(BO  §29,  cf  §35).  Terrence  Tice  explains  that  it  refers  to  the  Geisteswissenschaften,  the 
knowledge of the distinctively human (as distinct from knowledge of the natural world, the 
Naturwissenschaften,  which  Schleiermacher  called  ‗physics‘).  Further,  since  ‗ethics‘  is 
concerned with the whole of human culture, and not merely with humans as individual moral 
agents, it pursues a fundamentally social and historical understanding of humanity.36 That is, 
Schleiermacher‘s ‗ethics‘ covers a broadly similar field to Lindbeck‘s ‗social anthropology‘, 
and  Schleiermacher‘s  ‗philosophical  theology‘  is,  roughly,  a  social-anthropological 
understanding of the Church among other religious communities. And this is precisely what 
Schleiermacher lays out for his readers in the Introduction to CF. 
Philosophical theology, thus understood, is neither strictly empirical nor purely scientific, though 
its scientific character emerges in its critical method, especially in historical criticism (BO §§32, 
37). As regards its ecclesial orientation, philosophical theology‘s service to church leadership is 
expressed in apologetics and polemics. Apologetics is the presentation of the distinctive nature of 
Christianity (and of Protestantism) so as to ‗ward off hostility towards the community‘, and thus it 
contributes  to  the  ‗clerical  practice‘  of  evangelism  (BO  §39).  Polemics  seeks  to  provide  an 
‗authentic representation of the essence of Christianity‘ (and of Protestantism) so that ‗diseased 
deviations arising in the community‘ may be brought to light. In this way it helps the Church‘s 
leadership to maintain a cohesive fellowship, that is, it contributes to the ‗clerical activity‘ of 
church discipline.37 These two tasks comprise the whole aim of Schleiermacher‘s philosophical 
                                                       
35 Schleiermacher noted that the whole course of theological study could begin with philosophical theology ‗if…it 
were adequately developed as a discipline‘ (BO §29). 
36 See Tice‘s ‗Editor‘s Postscript‘, BO 116. 
37 BO §40. Schleiermacher insists on the wholly outward and non-aggressive orientation of apologetics, and the wholly 
inward and self-disciplinary orientation of his polemics eschews the common (then as now) understanding of polemics 
as inter-sectarian sniping. Such ‗polemics‘, says Schleiermacher, are unsalutary in any mature practical theology. Rather, 
the vital  first step towards  a proper polemic is the recognition that it is  fundamentally  a self-disciplinary practice. 
Therefore, it is invalid for Protestants to argue against Catholicism as a whole, but valid to criticise that within it which is 
regarded as a diseased condition of Christianity, or as inconsistent with its own particular essence (BO §41).   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    106 
theology,  and  nicely  illustrate  the  coincidence  of  ecclesial  and  scientific  interests  in  his 
understanding  of  theology.  The  conceptual  tools  employed  in  philosophical  theology  are 
‗borrowed  from  the  philosophy  of  religion‘  (seen  as  that  branch  of ethics,  i.e.,  of  the  social 
sciences, that we would now call the sociology of religion) but are here clearly employed in the 
service of church interests. The philosophical theology in the Introduction to CF incorporates both 
apologetics and polemics, with apologetics being the more prominent. 
Using this philosophical theology Schleiermacher seeks to create a wissenschaftlich space for 
dogmatic theology, describing what it is and what it is not, its sources and its limitations, its 
core and its boundaries. He begins in CF §2 with a preliminary definition of dogmatics as an 
ecclesial discipline. Since dogmatics ‗pertains solely to the Christian Church‘, the explanation 
of it can proceed only on the basis of an explanation of the concept ‗Christian Church‘: 
Granted, then, that we must begin with a conception of the Christian Church, in order to 
define  in  accordance  therewith  what  Dogmatics  should  be  and  should  do  within  that 
Church:  this  conception  itself  can  properly  be  reached  only  through  the  conception  of 
‗Church‘  in  general,  together  with  a  proper  comprehension  of  the  peculiarity  of  the 
Christian Church. Now the general concept of ‗Church,‘ if there really is to be such a 
concept, must be derived principally from Ethics, since in every case the ‗Church‘ is a 
society which originates only through free human action and which can only through such 
continue to exist. The peculiarity of the Christian Church can neither be comprehended and 
deduced by purely scientific methods nor be grasped by mere empirical methods.38 
Schleiermacher‘s  Introduction  develops  just  as  this  passage  indicates.  He  lays  out  a  social-
anthropological  (i.e.,  a  ‗borrowed-from-ethics‘)  understanding  of  what  a  church  is  (§§3-6, 
‗church‘ here being understood in the general sense of ‗religious communion‘). From this general 
definition, the argument becomes progressively more empirical and particular, considering, first, 
the  diversities  of  actual  religious  communions  (§§7-10)  using  material  borrowed  from  the 
philosophy (read ‗sociology‘) of religion, and, second, the distinctive nature of Christianity among 
the other major religions (§§11-14) using ideas borrowed from apologetics. As the argument 
develops, general and particular elements make crucial contributions as the idea of dogmatics is 
developed in §§15-19. The general element is that piety, the basis of all religious communions, 
consists in the feeling of being utterly dependent, that is, of being in relation with God.39 The 
particular element, in the case of Christianity, is the fact that ‗in it everything is related to the 
                                                       
38 CF §2.2. On a personal note, I regret that I did not become acquainted with Schleiermacher‘s work at first hand 
until my reading of the liberal/postliberal debates indicated that such an acquaintance was long overdue. I shall never 
forget the surprise, almost shock, of recognition that I felt on reading passages such as this one, which seemed (and 
still seem) very much like slightly archaised accounts of Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory. The congruence is all 
the more apparent when we make the appropriate translations: ‗religious communion‘ for ‗Church‘ (as in CF §3.1), 
and ‗social anthropology‘ for ‗ethics‘ (as indicated above). 
39 §§3-4. Schleiermacher explains feeling (Gefühl) as ‗immediate self-consciousness‘, the intention being that the 
phrase ‗a feeling of being utterly dependent‘ can be taken in the sense of ‗an immediate awareness of the self as 
utterly dependent‘. The adjective ‗immediate‘ should be taken in the sense of ‗unreflective‘, that is, Schleiermacher is 
speaking of an awareness that is not mediated by intellection or self-contemplation. See CF §3.2.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    107 
redemption  accomplished  by  Jesus  of  Nazareth‘  (§11).  Hence,  participation  in  the  Christian 
communion is only ‗through faith in Jesus as the Redeemer‘ (§14). 
The  programmatic  passage  quoted  above  already  hinted  that  the  content  of  Christianity‘s 
peculiarity would not be another borrowed concept, but might have to do with Christianity‘s 
own account of itself.40 Schleiermacher advances his formulation of Christian peculiarity in §11, 
not as having been (or even as something that could be) gained by other means, but rather as the 
least basis on which a Christian theology could reasonably be identified as such: 
[F]or the interests of Apologetics as well as of Dogmatics it seems advisable rather to be 
content with a scanty result at the beginning and to hope for its completion in the course of 
further procedure, than to begin with a narrow and exclusive formula, which is of necessity 
confronted by one or more opposing formulæ, with which there must be a conflict sooner or 
later. And it is in this sense that the formula of our proposition is set up (CF §11.1). 
Schleiermacher  continues  §11  with  an  exposition  of  the  meaning  of  redemption  and  the 
centrality of Christ in Christianity, beginning §11.5 with the hope that this exposition will ‗serve 
to confirm‘ what he has proposed for the distinctive element of Christianity. Not only does he 
not provide any transcendental grounds for his formulation, but in increasingly emphatic terms, 
he denies the possibility, and even the desirability, of doing so. He concludes §11.5 with the 
following declaration: 
Everything we say in this place is relative to Dogmatics, and Dogmatics is only for Christians; 
and so this account is only for those who live within the pale of Christianity, and is intended 
only to give guidance, in the interests of Dogmatics, for determining whether the expressions 
of  any  religious  consciousness  are  Christian  or  not,  and  whether  the  Christian  quality  is 
strongly and clearly expressed in them, or rather doubtfully. We entirely renounce all attempt 
to prove the truth or necessity of Christianity; and we presuppose, on the contrary, that every 
Christian, before he enters at all upon inquiries of this kind, has already the inward certainty 
that his religion cannot take any other form than this [i.e., a form in which everything is 
related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth].41 
                                                       
40 According to §2.2, the concept ‗Christian Church‘ is obtained from a general concept of religious communion 
together  with  an  understanding  of  what  is  peculiar  to  Christianity.  While  the  general  concept  of  a  religious 
communion ‗must be derived principally from Ethics‘, at this point Schleiermacher says of the peculiarity of the 
Christian  church  only  that  it  must  be  ‗properly  comprehended‘  and  that  this  proper  comprehension  cannot  be 
achieved  by  purely  scientific  or  empirical  methods.  He  does  not  describe  the  method  by  which  ‗proper 
comprehension‘ may be achieved until, at §11.5, he reviews the argument of §11.1-11.4 in these terms: ‗[W]e have 
tried, as it were by way of experiment, to single out from among the common elements of Christian piety that element 
by which Christianity is most definitely distinguished externally; and in this attempt we were guided by the necessity 
of regarding the inner peculiarity and the outward delimitation in their interconnexion.‘ 
41 CF §11.5. Compare §13.ps on the rationality and supra-rationality of Christianity: ‗In one respect all Christian dogmas 
are supra-rational, in another they are all rational. They are supra-rational in the respect in which everything experiential 
is supra-rational. For there is an inner experience to which they may all be traced: they rest upon a given; and apart from 
this they could not have arisen, by deduction or synthesis, from universally recognised and communicable propositions. 
If the reverse were true, it would mean that you could instruct and demonstrate any man into being a Christian, without 
his happening to have had any experience. Therefore this supra-rationality implies that a true appropriation of Christian 
dogmas cannot be brought by scientific means, and thus lies outside the realm of reason.‘ This does not mean that   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    108 
Thus Schleiermacher brings to light what he foreshadowed in §2.2—that dogmatics ‗pertains 
solely to the Christian church‘ and hence must be defined ‗in accordance with‘ the conception 
of  the  Christian  church.  A  peculiar  church  will  have  a  peculiar  theology.  The  strength  of 
Schleiermacher‘s feeling about the integrity of dogmatics as a loyal servant of the household of 
faith is indicated by his polemical tone, and by the fact that, although at §11 he is defining 
Christianity’s peculiarity and will not return to defining dogmatics until §15, he is already 
defending this sacred territory. 
Having defined the concept ‗Christian Church‘, in relation to which ‗dogmatics‘ was given a 
preliminary definition (§2), Schleiermacher completes the definition of dogmatics by specifying 
its nature and its relation to the Christian church‘s particular piety (§§15-19). These propositions 
contain some of Schleiermacher‘s more famous statements on dogmatics. Christian doctrines 
are descriptive accounts of the content of Christian piety. The need for such accounts arises 
necessarily  from  the  communication  of  piety,  whether  within  the  Christian  community  (in 
teaching) or at its boundary (in preaching). Therefore, the development of doctrine is itself an 
expression of piety, in that no human activity can be imagined apart from its communication. 
Dogmatic theology is then the scientific activity which systematises the doctrine prevalent in the 
church at a given time. The cumulative effect of this is not that dogmatics aims to provide a 
scientific explanation of piety. Theology‘s immediate raw material is not piety, but doctrine, 
which is always already present in the church as the accumulation of historical (and therefore 
situated and provisional) communal decisions concerning the meaning of Christ‘s original self-
proclamation.  Jesus‘  person  and  work  remain  the  overriding  norm  for  dogmatics  precisely 
because  Christian  doctrine  stems  from  a  piety,  or  religious  self-consciousness,  in  which 
‗everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.‘42 
In  the  discussion  of  doctrine,  the  polemical  tone  noted  earlier  reappears  in  two  substantial 
postscripts  which  emphasise  the  complete independence  of  (Protestant)  Christian  dogmatics 
from philosophy. In §16.ps, Schleiermacher idealises early Christian dogma as being entirely 
free of speculative philosophical influence.43 However, in the Middle Ages, a ‗conglomerate-
                                                                                                                                                             
Christianity is irrational. The rationality of Christianity is much like that common rationality evident in the ‗same laws of 
conception and synthesis as regulate all speech.‘ Christian rationality is distinguished in that faith in Jesus Christ as 
Redeemer appears in it as a datum, but never as a conclusion. ‗In this sense everything in Christian doctrine is entirely 
according to reason.‘ Thus there are two errors to be avoided. On the one hand, to denigrate the rational presentation of 
what goes beyond (conventional) reason ‗appears to be only a subterfuge designed to cover up some imperfection in the 
procedure.‘ On the other hand, to require that everything in Christian doctrine ‗must be, in every sense, based on reason, 
is simply meant to cover up the lack of a fundamental experience of one‘s own.‘ 
42 CF §11, compare CF §14: ‗There is no other way of obtaining participation in the Christian communion than 
through faith in Jesus as the Redeemer‘ and §14.ps, where Schleiermacher insists that ‗faith of itself carries with it 
that participation‘. Reflecting on the first edition of CF, Schleiermacher said he ‗would have wished to construct the 
work  so  that  at  every  point  the  reader  would be  made  aware  that  the  verse  John  1:14  is  the  basic  text  for  all 
dogmatics, just as it should be for the conduct of the ministry as a whole‘ (LL 59). Terrence Tice concludes his 
introduction to BO with the opinion that, for Schleiermacher, the whole of Christian theology, in its three overlapping 
areas, focuses on the one central fact of ‗the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth‘. As the best available 
expression of this ‗one distinctive historical fact‘ from which every theological definition of Christianity must take its 
bearing (‗Editor‘s General Introduction‘, BO 16), he offers John 1:14. 
43 ‗[I]n the dogmatic developments of the earliest centuries, if we discount the quite unecclesiastical Gnostic schools,   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    109 
philosophy…took shape within the Christian Church,‘ giving rise to a regrettable ‗confusion of 
the  speculative  with  the  dogmatic,  and  consequently  a  mingling  of  the  two.‘  But  now  the 
Evangelical  (Protestant)  Church  has  effected  the  restoration  of  a  dogmatics  that  ‗has  not 
proceeded  at  all  from  a  speculative  interest,  but  simply  from  the  interest  of  satisfying  the 
immediate self-consciousness solely through the means ordained by Christ, in their genuine and 
uncorrupted form.‘ Consequently, the Evangelical Church can consistently adopt only those 
dogmatic propositions that can show such a derivation. Not that the restoration of a pristine 
dogmatics, free of all speculative contamination, has yet been achieved, but it remains a major 
goal of theological inquiry. 
In §19.ps, Schleiermacher notes that many theologians who agree with his definition of dogmatics 
nevertheless  assign  this  theology  a  low  status  as  mere  ‗ecclesiastical  opinion‘,  and  make  it 
answerable  to  ‗the  essential  truths  of  religion.‘  But  Christian  theology  cannot  admit  to  any 
distinction between ecclesiastical doctrines and ‗essential truths of religion‘, because all Christian 
doctrine, if it really is Christian doctrine, issues from the same source and is of the same type. 
There is only one source from which all Christian doctrine is derived, namely, the self-
proclamation of Christ; and there is only one type of doctrine, for, whether more perfect or 
less perfect, it all arises out of the religious consciousness itself and its direct expression.44 
Any doctrine that does not issue from this source or is not of this type is not Christian doctrine, 
and has no claim on dogmatics. Against those who wish to furnish theology with putatively 
transcendental foundations, lest it become (or remain) mere shifting opinion mixed with error, 
Schleiermacher maintains that — 
nevertheless  there  is  nothing  else  superior  to  [ecclesiastical  doctrine]  in  the  realm  of 
Christian knowledge, except the purer and more perfect ecclesiastical doctrine which may 
be found in some other period and in other presentations. But this purifying and perfecting 
is just the work and the task of Dogmatic Theology‘ (§19.ps). 
It  is  clear  that  dogmatics  for  Schleiermacher  really  works  with  ‗faith-doctrine‘,  or 
Glaubenslehre, as CF became universally known soon after it was published. In the conjunction 
of ecclesial and scientific interests that characterises all theological study, the ecclesial interest 
clearly has priority. But ecclesial faith does not dominate the scientific inquiry of theology, as 
though the two could be played off against each other in a kind of zero sum game—the more 
science, the less need for faith. Still less can the results of scientific inquiry be added directly to 
ecclesial faith as an increase or deepening (let alone as a grounding or basis). Rather, the faith of 
the church and the discipline of scientific inquiry are simply not the same kind of thing. On the 
one hand, the church‘s common piety is a positive and personal thing (faith in Jesus as the 
Redeemer)  the  nature  of  which  is  communicated  in  the  church‘s  understanding  of  Jesus‘ 
original  self-proclamation.  On  the  other  hand,  although  theology,  viewed  externally,  is  a 
                                                                                                                                                             
the influence of speculation upon the content of dogmatic propositions may be placed at zero‘ (CF §16.ps). 
44  §19.ps. Note the conjunction of the general and particular elements to which I drew atte ntion earlier.  Both 
elements, and not only the particular, are deployed here with a view to keeping Christian doctrine and dogmatics free 
of philosophy. This strategy is discussed more fully in the next sub-section.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    110 
positive science in that it serves an explicit ecclesial interest, within the church it operates as a 
normative and critical discipline, not by deciding what norms and standards should currently 
apply, but by assisting the church in its ongoing work of clarifying and completing its doctrine 
by  reference  to  Jesus‘  self-proclamation.  Faith  is  immediate  self-awareness—awareness  of 
being in relation with God through Jesus Christ; scientific inquiry is activity—asking what is 
the nature and content of that relation. Thus, the church‘s faith is the domain within which 
scientific theological inquiry occurs, that is to say, theological inquiry supports ‗the cultivation 
of doctrine, or the process by which the religious self-consciousness gains clarity‘ (BO §166). 
I  am  not  aware  of  any  context  in  which  Schleiermacher  provides  analytic  reasons  for  this 
position. Indeed, he could hardly do so, since, as we have seen, he repeatedly and vehemently 
rules out of court approaches that attempt such reasons. ‗Speculative‘ or ‗rational‘ theology is 
excluded, not because it is, or can be shown to be, invalid on its own terms, but because it is 
simply not Christian theology. Schleiermacher‘s delineations of the boundaries of speculative 
and dogmatic theology have a somewhat arbitrary air about them, as though they were mere 
matters of definition rather than of substance. He does, after all, begin both CF (§2.1) and BO 
(§1) with disclaimers which make clear his eschewal of any transcendental aims or pretensions. 
Yet his apparently unsupported starting point is not really arbitrary. It is just that nothing can be 
more fundamental than the immediate self-awareness of being utterly dependent on God. Thus 
Schleiermacher  begins  dogmatics,  not  with  ‗a  Doctrine  of  God,  or  an  Anthropology  or 
Eschatology either‘ (CF §2.1), but with this immediate self-awareness, once perfectly realised 
in history in the person of Jesus Christ, and communicated by him to the Christian church, and 
continually, if only partially, realised in the church as it listens to him. This awareness, in which 
everything is related to the redemption accomplished in Jesus of Nazareth, must be presupposed 
by  the  Christian  theologian.  Notwithstanding  Schleiermacher‘s  unorthodox  conclusions  at 
various points, his trenchantly articulated theological vision indicates that he saw himself as a 
confessional theologian, and his dogmatics as a church dogmatics. 
4.2.3  ‘We do not philosophise’: Keeping Dogmatics Free of Philosophy 
If  the  polemical  tone  evident  in  Schleiermacher‘s  account  of  dogmatics  reflects  his 
determination to keep dogmatics entirely free of speculative elements, what did this freedom 
mean for Schleiermacher and how did he go about achieving it? We should perhaps begin 
answering this crucial question by noting that he did not mean that non-theological disciplines 
in general, and philosophy and the social sciences in particular, do not, or even should not, 
contribute terms and concepts to theology. 
Schleiermacher  is  quite  clear  that  his  conception  of  theology  operates  with  a  concept  of 
religious communions derived, or, as he puts it, ‗borrowed‘,45 from extra-theological sources. 
But he is also quite clear that concepts or propositions borrowed from extra-theological sources 
                                                       
45 By ‗borrowing‘ Schleiermacher means taking initially alien concepts and giving them new meaning by using them in 
a new context. Such concepts are not simply taken and used in the usual way. The word ‗borrowed‘ thus acknowledges 
the source of a concept and an awareness of its usual context, but also indicates some distancing from the original 
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cannot, or at least should not be assumed to, operate in theology with the same meaning that 
they had in their original disciplines.46 The tendency to assume that borrowed concepts do carry 
over their original meanings into theology is understandable, but this characteristic weakness of 
dogmatics highlights its need of church history and biblical studies as interdependent partners in 
theological study.47 However, when such borrowing is properly done, this tendency is avoided. 
That Schleiermacher sees such proper borrowing not only as a real possibility, but as effectively 
realised in CF, is apparent from a passage in the second letter to Lücke in which he responds to 
a  criticism  made  by  Jakob  F.  Fries.48  Fries,  influenced  by  the  Speeches,  agreed  with 
Schleiermacher in locating the source of piety in feeling rather than in morality or thinking, and 
in the nature of the distinction between religion and philosophy. However, he argued that any 
attempt  to  describe  religion  as  true  is  necessarily  ‗based  in  some  sort  of  philosophising‘.49 
Unless they  have  explicitly  worked  out  their  philosophical  positions,  religious  persons  will 
inevitably think in the philosophical terms common to their day, or as Schleiermacher says, 
Fries ‗maintains that in religious doctrine every consideration is essentially philosophical and 
                                                       
46 This follows from Schleiermacher‘s view that a proposition‘s meaning depends on the context in which it is used: 
Our dogmatic theology will not…stand on its proper ground and soil with the same assurance 
with which philosophy has so long stood upon its own, until the separation of the two types of 
proposition  is  so  complete  that,  e.g.,  so  extraordinary  a  question  as  whether  the  same 
proposition can be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology, and vice versa, will no 
longer be asked, for the simple reason that a proposition cannot appear in the one context 
precisely as it appears in the other: however similar it sounds, a difference must always be 
assumed (CF §16.ps, compare §2.ps1). 
47 ‗…it would be a very suspicious thing if it were just Dogmatics [and not also the other branches of theological 
study] that principally set the tone in this progress [towards the perfection of doctrine], because it depends more than 
the other branches (if only in form) upon Philosophy (Weltweisheit). For philosophy makes frequent new beginnings, 
and most of these revolutions engender new combinations and new expressions for the field from which Dogmatics 
draws its vocabulary; hence it is in this branch of theology that those variations most easily arise which provoke 
irrelevant controversy, and also those restatements which do not exactly represent progress but rather hinder than 
advance  the  theoretic  development‘  (CF  §19.ps).  Compare  BO  §226,  where,  speaking  of  the  sources  of  the 
terminologies employed in dogmatics and Christian ethics, Schleiermacher notes: ‗we have referred the theological 
sciences in general to ethics and the disciplines dependent on it. If we consider dogmatic theology in particular, 
however, we find that the terminology of faith-doctrine proper rests largely upon that philosophical science which 
used to have its place in metaphysics under the name of ―rational theology‖, whereas Christian ethics can draw for 
the most part only from discussions about duty in philosophical ethics.‘ 
48 The following material on the Schleiermacher-Fries comes from LL 80-3 and the translators‘ notes on pp. 126-7. 
49 This point acquires some subtlety in view of Schleiermacher‘s claim that dogmatics entirely set aside the question 
of truth (i.e., as defined in philosophy—demonstration of knowledge available to the objective consciousness without 
reference to piety). Dogmatics does not examine the truth of propositions, but their Christian-ness: ‗whether the 
Christian  quality  is  strongly  and  clearly  expressed  in  them,  or  rather  doubtfully‘  (CF  §3.5).  It  is  precisely 
Schleiermacher‘s point that he does not try ‗to establish anything objectively without going back to the higher self-
consciousness‘  (CF  §17.2).  He  is  not  ‗trying  to  describe  religion  as  true‘;  he  is  trying  to  describe  it  as  faith. 
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that anyone who tries to avoid philosophy will only fall prey to the philosophy that is passively 
communicated in language‘ (LL 81, 126 n53). 
Schleiermacher allows Fries‘ claim in relation to ‗religious doctrines‘ derived from speculative 
theology, but he objects to this use of the term ‗religious doctrine‘, which for him must always 
refer to the doctrine of some particular religious community. He also agrees with Fries that the 
implicit adoption of current philosophical concepts by those who do not explicitly philosophise 
when formulating a faith-doctrine would indeed be a matter of concern if it actually occurred or 
turned out to be unavoidable.50 But such a possibility holds no terrors for him, since not only 
does he regard such implicit encroachment of philosophy into dogmatics as entirely avoidab le, 
but he has cultivated in himself a finely tuned awareness of the difference between dogmatic 
and philosophical method, and consequently does not believe that he could ‗unconsciously fall 
victim to any danger‘ (LL 83). 
Schleiermacher‘s  account  of  the  Christian  appropriation  of  philosophical  terms  is  usually 
descriptive (this is what actually happens, by virtue of the appropriation) rather than prescriptive 
(we must make sure we do this when we appropriate such terms). The use of indicative rather than 
imperative  mood  lends  an  air  of  relaxed  confidence  that,  when  philosophical  (or  any  other) 
language is appropriated for Christian use, the appropriation in and of itself frees that language 
from its previous moorings and gives it new meaning in its new context, so that speculative 
philosophy is not imported. He presupposes that the discourse of Christian dogmatics is clearly 
distinct from other discourses, and that the meanings of terms and concepts are determined by the 
discursive context in which they are used. On this basis, Schleiermacher need not rely on carefully 
critical appropriation of terms and concepts in order to keep dogmatics free of philosophy.51 
But what, then, is the basis of Schleiermacher‘s clear distinction between dogmatics and other 
(especially philosophical) discourses? What is he really relying on in this matter? The basis 
emerges  when  he  contrasts  the  potential  problems  of  philosophical  intrusion  with  his  own 
borrowing from ‗the foremost English philosophers who greatly influenced pre-Kantian German 
philosophy‘.52  Since  these  philosophers  proceeded  from  feeling  as  a  given,  Schleiermacher 
questions whether their work should strictly be called ‗philosophical‘ at all. And that is just the 
point, because — 
this serves to make clear the similarity between their method and ours, and it also shows 
why we could most easily incorporate the field of language formed under their influence. 
Even though this mixture of elements drawn from the languages of different, sometimes 
contemporaneous,  sometimes  successive,  schools  seems  to  be  confused  and  useless  for 
philosophy so that now every new school is justified in creating a new language of its own, 
                                                       
50 Schleiermacher refers to the insinuation into theology of unnoticed philosophical elements as a ‗danger‘ to which 
one might ‗fall prey‘ (LL 81, 83). 
51 Tanner (1997, 107) notes this view as a point of kinship between postliberals and ‗Schleiermacher and his liberal 
Protestant followers.‘ 
52 Duke and Fiorenza‘s editorial note at this point nominates as examples ‗Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713), who related moral values to the ―aesthetic sense‖ or faculty, and Francis Hutcheson (1654-
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it is not useless to us because we do not philosophize. Indeed, those elements of it that we 
carry over into our dogmatic language can become completely clear, when properly treated 
in our field (LL 82). 
Schleiermacher‘s  argument  here  presupposes  an  understanding  of  philosophy  as  a  self-
consciously  objective  or  transcendental  inquiry  into  knowledge-in-general.53  The  English 
philosophers‘  work  on  feeling  is  distinct  from  philosophy  just  because  the  object  of  their 
inquiry, namely, feeling, is distinct from knowing. This is why philosophy struggles to make 
use of their language, while dogmatics can do so quite easily since it, too, proceeds from feeling 
as a given.54 That is, Schleiermacher‘s clear distinction between philosophy and dogmatics rests 
on  a  clear  distinction  between  knowing  and  feeling.  In  turn,  this  distinction  comes  from  a 
tripartite psychology of the human person expressed in terms of knowing, doing, and feeling 
(CF §3). Although he is clear that none of the three is ever completely unaccompanied by, or 
unconnected with, the other two, Schleiermacher insists that it is feeling, and not knowing or 
doing, that is the essence of piety.55 On this basis he maintains that his psychology (and that of 
those  who  influenced  him)  is  not  ‗philosophy‘  inasmuch  as  philosophy  is  not  inquiry  into 
feeling, but inquiry into knowing. For its part, piety, with which dogmatics is concerned, is 
neither a knowing (with which philosophy is concerned) nor a doing (with which ethics is 
concerned) but exists precisely on the border between knowing and doing: ‗piety is just the 
determination of self-consciousness which comes between the two‘ and doing cannot arise from 
knowing except as mediated by such a determination.56 
As may already be apparent from this description, Schleiermacher‘s psychology alone is not 
sufficient  to  clearly  separate  dogmatics  from  philosophy  (and  ethics).  Two  further 
presuppositions are involved: a general presupposition that the boundaries between disciplines 
are determined by distinctions between phenomena rather than by distinctions in method (a 
presupposition clearly expressed in the organisation and exposition of BO); and a presupposition 
that the fields of philosophy, theology and ethics in particular may be delineated by means of 
the distinctions between knowing, feeling and doing in the human person.57 Thus the real basis 
                                                       
53  This  parallels  his  understanding  of,  say,  philosophy  of  religion,  as  an  intentionally  objective  inquiry  into  a 
particular field of knowledge, namely, knowledge of religion. ‗By Philosophy of Religion is understood a critical 
presentation of the different existing forms of religious communion, as constituting, when taken collectively, the 
complete phenomenon of piety in human nature‘ (CF §2.ps2). 
54 Schleiermacher does not explain just what he means by ‗proper treatment‘ of these borrowed terms. Most likely, he 
is referring to his clear distinctions between knowledge and feeling, and hence between philosophy and dogmatics—
distinctions that preserve the English philosophers‘ language from the confusions that result when it is used in fields 
for which it is not suited (e.g., philosophy). The whole context at LL 80-2, 86-7 seems consistent with this reading. 
55 CF §3.4: ‗there are both a Knowing and a Doing which pertain to piety, but neither of these constitutes the essence 
of piety: they only pertain to it inasmuch as the stirred-up Feeling sometimes comes to rest in a thinking which fixes 
it, sometimes discharges itself in an action which expresses it.‘ CF §3.5: ‗piety in its diverse expressions remains 
essentially a state of Feeling. This state is subsequently caught up into the region of thinking, but only in so far as 
each religious man is at the same time inclined towards thinking and exercised therein; and only in the same way and 
according to the same measure does this inner piety emerge in living movement and representative action.‘ 
56 CF §3.5. The background to this idea is explored in the next sub-section. 
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of Schleiermacher‘s strict separation of dogmatics from philosophy lies in the combination of 
his  tripartite  philosophical  psychology,  the  conception  of  disciplinary  boundaries  as  clearly 
determined by the objects of inquiry, and an ordered correspondence between knowing-feeling-
doing and philosophy-theology-ethics. These presuppositions operate together to guarantee that 
no philosophy will intrude into Schleiermacher‘s dogmatics: in always referring back to the 
religious affections he not only does not but cannot ‗philosophise‘.58 
Unfortunately,  as  the  following  discussion  will  show,  the  presuppositions  underlying 
Schleiermacher‘s confidence on this matter derive entirely from his philosophy. 
4.2.4  Sources of Freedom: Schleiermacher’s Engagement with Kant 
A digression into Schleiermacher‘s extended critical engagement with Kant‘s Critiques will be 
useful  here,  as  the  philosophical  background  to  Schleiermacher‘s  psychology  has  special 
relevance to an appraisal of his theological vision.59 For this I will critically adapt the insights of 
Thandeka (1992), whose presentation of Schleiermacher‘s recovery of the self ‗lost‘ by Kant is 
based on an assessment of the Dialektik as possessing ‗an underlying basic structure and overall 
coherency  to  the  entire  series  of  lectures.‘60  Thandeka‘s  presentation  of  Schleiermacher‘s 
critical and constructive responses to Kant‘s analysis of the self is cogent, and coheres with my 
reading of Schleiermacher‘s view of the relation between theology and philosophy. 
Although the precise nature and extent of the gap in Kant‘s description of the self (and Kant‘s 
awareness of it) can be debated,61 it seems clear that Kant was aware that his argument in the 
first and second Critiques had left unresolved the question of the unity of the self: ‗What is the 
link between self as subject and self as object?‘ This difficulty preoccupied Fichte and was a 
focus of Schleiermacher‘s extended argument in the six series of lectures later collected as his 
Dialektik. In these lectures Schleiermacher considered and dismissed Fichte‘s solution to the 
problem—the adoption of intellectual intuition as the highest standpoint—for failing to break 
                                                                                                                                                             
between his method and that of philosophy. Does he really think differently in, say, the Dialektik and his dogmatics? No; 
but his systematic starting points, that is, the acknowledged axioms of the respective systems, are different. 
58 I speak of a ‗guarantee‘ here in view of the systematic importance of Schleiermacher‘s psychology and the very 
high level of confidence he expressed in the philosophy-free status of his dogmatics. Yet Schleiermacher himself 
would not speak this way. Such a guarantee would presume to speak for philosophy as well as dogmatics: But ‗we 
theologians…would not even think of policing a foreign territory. …If it becomes established that church doctrine, 
when  correctly  presented  as  the  content  of  faith,  cannot  conflict  with  true  philosophy,  all  the  better!  But  we 
theologians cannot attempt in any way to guarantee that‘ (LL 86). 
59 Schleiermacher‘s work on philosophical psychology and epistemology, as represented for example in his Dialektik 
and Hermeneutik among other works, is a substantial contribution to the Western philosophical tradition. His critiques of 
Kant and Fichte are of major importance, and his anthropology (and especially his identification of Gefühl as the locus of 
the self) are worked out largely in response to inadequacies he perceived in those thinkers‘ accounts of the self. While 
the opinion that ‗no one can adequately interpret Schleiermacher‘s theological masterpiece, The Christian Faith, without 
having read and understood his Dialektik‘ (Reuter 1979, 17) is somewhat daunting, I hope I have paid sufficient attention 
to the text of CF, and to specialists‘ works on the Dialektik, that no serious distortion will result. 
60 Thandeka notes that this view conflicts with major English works on Schleiermacher by Brandt (1941), Spiegler 
(1967) and Thiel (1981) 
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out of the boundary of pure thinking. Being, the ‗I‘ of the ‗I think‘, remained unaccounted for. 
For Schleiermacher, both Kant and Fichte failed because they tried to ground transcendental 
consciousness sheerly in the agencies of human thinking.62 But the self is more than thinking, 
and thinking cannot be its own ground. 
For his own solution, Schleiermacher sought the ‗I‘ at the border between determinate moments 
of  consciousness.  At  this  border  there  is  no  actual  object  of  consciousness,  so  from  the 
viewpoint  of  objective  consciousness  the  border  is  an  empty  or  null  awareness,  which 
Schleiermacher called Anschauung (‗immediate intuition‘). This empty consciousness is self-
consciousness  described  from  the  objective  standpoint  of  thinking.  It  is  Schleiermacher‘s 
equivalent to the gap in Kant‘s account of the self, and it represents the limit of thinking‘s 
access to self-consciousness. At the limit, there is nothing there for it to think! Schleiermacher 
thus leaves the Kantian impasse intact in the objective consciousness, effectively agreeing that, 
from the viewpoint of determinate thinking (objective consciousness), it cannot be resolved. The 
means by which our thinking shifts between one determinate moment of consciousness and the 
next is not thinking, but the self that thinks and remains when thinking has ceased.63 
Schleiermacher‘s innovation was to pose the question ‗What is the counterpart to Anschauung 
in ourselves as organic beings who think?‘ This counterpart is self-consciousness considered 
from the viewpoint of subjective consciousness, or Gefühl (‗feeling‘). It is Gefühl that is the 
ground of the self for Schleiermacher and the source of identity at the border  between two 
determinate moments of consciousness. Schleiermacher described the subjective state of Gefühl 
as  the  self‘s  unreflected,  immediate  awareness  of  its  own  identity  in  two  moments  of 
determinate thinking which are linked by a border. Crucially, the actual content of the self in the 
transition point is not a determinate state of the self because the self is between two actual 
moments of determination. In the transition point, the self‘s individuation has been cancelled 
and it is therefore unbounded and undifferentiated from all of reality.64 
                                                       
62 Thandeka 1992, 438-40. 
63 Thandeka 1992, 444. 
64  Thandeka  1992,  446-8.  Thandeka,  borrowing  gratefully  from  Dieter  Henrich‘s  work  on  Fichte  (Fichtes 
ursprüngliches  Einsicht,  Klostermann,  Frankfurt,  1939;  ET  ‗Fichte‘s  original  insight‘,  trans  D.R.  Lachterman, 
Contemporary  German  Philosophy  1,  1982)  describes  Gefühl  as  ‗subject-less  awareness‘.  Why  adopt  such  a 
paradoxical concept? Thandeka quotes Henrich on ‗subject-less knowing‘ in Fichte: ‗if every item of knowledge 
really had a subject, then the subject itself could not be an item of knowledge. Otherwise we would have to assume a 
subject of this subject and thus surrender to the infinite regress that Fichte had so feared. The idea of the Self would 
sink  into  the  abyss.  The  paradox  of  subject-less  knowing  is  preferable  to  that.‘  That  is,  Thandeka  prefers  the 
paradoxes of ‗subject-less knowing‘ and ‗subject-less awareness‘ to losing the self in a vortex of reflexion. 
I doubt that this problem existed for Schleiermacher, for whom the self-in-transition is inseparable from all of life and is 
therefore, in this sense, ‗subjectless‘. Admittedly, both subjectlessness and infinite reflexion would be highly problematic 
for a determinate self, whose awareness and knowledge will be of objects distinct from it. But for an unindividuated (i.e., 
indeterminate) self (if this is in any sense a meaningful concept) these problems would scarcely arise. This is because, for 
an unindividuated self, there is (presumably) no other, i.e., no object which is not already one with the self, and for the 
self as subject, no possibility of regarding the self as object since the self‘s subjectivity is unbounded. The paradox 
inherent in Schleiermacher‘s idea of the unindividuated self is clouded, rather than clarified, by the deployment of further 
paradoxes (infinite regress of reflexion and subjectless awareness). In any case, the difficulties of attributing meaning to   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    116 
This compressed outline of Schleiermacher‘s theory of (self-)consciousness is based largely on 
selected secondary sources and so has shortcomings as a scholarly account.65 However, I am not 
attempting a philosophical evaluation of Schleiermacher‘s theory. All I require is an indication 
of the extent to which he developed his theory in conversation with the then-new philosophy of 
Kant and Fichte, and a demonstration that the main features of his psychology, as presented but 
never  demonstrated  in  CF,  emerged  from  this  conversation.  Assuming  acceptance  of  these 
points, I now draw attention to three aspects of Schleiermacher‘s argument that are directly 
relevant to the discussion in this chapter and the next. 
Firstly, a matter that will be recalled in later argument is the extent of common ground between 
Schleiermacher  and  Ludwig  Wittgenstein.  This  is  relevant  to  two  common  perceptions  in 
liberal-postliberal debates: the perception that postliberals are opposing a liberalism that stems 
from  Schleiermacher,  and  the  perception  that  Wittgenstein‘s  work  provides  philosophical 
support for postliberal claims. In this chapter I am laying out what I believe to be a strong 
argument  that  the  relationship  between  Schleiermacher  and  liberal  theology  is  not  so 
straightforward, and that, in any case, Schleiermacher‘s name should be just as much connected 
with postliberal as with liberal theology. I will show in the next chapter that the case against 
aligning Wittgenstein with postliberal thought (as espoused by Lindbeck, at least66) is equally 
                                                                                                                                                             
the idea of the self and to subject-object language under such conditions are apparent. 
65  In those secondary sources I have paid most attention to the descriptive pas sages that present summaries of 
Schleiermacher‘s Dialektik. The interpretive comments appear to me to be less reliable, especially where they reflect 
the encroachment of a transcendental viewpoint. For example, Thandeka (1992, 442) finds that: ‗in The Christian 
Faith, Schleiermacher claimed that there is a ―common religious communion‖ accessible to all because it is based on 
―the absolutely common essence of humankind.‖‘ She cites CF §§29, 33 to support this statement, but §29 carefully 
disclaims any reliance on the idea of a common religious communion, and indeed (yet again) affirms the Christian 
particularity of Schleiermacher‘s project. The idea of a common religious communion is specifically rejected at 
§§6.ps, 10.ps. The phrases ‗natural religion‘ or ‗religion in general‘ can only be applied to ‗the general susceptibility 
of individual souls to religious emotion‘ (CF §6.ps), not to any ideal of a universal religious fellowship. 
This susceptibility or capacity or disposition of ‗the intelligence in its subjective function‘ is what Schleiermacher 
postulates as an anthropological universal in §33.1. At least, this is the position that his argument allows in both the 
Dialektik  and  CF.  Unfortunately,  he  goes on  in  CF  §33  to  maintain  the  universality  of  the  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence by means of a logical sleight of hand: the universality of a potential is assumed to entail the universality 
of its realisation, any lack of which is explained (away) in terms of arrested development, confusion, or diseased 
understanding (§33.2). Further, the realised feeling of absolute dependence ‗as such‘ is assumed to be ‗the same in 
all, and not different in different persons‘, again by virtue of the universality of that same potential (§33.1). 
But Schleiermacher himself relegates his transcendental anthropology (and hence my critique of it) to the status of a 
mere curiosity. Even if the (alleged) universality of the feeling of absolute dependence ‗entirely takes the place, for 
the  Glaubenslehre,  of  all  the  so-called  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God‘  (§33),  yet  such  proofs  are  ‗entirely 
superfluous‘, since Glaubenslehre is ‗only for those who have the inner certainty of God‘ of which they can be 
‗directly  conscious  at  every  moment‘  (§33.3).  Schleiermacher  does  indeed  think  that  the  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence is an anthropological universal, but its universality or otherwise is of no dogmatic importance, since, as 
the reader of CF is reminded yet again, Christian dogmatics can proceed only as the explication of the content of a 
particular  feeling  of  absolute  dependence,  namely,  that  in  which  everything  is  related  to  the  redemption 
accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth. Glaubenslehre proceeds only from Glaubens. 
66 Hauerwas‘ grasp of Wittgenstein may be more reliable, though he refers to him only rarely. He does however, 
mention an extensive reading of Wittgenstein bearing fruit in the realisation that he did not need an epistemology 
(Hauerwas 1997, 229). Although ‗thinking you need an epistemology is a hard habit to break‘, Hauerwas believes he   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    117 
compelling. The present point is that the existence of substantial congruences of perspective, 
position and technique in Schleiermacher and Wittgenstein flags the possibility that, where a 
debate  sets  them  against  each  other,  the  parties  to  the  debate  may  have  substantial 
misconceptions  in  common.  In  short,  not  only  are  postliberals  and  liberals  wrong  in  their 
respective perceptions of Schleiermacher and Wittgenstein, but the area of agreement between 
Schleiermacher and Wittgenstein (an agreement not to be taken lightly) emerges as a potentially 
fruitful source of critique of both postliberal and liberal positions.67 
What is this area of agreement? An account of the similarities and contrasts in philosop hical 
stance and rhetorical method between Schleiermacher and Wittgenstein would be a fascinating 
and substantial work, and well beyond the scope of this study. I can offer only a brief indication 
of agreements relevant to my argument. For both Schleiermacher and Wittgenstein, the relation 
between mind and reality, language and world, is not available to objective consciousness and 
therefore cannot be expressed in words. It is rather a mystery, and hence a matter for wonder. 68 
                                                                                                                                                             
is learning better ‗how to think without assuming that I must first have an account [of] how to think.‘ Unfortunately, 
Hauerwas  seems  to  think  that  this  realisation  supports  or  leads  to  the  claim  that  ‗I  simply  do  not  have  an 
―epistemology‖‘. But ‗not needing‘ is not the same as ‗not having‘. 
67 These comments should not be taken as minimising the methodological and substantive differences between these 
two thinkers. For example, although I think some similarity can be demonstrated in their views  of philosophy‘s 
limitations and their accounts of the self, Wittgenstein is more reticent than Schleiermacher regarding analytical 
description of the self, and far more suspicious of metaphysical arguments. Wittgenstein‘s analytical reticence enacts 
his  dictum  ‗Wovon  man  nicht  sprechen  kann,  darüber  mu  man  schweigen.‘  His  preferred  technique  (and 
increasingly so through his career) was to probe the edges of what cannot be spoken. So that his remarks might 
provoke wonder he deliberately set out to make analytical reading of his work difficult, using syntax and punctuation 
that  would  force  his  readers to go  slowly  and  ponderingly.  The  analytically-oriented  are  apt  to  find  such  work 
difficult to penetrate. By contrast, Schleiermacher remains analytical, as required by his approach of developing his 
Dialektik  in  detailed  conversation  with  Kant  and  Fichte,  whereas  Wittgenstein  deliberately  eschewed  notes  and 
references. I think Wittgenstein would have found Schleiermacher‘s theory of the self to be flawed by metaphysical 
dualism, and would have seen his picture of the oscillating (now you feel it, now you don‘t) individuation of the self 
as an illicit analytical encroachment into the realm of what cannot be said. Yet both knew that philosophy is not 
fundamental, but presupposes something beyond its scope, a conviction, a relation of trust: ‗What can I rely on? I 
really want to say that a language-game is possible only if one trusts something. (I didn‘t say ―can trust something‖.)‘ 
(Wittgenstein, On Certainty §§508-9, cited in Kerr 1997, 210). For Wittgenstein, trust is ‗not some subjective feeling, 
but rather a mode of conduct or behaviour…within the flow of life‘ (Incandela 1985, 469 n5). 
68 I take this to be the burden of Wittgenstein‘s  Tractatus, a  work  which expresses rather than demonstrates  a 
viewpoint,  and  therefore  relies  on  aesthetic  rather  than  deductive  appeal.  Wittgenstein‘s  basic  point  is  that  the 
problem with philosophy is not so much the solutions it proposes as the problems it considers, and that ‗the reason 
why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood‘ (Wittgenstein 1971, Preface). The 
misunderstanding that concerns Wittgenstein is the idea that it is possible to express the relation between thought and 
world. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein ponders this relation through an acute appreciation of the nexus between thought 
and language—what can be said, can be thought, but not everything can be said. Thus, the work aims to draw a limit 
to the expression of thoughts. And the sense of this limit, as Wittgenstein gives it in his Preface and in the last 
proposition of the book, is this: ‗Was sich überhaupt sagen lät, lät sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden 
kann, darüber mu man schweigen‘ (‗What can be said at all can be said clearly, and one must be quiet about that 
whereof one cannot speak‘, Tractatus, Preface and §7). This does not mean that beyond speech lies nothing, only that 
philosophy (as it has usually understood itself) lacks access to what lies beyond speech. So what lies beyond speech? 
The mystery that the world exists, the feeling for the world as a limited whole, the feeling for life itself. These are 
mysteries that cannot really be expressed, but they nevertheless make themselves manifest (Tractatus §§6.44-6.522).   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    118 
Thus, neither Schleiermacher nor Wittgenstein saw their philosophical convictions as amenable 
to proof or demonstration. As Thandeka explains it, Schleiermacher learned from Plato that the 
chief goal of philosophy was to bring the reader to self-consciousness, and that this goal was 
achieved only when the reader was ‗driven to an inward and self-originating creation of the 
thought…or  [submitted]  to  surrender  himself  more  decisively  to  the  feeling  of  not  having 
discovered or understood anything.‘69 Schleiermacher believed that the self he described in his 
Dialektik can be disclosed only in an actual act of self-consciousness. But this ‗actual act‘ is 
beyond the purview of thinking. That is, it lies beyond what is available to philosophy, and 
philosophy itself cannot lead to it, but can only proceed from it.70 
The second notable aspect of Schleiermacher‘s argument is the indeterminacy of the self in the 
state of transition, which is important for understanding such statements as that in CF §3.5: 
‗piety  is  just  the  determination  of  self-consciousness  which  comes  between  the  two  [i.e., 
between knowing and doing]‘.71 Just as thinking is not its own ground, but is grounded in the 
self, so the self has its ground, not in itself, but in the transcendent ground of determination. It is 
this, and not the self, that is the agent of the self‘s continuity from one determinate moment of 
consciousness  to  the  next,  since,  at  the  border  between  such  moments,  the  self  and  all 
determinate  beings  as  agents  of  activity  are  cancelled.  Consciousness  of  this  state  of  self-
cancellation72  is  ‗the  feeling  of  universal  dependence‘  on  the  transcendent  ground  of 
determination.73 Theologically, it seems that for Schleiermacher the self is received anew in 
                                                                                                                                                             
A common misreading of the Tractatus is that which, following the Vienna Circle, sees in it a manifesto of logical 
positivism, a position repudiated in Wittgenstein‘s later work, especially the  Philosophical Investigations. In my 
view, such a reading ignores Wittgenstein‘s Preface and concluding remarks, which indicate that his intention is 
rather to completely ironise philosophy‘s self-understanding. In the Preface, Wittgenstein problematises the problems 
that philosophy sets itself (they arise from a misunderstanding), but nevertheless believes that he has found, ‗on all 
essential points, the final solution of the problems.‘ And, if he is not mistaken, the Tractatus also shows ‗how little is 
achieved when these problems are solved.‘ Thus, the Tractatus is a work of critical or negative philosophy aimed at 
raising awareness of the deep blindness of the alley into which philosophy had strayed. In this way it prepares for the 
later works which, although more constructive than negative, continue the same sense of wonder, the same rhetorical 
techniques, and the same keen appreciation of the limits of philosophy and the ineffability of the sense of life. 
69 Thandeka 1992, 443, quoting from Schleiermacher‘s Introduction to Plato’s Dialogues (trans. W.Dobson, Arno, 
New York, 1973), 17-8. 
70 Thandeka 1992, 450-2. A brief perusal of Wittgenstein‘s Preface and concluding remarks (say from §6.4 to the 
end) in the Tractatus, together with Thandeka‘s presentation of Schleiermacher‘s argument in the Dialektik, indicates 
a considerable congruence in perspective and conclusions. 
71 Referred to on p. 113 above. 
72 This term refers to a cancellation of the self in which the self is passive (as it must be in relation to its own 
ground). The self is not cancelling itself, but being cancelled. 
73 Compare CF §8.2, in connection with the superiority of monotheism to polytheism and idolatry:   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    119 
each new moment of consciousness as a new offering of divine grace. The direct link between 
this  continually  renewed  grace  and  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  is  reflected  in  the 
importance  of  preservation,  and  the  relative  unimportance  of  creation,  in  Schleiermacher‘s 
account of the God-world relation.74 The indeterminacy and unboundedness of the self-between-
the-moments, in consciousness of which we ‗take up the whole world along with ourselves into 
the unity of our self-consciousness‘ (CF §8.2), appeared to some to posit the totality of finitude 
as an Absolute, and therefore as indistinguishable from God.75 Hence the charges of pantheism 
and ‗Spinozism‘ from some theologians.76 Such misunderstandings can distract from the crucial 
                                                                                                                                                             
But when the higher self-consciousness…has been fully developed, then, in so far as we are 
open in general to sensible stimulation, i.e. in so far as we are constituent parts of the world, and 
therefore in so far as we take up the world into our self-consciousness and expand the latter into 
a general consciousness of finitude, we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent. 
[This amounts to Monotheism because] if we are conscious of ourselves, as such and in our 
finitude,  as  absolutely  dependent,  the  same  holds  true  of  all  finite  existence,  and  in  this 
connexion  we  take  up  the  whole  world  along  with  ourselves  into  the  unity  of  our  self-
consciousness. 
See also CF §34 and the discussion of creation and preservation in §36. 
74  See  the  whole  development  of  the  doctrines  of  creation  and  preservation  in  CF  §§36-49.  Creation,  being  a 
discontinuity that is not strictly part of the present feeling of absolute dependence, is only an indirect corollary of the 
doctrine of preservation: ‗…the question of the origin of all finite being is raised not in the interest of piety but in that of 
curiosity, hence it can only be answered by such means as curiosity offers‘ (§39.1). The doctrine of creation is developed 
negatively, so as ‗to prevent anything alien from slipping in from the field of knowledge‘ and so as to maintain non-
contradiction with scientific principles of research in the sphere of nature or history. On this part of CF, and especially 
on the fundamental link between the feeling of absolute dependence and the awareness of ourselves as part of (and one 
with) the universal nature-system, see Behrens 1996. 
75 In a variation on this idea, Hans-Richard Reuter suggests that for Schleiermacher the totality of finite being is an 
Absolute, but is nevertheless distinguishable from God: the ‗Absolute wherein the self sinks is not the one God; but 
the total world‘ (Reuter 1979, 245 cited by Thandeka 1992, 451, original italics). Building on this, Thandeka suggests 
that the feeling of absolute dependence is not the experience of merging with God, but the experience of ‗the self at 
one with the totality of being‘ (in loc.). Reuter‘s suggestion implies that for Schleiermacher either (a) both world and 
God function as Absolutes, or (b) God is not an Absolute, and drops out of the picture, leaving the world as the sole 
Absolute. Both alternatives are expressly repudiated in CF, as is the idea that the feeling of absolute dependence is in 
any sense a merging with God. That the feeling of absolute dependence includes an experience of ‗the self at one with 
the totality of being‘ is clear from CF §§4 and 8, but it is also clear that this feeling is not to be equated with that 
experience. Schleiermacher always carefully maintains the otherness of God; for him, only God, and not any part or 
even the whole of finite being, could possibly be an Absolute. At CF §32.2 Schleiermacher considers the possibility 
of explaining the sense of absolute dependence in terms of a referent other than God, as Reuter and Thandeka 
apparently wish to do. He calls such explanations ‗non-religious‘ and sees them as a ‗misunderstanding‘, since ‗to be 
one with the world in self-consciousness…cannot possibly be a consciousness of absolute dependence‘. 
76 The second edition of CF indicates the care with which Schleiermacher distinguishes his position from pantheism. See 
§§8.ps2, 46.2. See also §49.2, where Schleiermacher considers the possibility of expressing the relation between God, 
natural causes,  and our free  causality in terms of cooperation: ‗this expression requires  at least to be treated very 
cautiously if the differences of finite being are not to be placed within the Supreme Being and thus God Himself appear 
as the totality, a view which can scarcely be differentiated from that of Pantheism.‘ See also LL 47-51. The charge of 
pantheism had dogged Schleiermacher since the first edition of the Speeches, in which he referred to Spinoza‘s ‗piety‘.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    120 
role  played  by  this  doctrine  of  the  indeterminacy  of  the  self-between-the-moments  in 
Schleiermacher‘s understanding of the God-world relation, divine causation, and providence. 
The  third  and  last  aspect  of  note  brings  us  back  to  considering  the  means  by  which 
Schleiermacher sought to keep dogmatics free of philosophy. Schleiermacher clearly understood 
the  philosophical  goal  of  truly  transcendental  knowledge  to  be  unattainable,  and  saw 
epistemological confidence as arising not from the objective consciousness but from Gefühl, the 
immediate awareness of unity, identity and relation to the world from moment to moment. That 
the ground of Gefühl is the transcendent ground of determination of the self and of all finite 
entities is not susceptible to demonstration (which would place it in the sphere of the objective 
consciousness), but is available only to ‗immediate intuition‘ (Anschauung). Consciousness of 
this ground therefore manifests itself not as objective knowledge but as felt conviction, and thus 
it is conviction that undergirds and guides the quest for knowledge.77 The significance of this in 
the present discussion is that the entire argument of the  Dialektik leading to this point is a 
philosophical one, in that religious self-consciousness never appears as a datum but only as a 
conclusion, as the coming-to-consciousness of Gefühl. Earlier, we noted Schleiermacher‘s view 
that an argument proceeding from Gefühl is not a philosophical argument. Now it appears that 
this view is based on reasoning that is, even in Schleiermacher‘s terms, entirely philosophical.78 
Thus,  Schleiermacher‘s  argument  in  the  Dialektik  shows  that  Gefühl  itself,  the  strict 
demarcation  between  Gefühl  and  philosophy,  and  indeed  Schleiermacher‘s  whole  analytic 
psychology, are philosophical concepts. This psychology is not dogmatic in origin, since it was 
developed entirely in the speculative context of reflection on the psychological crux in Kantian 
philosophy. It is not ‗borrowed‘ in the sense of being cut off from its philosophical roots and 
infused with new meaning in the Christian linguistic field—the theory is never ‗clarified‘ by 
being  subjected  to  dogmatic  critique  that  might  lead  to  modification  or  redefinition.  Yet  it 
provides the  methodological  framework  and  governing  criterion  for  Schleiermacher‘s entire 
dogmatics. Schleiermacher thought his psychology provided a way of protecting the sanctuary 
of dogmatics from philosophy‘s encroachment. Not only was the protection illusory, but the 
illusion  disguised  the  fact  that  the  same  psychology  both  enabled  and  enacted  the  very 
encroachment Schleiermacher wanted to repulse. 
                                                       
77 Thandeka 1992, 452. The argument in the second paragraph of CF §3.4 considers the relation between piety, 
knowledge, and ‗conviction‘, but not in quite this sense. 
78 Moreover, although Schleiermacher indicates (LL 82) that Gefühl, as the basis of the religious disposition in the 
subjective consciousness, is the given that distinguishes the sphere of dogmatics from that of philosophy, it seems to me 
that the outcome of his argument in the Dialektik is that Gefühl, as the locus of identity linking successive moments of 
objective consciousness, is ultimately the basis also of the disposition to the pursuit of knowledge, i.e., of philosophy. 
But if this is the case, as Thandeka (1992, 450-2) indicates it is, then the fact that one may be starting from Gefühl as a 
given cannot provide a criterion by which one‘s dogmatics may be decisively distinguished from philosophy. Nor does it 
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4.3  LIBERALS, POSTLIBERALS AND SCHLEIERMACHER 
4.3.1  The Relation Between Theology and Philosophy as a Philosophical Question 
Although, by his own lights, Schleiermacher did not philosophise in dogmatics, his philosophy 
was such as to shed almost no light on the fact that he did philosophise, and did so extensively. It 
is no surprise, then, that in the survey of formulations of the relation between philosophy and 
Christian theology to which we now turn, Schleiermacher represents more than one of the options. 
But there is more here than a divergence between Schleiermacher‘s intention and achievement in 
CF;  for  the  previous  discussion  has  mentioned  at  least  five  views  of  the  relation  between 
philosophy and theology that can claim some support from Schleiermacher, depending on which 
texts are read, and how one reads them. These views are: (1) that philosophy and theology have 
similar status as scholarly disciplines but are completely independent by virtue of their distinct 
objects of inquiry—a view explicitly stated in LL and some passages of the Introduction to CF; 
(2) that theology holds its own ground inviolate, but with the boundaries and nature of that ground 
already set by philosophy—a view implicit in the logic of the Introduction; (3) that philosophy 
prescribes the method and criteria by which theology may proceed, thus intruding intimately into 
theology without itself being modified by the encounter—the view actually implemented in CF; 
(4) that philosophy‘s quest, like the clarification of religious knowledge in theology, rests on 
conviction, and there is therefore no reason why either philosophy or theology should be excluded 
from any field of inquiry—a view implicit in the argument of the Dialektik;79 and (5) that theology 
is open to philosophy, but neither has nor seeks any particular relation to it, and philosophy for its 
part may take its own view of the matter—a view suggested late in Schleiermacher‘s second letter 
to  Lücke.  We  have  already  surveyed  texts  in  which  the  first  view  is  represented.  Most 
significantly for the present study, the second and third positions identified above are the opposing 
positions in the postliberal-liberal debate. 
The first view (that theology and philosophy are completely independent in view of their distinct 
objects of inquiry) might be called ‗objective independence‘. Schleiermacher‘s formulation of this 
view failed because his distinction between the objects of inquiry was already a philosophical 
distinction.  But  if  this  distinction  cannot  justify  a  strict  separation  between  theology  and 
philosophy, it can still serve as a reminder that the present discussion is not about the relation 
between theology and philosophy as these disciplines are nowadays commonly defined. Rather, 
we are concerned with the relation between theology and non-theology, where ‗theology‘ refers to 
knowledge that proceeds from a relation to God in which everything is related to the redemption 
accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth, and ‗non-theology‘ refers to all other kinds of knowledge.80 
Schleiermacher would not be happy with my use of ‗knowledge‘ in relation to both theology and 
                                                       
79 See n78 above. 
80 Schleiermacher‘s tripartite division of human psychology amounted to a division of reality into distinct fields, 
some belonging exclusively to philosophy, some exclusively to dogmatics, some to other intellectual activities. The 
idea that such knowledges (a now-fashionable term that reflects the degree of distinction with which Schleiermacher 
operated) can remain, in the end, mutually exclusive is in tension with the experience of the unity of the self as the 
source of a particular perspective on the world, and with the experience of the world-system as a single whole of 
which human beings are living parts. Schleiermacher refers to the latter at CF §34.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    122 
non-theology, but he was quite familiar with the use of ‗philosophy‘ as a general term for all 
‗objective‘ inquiry in the natural and social sciences. 
However, if theology‘s distinctness is secured on philosophical grounds (as in Schleiermacher‘s 
case) and philosophy then refrains from intruding on the ground it has cleared, we have the second 
view  listed  above,  in  which  theology  appears  to  be  encapsulated  within  philosophy.  Here, 
philosophy preserves theology‘s freedom from philosophy, and defends the right of Christianity‘s 
reflective disciplines to exist and to draw water from their own wells. This view is implied in 
those  strands  of  argument  in  Schleiermacher‘s  Introduction  where  dogmatics  appears  as 
disciplined reflection on the common faith of a particular religious communion whose faith draws 
on sources acknowledged  by, but not accessible to, philosophy. Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic 
theory  is  an  encapsulation  of  this  sort,  in  that  it  defines  Christian  particularity  in  social-
anthropological terms and sees dogmatics as grammatical explication of Christianity‘s semiotic 
system.81  In  both  cases,  dogmatics  acquiesces  in  its  encapsulation  by  accepting  philosophy‘s 
definitions of Christian particularity and Christian theology without engaging them theologically. 
But encapsulation is inherently unstable. Like other religions, Christianity involves an ultimate 
commitment and offers an all-encompassing way of life, so encapsulation is already an intrusion 
and theological acquiescence is already an acknowledgement that philosophy still controls the 
ground  apparently  ceded  to  theology.82  Therefore, encapsulation is stable only so long as it 
remains  hidden.  When  an  unacknowledged  encapsulation  (such  as  Schleiermacher ‘s  or 
Lindbeck‘s) is brought to light, theology must either face the challenge of critically engaging the 
encapsulating philosophy, or frankly acknowledge philosophy‘s right to rule (as Brown does).83 
But if Schleiermacher‘s Introduction indicated encapsulation as a possibility, the body of  CF 
showed  his  philosophical  psychology  intruding  deeply  into  his  dogmatics  without  being 
challenged or changed by it. The matters decided in the psychology were never reopened for 
discussion in the dogmatics, but appeared there as criteria, as boundary markers, and as constant 
reminders of the focus of discussion. Thus Schleiermacher‘s philosophy remained independent of 
his dogmatics, while his dogmatics was deeply conditioned and shaped by his philosophy. In its 
outworking, then, Schleiermacher‘s dogmatics illustrated (and even epitomised) the third view 
listed above—a rationalist or ‗classic liberal‘ approach in which philosophy not only defines the 
                                                       
81 At first glance, it may appear that Schleiermacher‘s encapsulation differs from Lindbeck‘s insofar as the final 
propositions  of  the  Introduction  and  the  main  body  of  CF  display  the  pervasive  intrusion  of  his  philosophical 
psychology into the development of dogmatics proper. That is, Schleiermacher‘s overall approach may have been 
more  like  Lindbeck‘s  encapsulation  if  he  had  continually  returned  to,  say,  Jesus‘  self-proclamation  and/or  ‗the 
redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth‘ without systematically conditioning such criteria in terms of his 
psychology.  This comparison should be tempered by a recognition that encapsulation is already a philosophical 
intrusion  (as  I  am  about  to  argue),  and  that  Lindbeck‘s  cultural-linguistic  theory  also  insinuates  philosophical 
conditioning into the heart of dogmatics (as I will argue in the next chapter). 
82 This difficulty was noted earlier in respect of both Lindbeck and Delwin Brown. 
83 A third alternative would be to avoid such engagement and simply assume theology‘s self-sufficiency without 
philosophy. But such a stance  would have  avoided using philosophy explicitly  from the start,  thus avoiding an 
encapsulation situation. As I have defined it, encapsulation involves the knowing use of philosophy. It is not the 
philosophy, but theology‘s encapsulation by it, that may go unrecognised. This lack of recognition is what allows 
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ground on which theology may build but also provides the tools and supervises construction.84 I 
indicated above that encapsulation, as offered by Lindbeck and Brown, leads to, or is already a 
form of, this approach. In addition, although neither of these authors has produced a full 
dogmatics, they illustrate the penetration of philosophy into dogmatics in that each provides a 
non-theological account of the Christian community and its relation to the Christian scriptures.85 
Brown‘s attitude to non-theological scholarship is at least consistent (as noted earlier), while 
Schleiermacher and Lindbeck illustrate the very tendency they believe they are resisting. 
These three views of the relation between theology and philosophy all decide that relation on 
philosophical grounds, and on this basis may be distinguished from the last two views in our 
list. Since the second and third views are essentially those ranged on opposite sides of the 
liberal-postliberal  debate,  we  can  break  off  our  survey  here  for  a  reassessment  of 
Schleiermacher‘s relation to that debate. We will then return to the relation between theology 
and philosophy, not precisely in terms of the fourth and fifth views in our list, but covering 
similar ground through a survey of some themes in the early work of Karl Barth. 
4.3.2  Liberals and Postliberals as Schleiermacher’s Children 
Our inquiry into Schleiermacher‘s understanding of theology arose from a question about the 
origins of the approach shared by Lindbeck and Brown of encapsulating theology in a social-
scientific understanding of religion. From this inquiry, we can now draw some conclusions 
about the relation between liberal theology and Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory, and also 
assess Lindbeck‘s claim that Schleiermacher was an ‗undoubted experiential-expressivist‘. 
To  begin  with  Lindbeck‘s  claim,  one‘s  assessment  of  the  experiential  aspects  of 
Schleiermacher‘s  theology  will  vary  depending  on  whether  one  pays  most  attention  to 
methodological intent or to theological practice. Schleiermacher held the existence and identity 
of the self to be a universal grace, a relation of absolute dependence of all being(s) on the 
transcendental ground of being. But he expressly rejected the notion that such an idea could ever 
provide a transcendental ground for Christian theology. For him, even though his transcendental 
anthropology entirely replaced ‗all the so-called proofs of the existence of God‘, the function of 
such proofs was strictly limited, and in fact they had no place within Christian doctrine as 
such.86 Rather, Christian doctrine was for those who are aware of being in a relati on with God 
which is at every point related to the redemption accomplished in Jesus of Nazareth. This 
immediate relation is, in itself, the only true ground of doctrine. 87  Thus,  Schleiermacher‘s 
                                                       
84  As  Schleiermacher  saw  it,  the  reverse  situation  applied  during  the  Middle  Ages.  ‗Have  not  the  philosophers 
complained long enough that in the Scholastic period philosophy was both in the service of our church‘s faith and under 
its control? Be that as it may, at least philosophy has now become free enough. The faith that returns to its original 
source no longer has any need of its service, even for the dogmatic formulation of church doctrine. Moreover, a church 
better informed of its own interest would not want to exert any pressure on philosophy.‘ (LL 86, compare CF §16.ps) 
85 Lindbeck‘s use of philosophical tools in areas of dogmatic interest will be further examined in the next chapter. 
86 CF §33. More detailed discussion of this proposition was given in n65 on p. 116 above. 
87  For (yet another) reference in  CF  see  §28 passim,  but  especially  §28.2:  ‗In  Dogmatics…the  arrangement  of 
material  can  have  no  resemblance  to  that  employed  in  those  sciences  which  are  built  upon  some  fundamental 
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intention was certainly not experiential-expressivist in Lindbeck‘s sense—he rejected the idea 
of using a putatively universal prereflective religious experience as a transcendental ground for 
theology,  and  argued  against  those  who  sought  any  such  ground.  Moreover,  he  both 
acknowledged and insisted that the concept ‗religious experience‘ was merely an abstraction, a 
creation of human convenience, and that no such thing existed apart from the concrete forms of 
particular religious communions. For him, Christian dogmatics proceeded from the experience 
of faith in Jesus, and had no basis apart from that experience.88 
Yet Schleiermacher‘s identification of the feeling of absolute dependence as a universal element 
of (human) life played an important part in his dogmatics. To describe that part, we must again 
carefully  distinguish  between  intention  and  execution.  Schleiermacher  believed  that  the 
Introduction  to  CF  was  neither  dogmatics  nor  part  of  dogmatics,  but  rather  philosophical 
theology in that it borrowed terms from the social sciences (ethics), philosophy of religion and 
apologetics in order to set out the ground, to clarify just what it was that was being attempted in 
the  dogmatics  proper,  the  Glaubenslehre  that  begins  at  §32.  Prominent  among  the  many 
delimitations and demarcations in the Introduction is that introduced in §3 between knowing, 
doing and feeling. This distinction has various functions, the most immediate being the part it 
plays in the concept of a church developed in §§3-6. A church is a community of ‗feeling‘ (or, 
we might say, of personal or existential orientation). But we have seen that the same distinction 
is also the basis of Schleiermacher‘s radical separation of theology and philosophy, and of his 
insistence that ‗we do not philosophise‘. Closely related to this is another, and perhaps the most 
important function, namely that of apologetics. 
Recall  Schleiermacher‘s  definition  of  apologetics:  it  contributes to the ‗clerical  practice‘  of 
evangelism  by  presenting  the  distinctive  nature  of  Christianity  so  as  to  ‗ward  off  hostility 
towards the community‘ (BO §39). In Schleiermacher‘s day there was in Enlightenment circles 
a deep suspicion of traditional authority, especially of any presumption on the part of religion to 
pronounce on matters beyond its sphere. But what, exactly, is the ‗sphere‘ of religion? How can 
its definitive pronouncements be formulated so as to avoid unnecessary encroachments that 
might give offence and create hostility? Schleiermacher‘s tripartite psychology functions very 
powerfully in this regard. It provides a means by which religion and theology, which relate to 
feeling, can be distinguished from philosophy and science, which are concerned with knowing, 
and also (though less crucially) from ‗the science of morals‘, which relates to doing. If theology 
                                                                                                                                                             
perception and in this sense are historical. Instead of a fundamental law, Dogmatics has simply the fundamental inner 
fact of Christian piety which it postulates; and what it has to arrange consists simply in the different modifications of 
this fact which emerge, according to its differing relations with the other facts of consciousness‘ (Schleiermacher 
provides a cross-reference to §10.3). Continuing in §28.3, Schleiermacher is unable to resist the temptation to put this 
argument to the service of his understanding of the division between dogmatics and philosophy. Interestingly, this 
section appeals to the unity of human nature (in theologians) as necessarily providing non-contradiction between the 
‗speculative consciousness‘ and the ‗religious self-consciousness‘ (as being respectively the highest objective and 
subjective  functions of  the  human  spirit).  Any  perceived  conflict  is  therefore  a  misunderstanding.  But  guarding 
against such misunderstandings ‗is not the business of Dogmatics, which has nothing whatever to do with those who 
do not admit the fundamental fact. It is rather the business of Apologetics.‘ 
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continually checks to make sure that its considerations and conclusions relate to the sphere of 
feeling, and do not stray into the field of knowing then it will not give offence.89 
So although, strictly speaking, we may allow Schleiermacher‘s claim that he has not founded his 
Glaubenslehre  on  a  transcendental  anthropology,  it  is  unquestionably  the  case  that  both  the 
boundaries  of  his  dogmatics  and  the  method  by  which  it  proceeds  have  been  apologetically 
determined,  being  conducted  (if  not  actually  founded)  on  terms  set  by  his  transcendental 
anthropology. That is, using Schleiermacher‘s definitions of the relevant terms, The Christian 
Faith as a whole, and not only the Introduction, is a work of apologetics (as well as of dogmatics). 
The apologetic determination of boundaries and methods is an important part of Schleiermacher‘s 
legacy to the liberal theological tradition, though that tradition took the further step of eschewing 
his  pietistic  foundation  and  replacing  it  with  transcendental  anthropology,  a  step  that 
Schleiermacher vigorously opposed in his lifetime, and would never have countenanced, since it 
amounts to treating as secondary and derivative what he regarded as the fundamental fact of 
Christianity. Although Lindbeck‘s identification of Schleiermacher as an experiential-expressivist 
is debatable, there can be no doubt that Schleiermacher provided the intellectual tools and actual 
theological method that became characteristic of those more deserving of that label. 
The phrase ‗actual theological method‘ reminds us of the distinction that is so vital to a proper 
appreciation of Schleiermacher‘s theology: that the method actually deployed in CF does not and 
cannot achieve the aim espoused and so trenchantly defended in the Introduction and in  LL. 
Schleiermacher passionately believed that Jerusalem had nothing to do with Athens, that theology 
had nothing to do with philosophy, and thus that dogmatics, speaking as it did from faith to faith, 
was  quite  distinct  from  apologetics.90  It  seems  to  me  that  those  who  see  themselves  as 
Schleiermacher‘s heirs have paid too little attention to his avowed intentions for theology. Are 
these now something of a pietistic embarrassment? I suggest that there is more to be learned from 
                                                       
89 We have seen that the same argument also provides apparently reasonable grounds for maintaining the integrity of 
theology‘s sphere against encroachments from philosophy. Of course, philosophy has not been inclined to accept 
such distinctions, and simply does not recognise that there is anything in heaven or earth of which it may not dream. 
For example, the prospect of Schleiermacher‘s argument (see especially CF §30) being taken seriously by early 21
st 
century psychology is simply ludicrous. 
90 Schleiermacher believed he had remained faithful to the dictum timeo Danaos et dona ferentes (‗I fear the Greeks 
even when they bear gifts‘) and to his own ‗philosophical dilettantism‘: 
Even if I had referred more often to the domain of philosophy, I would still follow the rule of 
not allowing philosophy to influence the content of the Glaubenslehre. Of course, how faithful I 
have  been  to  my  resolution  is  another  matter,  but,  for  the  time  being,  the  signs  are  fairly 
good.…All  things  considered,  then,  it  would  seem,  that  very  little  of  philosophy  or  of 
philosophers  is  to  be  encountered  in  my  work.  And  in  this  matter  I  am  far  from  wanting 
anything else. Were I to find that the content of even one proposition was speculative or could 
justly be considered so, I would remove this inappropriate garment from it or strike it  out 
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the deep incoherence of Schleiermacher‘s thought than that his theological intentions should be 
jettisoned in favour of his theological execution, as liberal theology has often done. 
These reflections support a view of Schleiermacher as the father of liberal theology, but not in 
the usual sense. Strictly speaking, liberal theology is the child of Schleiermacher‘s theological 
practice rather than his theological intent. A liberal theology that continues to identify with 
Schleiermacher should perhaps consider whether the great man might not see it as a wayward 
child that has gone against his wishes. Of course, this possibility arises only because of the 
contradiction  between  intention  and  execution  in  Schleiermacher‘s  work.  Had  he  seen  this 
difficulty, I doubt he would have sacrificed his intention on philosophy‘s altar. 
Schleiermacher‘s intentions are of particular interest in this study due to their strong resonance 
with Lindbeck‘s methodological prescription. Indeed, it would not be going too far to say the 
two  theologians  share  much  the  same  theological  vision,  as  evidenced  by  similarities  in 
theoretical tools, methodological approach, conception of the theology/philosophy relation, and 
even  some  of  the  internal  tension  between  intention  and  practice.  The  congruences  are 
extensive.  Methodologically,  both  maintain  that  religion  and  theology  are  independent  of 
philosophy,91 but nevertheless lay out that independence, and describe the scope and sources of 
theology, using a kind of philosophical social anthropology.92 Both maintain, on the basis of this 
framework rather than on theological grounds, that theology is an ecclesial discipline, a task 
undertaken by and for the sake of the community whose lived faith comprises theology‘s whole 
source material. Both maintain, on the same grounds, that theology, and especially dogmatics, 
must live from the witness to Jesus Christ in creed and scripture, and is under no obligation to 
justify itself in terms of any putatively transcendental philosophy. 
Polemically,  both  position  themselves,  on  the  one  hand,  against  rationalists  who  admit  (or 
worse, insist on) philosophy‘s right to decide what can reasonably be believed, and, on the other 
hand, against conservative literalists who profess to take (or to demonstrate) the Bible to be 
absolutely true, minimising the role of faith. Technically, there is a similar idea of religions as 
discrete linguistic communities and dogmatics as the discipline devoted to clarifying Christian 
religious  language;  and  a  similar  insistence  that  the  evaluative  aspect  of  dogmatics  is  not 
concerned with the truth of Christianity, but only with the extent to which the Christian quality 
is expressed in the language and action arising within the Christian community. 
                                                       
91 It is probably best to put the similarity in this way, rather than as the mutual independence of theology and philosophy. 
As we have seen, Schleiermacher does regard philosophy and theology as mutually independent, but his real concern is 
with theology‘s independence, and he expresses some concern that theologians refrain from trespassing on philosophy 
by telling it what its attitude should be. Lindbeck sees transcendental philosophy as grounded in modernity‘s myths of 
universality, and therefore as no more or less particular than theology. But the point for Lindbeck is that there are 
therefore  good  philosophical  grounds  for  respecting  religious  particularity,  that  is,  the  argument  is  really  aimed  at 
advancing theology‘s identity as a religious activity independent of methodological agnosticism. 
92  Admittedly,  the  social  aspect  is  less  important  methodologically  for  Schleiermacher  than  for  Lindbeck. 
Schleiermacher‘s  Christian  communion  appears  as  more  of  a  collection  of  like-minded  (or  rather,  like-feeling) 
individuals (CF §6.2), and the essence of the communion then emerges as that which is common in the shared 
feeling. The nature of communities as forming and producing individuals-in-relation, though affirmed, receives rather 
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Thus, the liberal-postliberal debate may be seen as a dispute among Schleiermacher‘s heirs. The 
conventional description of Schleiermacher as the father of liberal theology may be affirmed 
with the proviso that this inheritance is by way of his theological execution. To this we must 
add that Schleiermacher is also the father of postliberal theology (or at least of Lindbeck‘s 
version of it) by way of his theological vision. Indeed, it could be said that Lindbeck is a more 
faithful child than his liberal opponents, in that his proposal is subject to contradictions similar 
to those present in Schleiermacher, whose paternal responsibilities appear to be wider and more 
complex than his children realise. In short, however much liberal and postliberal thinkers may 
view each other as theological opponents, both streams of thought are strongly represented in 
Schleiermacher, whose thought is just as important for understanding Lindbeck‘s work as it has 
always been for understanding liberal theology. 
4.3.3  Lindbeck as Schleiermacherian Theologian 
Schleiermacher‘s intention and vision, largely occluded in the liberal tradition that followed his 
actual method rather than the one he espoused, have found a new champion in Lindbeck‘s 
postliberalism. Both approaches begin with religion as a socio-linguistic phenomenon, a fact of 
human culture to be taken seriously in its own peculiar integrity. In their view, theology is a 
reflective discipline by means of which religious communities clarify their beliefs and support 
their actions. As such, its proper subject is the shared piety of particular religious communities. 
Hence, although theology is an ecclesial (churchly) discipline, it can reasonably claim a place in 
the  academy  among  the  social  sciences,  and  ministerial  training  can  claim  a  place  as  a 
professional discipline alongside medicine, law, commerce, politics, education, etc. Thus far, 
Lindbeck and Schleiermacher may agree.93 
But if communal piety is strictly a beginning, and theology is content simply to go on from 
there without looking behind as well as in front, who has defined the nature of piety? This is the 
point at which encapsulation is  most apparent in both Schleiermacher and Lindbeck —each 
encloses theology within a non-theological framework that is never theologically engaged. It is 
also the point at which their approaches diverge, by virtue of differences in their encapsulating 
frameworks. We have seen that Schleiermacher identified the common piety of the Christian 
community as a feeling of absolute dependence, or relation to God, in which everything is 
related  to  the  redemption  accomplished  by  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  We  have  also  seen  that,  in 
practice, Schleiermacher‘s ‗everything‘ meant ‗everything except the philosophical psychology 
used to define ―feeling‖ and distinguish it from ―knowing‖ and ―doing‖‗, that is, ‗everything 
except whatever is available to philosophical inquiry‘. This unrecognised exception directly 
contradicted Schleiermacher‘s intention and rendered his theological project incoherent. 
But to what extent is Lindbeck‘s approach an advance? A disciple of Schleiermacher would 
note that Lindbeck also takes communal piety as primary, and indeed extends this approach by 
recognising that the community does not orient itself simply by its own common faith in Jesus 
as Redeemer, but continually and intentionally reorients itself by reading a canon of texts, and 
                                                       
93 Though Lindbeck might begin to demur at the start of the previous sentence, which to some extent pre-empts the 
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incorporates the practice of this reading at the core its life and worship. We may ask Lindbeck, 
as we did Schleiermacher, ‗If that is your starting point, who has defined it for you?‘ Lindbeck 
is clear that he has passed on to the church what he received from the social anthropologists as 
of the first importance: that religion, communal piety, is a cultural-linguistic phenomenon in 
which a textual canon becomes the lens through which a community views and interprets the 
world. Lindbeck makes no attempt to absorb this cultural-linguistic framework into ‗the biblical 
world‘, but insists that it is a ‗pre-theological‘ framework, not realising that, as such, it cannot 
be available to the church, for whom ‗the biblical world‘ is theological through and through. 
At this point, Schleiermacher‘s disciple would not know whether to laugh or to cry. Lindbeck‘s 
self-positioning with respect to Schleiermacher has turned out to be massively misconceived: 
not only are his intentions largely consistent with Schleiermacher‘s; not only are his criticisms 
directed against opponents similar to those Schleiermacher faced; but Lindbeck‘s attention to 
communal reading practice has brought into still sharper focus the contradiction between vision 
and practice that he shares with Schleiermacher. Tragically, Lindbeck has neither corrected this 
problem nor avoided it. He has made the same procedural error, and made it more clearly and 
emphatically, but seems just as unaware of it as was Schleiermacher. 
What then has Lindbeck achieved? Unfortunately, his cultural-linguistic framework, borrowed 
from  the  academy  and  made  ‗available‘  to  the  church,  must  be  returned  unopened,  since, 
according to that pre-theological theory, the church has no use for a pre-theological theory.94 
However, such a theory could serve the function of defining, on the academy‘s terms, a place in 
the  academy  for  the  church‘s  reflective  disciplines.  It  would  have  the  virtue  of  preserving 
theology‘s freedom from domination by other disciplines, though the independence thus granted 
and guarded by the academy would be the same as that graciously accorded any other specimen of 
socio-anthropological interest whose integrity the anthropologist is obliged to respect. It seems 
then, that if Lindbeck were to win his argument with liberal theology, the  victory would be 
                                                       
94 This is highly reminiscent of the paradox of the (possibly mythical) commercial computer software package that 
contained, inside the box, a list of terms and conditions including the condition that if the purchaser found the terms 
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Pyrrhic: he would obtain recognition of theology‘s integrity at the cost of rendering it harmless.95 
This is hardly an improvement on Schleiermacher‘s vision of theology as a practical, professional 
discipline serving the reflective needs of church leadership.96 In such a vision, theology may be 
expected to sit somewhat loosely to other disciplines that do not share its particular practical 
interest. Unfortunately, the incoherence of Schleiermacher‘s and Lindbeck‘s theologies render 
them incapable of supporting, let alone embodying, their authors‘ visions of the theological task. 
4.4  TOWARDS A COHERENT CHRISTIAN PARTICULARITY 
4.4.1  On the Particularity of Particularity 
Recasting the liberal-postliberal debate as a dispute over Schleiermacher‘s legacy contributes 
more to an appreciation of the protagonists‘ common shortcomings than to an assessment of 
their relative merits and demerits. The basic problem remains: the Christian confession of Jesus 
Christ is a  particular  confession  made  with  universal intent,  and  other  religions, too,  make 
declarations with universal intent. Can we formulate a general account of particularity in which 
universal claims are taken seriously? 
Basic religious claims do not say ‗this is true for us‘, but ‗this is true‘. While the relation 
between  divergent  universal  claims  is  a  significant  theological  and  philosophical  issue,  the 
present point is the sheer fact of the universal intent with which such claims are made, a fact 
against which both liberal and postliberal approaches stumble insofar as they assume viewpoints 
that  remain  outside  the  religious  views  they  describe.  The  difference  between  the  two 
approaches in this respect is one of self-awareness—liberal views being aware, and Lindbeck‘s 
                                                       
95 Or, changing the classical allusion, Lindbeck‘s argument could perhaps be a Trojan horse, along these lines: 
The cultural-linguistic theory could give universities a reason for welcoming theology into their 
halls and libraries, even if our reasons for wanting to be there are quite different. We do not 
acknowledge or accept theology‘s eclipse by social anthropology. Theology has its own sources 
and standards of reason and its own warrants for its conclusions. As rational discourse about God, 
it  necessarily  includes  the  whole  of  existence,  including  the  university,  in  its  purview.  Yet, 
because theology is reasoned discourse, and because the university is, in its own way, devoted to 
fostering reasoned discourses and has substantial resources to support them, it is advantageous for 
theology to live in that environment. Creation of such an arrangement requires, not that church 
and university agree on the rational grounds for its adoption, but merely that each has reasons 
sufficient for its own purposes. 
Unfortunately Lindbeck‘s argument, as he states it, is not an argument that the church can use. Nor is there any sign 
of it being a Trojan horse: he presents it to the church, and especially to theologians, not for tactical use in the 
academy, but for their own serious consideration. 
96 Of course, we have seen that Schleiermacher‘s philosophical psychology operates to ensure that theology will not 
trespass on philosophy‘s hallowed ground. Thus, he too can be read as rendering theology harmless. On his view, 
theology is harmless to philosophy because it addresses a different region of the human psyche. On Lindbeck‘s 
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postliberalism unaware, of their externality. The shared difficulty is that, as external viewpoints, 
neither can be adopted coherently by those who confess Jesus Christ as Lord, for the Christian 
confession does not acknowledge any limit to that Lordship.97 In more philosophical language, a 
general  theory  of  particularity  may  be  viable  for  a  tradition‘s  adherents  only  if  it  is  their 
particular theory of particularity-in-general. Uncritical adoption of a general theory that assumes 
an external viewpoint both implies and enacts the subsumption of the tradition into the external 
tradition from which the general theory comes. 
Related to this is the necessarily reflexive nature of general theories that touch on anthropology. 
Since a general theory of particularity is an ideational construct about how humans construct 
ideas, such a theory must include its own construction within its purview. If it does not do so, it 
is incomplete; and if it cannot do so, it is either incoherent or lacking in generality, and hence 
unviable as a general theory. Had Lindbeck attended to the cultural-linguistic system within 
which  his  cultural-linguistic  theory  was  implicitly  embedded,  he  might  have  avoided 
incoherence. Brown, for all his awareness of tradition, did not reflect on the fact that ‗our 
common discourse‘ and his own proposal are embedded in tradition. Thus, where theories of 
particularity lack reflexive awareness, they may be unviable in their own terms, whether or not 
they appear to provide a viable option for Christian theology. 
What would a viable account look like? The discussion in the previous and current chapters 
points to a viable Christian account of particularity being one that locates itself within the 
community that confesses Jesus Christ and that acknowledges its own particularity, its own 
limitations  as  human  construction,  and  the  formative  and  evaluative  significance  of  human 
embodiment and sociality. But this specification derives from investigations of extra-Christian 
viewpoints—the confessional location and the acknowledgements of particularity, vulnerability 
and embodiment were not derived from internal Christian sources, but from immanent critiques 
of proposals whose roots were identified as lying elsewhere.98 That is, the specification assumes 
a standpoint among the discourses we have been exploring and identifies characteristics that, if 
recognised in a Christian account of particularity viewed from that standpoint, would give that 
account the appearance of coherence and viability. 
                                                       
97 In speaking of Christ‘s ‗Lordship‘ I draw on the complex of meanings associated with the earliest Christian confession 
of Jesus as Lord. Recognition of Jesus as Lord is particularly associated with the resurrection (Rom 1:4, 10:9), which 
marks the beginning of Jesus‘ rule in power. The application to Jesus of Old Testament passages in which  
appears as a divine title indicates that Jesus‘ Lordship is absolute in the sense once ascribed (and still ascribed) to 
YHWH. The church confesses Jesus as Lord in anticipation of his universal acknowledgement (Phil 2:11). The phrase 
‗Jesus [Christ] our Lord‘ indicates personal allegiance deriving from Jesus‘ role as redeemer. Yet Jesus‘ Lordship is not 
like that of other lords. The exalted one is the crucified one. His Lordship is expressed in suffering love, in dying for the 
ungodly, in washing disciples‘ feet, in healing the sick, in bringing good news to the poor, in table fellowship with 
sinners. Phil 2:1-11 indicates that both humiliation and exaltation are of the essence of this strange Lordship. 
98 Use of immanent rather than dogmatic critique follows from acknowledgement of particularity and the  need for 
methodological humility. The critical question is not ‗How does it look from here?‘ but ‗How would it look if I stood 
within it?‘, and the main critical criterion is coherence: ‗Does that viewpoint make sense on its own terms?‘   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    131 
4.4.2  The Shape Of Christian Particularity 
It  seems  that,  according  to  our  externally-derived  specification,  an  account  of  particularity 
formulated on the basis of that specification would not be a Christian account. The question is 
then whether a truly Christian account would, for its own reasons, include elements that could 
be recognised under the headings set out in the externally-derived specification. For its part, 
Christian theology can answer this question with a strong ‗Yes‘.99 Acknowledgements of human 
particularity,  vulnerability  and  embodiment  do  not  need  to  be  imposed  upon  the  basic 
confession of Christ, but flow from it as anthropological corollaries of the Christian doctrines of 
creation and fall. That is, there happens to be an area of overlapping discourse in which the 
insights of philosophers critical of the Enlightenment‘s apotheosis of reason may cohere with or 
contribute to Christian theological anthropology. These thinkers especially, but not only these, 
may remind Christian theology of things it ought to remember, or prompt it to give attention to 
matters it has overlooked. If a self-critical philosophy reminds us that those who speak of God 
do not thereby cease to be human and that their speech remains human speech, then exploration 
of the consequences of that recollection should be gratefully and humbly pursued just because 
and insofar as it may serve a more faithful Christian confession of Jesus Christ.100 
I am suggesting, then, that a Christian account of particularity will stem from the confession of 
Jesus Christ as Lord, i.e., it will acknowledge the universal Lordship of the particular Jesus Christ. 
Precisely because it stands within this confession, it will acknowledge that that confession is a 
human construction and as such vulnerable to critique in view of its provisionality, socio -historical 
location, and implication in complex networks of human desire and power. Precisely because it 
stands within this confession, it will acknowledge its own nature and vulnerability as human 
construction, and will serve the formation, explication and demonstration of Christian confession 
in the daily living of Christian communities.101 It will make these acknowledgements just because 
and insofar as they belong to the service of the Lord, Jesus Christ—a service which at this point 
consists in speaking truthfully of the One who is the truth. 
In modern theological writing, the pre-eminent example of such a view of Christian particularity is 
Karl  Barth‘s  Church  Dogmatics.  Barth  famously  asserted  theology‘s  independence  from 
                                                       
99 This affirmation concerns recognition that Christian theology provides substantial accounts of its own particularity, of 
the importance of human finitude and embodiment, and of its own human vulnerability. It does not require or presuppose 
detailed agreement between these accounts and those held on the basis of extra-Christian standpoints. Recalling Delwin 
Brown‘s theoretical advocacy (and practical abandonment) of ‗intersystematic reason-giving‘ (see BH 5-6 and p. 85 
above), I am asserting the possibility of genuine intersystematic reason-giving between Christian theology and critical 
philosophy on the theorisation of particularity. The foregoing argument functions as an example of such reason-giving. 
100 The point here is that aspects of non-theological wisdom may display a coherence and cogency that spurs theological 
reflection on the same matters. If Christ is truly Lord, as Christians confess, will not all truth find a place in his service? 
An acknowledged truth that had no place under Christ‘s Lordship would directly threaten the confession of Jesus as 
Lord. 
101 Being aware of its own confessional basis and accepting particularity as  a basic feature of the grace of human 
existence, such an account may be inclined to treat an immanent critique more seriously than an external critique that 
does not acknowledge its confessional basis; and for the same reasons its engagement with other views may be more 
by means of immanent than dogmatic critique. That is, the manner of argument I have adopted in this thesis is meant 
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philosophy  on  confessional  grounds,  though  he  recast  the  issue theologically  in  terms  of  the 
independence of revelation.103 Precisely by consistently pursuing this assertion, he substantially 
realised  Schleiermacher‘s  vision:  a  dogmatics  conceived  as  a  scientific  examination  of  the 
church‘s distinctive talk about God, a discipline in which ‗everything is related to the redemption 
accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth‘,104 and in which borrowed elements are in fact, and not 
merely  by  assumption,  loosened  from  their  original  discursive  contexts  through  explicit 
interrogation  concerning  their  relation to  that centre.105  For Barth, theology is the vulnerable 
human work of questioning church proclamation as to the truthfulness of its human representation 
of revelation.106 As human work, theology is as vulnerable as any hu man work; but as critical 
enquiry, theology is independent by virtue of the independence of its sole criterion, namely, 
revelation. With its dual emphasis on independence and vulnerability Barth‘s view of theology 
seems well able to support a Christian account of particularity along the lines suggested above. 
For  Barth,  theology‘s  independence,  though  derived  from  the  independence  of  revelation,  is 
expressed in and through the vulnerable practice of linguistic borrowing—theology cannot say 
anything at all without using terms and concepts that lie ready at hand. That is, it must press into 
service terms and concepts that in themselves know nothing of Christ‘s Lordship. Earlier, we 
noted  Schleiermacher‘s  assumption  that  linguistic  borrowing  would,  in  itself,  sever  borrowed 
terms from their former meaning and give them new meaning in the field of Christian language.107 
Fries saw that without explicit criticism such borrowing would result in the philosophy of the day 
                                                       
103 Allowing for Barth‘s redescription of the issue, such independence seems to be compatible with both the fourth and 
fifth views ascribed to Schleiermacher on p. 121 above. I suggest that, for Barth, the distinction between these views 
would have been unimportant. 
104 CF §11. Admittedly, Barth would not be happy with this statement just as it stands, no doubt preferring to replace the 
mention of redemption with something more like ‗the revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth‘. Also, the word ‗related‘ 
would be far too weak. But the point remains, I think, that Barth was far more successful than Schleiermacher in 
implementing the thrust of the latter‘s vehement statements of theology‘s self-sufficiency in relation to philosophy. 
105 Schleiermacher would have said ‗cut free‘ rather than ‗loosened‘. Unlike Schleiermacher, Barth did not see Christian 
discourse as radically distinct from other discourses. After all, it is only through their existing meanings that terms from 
other discourses suggest themselves as useful to Christian God-talk. Their responsible appropriation then requires careful 
delimitation of the particular sense in which they are pressed into theology‘s service of Christ. Yet some of Barth‘s 
comments,  when taken in isolation, seem to suggest that he  shared Schleiermacher‘s desire to completely exclude 
philosophy from dogmatics. For example, writing to Bultmann, Barth called Bultmann‘s work ‗a new form of the old 
neo-Protestantism from which I am separated not only by a different theology but…a different faith‘. He continued: 
I  can  only  repeat  that  with  your  well  known  attachment  to  Heidegger  (not  because  he  is 
Heidegger but because he is philosopher, who as such has nothing to say to and in theology) 
you have done something you ought not to do as an evangelical theologian. And if you ask: 
Why not? I can only answer you, not with an argument, but with a recitation of the creed. 
(Both passages appear in Barth and Bultmann 1982, 65). As I will shortly discuss, what Barth wanted to exclude was 
not philosophy as such, but philosophical foundations independent of Christian confession. 
106 In the early theses of CD I.1, Barth usually puts the criterion in terms of ‗the being of the church‘ a phrase that is 
then exegeted as ‗Jesus Christ, God in his gracious revealing and reconciling address to humankind‘. The significance 
of ‗the being of the church‘ in this context will be considered further below. 
107 See p. 111 above.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    133 
being carried over into theology; hence he advocated explicitly working out one‘s philosophy 
before embarking on theology. As we shall see in the following discussion, Barth agreed that 
criticism was needed, but not philosophical criticism, and not before theology. Rather, all terms, 
whether  strange  or  familiar  to  Christian  discourse,  must  be  interrogated  concerning  their 
serviceability for responsible speech about Jesus Christ. With this caveat, Barth readily borrowed 
and pressed into use whatever was at hand that would help him to speak responsibly of Jesus 
Christ.  For  him,  only  revelation  itself  is  necessarily  independent.  Theology‘s  independence, 
insofar  as it  reflects  the independence  of  the revelation  to  which  theology  is  accountable, is 
expressed precisely in theology‘s critical engagement with the church‘s language, including its 
own language and borrowed language, a vulnerable engagement in which the single ultimate 
criterion is Jesus Christ, God‘s revealing and reconciling address to humankind. 
But the approach Barth set out and followed in the Church Dogmatics was developed only after 
considerable struggle and a number of false starts (as Barth later saw them). In the following 
sub-sections I will consider one of Barth‘s earlier formulations of Christian particularity, and 
then two aspects of his later approach in the Church Dogmatics. As in the earlier engagement 
with Schleiermacher, the aim of the discussion is to identify some pitfalls on the way towards a 
theology that speaks faithfully of Jesus Christ, and speaks coherently of Christian particularity 
on that basis. The difference here is that, rather than working from the outside in, as we did in 
following Schleiermacher‘s argument, we will follow Barth by working from the inside out, 
trusting that the centre itself will illuminate our standpoint. After reflecting on Barth I conclude 
the  chapter  by  reviewing  Lindbeck‘s  proposal  in  the  light  of  the  theological  accounts  of 
particularity we have considered. 
4.4.3  Philosophy in Karl Barth’s Early Theology 
Bruce McCormack has traced the development of Barth‘s theological epistemology from his 
earliest  position  as  a  follower  of  Herrmann‘s  neo-Kantian  idealism,  to  the  new  direction 
indicated in the second Römerbrief (Romans II), and then the position reached in the Göttingen 
Dogmatics  of  the  mid-1920s.108  In response  to  ‗the  ease  with  which  German  theologians 
confused war hysteria with religious experience at the outset of the First World War‘, Barth 
wanted to move theology‘s starting point away from religious experience towards something 
less prone to ideological manipulation and distortion.109 McCormack argues that throughout this 
                                                       
108 McCormack 1998. McCormack‘s article traces the developments in the idea of the independence of religion from 
Schleiermacher, through Herrmann, to the early Barth. Herrmann, working against the background of the wholly 
constructivist ‗neo-Kantian‘ epistemology of Cohen and Natorp at Marburg, sought to secure the knowledge of God 
from being treated as purely a human construction, and therefore set out to drive a wedge between knowledge of the 
world  (which  was,  admittedly,  a  human  construction)  and  knowledge  of  God  (which  must  not  be).  Herrmann 
radicalised Schleiermacher‘s approach to the independence of religion by (1) positing the ground of faith, not as a 
human universal such as Gefühl, but as something given by God in individual encounter; and (2) almost completely 
removing any confirmatory role for theoretical knowledge in the life of faith, since, after all, such knowledge is 
merely  human  construction.  Against  this  background  the  later  Barth  and  Bultmann  represent  respectively  the 
contradiction and continuation of Herrmann‘s position, even as both, in their different ways, sought to carry into the 
twentieth century the standard of theology‘s independence which Herrmann had taken up from Schleiermacher. 
109 McCormack 1998, 25, and compare Barth‘s own comments in Barth 1960, 14, 40.   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    134 
development Barth was addressing a problem described in Kantian terms—the limitation of 
theoretical  knowing  to  the  intuitable.  If  God  is  transcendent  spirit  as  Christian  tradition 
maintains,  then  God  is  unintuitable  and  therefore  (if  Kant‘s  limitation  holds)  unknowable. 
Rather than avoiding the problem by locating God‘s access to us in the subjective consciousness 
as Schleiermacher and Herrmann had done, Barth boldly located revelation  in the realm of 
theoretical knowing available to the objective consciousness. 
The most basic feature of this move was the replacement of the idea of the independence of 
religion based on a transcendental philosophical psychology with the idea of the independence of 
revelation based on the sovereign freedom of God. McCormack puts the structure of the problem 
and of Barth‘s solution as follows: ‗If the unintuitable God is truly to be known, God must make 
Godself intuitable. But God must do so in such a way that the unintuitability proper to God is not 
set aside.‘110 In Romans II, the unintuitable divine power at work in the punctiliar event of Jesus‘ 
resurrection sheds light on the intuitable event of the cross, identifying it as the work of God. This 
account falls short of Barth‘s goal in that God has not really become intuitable.111 However, in the 
Göttingen Dogmatics Barth‘s theological epistemology is worked out by means of the doctrine of 
the incarnation, in particular an anhypostatic-enhypostatic christology in  which God becomes 
intuitable by assuming a human nature without surrendering the unintuitability proper to God. But, 
in itself, Jesus‘ life remains a riddle, a mystery, a veiling, and does not impart the knowledge of 
God. Only the Holy Spirit can make the veil transparent by giving us the eyes of faith.112 Although 
the Göttingen formulation still appeals to God‘s power in order to overcome the Kantian impasse, 
the presence of the unintuitable God in history is no longer restricted to a single mathematical 
point (as in Romans II) but has historical extension as Jesus‘ life. Therefore, appeals to the Holy 
Spirit are not made in a vacuum, but refer to an historical reality that is equally accessible to faith 
and non-faith, namely, the veil of the divine self-revelation. 
Although,  as  I  believe  McCormack  has  demonstrated,  the  early  Barth‘s  theological 
epistemology, like Schleiermacher‘s, was developed in response to a problem seen in Kantian 
terms,  Barth  was  more  successful  than  Schleiermacher  in  developing  his  response  from 
resources internal to the Christian faith. As McCormack notes – 
That Barth was not absolutely wedded to his Kantianism, that it was, in the final analysis, 
his christology which determined both his doctrine of revelation and his use of Kantian 
categories in explicating it—the proof of that lies in the fact that his christology could be 
elaborated and defended without resort to Kantianism at all. So however true it may be that, 
from  a  genetic  standpoint,  Barth‘s  Kantianism  played  a  sizable  role  in  helping  him  to 
conceptualize  the  christology  he  finally  advocated,  from  a  systematic  standpoint,  his 
Kantianism could conceivably be revised without serious loss to his christology.113 
                                                       
110 McCormack 1998, 25-6, italics removed. 
111 McCormack 1998, 26-7. 
112 McCormack 1998, 27-31. See also the account of the development of the  Göttingen Dogmatics in chapter 8 of 
McCormack‘s earlier (1995) book on Barth‘s theological development. 
113 McCormack 1998, 33. He then continues: ‗But all of this is to say that the appeal  made by  theologians to 
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McCormack  concludes  his  account  of  the  development  of  Barth‘s  early  theological 
epistemology with the critical question, ‗has Kant really been overcome by means of Kant?‘114 
For both Barth and Schleiermacher the more important methodological question would have 
been whether they had addressed the Kantian problem by means of Christ. Although both would 
have wanted to be able to answer this question affirmatively, only Barth could have done so. For 
Schleiermacher, the answer must be ‗No‘ insofar as the means he employed was not Christ but 
an  independent  philosophical  psychology.  But  neither  overcame  Kant.  As  we  saw, 
Schleiermacher avoided the Kantian problem. The early Barth set forth a realistically conceived 
divine act that transcended the problem without negating it.115 
In the Göttingen Dogmatics Barth deployed a quite traditional Reformed christology to show 
how the Kantian limitation appears from a theological standpoint, and how it relates to, but does 
not limit, divine revelation. The fact that the Kantian account of the epistemological problem is 
not directly challenged or negated supports McCormack‘s suggestion that this formulation is a 
‗correlation‘ of modern epistemological concerns with traditional christology and a ‗mediation‘ 
of  tradition  by  means  of  a  modern  theological  epistemology.116  Granted,  Barth‘s  approach 
privileged  God‘s  self-revelation  in  Jesus  Christ,  unlike  the  many  liberal  correlations  and 
mediations that privilege philosophy over theology. But as Barth himself soon realised, the 
Göttingen formulation was not yet a fully Christian response, in that it did not theologically 
engage the description of the problem before attempting an answer, but accepted the terms of 
the problem as already defined by philosophy.117 
                                                                                                                                                             
not inappropriate from a Barthian perspective.‘ This conclusion would have been more satisfactory had McCormack 
spoken of ‗the use…of philosophy‘ rather than ‗the appeal…to philosophical foundations.‘ Although he speaks of 
Kantianism as the ‗philosophical foundations [Barth] presupposed‘, he also says repeatedly (pp. 32-3) that ‗Barth 
refused to allow his philosophical foundations to become foundational for theology‘. By this refusal, Barth was 
‗denying to them any ultimacy. And because they lack ultimacy, philosophical formulations of the foundations of 
human knowledge must be open-ended and revisable‘ (p. 33). But on this basis it would be better not to speak of 
Barth‘s philosophical ‗foundations‘ at all. That Barth had a philosophy, and that that philosophy was Kantian, seems 
clear. But that philosophy was open-ended and revisable because it was answerable to God‘s self-revelation in Jesus 
Christ. For the same reason, it would have been better to speak of ‗using‘ philosophy than ‗appealing‘ to it. In the 
1920s, Barth found that Kant served well enough in enabling him to say what needed to be said. Indeed, Kant 
continued to serve, as indicated by the headings in CD I.2 (compare §13.1 ‗Jesus Christ the Objective Reality of 
Revelation‘, and §16.1 ‗The Holy Spirit the Subjective Reality of Revelation‘). But Barth did not ‗appeal‘ to Kant. 
114 McCormack 1998, 31, original emphasis. 
115 McCormack 1998, 33, original emphasis. 
116 McCormack (1998, 28) notes that ‗the requirements of Barth‘s theological epistemology controlled to a considerable 
degree  his  appropriation  of  the  classically  Reformed  model  of  christology  even  as  that  christology  forced  him  to 
significantly revise his theological epistemology.‘ When he suggests that ‗Barth might justly be located within the 
Schleiermacherian tradition of ―mediating theology,‖‘ McCormack indicates that this suggestion requires that the term 
‗mediating theology‘ not be treated as ‗largely synonymous with the foundationalist enterprise in theology‘ (p. 34). 
117 In the preface to CD I.1, Barth reflected on the changes made between the ‗first edition‘ (the first volume of a 
projected  Christian  Dogmatics  in  Outline,  published  in  1927,  i.e.,  after  the  Göttingen  Dogmatics,  and  hence 
incorporating further critical development) and the ‗second edition‘ (the new beginning made in CD I.1, published in 
1932). Part of the work of revision involved the exclusion of ‗anything that might appear to find for theology a 
foundation,  support,  or  justification  in  philosophical  existentialism‘.  He  now  saw  in  the  earlier  edition  ‗only  a 
resumption of the line which leads from Schleiermacher by way of Ritschl to Herrmann‘, continuation of which   LINDBECK AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY    136 
4.4.4  Observations on Barth’s Later Theology: The Criterion of Dogmatics 
Later, in his Church Dogmatics, Barth insisted that it is only from and in relation to Jesus 
Christ, and not from any prior knowledge of what reality is apart from him, that we know who 
God is, what time is, what time it now is, who human beings are, what the church is, etc. No 
human question intrinsically deserves an answer in the terms in which it is asked. The important 
questions are those asked of us by Christ, and every question of ours must first be interrogated 
from his standpoint. In this sub-section and the next I discuss two areas of Barth‘s exposition in 
the Church Dogmatics in which his subjection of every thought to Christ‘s Lordship may be 
problematic. I say ‗may be‘ because I cannot here devote to the matter the detailed attention that 
would be required to support stronger conclusions. In any case, my intent is not so much to 
establish critical points against Barth as to shed light on the problems of formulating and using a 
Christian account of particularity. The areas in question concern Barth‘s understanding of the 
relation between christology and ecclesiology as it affects, firstly, his description of the criterion 
of dogmatics in CD I and, secondly, his account of the church in CD IV. 
The understanding of this relation marks the point at which Barth‘s introductory comments in 
CD I diverge from those of Schleiermacher in CF. Let us leave aside for a moment what Barth 
would insist we certainly cannot leave aside (even for a moment), namely, his disagreement 
with Schleiermacher over the relation of prolegomena to dogmatics.118 Barth begins CD I with a 
definition that takes up all of Schleiermacher‘s main concerns: ‗As a theological discipline 
dogmatics is the scientific self-examination of the Christian church with respect to the content 
of its distinctive talk about God‘ (§1, CD I.1 3). Here are Schleiermacher‘s combination of 
ecclesial  and  scientific  interests;  an  indication  that  dogmatics  is  concerned  with  what  the 
church, not anybody else, says about God; an emphasis on the distinctiveness of the church‘s 
God-talk; and an acknowledgment that dogmatics is formulated by the faithful, to the faithful, 
concerning their faith. 
Of course, Barth‘s explanation of this opening thesis is distinctively his own. The church‘s self-
examination,  he  maintains,  consists  in  putting  to  itself  ‗the  question  of  truth,  with  which 
theology is concerned throughout‘ (I.1 4). Knowing the care taken by Schleiermacher to avoid 
straying onto the field of ‗knowledge‘, we might expect this to mark a decisive break. But Barth 
immediately explains that this ‗question of truth…is the question as to the agreement of the 
Church‘s distinctive talk about God with the being of the Church‘. ‗The criterion of…Christian 
utterance is thus the being of the church (das Sein der Kirche)…‘.119 As is clear from CF §17.2, 
Schleiermacher  would  have  little  cause  to  disagree.120  For both Barth and Schleiermacher, 
                                                                                                                                                             
would lead to the destruction of Protestantism (p. xiii). 
118 This is actually no great distortion, since Barth maintains that the assertion of the possibilit y of pre-theological 
prolegomena is nevertheless a dogmatic assertion originating from within ‗Modernistic dogmatics‘ (CD I.1 38). Thus 
Barth should really have no problem with my approach on this point, since I am (I hope) taking the opening theses of 
his CD as they were meant, while treating those of Schleiermacher‘s CF as if they were properly dogmatics. If 
apologies are owed, they are owed to Schleiermacher. 
119 By ‗being‘ Barth means roughly ‗essential nature‘, something like a person‘s ‗self‘. 
120 That is, if what Barth meant by ‗truth‘ was simply the agreement of the church‘s God-talk with the church‘s 
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dogmatics is the church‘s explanation of itself, an explanation conducted by itself, for purposes 
peculiar to itself, and addressed to itself. 
But what is the church‘s ‗self‘? It is in the answers to this question that the crucial break really 
occurs.  Not  unreasonably,  Barth‘s  contention  with Schleiermacher is  often  cast  in  terms  of 
christology versus anthropology, but it is less often remembered that the point of divergence in 
their  respective  prolegomena  is  ecclesiology,  as  Barth  provides  a  christological,  against 
Schleiermacher‘s anthropological, answer to the question of the church‘s identity.121 What is the 
nature of the church, in which, as both agree, theology lives and moves and has its being? For 
Schleiermacher, the church is a religious communion, and the identity of a religious communion 
consists in the shared piety of its members. For Barth, the church‘s being is ‗Jesus Christ, God 
in his gracious revealing and reconciling address to humankind‘ (I.1 4). 
The different answers are buttressed by different structural contexts. Schleiermacher felt that his 
initial definition of dogmatics as a churchly activity immediately required a definition of the 
church, after which he could go on to complete the definition of dogmatics, before venturing into 
the territory of dogmatics itself. The importance of his definition of the church arises from the 
linearity of his argument: first a definition of the church, then a definition of dogmatics, then 
dogmatics itself. By defining ‗churches‘ in general in terms of their members‘ shared piety (both 
‗piety‘ and ‗church‘ being defined without reference to theology) Schleiermacher cleared a space 
within which the Christian church‘s God-talk might be heard as arising from its own peculiar 
piety, in which everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth. For 
Schleiermacher, the being of the church is this piety, and this piety is the criterion of dogmatics. 
Barth, too, acknowledges that everything is related to Jesus Christ, but there is no question of 
circumscribing the extent of these relations in any way, or of describing them without recourse to 
terms such as ‗lordship‘ and ‗service‘. Barth, too, identifies a space within which Christian God-
talk occurs, but this space neither contains nor constrains Jesus Christ, for it is his creation, i.e., it 
is the church, which in its proclamation conveys and represents him to the world he addresses as 
God‘s revealing and reconciling Word. In view of the human vulnerability of that proclamation, 
dogmatics  is  necessary  as a  critical  discipline that,  as  part  of the  church‘s  God-talk,  accepts 
responsibility for seeing that that God-talk conforms with Jesus Christ the Word of God. The 
logical structure here is less linear than circular. Because the Word of God is a self-authenticating 
event, dogmatics can do no other than patiently circle around its witnesses in the expectation of 
hearing it anew. Only in this way can dogmatics hope to continually clarify its talk, including its 
own basic concepts and its talk about the church, according to the Word of God. Thus, for Barth, 
the criterion of dogmatics is not the church‘s piety, but Jesus Christ the Word of God, whose 
address to humankind in the church is the event of his own free and gracious act. 
But isn‘t identification of the church‘s being as the criterion of dogmatics rather more at home 
in Schleiermacher‘s Introduction than in Barth‘s doctrine of the Word of God? For Barth, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the ‗Christian quality‘ is expressed in doctrinal statements (CF §3.5). 
121 That the ecclesiological dimension of the divergence is often overlooked is probably related to the general under-
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criterion of dogmatics is not the church‘s piety but the object of that piety, not the church‘s 
proclamation but the one proclaimed, not even the church‘s confession but the one confessed.122 
Why then does he insist that the dogmatic criterion is ‗the being of the church‘, even if he 
exegetes this phrase by means of the name ‗Jesus Christ‘?123 
Prima facie, Barth makes this assertion in obedience to the witness of Scripture: 
As the Church accepts from Scripture, and with divine authority from Scripture alone, the 
attestation of its own being as the measure of its utterance, it finds itself challenged to know 
itself, and therefore even and precisely in face of this foundation of all Christian utterance 
to ask, with all the seriousness of one who does not yet know, what Christian utterance can 
and should say today (CD I.1 16). 
The strength of this statement amplifies a strange silence: no scriptural warrant is given.124 Since 
Barth merely asserts the existence of a scriptural basis without displaying it, we cannot engage 
his argument on that point. We can, however, observe how ‗the being of the church‘ contributes 
to his dogmatic criteriology. Its function is essentially polemical, in that it serves to identify 
Roman  Catholicism  and  Protestant  Modernism  as  heresies.125  In the face of these heresies, 
Evangelical theology must purify itself in respect of its basis and source of knowledge, which, 
as all three positions agree, is the being of the church ( CD I.1 34-6). Modernism defines the 
being of the church on the basis of a prior independent anthropology.126 Roman Catholicism 
presupposes  ‗that  the  being  of  the  church,  Jesus  Christ,  is  no  longer  the  free  Lord  of  its 
existence,  but…is  incorporated  into  the  existence  of  the  Church,‘  with  the  result  that  ‗the 
personal act of divine address becomes a constantly available relationship‘ (40-1). Against these 
heresies  Barth  insists  that  ‗the  being  of  the  Church  is  actus  purus‘,  i.e.,  a  free  and  self-
                                                       
122 This parallels Barth‘s rejection of anthropological reductions as being precisely reductions of humanity. The 
scriptures, and the Christians that read them, are not trying to say anything about ‗human states‘. They are trying to 
say something about God. To speak only of human states in the face of this clear intention is to fail to take seriously 
the scriptural writers and Christians as human beings that mean to say something. 
123 In his Introduction to CD I Barth provides an initial description of the nature and task of dogmatics (§1) and of 
prolegomena to dogmatics (§2). In these sections ‗the being of the church‘ is frequently mentioned as the dogmatic 
criterion. Barth‘s basic description of the theological task is ‗measuring the Church‘s talk about God by its being as the 
Church‘ (pp. 4, 5, 16, 18, 34, 35). The basic formulation may be amplified by exegeting ‗the being of the church‘ as 
‗Jesus Christ‘ (pp. 4, 6, 12, 15, 17, 32, 41, 42) or as ‗divine revelation‘ (p. 28). Occasionally, the criterion is mentioned 
without reference to the being of the church (e.g., ‗conformity to Christ‘, p. 13; ‗the Word of God‘, pp. 27, 43). 
124 The warrant that eventually appears in CD IV is the subject of the next sub-section. 
125 CD I.1 32: Because in dogmatics ‗we ask about the being of the Church, about Jesus Christ, as the norm of 
Church action‘, we find that the understanding of this presupposition distinguishes between those with whom we can, 
and  those  against  whom  we  must,  pursue  the  dogmatic  task.  ‗We  have  to  state  quite  definitely  that  our  own 
understanding of the being of the Church is in no sense the only one, that alongside it other and quite different 
understandings are also present…. The paradoxical fact to which we refer is that of heresy.‘ 
126 CD I.1 36-40. Compare the earlier comment on p. 6: Rather than criticising and correcting the church‘s God-talk 
‗in the light of the being of the Church, of Jesus Christ as its basis, goal and content‘, non-theological (and especially 
philosophical) accounts ‗always miss the real problem by setting it within the sphere of their own sciences, judging 
the utterance of the Church about God in accordance with alien principles rather than its own principle…. The result 
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originating divine action. As such, it can be understood neither in terms of a constantly available 
creatureliness  (because  it  is  a  divine  act),  nor  in  terms  of  a  constantly  available  divine 
connection with the Church (because it is a divine act). ‗On both sides we can only ask how it 
may be otherwise if the being of the Church is identical with Jesus Christ‘.127 
How  indeed,  if  that  identity  really  holds?  We  have  now  noted  two  important  propositions 
advanced by Barth without argument or evidence that would raise them above the level of 
axioms or assumptions, and thus make of the above question something more than a merely 
hypothetical exercise. Firstly, if the criterion of dogmatics is the being of the church, as all 
parties agree, then the identification of that being has implications for the nature of dogmatics—
but at this stage the premise remains untested.128 Secondly, identification of the church‘s being 
as  Jesus  Christ,  on  the  basis  of  which  Barth  denies  the  Modernist  and  Roman  Catholic 
identifications,  is  also  asserted  without  argument—it,  too,  operates  as  an  untested 
presupposition.  We  will  now  examine  the  role  of  the  first  of  these  propositions  in  Barth‘s 
argument. The role of the second is taken up in the following sub-section. 
Neither  presupposition  is  substantiated  in  the  course  of  Barth‘s  positive  identification  of  the 
criterion of dogmatics (CD I.1 42-4), but then, apart from a brief initial mention of ‗the being of 
the church‘, neither presupposition actually figures in his discussion.129 Rather, emphasising that 
dogmatic prolegomena are always already within dogmatics, Barth takes his point of departure in 
the fact that the church ventures to talk of God. The criterion by which such talk may be rightly 
criticised and corrected can only be the Word of God itself as and when it is spoken by God to the 
church. The concept of the being of the church makes no contribution to this statement. 
In Barth‘s first chapter,130 as he develops his definition of the criterion of dogmatics, the phrase 
‗the being of the church‘ is rare, and when it does appear it serves not to identify or specify the 
dogmatic criterion but to locate it within the life of the church, so as to emphasise that the 
church must not listen to any alien voice as authoritative, but only to the voice of Jesus Christ 
whom it already worships and confesses as Lord, and whose servant it knows itself to be.131 But 
it  is  not  in  virtue  of  being  ‗the  being  of  the  church‘  that  the  dogmatic  criterion  serves  as 
criterion.132 The idea of ‗the being of the church as the criterion of dogmatics‘ strains against 
                                                       
127 CD I.1 41. Barth continues: ‗If this is true, then the place from which the way of dogmatic knowledge is to be 
seen and understood can be neither a prior anthropological possibility nor a subsequent ecclesiastical reality, but only 
the present moment of the speaking and hearing of Jesus Christ Himself, the divine creation of light in our hearts.‘ 
128 We saw above that Barth accepts this presupposition on the basis of scripture. But he asserts the existence of 
scriptural warrant without displaying that warrant, and thus the assertion remains a bare assertion. 
129 The initial passing remark concerns the nature of the dogmatic criterion as actus purus, a nature that depends, not 
on the being of the church as such, but on the nature of Jesus Christ the Word of God. 
130 Chapter I, ‗The Word of God as the Criterion of Dogmatics‘, comprises §§3-7. 
131 This is apparent at §3.2 (CD I.1 72-3). Like all human action, church proclamation is exposed to the question of 
its responsibility. But the church cannot allow itself to be held responsible in terms of anything other than the centre 
of its own life ‗…it is precisely in terms of its origin and basis, of the being of the Church, that church proclamation, 
and with it the Church itself, is assailed and called into question‘. This question is the question of the authenticity of 
the church‘s existence as the church. 
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Barth‘s observation that a dogmatic criterion can act as such only because of its otherness, just 
because it is distinct from the church in its work of proclamation. The critical task of dogmatics 
requires that the church distinguish God‘s Word from its own word, and the concrete form in 
which the church may ‗see the Word of God as an entity distinct from Church proclamation so 
as to compare the latter with it and measure it by it‘ is Holy Scripture (CD I.1 250). The 
criterion of dogmatics, then, is the Word of God in the concrete form of its attestation in the 
Bible,133 and Barth reviews the whole argument on the dogmatic criterion (§7.3, pp. 287 -91) 
without once referring to ‗the being of the Church‘. 
After this, the idea of the church‘s being does not reappear in Barth‘s argument until the final 
chapter of the Doctrine of the Word of God, ‗The Proclamation of the Church‘, where it occurs 
three  times.134  The second occurrence is in a summary statement at the beginning of an 
exposition of ‗The Material Task of Dogmatics‘ (§24.1, CD I.2 844). Having just spoken in §23 
of dogmatics as a function of the hearing church, Barth goes on in §24 to speak of it as a 
function of the teaching church. Because the church hears the Word of God which calls it to 
teach, the Church must be at one and the same time both hearing and teaching. Therefore 
dogmatics has not only a critical and formal task in respect of the norm which is heard, but at 
the same time a material and positive task in respect of the object set forth. But the Word of God 
is both the norm of proclamation and the object proclaimed, and so as dogmatics calls the 
church to hear and to teach, this is not two calls but ‗the one reminder that the Church has its 
being in Jesus Christ‘. Thus, ‗being‘ serves here to unify the recollection that Christ is not only 
the church‘s source and basis but also its telos and purpose. 
                                                                                                                                                             
God did not leave the Church grounded only in itself as the Church: 
The return to its own being on the basis of which alone it may actually venture its proclamation 
does indeed mean for it a return to its own being, but to its self-transcendent being, to Jesus 
Christ as the heavenly Head to whom it, the earthly body, is attached as such, but in relation to 
whom it is also distinct as such, who has the Church within Himself, but whom the Church does 
not have within itself, between whom and it there is no reversible or alternating relation, just as 
the relation between master and servant is not reversible (p. 100). 
That is, the possibility of a criterion exists precisely in that aspect of the church‘s being in which it is differentiated 
from itself, i.e., ‗its self-transcendent being‘, the heavenly head from which the church is distinguished as earthly 
body, the Lord in relation to whom the church is a servant. 
133  According  to  §7,  ‗Dogmatics  is  the  critical  question  about  dogma,  i.e.,  about  the  Word  of  God  in  Church 
proclamation, or, concretely, about the agreement of…Church proclamation…with the revelation attested in Holy 
Scripture‘ (p. 248). The scientificity of dogmatics, its objectivity, consists precisely in its responsiveness to its object: 
the Word of God attested in scripture. 
134 Nor should it have reappeared any earlier. At the conclusion of chapter I Barth indicated that he would expound 
the content of the criterion of dogmatics, namely, the Word of God, in its threefold form. Thus chapter II dealt with 
the Word of God as Godself in self-revelation, chapter III with the Word of God in its attestation in scripture, and 
now chapter IV addresses the Word of God in the church‘s proclamation. The three occurrences of ‗the being of the 
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On either side of this summary, the first case indicates that dogmatics, precisely as the church 
and in solidarity with it, summons the church to hear its own Lord. Speaking for the sake of 
Jesus Christ as Lord of the Church, dogmatics ‗does not demand anything but what from the 
depths of its own being and basis the Church necessarily demands of itself‘ (§23.1, CD I.2 805-
6). In the third case, dogmatics will serve the church‘s teaching by unfolding and presenting the 
Word of God as life-giving gospel. 
The Law which slays can be made effective only on the basis and in the content of the 
Gospel which makes alive. For this reason and in this way dogmatics will be able to speak 
comfortably to the Church itself. Unfolding and presenting the Word of God, it will speak 
to the Church from no other standpoint than the Church‘s own being and essence. It will 
say to it only what it already is and has, because Jesus Christ is already present in it (§24.1, 
CD I.2 852). 
These passages reinforce the impression gained from Barth‘s first chapter: the phrase ‗the being 
of the church‘ serves to locate rather than to specify the criterion of dogmatics. The location of 
the  criterion  has  important  consequences  for  the  way  in  which  the  church  goes  about  the 
dogmatic task as part of its work of proclamation, and for the way in which it receives the fruits 
of that task. Criticism in terms of the criterion of dogmatics can shake the church and must be 
taken with utter seriousness, and advice on the basis of the criterion of dogmatics can build the 
church and can be received joyfully, because that criterion is nothing other than the centre of the 
church‘s life, its basis and its Lord. Yet, as Barth himself argues cogently, the criterion operates 
as such only in its distinction from and transcendence of the church, and without this distinction 
and transcendence it could not be a criterion. 
In summary, Barth offers no scriptural or theological warrant for asserting that the being of the 
church is the dogmatic criterion. Nor does the church‘s being contribute to his specification of 
the criterion‘s content. Rather, the assertion functions entirely as polemic—as a point of contact 
with both Modernist and Roman Catholic dogmatics, it provides a single fulcrum for leveraging 
arguments  against  both.  Despite  the  rhetorical  strength  with  which  Barth  affirmed  the 
assertion‘s biblical foundations, apparently setting it up as the basis for the following argument, 
it has no dogmatic significance for him. His dogmatic criterion is in fact Jesus Christ the Word 
of God, and this identification is the real basis of his critique of Modernist and Roman Catholic 
dogmatics. In substance, if not in rhetoric, the argument is this: if the being of the church is 
taken to be the criterion of dogmatics (as Modernists and Roman Catholics affirm), then that 
being can only be Jesus Christ, the centre of the church‘s life. But in fact the criterion is not the 
church‘s being, but Jesus Christ the Lord, source and goal of the church‘s life. This is the basis 
on which Barth‘s Doctrine of the Word of God (§§3-24) actually proceeds. 
Thus, despite its strong rhetoric, Barth‘s identification of the church‘s being as the dogmatic 
criterion is not the real basis of his argument, but a polemically-motivated distraction of merely 
hypothetical force. Although, as the discussion has indicated, Barth‘s argumentative error had 
little overall effect on his Doctrine of the Word of God, it necessitated another identification—
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4.4.5  Observations on Barth’s Later Theology: The Being of the Church 
Since, for Barth, the real criterion of dogmatics is the Word of God attested in scripture, this is the 
basis on which to question Barth‘s claim that ‗the Church accepts from Scripture, and with divine 
authority from Scripture alone, the attestation of its own being as the measure of its utterance‘.135 
In fact, scripture does not make this attestation. That the church‘s own being is the measure of its 
utterance is very much a theological construction. In terms of materials in Barth‘s dogmatics it 
appears to synthesise two propositions: that Jesus Christ is the criterion of dogmatics, and that 
Jesus Christ is the church‘s being.136 The first of these I accept as biblical and as fully congruent 
with the Christian confession of Christ‘s Lordship. I take issue with the second. 
Is Jesus Christ the church‘s ‗being‘ (Sein)? In a short aside in §67.2 Barth acknowledges the 
axiomatic nature of the starting point adopted in §1.1—‗that the being of Jesus Christ is the 
being of the church‘137—and this is the only place I have found where Barth indicates that his 
initial axiom should not remain an axiom, but must, like all else, answer to the Word of God 
attested  in  scripture.  The  aside  occurs  as  Barth  expounds  the  church  as  Christ‘s  earthly-
historical form of existence, i.e., as Christ‘s body, and it may be (though he does not say so 
directly) that this Pauline image is what he has in mind as scriptural warrant for the assertion 
that the being of the church is Jesus Christ (and hence also the criterion of dogmatics). 
Barth‘s concept of the church as Christ‘s earthly-historical Existenzform operates in a carefully 
structured  context.  Christ‘s  earthly-historical  Existenzform  as  the  church  is  the  earthly 
counterpart to his heavenly-historical Existenzform as Lord of history and Lord of the church 
from the resurrection to his final coming (CD IV.1 661). Between these two direct and definitive 
manifestations  of  the  future  of  humanity  in  Christ,  the  church  exists  as  a  provisional 
representation of all humanity redeemed in his finished work.138 Thus, ecclesiology is an aspect 
of the work of Christ, and Barth‘s core ecclesiological material appears within his three-part 
exposition of Christ‘s finished work in the doctrine of reconciliation. In this exposition, the first 
part, ‗Jesus Christ, the Lord as Servant‘ (§§59-63), treats God‘s judgement of humankind in 
Christ.  The  second  part,  ‗Jesus  Christ,  the  Servant  as  Lord‘  (§§64-68),  speaks  of  God‘s 
conversion of humankind to himself in Christ. The third part, ‗Jesus Christ, the True Witness‘ 
(§§69-73), deals with God‘s calling of humankind in Christ. The three parts correspond to the 
traditional division of Christ‘s work according to his priestly, kingly, and prophetic ministries; 
or to the doctrinal loci of justification, sanctification, and witness. 
                                                       
135 CD I.1 16, and see p. 138 above. 
136 ‗Appears to be‘. But the statement that ‗the criterion of dogmatics is the being of the church‘ cannot be logically 
deduced from these two propositions. This is because in ‗Jesus Christ is the being of the Church‘ Barth does not mean 
‗is‘ in the sense of mathematical identity. The priority is always with Jesus Christ. ‗The being of the community is a 
predicate of his being‘ (CD IV.2 655). The ‗is‘ relation is not reversible. Hence, ‗A is B‘ and ‗A is C‘, taken together, 
do not imply ‗B is C‘. The nature of Barth‘s ‗is‘ makes the question of scriptural attestation even more acute. 
137 Here Barth misquotes the earlier expression at CD I.1 3, which speaks of ‗Jesus Christ‘ rather than ‗the being of 
Jesus Christ‘. The difference appears not to be significant, suggesting that perhaps there is no real difference between 
‗the church‘ and its ‗being‘. Yet Barth‘s argument suggests otherwise. 
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Each of the three parts of Barth‘s doctrine of reconciliation comprises five sections which follow a 
consistent pattern. The first expounds the history of Jesus Christ in relation to the aspect of his 
work being considered. The second section describes the aspect of the human situation specifically 
addressed by the aspect of Christ‘s work just expounded. The third section focuses on the new 
situation of humanity in view of this aspect of Christ‘s finished work and the fourth speaks of the 
Holy Spirit‘s work in the Christian community as a provisional representation of that new human 
situation. The  fifth section  reflects  on the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in the  lives  of  individual 
Christians. Thus, Barth‘s core ecclesiological material appears as the fourth of five sections in 
each of the three parts of his doctrine of reconciliation (§§62, 67, 72). The consistent pattern is that 
the church, as Jesus Christ‘s earthly-historical form of existence, is the provisional representation 
of all humanity definitively and completely justified, sanctified and called in him. 
This pattern first emerges in Barth‘s discussion of ‗The Being of the Community‘ (§62.2) where, 
as  in  his  earlier  critique  of  Protestant  Modernist  and  Roman  Catholic  misconceptions,  he 
maintains that the church cannot be simply identified with its human members. Rather, the church 
is a divine work which occurs among human beings in the form of human activity. The church is 
when  it  takes  place  under  God‘s  grace  that  the  justification,  sanctification  and  calling  of  all 
humanity in Christ is actual among certain human beings (CD IV.1 650-1). As a divine event 
among  human  beings,  the  church  can  be  understood  neither  in  purely  divine  terms  (in  its 
invisibility)  nor  in  purely  human  terms  (in  its  visibility).  Such  one-sided  views  are  equally 
abstractions. Certainly, the church exists in the visible dimensions of space and time, but as a 
divine work it exists also in an invisible third dimension of spiritual reality. The three dimensions 
taken together comprise the church‘s self-understanding and self-confession (652-60). 
My reservation regarding Barth‘s assertion that ‗Jesus Christ is the church‘s being‘ is that, in the 
context  of  his  basic  definition  of  church  as  event,  the  church‘s  ‗being‘  becomes  too  much 
identified with the third dimension of its existence, the so-called ‗invisible‘ dimension visible only 
to  faith.  I  recognise  that  for  Barth  what  faith  perceives  in  the  church  is  not  simply  the 
mathematical sum of its invisible spiritual reality and the spatio-temporal reality apparent to faith 
and non-faith alike, but rather the whole three-dimensional spiritual-spatio-temporal reality of the 
church as ‗the earthly-historical form of existence of Jesus Christ Himself‘ (661). It is not that the 
church‘s spiritual dimension alone is its true being, with the spatio-temporal manifestations as 
mere epiphenomena, but that perception of the church‘s spiritual dimension enables its spatio-
temporal dimensions to be seen in their relation to Jesus Christ. Yet I will argue in this sub-section 
that, despite advocating a fully ‗three-dimensional‘ understanding of the church and criticising 
those who transgress this requirement (652-8), Barth‘s key conceptual tools pull away from this 
goal in a spiritualising or docetic direction. This distortion, like that noted in his treatment of the 
dogmatic criterion, may be attributed to polemical aspects of his argument. 
Consider Barth‘s treatment of the church‘s limitations, especially its sin.139 He is fully aware 
that the church‘s visible history is not only a creaturely history, but a fleshly and fallen history. 
                                                       
139 The importance of the connection between the visibility-invisibility tension and the sinfulness-obedience tension 
is also noted by Kimlyn Bender (2005, 272-77). Bender suggests speaking of the Church as in ‗imperfect and varying 
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It is always sinful history—just as the individual believer is not only a creature but a sinful 
man. Woe to [the church] if what it is is directly identical with what it is as generally 
visible, or if it accepts as its being its concrete historical form, equating itself with it and 
trying to exist in it abstractly! (CD IV.1 657) 
Woe indeed if the church is merely what it is visibly! Yet visibility is as much of the essence of 
the church as its invisible relation to Christ as the centre of God‘s reconciling work. Therefore, I 
suggest that Barth‘s ecclesiological goal may have been better served had he identified the 
church‘s being in terms of another of his programmatic definitions, namely, as a provisional 
representation of all humanity reconciled to God in Jesus Christ.140 After all, as Barth insists, 
this provisional representation is a saving necessity and intrinsic (‗internal and material and 
decisive‘) to the church (CD IV.2 621-2). Surely, then, it belongs to the church‘s ‗being‘. 
But if, as I suggest, the church‘s visibility as a provisional representation of reconciled humanity 
belongs to its essence, what of the sinfulness of the people who are visibly its members? The 
passage quoted above shows that Barth has no illusions in this regard. If the glory of reconciled 
humanity is made manifest, it is in and through such sinners that the representation occurs: ‗The 
glory of the community…can appear only where there appears the glory of Jesus Christ and the 
sinner justified by Him‘ (CD IV.1 658). 
Yet Barth‘s characterisation of church as event and his identification of Jesus Christ as the 
church‘s being strain against the attribution of sin to the church. In Barth‘s basic conception of 
church as event, the church is when it takes place under God‘s grace that the justification, 
sanctification and calling of all humanity in Christ is actual among certain human beings (CD 
IV.1 650-1). But the church which is in this event is the true or real church, the church in its 
being as Jesus Christ. When Barth refers to the church as a sinful church, this is a shorthand way 
of referring to the people in and among whom Church becomes event.141 In Barth‘s definition, 
                                                                                                                                                             
theologically specific about the nature of the imperfection and variation. 
140 Always remembering that the provisional representation ‗never takes place in virtue of the qualities of this people 
itself.  Jesus the  Lord,  in  the  quickening  power  of  His  Holy  Spirit,  is  the  One  who  acts  where  this  provisional 
representation takes place, and therefore where the true Church is an event‘ (CD IV.2 623). I am not yet engaging 
Barth‘s idea of church as event, but suggesting that the idea of provisional representation, so prominent in Barth‘s 
programmatic  ecclesiological  statements,  properly  belongs  to  the  church‘s  being.  Such  an  identification  of  the 
church‘s being might have prevented misunderstandings such as those of Nicholas Healy (1994), who reads Barth as 
having ‗bifurcated‘ the church ‗into two separate entities, the human church and its spiritual counterpart‘, and Joseph 
Mangina (1999, 278), who, concurring with Healy, says that what Barth ‗finds important about the church is not its 
empirical or historical dimensions, but rather its essential identity with Jesus Christ‘. In their defence, passages in 
which Barth explicitly denies such views (e.g., CD IV.3.2 726-8) may be followed by talk of the church‘s being as 
invisible, or of the church‘s ‗invisible essence‘, or by an assertion that ‗what it is invisibly is its being by grace and 
not by nature‘ (CD IV.3.2 728-9). Healy (2004, 295 n13) has since reconsidered his criticisms, though without 
providing details of how his views have changed. 
141 E.g., see CD IV.2 622-3. Much of my difficulty with Barth‘s ecclesiology lies in the tension between church-as-
people and church-as-event. Consider Barth‘s insistence on the intrinsic visibility of the church as Christ‘s body at 
CD I.2 219-20. The context here concerns ‗The Holy Spirit the Subjective Reality of Revelation‘ (§16.1). As the 
work of the Holy Spirit, the Church is ‗the area by which the subjective reality of revelation is invariably enveloped‘, 
and as such it is ‗the reality of God‘s revelation for us‘ (221). Barth insists that in and through Christ the church has 
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the church is not so much sinners justified, sanctified and called in Christ, i.e., people set in 
relation to Christ, as the event of relation between Christ and people. For him, insofar as the 
people are sinful, they are not really, but only apparently, the church.142 
Building on my suggestion that the church‘s being be understood as a provisional representation 
of  humanity  reconciled  to  God  in  Christ,  I  now  suggest  that  the  church‘s  sinfulness  be 
understood  as  an  aspect  of  the  provisionality  of  that  representation.143  If the church is a 
provisional representation in this sense, then its relation to Christ will include judgement as well 
as blessing. If the household of God is judged on account of its sin, then, in that sin and that 
judgement, it is still the household of God. (But if it rejected the judgement, that would be 
another matter.) A church conceived along these lines may better represent th e theological 
concreteness of the church in the Bible.144 
These reservations and briefly -outlined  suggestions  concerning  Barth‘s  identification  of  the 
‗being of the Church‘ should not be taken as indicating that I think Barth‘s ecclesiology is 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Him and through Him there is also its bodily life, without which it could not be a gathering of 
real [human beings] and the permanent setting of witness to Him amid human history. In Him 
and through Him the Church is the wholly concrete area of the subjective reality of revelation. 
Within this area the justification and sanctification of [humans] may become an event (CD I.2 
220). 
I  find  two  definitions  of  church  at  work  here:  church  as  the  event  of  (the  provisional  representation  of)  the 
justification and sanctification of human beings in Christ; and church as the area of reality (or gathering of human 
beings) within which this event takes place. Of these, church as event is clearly more basic in CD. 
142 The eschatological aspect is important as well. For Barth, the church as event is the true church, and an event in 
which it is only the apparent church is not  the event of the church. The true church, in its occurrence, has a future, 
namely, its telos in Christ. Its sinful alter ego has no future (or rather, its only future is that already revealed in the 
cross) and will pass away. 
143  Here  I  am  doing  considerable   violence  to  Barth‘s  formulation.  For  Barth,  the  church‘s  representation  is 
provisional  for  the  same  reason  that  Jesus  Christ‘s  own  work  was  provisional:  it  takes  place  prior  to  its  final 
fulfilment at Christ‘s return. Thus the present time of the church is the time ‗between the provisional and transitory 
and particular revelation of [the world‘s] reconciliation with God in Jesus Christ and the perfect and definitive and 
universal  revelation  of  it  in  His  final  coming‘  (CD  IV.1  734).  But  although  the  representation  is  provisional, 
nevertheless ‗it is a true and effective, genuine and invincible representation of the elevation and establishment of all 
men as it has been fulfilled in the exaltation of the man Jesus, and therefore of the divine work of sanctification in its 
totality‘ (CD IV.2 622). So also in the case of the church, where the provisional representation takes place in the form 
of human action: the provisionality of the representation is due not to its form, but to its location in time. 
144 The best-known NT passage is probably 1 Peter 4:17 which speaks of judgement beginning with the household of 
God, reflecting a number of prophetic references to judgement falling first, or especially, on God‘s people (Mal 3:1-5, 
Jer 25:29, Ezek 9:6, Isa 10:12, Zech 13:7-9, Amos 3:2). Of course, significant hurdles remain, even after careful 
biblical exegesis. The church‘s spatio-temporal reality in fallen creatureliness and its organic reality as Christ‘s body 
must be worked out in relation to each other and in their eschatological relation to Christ‘s first and second comings. 
The fact that Christ came in the form of our sinful flesh (Rom 8:3, see Barth‘s comments at CD I.2 147-59) would 
also be relevant. I am not sure whether the attribution of sin to the church necessarily leads away from Barth‘s 
conception of church as event. It may be that human personhood is itself better understood as event (Schleiermacher, 
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seriously wrong. On the contrary, I would be quite dissatisfied with my suggestions if it turned 
out  that  they  could  not  accommodate  many  of  the  results  of  Barth‘s  exposition,  including 
especially the church‘s existence on a continual knife-edge of possibility: the continually open 
decision concerning its obedience or disobedience to the Word of God, and hence its agreement 
with or contradiction of its calling. The main effect of my suggestions would be to reconfigure 
some aspects of the exposition: firstly, by acknowledging in the basic formulation what Barth 
clearly  acknowledges  in  the  details,  namely,  that  the  particularity  of  Christians  as  God‘s 
creatures is not subsumed in the particularity of Jesus Christ, but is given its true and rightful 
form as particularity-in-relation to him; and secondly, by acknowledging not only the possibility 
but also the reality of disobedience within the church‘s being. 
As in the earlier case of the dogmatic criterion, the distortion I see in Barth‘s ecclesiology may 
be over-reaction against the distortions of others. Barth opposes views of the church that assume 
its continuing visible existence to be its true reality (Modernist Protestantism), or that suppose 
its true reality to be enduringly bound to its continuing visible existence (Roman Catholicism). 
The  former  misses  the  church‘s  theological  reality,  and  the  latter  mistakes  it.  Against 
sociological  accounts  like  Schleiermacher‘s,  Barth  may  have  over-emphasised  the  spiritual 
reality. Against continually available essence, as in Roman Catholic accounts of the church, 
Barth insisted that the church‘s being was actus purus, divine event, and therefore not at our 
disposal. He rightly says that the church perceived without its third dimension is not the church 
of which the New Testament speaks. But, in opposing both Roman Catholicism and Modernist 
Protestantism,  I  think  he  tended  to  say  what  he  himself  did  not  believe,  namely,  that  the 
theological reality is (simply) the invisible reality. 
4.4.6  Reflections on a Christian View of Particularity 
As indicated when introducing my observations on Barth‘s particularism, my concern is less 
with  Barth‘s  theology  as  such  than  with  describing  a  particularity  appropriate  to  Christian 
theology. In this regard four points emerge from the foregoing discussion. 
Firstly, a Christian theology, i.e., a theology that stands with the church in confessing ‗Jesus is 
Lord‘, cannot be content to answer a question from the standpoint of Jesus‘ Lordship without 
engaging from that standpoint the terms in which the question is asked. Theology‘s discontent 
with giving ‗straight answers‘ follows from its recognition of two facts intrinsic to its situation. 
Most basically, Jesus‘ Lordship means inter alia that the extent to which an assertion can be 
acknowledged as true is limited by the extent to which the assertion can be located in relation to 
Jesus, i.e., under and within his Lordship. Further, a theological anthropology answerable to the 
scriptures that attest Jesus‘ Lordship includes the understanding that every question presupposes 
answers  to  other  questions.  Therefore,  since  Christian  theology  accepts  Jesus  as  Lord  and 
therefore as criterion, it will satisfy itself, so far as it can, that it is not implicitly assuming the 
truth of assertions formulated without reference to him. 
Secondly, as a limited and vulnerable human activity theology takes place as an ongoing argument 
over the meaning of following Jesus.145 That is, theology necessarily has a polemical aspect. The 
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polemical context in which theology develops has its positive side as a provocation for the venture 
of faithful theological construction, but it also necessarily creates opportunities for the intrusion of 
untested assertions, as real disagreement on an issue implies agreement on the terms in which the 
issue is stated.146 We saw this in the case of the clear and direct contrast between Barth, Roman 
Catholicism and Modernist Protestantism over the criterion of dogmatics. Barth agreed with his 
opponents that the criterion of dogmatics was the church‘s own being, though his own basis for 
this statement was a scriptural attestation which he did not display. However, even if Barth was 
wrong in this (as I maintain), the error had little effect on his doctrine of the Word, since the 
church‘s being played no role in explicating the criterion‘s content.147 
Thirdly, in a situation where one‘s perception of theological reality indicates that truth lies in 
balancing several aspects under which a particular presents itself, reaction to the polemical 
context  may  lead  to  an  unbalanced  description.148  I  believe  this  is  the  situation  in  Barth‘s 
ecclesiology. In his critical comments and programmatic prescriptions Barth insisted on a three-
dimensional  account  of  the  church  (spatio-temporal-spiritual):  the  Christian  community  ‗is 
totally  and  properly  both  visible  and  invisible‘.  But  his  polemic  against  Modernist 
Protestantism, especially, contributed to an under-emphasis on the church‘s humanity. 
Lastly,  particularity  itself  can  be  a  temptation.  If  a  certain  particular  is  fundamental,  as  the 
confession ‗Jesus is Lord‘ implies, we must be careful not to presuppose how it is so. In the 
inevitable circularity of the confessional situation, we must hear from the Word of God itself the 
manner in which it is the ground of everything else.149 Although Barth would most likely agree 
with that statement, it identifies one of the difficulties in his identification of Jesus Christ as the 
church‘s being. As an illustration, consider the following passage in CD II, ‗The Doctrine of God‘. 
Anthropological  and  ecclesiological  assertions  arise  only  as  they  are  borrowed  from 
Christology. That is to say, no anthropological or ecclesiological assertion is true in itself 
and as such. Its truth subsists in the assertion of Christology, or rather in the reality of Jesus 
Christ alone (CD II.1 149). 
Against the idea that an assertion can be ‗true in itself and as such‘, Barth insists that ‗its truth 
subsists…in the reality of Jesus Christ alone‘. But does the truth of that assertion also subsist in 
the  reality  of  Jesus  Christ  alone,  i.e.,  is  it  received  from  the  Word  of  God  as  attested  in 
scripture? Some of Barth‘s formulations, such as this one, suggest the subsumption of all truth 
                                                       
146 This point is not in the least diluted by the fact that Barth‘s disagreement with Modernist Protestantism and 
Roman Catholicism in CD is, inevitably, his construction of the disagreement. Their constructions of it may well 
differ from his. My point is that construction of a relation as a genuine disagreement implies some single specific 
construction of what the disagreement is about. 
147 That is, although in my view the idea that the church‘s being is the criterion of dogmatics is an alien intrusion, and 
although I find this idea clearly stated in Barth‘s introduction, I do not find that his argument in CD I is seriously 
compromised by it. This is because, in §§3-7, he moved away from this idea, specifying the dogmatic criterion as the 
Word of God attested in scripture, a criterion always already present in the church. 
148 ‗Balanced‘ here does not mean ‗equally balanced‘ but ‗appropriately balanced according to the Word of God 
attested in scripture‘. Barth was well aware of the danger of polemical over-reaction, and pleads guilty in his own 
case over his early exposition of God as ‗wholly other‘ vis-à-vis man (1960, 42). 
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into ‗the reality of Jesus Christ alone‘, as if God were already all in all (1 Cor 15:28), or as if the 
perspective of God‘s eternal decree or that of the final consummation were already available to 
us. But here, too, Barth‘s rhetoric is shaped by polemic (the ‗anthropological and ecclesiological 
assertions‘  he  has  in  mind  are  those  of  Modernist  Protestantism  and  Roman  Catholicism 
respectively). The thrust of his exposition may have been better served by a formulation that 
was at once more biblical, more relational, and better attuned to our eschatological situation. 
Since Jesus Christ is the one through whom and for whom all things were created, and since 
created things, though inconceivable without him, are nevertheless presently distinct from him, we 
should say rather that the truth of anything subsists in its God-given reality in its God-given 
relation to Godself. What is God-given in the present eschatological situation is that truth subsists 
in the relation of all things to the present Lordship of Jesus Christ. Hence, the truth of an assertion 
subsists neither in and of itself nor ‗in the reality of Jesus Christ alone‘, but in its capacity to 
acknowledge that Jesus‘ name is above every name, i.e., in the extent to which it can join with the 
church, in advance of all creation, in swearing fealty to Jesus and confessing him Lord, to the 
glory of God the Father (Phil 2:11). Such a formulation both reflects the manner and content of 
Barth‘s exposition, and is consistent with a faithful assertion of Christian particularity. 
4.5  LINDBECK AS MODERN THEOLOGIAN 
I  have  already  compared  and  contrasted  Lindbeck‘s  postliberal  prescription  with  the 
methodological  aspects  of  Schleiermacher‘s  theology.150  Lindbeck  and  Schleiermacher  both 
stand against the universalising rationalism of the Enlightenment as represented in classic liberal 
theology, and both pursue the self-contradictory strategy of securing theology‘s integrity and 
independence by means of the very rationality that threatens it. Seeing this as a blind alley, I 
have  critically  surveyed  certain  aspects  of  Barth‘s  theology  so  as  to  highlight  some  of  the 
consequences  and  difficulties  of  abandoning  the  self-contradiction  of  Lindbeck‘s  and 
Schleiermacher‘s particularism for the circularity of a consistently confessional particularism. 
This concluding section of the chapter compares and contrasts Lindbeck‘s approach with that of 
Barth (while not entirely forgetting Schleiermacher). The main point of contact, and hence the 
most important disagreement, lies in their accounts of the particularity of Christian theology as 
knowledge. Along the way, we will be able to evaluate the not uncommon characterisation of 
Lindbeck‘s stance as ‗Barthian‘. 
4.5.1  The Independence of Christian Theology as Knowledge 
The story of modern theology can be told as a story of encounter between two traditions of human 
knowing: modernity and Christianity. Modernity pursued knowledge through ‗philosophy‘, i.e., 
the  unconstrained  critical  inquiry  of  the  sciences.  Christianity  pursued  knowledge  through 
theology, i.e., the seeking of understanding in and through faith. Philosophy took as its slogan 
‗Dare to know!‘ and told itself the story of autonomous reason. Theology knew a story in which 
the daring of pure knowledge was mere presumption, and the prospect of autonomous reason the 
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oldest of temptations.151 That is, it always had the resources to understand autonomous reason as 
both seduction and sedition, though it was not always inclined to draw upon them.  
Against an autonomous reason that claims universal validity and threatens to dissolve all 
particularities (and especially religious ones) into itself, Schleiermacher, Barth and Lindbeck all 
assert that Christian theology as knowledge of God subsists in and follows from faith in Jesus 
Christ. In order to make this assertion Schleiermacher denied that Christian theology was 
knowledge at all, from a philosop hical viewpoint, in that its object of inquiry lay in the 
subjective  consciousness,  while  the  objects  into  which  philosophy  inquired  were  those 
perceived by the objective consciousness. That is, he could allow that Christian theology was 
knowledge only in  the sense that it was knowledge of the content of the peculiarly Christian 
feeling of absolute dependence in which everything is related to Jesus Christ as Redeemer. 
Thus, as the scientific clarification of Christianity‘s descriptions of its own piety, theology had 
nothing to do with philosophy, and could coexist with it quite well on this basis. 
Barth rejected the idea that anthropology, sociology or psychology could be allowed to define 
theology‘s object. God is not an object like any other object of human inquiry. If God has in fact 
spoken, then we must reckon with the fact that it is God who has spoken. That is, God‘s speech 
itself must be the basis of human response to the divine word, and theology can only be the 
responsible description of the content of that word.152 Thus, for Barth, Christianity is nothing if 
not the confession of Jesus Christ as Word of God; and apart from that Word and that 
confession, Christianity and its theology are nothing. Hence, Christian theology is knowledge as 
much as anything is knowledge (if not more so), but it is knowledge of an object unlike any 
other, namely, the Word of God. 
We have seen that Lindbeck shares with Schleiermacher the view that Christianity is a member 
of that class of entities known as religions, each of  which is particular to itself, and they both 
seek a general understanding of religious particularity on the basis of social anthropology. But 
Lindbeck differs from Schleiermacher in maintaining that religion is concerned with knowledge, 
and is not distinguished from other human behaviours and discourses by its relation to the 
human psyche. Rather, religion is distinctive in its comprehensiveness—it offers an ultimate 
framework, a way of viewing all of reality. Christian religious knowledge is distinctive because 
its  comprehensive  categorial  framework  is  drawn  from  a  distinctive  source:  the  Christian 
scriptures. The Christian view of reality is the biblical view, the Christian world the biblical 
                                                       
151 The most obvious texts to appeal to here are the final speeches in Job, and the temptation story in Gen 3. 
152 Barth strongly emphasises the event of God‘s word as fact. Only in the light of this fact can we say anything about 
the conditions under which it is possible. Only knowledge of the reality of the Word of God enables knowledge of the 
conditions of its possibility. Conversely, if God has not spoken, then no human possibilities are of any avail, and our 
idea of God can only be an idol, a mere projection of the human psyche. That is, Feuerbach was right, if God has not 
spoken. Apart from one fact, the situation really is how Feuerbach describes it. But that fact, the fact that God has 
spoken,  is  crucial.  See  CD  I.1  343;  I.2  6,  41-2,  290.  Of  course,  the  fact  of  God‘s  speech  does  not  invalidate 
Feuerbach‘s insight that the organ and essence (Organ und Wesen) of religion is imagination. Christian theology 
accepts the vulnerability of its own imagination as it seeks to ground that imagination in the fact of God‘s speech. 
Garrett Green offers a helpful treatment of Feuerbach and of Barth‘s positive appropriation of him (Green 2000, 83-
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world.  Thus,  in  their  different  ways,  Lindbeck  and  Barth  both  maintain  that  theology  is 
concerned with knowledge. They also agree that theology is not distinctive in its manner of 
knowing, though they assert that generally accepted notions of epistemology and the nature of 
knowledge are often inadequate, and that a conceptuality that allows us to treat theological 
knowledge as being properly knowledge (and not only in some conceded or attenuated sense) 
will also be more adequate as an account of knowledge in general.153 
Schleiermacher, Barth and Lindbeck all want to maint ain theology‘s independence, but they 
have quite different ways of doing so. Schleiermacher grounded theology‘s independence in a 
philosophical distinction between knowing and feeling in the human psyche, so that, for him, 
theology was not knowledge in the strict (i.e., philosophical) sense. For Barth, theology as 
human God-talk could be ‗independent‘ only in a relative and vulnerable way, and yet such 
independence as it had was grounded in the absolute independence of revelation. Since God has 
spoken, theology as responsible human God-talk is ventured in obedience to God‘s talk, and 
where it is not thus obedient, neither is it independent. For Lindbeck, theology is the explication 
of  knowledge  framed  by  the  Christian  cultural-linguistic  system,  and  therefore  develops 
independently  of  discourses  that  do  not  share  its  ultimate  frame  of  reference.  So  then,  for 
Schleiermacher theology is independent of knowledge discourses because its object of inquiry is 
not an object of knowledge, while for Barth and Lindbeck theology is a knowledge discourse, 
though it is independent of other such discourses in view of its distinct object. 
4.5.2  The Idea of Particularity in Christian Theology 
Lindbeck‘s  idea  of  a  cultural-linguistic  system  comes  from  his  understanding  of  social 
anthropology. As such it is avowedly ‗pre-theological‘, like Schleiermacher‘s Introduction, and 
therefore  both  untenable  from  a  confessional  viewpoint  and  incoherent  as  an  account  of 
particularity.154 In their outworking, if not in their intent, Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory 
and  Schleiermacher‘s  philosophical  psychology  operate  as  attempts  to  secure  theology‘s 
freedom before embarking on theology, as if to say, ‗This is our freedom, and in this freedom 
we will know the truth‘. In terms of the logic of particularity, and the logic of serving the living 
God, this is not freedom, but captivity renamed. 
However, as we saw in Barth, while acknowledgement of particularity may offer the possibility of 
coherence,  and  even  the  possibility  of  truth,  it  does  not  render  the  idea  of  particularity 
unproblematic. Although this idea may help us to recognise and resist the myths of autonomous 
reason, it is, after all, another idea, and as such it may do multiple service: it may help us deal with 
reality; it may seduce us into comfortable worlds of our own making; it may tempt us to betray our 
proper allegiance; it may do any or all of these together. But whatever else it may do, the idea of 
human particularity, as a human idea, necessarily includes itself within its own purview, and so 
cannot remain a prior idea. Not particularity, but Jesus Christ, is Lord in the Christian confession. 
That is, particularity, too, is answerable to Christ and must find its truth in relation to him. It is 
clear, then, that while Lindbeck defends the integrity of Christian confession, and may to that 
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extent  be  called  a  ‗confessional  theologian‘,  the  means  by  which  he  does  so  are  those  of 
Schleiermacher rather than Barth. Therefore, to describe Lindbeck as ‗Barthian‘ is misleading. 
Those who do so should recall that Schleiermacher, too, saw himself as a confessional theologian. 
Confession  of  Jesus  Christ  as  Lord  is  not  only  a  confession  of  personal  allegiance  but  an 
acknowledgement of truth. He is not only our lord by virtue of being our redeemer, he is Lord 
absolutely by virtue of his resurrection and exaltation. As such he sets us in relation to himself 
as Lord and in relation to the world with which and in which he has graced us. In this situation, 
Christian theology is the activity in which the Christian community questions itself concerning 
the faithfulness, truth and vitality of its confession of Christ. In its primary concern with truth, 
dogmatic theological reflection proceeds by relating existing concepts to Jesus Christ, and this 
encounter will have an impact on both sides of the relation. On the one hand, in view of the 
Christian confession of Christ‘s Lordship, the concepts employed should not go unchallenged or 
remain  unaltered  in  the  encounter.  On  the  other  hand,  in  view  of  the  vulnerability  of  that 
confession, we should not imagine that our idea of Jesus Christ will somehow remain self-
identical and unchanged. If this is the case even in relation to our idea of Jesus Christ, it is also 
the  case  in  relation  to  our  ideas  of  particularity,  whether  we  have  in  mind  the  historical 
particularities of the incarnation of the Word of God and the original witnesses thereto, the 
particularities of later generations that received, interpreted and handed on the Christian faith, or 
our own particularities as we receive and interpret these witnesses and venture to speak of the 
Word of God in our own places and times. 
In chapter 2 above we noted that the first part of Lindbeck‘s argument sought to dismiss liberal 
theology from the field of serious ecumenical engagement over doctrine. In chapter 3 we saw 
that while this argument may work against older liberal theologies of the experiential-expressive 
type, its success against hermeneutically-aware contemporary liberal theologies is doubtful. In 
the present chapter, this mixed achievement has been overshadowed by a strong theological and 
philosophical  case  that  any  understanding  of  Christian  particularity,  whether  originating  in 
contemporary  liberal  theologies  or  in  Lindbeck‘s  ‗postliberal‘  proposal,  can  be  received  in 
Christian theology only to the extent that it contributes to theology‘s service of its Lord, Jesus 
Christ. I argued that a ‗non-theological‘ understanding of particularity (or of anything else) 
implies a limitation of Christ‘s Lordship and hence a qualification of allegiance to Christ and of 
Christian identity. That is, liberal and postliberal approaches are similarly mistaken to the extent 
that they adopt, import or ‗make available‘ to theology any anthropological, hermeneutical, or 
other theory without critically engaging it from the standpoint of the gospel. Just to the same 
extent, they show themselves to be joint heirs of F. D. E. Schleiermacher. 
But if Lindbeck‘s account of Christian particularity, like those of Schleiermacher and of some 
liberal theologians, cannot succeed as Christian theology, that does not mean that he is wrong 
about the comprehensiveness of religious claims, nor does it mean that the rest of his proposal 
may  be  simply  discarded.  Granted,  Christian  theology  requires,  and  in  fact  offers,  its  own 
accounts of Christian particularity and of human particularity in general, and therefore cannot 
agree with the bases on which Schleiermacher and Lindbeck sought to provide it with such 
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have faith, and with Lindbeck that the biblical witness to Christ implies a truly comprehensive 
world-view.  That  is,  while  Lindbeck‘s  externally-based  account  of  comprehensiveness 
contradicts  the  comprehensiveness  he  claims  for  Christianity,  this  contradiction  need  not 
necessarily invalidate his account of the internal elucidation of Christian identity. The next two 
chapters seek an ‗inside‘ account of Christian identity, firstly in Lindbeck‘s theory of doctrine, 
and  then  in  conversation  with  others  who,  in  their  different  ways,  agree  with  him  that 
Christianity must drink from its own wells. 153 
5 
 
LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE, 
ITS RIVAL, AND ITS PROBLEMS 
If Christianity must drink from its own wells, what does this mean, how is that drinking done, and 
how should it be done? This is the question addressed in the fourth and fifth chapters of ND. In 
laying out his answers, Lindbeck now engages those who fully accept their position within the 
Christian confession and understand theology as proceeding only on that basis. In the previous 
two chapters the vague term ‗liberal‘ referred to diverse theologies in which the mode of argument 
implicitly limits Christ‘s Lordship and allows only a qualified allegiance to him. Now another 
vague term, ‗conservative‘, will denote another diverse range of theologies, namely, those in 
which Christ‘s Lordship is claimed to be determinative for all aspects of theological construction.1 
Conservative responses to  ND  have  been  both  like  and  unlike  liberal  ones.  Like  liberal 
theologians, conservatives quickly recognised that Lindbeck had them in mind in one of his 
descriptions of unsatisfactory theories of religion. At the same time they insisted that, however 
valid Lindbeck‘s critique might have been in relation to theologies that match his description of 
‗propositionalism‘, his assumption that propositionalist understandings of doctrine relied on a 
crude realism was invalid. Like liberals, conservatives generally felt that Lindbeck‘s criticism of 
them was simplistic and misdirected. 
However, unlike liberal respondents, conservatives have enthusiastically supported Lindbeck‘s 
critique of his other opponent and welcomed his emphasis on the Bible as the semiotic lexicon of 
the Christian community, while expressing concern over his apparently relaxed attitude towards 
the relations between scripture, doctrine and reality.2 That these themes are only faintly echoed in 
liberal responses reflects the different tensions between the respondents‘ underlying commitments 
and Lindbeck‘s understanding of religious knowledge as being properly knowledge and hence, 
unavoidably, both particular and indirect.3 Liberal theology generally agreed with Lindbeck that 
religious knowledge was particular and indirect, but distinguished it from the proper knowledge 
by means of which that particularity and indirectness could be overco me. Conservatives agree 
with Lindbeck that religious knowledge is properly knowledge, and they embrace its particularity. 
                                                       
1 I emphasise that I use these labels because they seem to me to be reasonably appropriate to the distinction I am making 
between various theologies‘ attitudes to particularity. This attitude is, of course, merely one aspect of a theology, and 
there is much more to any theology than its ‗conservative‘ or ‗liberal‘ disposition. While these labels can be used 
dismissively as a way of avoiding engagement, I hope it is clear that I am using them precisely to facilitate engagement. 
2 See for example Olson 1996, McGrath 1996, and Callahan 1997. Questions about truth were by no means entirely 
lacking in liberal reviews, e.g., see Tracy 1985a. 
3 There are also other contributing factors. For example, that conservatives have applauded Lindbeck‘s attack on 
liberal  theology  while  liberals  have  largely  ignored  Lindbeck‘s criticism  of  conservatives  may  be  partly  due  to 
liberalism‘s tendency to be dismissive of conservative theology and conservative theology‘s tendency to define itself 
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Hence they welcome an argument that helps to unmask and disarm liberal scholarship‘s striving 
for universality and objectivity. But the indirectness and equivocality of truth claims in Lindbeck‘s 
cultural-linguistic  theory  seem  to  them  to  undermine  the  idea  that  biblical  affirmations  and 
biblically-based doctrinal affirmations are straightforwardly ‗true‘. 
This  chapter, then,  engages  Lindbeck‘s  view  of the  nature  of truth, and  how  scripture  and 
doctrine deal with or convey truth. The theoretical basis of this view is given in the ‗Excursus 
on Religion and Truth‘ examined in chapter 2 above.4 I begin by placing this material in the 
context of the overall argument in ND, reviewing its content in the light of a later clarification, 
and summarising the ‗rule theory‘ of doctrine Lindbeck presents in his fourth chapter. The 
second  section  studies  Lindbeck‘s  fifth  chapter,  in  which  he  argues  that  his  rule  theory  is 
superior to propositionalist accounts of doctrine. The discussion highlights some philosophical 
problems in Lindbeck‘s theory, and notes that the propositionalism with which he engages is a 
simple one that knows nothing of its own historical relativity. The third section takes up the 
philosophical  issues  noted  in  section  two,  addressing  in  particular  Lindbeck‘s  use  of 
Wittgenstein and his attachment to the possibility of doctrinal constancy. The problems and 
possibilities of a historicising propositionalism are left to the following chapter. 
5.1  DOCTRINE AS THE PATTERN OF TRUTH 
The  conclusion  of  the  third  chapter  of  ND  marks  the  end  of  the  first  part  of  Lindbeck‘s 
argument, and opens the way to the second. To this point he has described the problem of 
interest, briefly stated three alternative approaches to it, dismissed one of those from further 
consideration, and, in the Excursus, set out the theoretical basis on which his presentation of the 
nature of doctrine will proceed. Thus, in a way, the entire first half of ND is an introduction 
which clears the way for the real substance of the argument: Lindbeck‘s epistemological schema 
and his view of scripture and doctrine in their relation to truth. Only now can real engagement 
begin, an engagement with those who believe that doctrines deal in truth, and therefore that 
doctrinal disagreement and doctrinal development should not be explained away, but really 
explained. Only now do we come to the heart of the matter, as we directly engage the question 
that  motivated  Lindbeck‘s  inquiry:  if  doctrinal  reconciliation  can  occur  without  doctrinal 
change, what then is the nature of doctrine?5 
5.1.1  The Nature of Truth 
The epistemological principles that lie at the heart of Lindbeck‘s proposal are introduced in his 
discussion  of  ‗unsurpassability‘  in  the  third  chapter of  ND,6  developed in more detail in the 
Excursus at the end of that chapter,7 and deployed in the theorisation of doctrine in the second 
                                                       
4 See pp. 37-43 above. It may be helpful to review that section before continuing with this chapter. In what follows I 
will generally refer to the relevant part of ND as ‗the Excursus‘. 
5 Compare Bruce Marshall‘s (2009, xxiii) similar view of the relation between the two halves of ND. 
6 At ND 48-52, Lindbeck proposes that an ‗unsurpassably true‘ religion is one in which the conceptual categories 
maximally enable the making of true religious assertions. See pp. 30-33 above. 
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section of the fourth chapter (ND 79-84). Although these principles have been vigorously debated, 
Lindbeck has not felt obliged to modify his views in the light of the discussion. Since 1984 it has 
been his practice, when referring to matters touching on theories of religion and doctrine, to refer 
the reader to ND for an account of the position he is assuming in his current work.8 As far as I am 
aware, Lindbeck‘s only acknowledgment of any need for qualification appears in his grateful 
response to Bruce Marshall‘s sympathetic parallel exegesis of ND and Aquinas on the question of 
truth, and the qualification involved is less a correction than a clarification.9 
The  clarification  concerns  the  nature  of  truth  (what  Lindbeck  calls  ‗alethiology‘10)  and 
especially  the  terms  ‗intrasystematic  truth‘  and  ‗categorial  truth‘.  Earlier,  we  saw  that 
‗categorial truth‘ concerns the appropriateness of the conceptual categories in terms of which 
propositions  may  be  formulated.11  True categories are categories that correspond to reality. 
Lindbeck is aware of the problems of assessing the extent of such correspondence, but he is 
primarily concerned with drawing to our attention the fact that the truth value of a proposition 
depends upon the truth value of the categories in terms of which it is expressed, and of the tacit 
assumptions, and especially the formative and performative contexts, that contribute to its sense. 
Marshall  pointed out,  and  Lindbeck  accepted,  that using  the  word ‗truth‘ in these  terms  is 
potentially misleading. For Lindbeck, categories do not affirm or assert anything, and so are not 
properly considered ‗true‘ or ‗false‘. They merely create or frustrate the possibility of stating 
ontological  truth  or  falsehood.  Moreover,  acceptance  of  a  proposition  as  being,  from  some 
particular point of view, ‗true‘, means, in the first instance, that it coheres with other beliefs 
already  held  by  those  who  share  that  point  of  view.  But  it  does  not,  without  considerably 
expanding the scope of justification, adequately evaluate the ‗truth‘ of the point of view from 
which coherence is being assessed. Therefore, rather than speaking of ‗categorial truth‘ and 
                                                       
8 See Lindbeck 1987, 176 n4; 1988, 6 n2; 1993, 100 n1; 1996b, 145 n4 = 1996a, 222 n2 (p. 294-5); 1997, 423 n2 (p. 
448-9). 
9 See Marshall 1989, and Lindbeck‘s reply (Lindbeck 1989b). The only other reference I have found to any change of 
mind on Lindbeck‘s part is in an article by Mike Higton (1997, 94), who claims that Lindbeck ‗has acknowledged 
that his  treatment  of  truth  claims was seriously  confused‘.  Unfortunately,  Higton does not  cite any  evidence  in 
support of this claim. If it is meant to reflect a reading of the articles by Marshall and Lindbeck to which I refer, then 
the allegation of ‗serious confusion‘ is overstated. Lindbeck‘s response to Marshall is certainly not an admission of 
conceptual confusion. Rather, Lindbeck (1989b, 406) welcomes Marshall as one who ‗has explained the view of truth 
which I had in mind better than I explained it myself‘. Lindbeck and Marshall both see Marshall‘s article as clarifying 
some of the language in Lindbeck‘s proposal rather than offering any substantive modification of the proposal itself. 
The  confusion  they  are  prepared  to  acknowledge  is  that of  readers who  may  have  been  misled  or  confused  by 
Lindbeck‘s less than clear terminology. 
10 Strictly, epistemology concerns theories of the justification of knowledge. Lindbeck‘s proposals in relation to truth 
have at least as much to do with the nature of truth as with the nature of the justification of statements as true, a point 
emphasised by Marshall (1989, 354-5) and acknowledged by Lindbeck in his response (1989b, 403-4). Lindbeck (in loc) 
distinguishes epistemology in the strict sense from ‗alethiology‘, the study of the nature of truth, and goes on to note that 
these are, ‗at least in some contexts, partially independent variables. There is no one-to-one relation between different 
meanings or theories of truth and the various views as to how we know such and such is true.‘ I will generally use 
‗epistemology‘ to refer to both ‗variables‘ unless the argument requires that they be distinguished. Postliberal concern 
with the ‗structure of knowledge‘ is noted by Lints 1993, 664-5. 
11 See above, pp. 30 and 38.   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    156 
‗intrasystematic  truth‘,  it  would  be  more  appropriate  to  speak  of  categorial  adequacy  and 
intrasystematic coherence as criteria relevant to the evaluation of the (ontological) truth status 
of propositions. Lindbeck‘s alethiology may then be re-expressed as follows: 
An intrasystematically coherent proposition will be (ontologically) true only to the extent that 
the system within which it is affirmed is categorially adequate. To the extent that a system‘s 
categories are inadequate, propositions affirmed within that system are neither true nor false 
but meaningless. Thus, individually, categorial adequacy and intrasystematic coherence are 
each  necessary  but  insufficient  conditions  for  truth.  Together,  categorial  adequacy  and 
intrasystematic coherence are the necessary and sufficient conditions for (ontological) truth.12 
With  this  clarification,  the  basic  principles  of  Lindbeck‘s  epistemological  schema  may  be 
summarised as follows: (a) categorial adequacy and intrasystematic coherence, taken together, are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a statement; (b) the relevant context with 
respect to which the intrasystematic coherence of religious utterances should be assessed is not 
only other such utterances, but the entire religion as a way of life, ‗a total pattern of speaking, 
thinking, feeling and acting‘ (ND 64); and (c) propositions are not merely words, but intentional 
acts of affirmation, expressed in particular contexts and using particular conceptual categories. 
Earlier, in dialogue with Delwin Brown, I criticised Lindbeck‘s view of religions as static unitary 
meaning-systems,13 so we can expect that his alethiology will be similarly vulnerable to the extent 
that it presupposes static categorial systems. This matter is addressed in this chapter‘s last section, 
which explores the viability, sources and consequences of Lindbeck‘s attachment to stasis. Here, 
having heard Lindbeck on the nature of truth, we turn to his account of the nature of doctrine. 
5.1.2  Doctrine as Grammar: Lindbeck’s Rule Theory 
The crux of Lindbeck‘s theory of doctrine is the role of doctrine within his epistemological 
schema, which in turn clarifies one aspect of the cultural-linguistic theory of religion. According 
to this theory, a religion is – 
a comprehensive interpretive medium or categorial framework within which one has certain 
kinds of experiences and makes certain kinds of affirmations. In the case of Christianity, 
the framework is supplied by the biblical narratives interrelated in certain specified ways 
(e.g., by Christ as center). (ND 80) 
A  religion‘s  categorial  framework  thus  comprises  content  and  pattern,  or,  by  analogy  with 
language, vocabulary and grammar. ‗The vocabulary of symbols, concepts, rites, injunctions 
and stories is in part highly variable, even though there is a relatively fixed core of lexical 
                                                       
12 This is my adaptation of ND 64-5 and Marshall 1989, 365-6. Despite Marshall‘s Trinity and Truth (2000) having 
its genesis in his reading of draft chapters of ND, and although it mentions ND in several contexts, it does not engage 
Lindbeck  on  the  nature  of  truth.  At  the  outset,  Marshall  notes  Lindbeck‘s  ‗correct  and  important  claims‘  that 
Christians ‗have their own ways of thinking about truth‘, and have more options than either servitude to, or isolation 
from,  other  epistemic  discourses.  Given  such  acknowledgement,  it  is  strange  that,  without  further  comment  or 
engagement, ‗little of Lindbeck‘s own idiom for making these claims remains‘ in Marshall‘s work (op. cit. xi). 
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elements‘.14 The lexical core is essentially the canonical scriptures, though in practice some 
parts are omitted or emphasised, and the lexical status of postbiblical confessions is disputed. A 
religion‘s grammar, the interrelations or patterns in which its vocabulary may be combined, is 
reflected in its doctrines. In essence, the linguistic analogy identifies scripture as the lexicon, 
and doctrine as the grammar, of the Christian religion. Together, these comprise ‗the abiding 
and doctrinally significant aspect‘ of Christianity (ND 80). 
Doctrine conceived as grammar exhibits several characteristics that facilitate theorisation of 
ecumenical  doctrinal  agreement:  it  is  constant  rather  than  variable,  it  eludes  complete 
specification,  and it  refers  to  language  rather  than extra-linguistic reality.  If  doctrine  is the 
unchanging grammar (and scripture the unchanging vocabulary) of Christianity, then what are 
commonly perceived as doctrinal changes are really changes in first-order truth claims arising 
from the application of the Christian interpretive scheme to  the shifting worlds that human 
beings inhabit.15 Similarly, the variability of religious experience is seen as ‗a function of the 
interaction of changing selves in changing circumstances with the selfsame story‘ (ND 83). 
Another metaphor Lindbeck employs to emphasise the constancy of the interpretive scheme is 
that of the lens. Religions are ‗the lenses through which human beings see and respond to their 
changing worlds.‘ The world may vary enormously while the lens remains the same. These 
powerful metaphors not only carry the burden of the argument at this point; they also indicate 
that there is nothing unique or supernatural about the constancy Lindbeck postulates for the 
Christian interpretive scheme: ‗This is simply the kind of stability that languages, religions, and 
to a lesser extent cultures, observably have‘.16 The basic grammars of cultures, languages, and 
religions remain, while the products (such as propositions and experiences) change. 
But constancy by itself does not imply availability. ‗Even more than the grammar in grammar 
books, church doctrine is an inevitably imperfect and often misleading guide to the fundamental 
interconnections within a religion‘ (ND 81). This is because the primary thing is the language 
itself, rather than the grammar abstracted from it. Grammarians and theologians will not be 
aware  of  all  the  exceptions  to  every  formulated  rule.  Some  rules  may  reflect  transient  or 
superficial features lacking deep roots in the language, and ‗the deep grammar of the language 
                                                       
14 ND 81. Compare this list with the variety of material Delwin Brown included in ‗canon‘. Lindbeck acknowledges a 
similar diversity of identity-forming materials, but, unlike Brown, he is acutely aware that it is a structured diversity. 
Indeed, his whole argument concerns this structure, the name of which is doctrine. 
15 ‗Theological and religious transformations that lead to relativistic denials of an abiding identity (when one assumes 
constancy must be propositional, or symbolic, or experiential) can be seen, if one adopts rule theory, as the fusion of 
a self-identical story with the new worlds within which it is told and retold‘ (ND 83). 
16 ND 83. I still cannot read this statement of Lindbeck‘s without a sense of amazement. Although the field of 
language study to which he had access was less permeated by cultural and literary theory than it is today, there was 
certainly an awareness of the history of languages, and not only among specialists in language and philology. Did 
Lindbeck never use an etymological dictionary? However, there is little to be gained from contesting this patently 
erroneous statement, since Lindbeck is deploying culture and language as explanatory metaphors. He does not say 
that the constancy of cultures and languages implies that of religions. The former merely provide a useful parallel, 
and if they did not, the constancy of the lens might have been sufficient illustration. The question of the source of 
Lindbeck‘s commitment to the possibility of doctrinal constancy is examined later in this chapter (see section 5.3.2 
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may  escape  detection‘  (82).  For all  these reasons,  there  will  be  occasions  when  competent 
speakers  will  know  that  a  usage  is  right  or  wrong  in  spite  of,  rather  than  because  of,  the 
specified  rules.  For  the  same  reasons,  the  competence  of  such  speakers  can  only  be 
acknowledged rather than defined (81-2). 
Consistent with their grammatical character, doctrines as such, i.e., in their function as norms of 
communal belief or practice, are not religious affirmations but rules according to which such 
affirmations may be made. Of course, as rules, doctrines are also propositions, but they are 
propositions about how religious affirmations work—they affirm nothing about the objects of 
such  affirmations;17  and the same sentences in which rules are stated may also be used 
propositionally or expressively. However, doctrines qua doctrines are second-order propositions 
about the formulation of first-order propositions.18 In terms of Lindbeck‘s alethiology, doctrines 
have a purely intrasystematic function. They reflect the exploration of a religion‘s interpretive 
framework, not the exploration of the world by means of that framework (ND 80, 84). 
These three features—constancy, incomplete availability, and strictly ‗second-order‘ function—
provide the combination of continuity and flexibility Lindbeck requires. He can accommodate 
Roman Catholic claims for the permanence of church doctrines. Apparently divergent positions 
may be reconciled by uncovering the invariant framework applied in different circumstances. 
Doctrinal development is viewed as the partial and piecemeal specification of the unchanging 
grammar of the gospel. The abstraction of rules from the circumstantial formulations in which 
they are instantiated means that the ‗truth‘ of doctrines is not erroneously identified with the 
‗truth‘ of the intellectual and social contexts that informed their construction. 
Having presented his theory of doctrine in non-theological terms in the fourth chapter of ND, in 
the fifth chapter Lindbeck turns to theological evaluation. Here, the question is whether, in 
relation  to  specific  doctrine-theoretical  problems,  his  regulative  approach  can  show  itself 
superior to a propositional one (experiential-expressive approaches being already discounted). 
5.2  LINDBECK‘S ENGAGEMENT WITH ‗PROPOSITIONALISM‘ 
This section offers a close reading of Lindbeck‘s major engagement with propositional views of 
doctrine (ND chapter five), an engagement in which the main lines of argument elaborate hints 
given  in  earlier  comments  on  propositionalism.  Since  the  earlier  comments  raise  important 
questions concerning the nature of the propositionalism engaged in Lindbeck‘s later argument, 
and the means by which he conducts that engagement, the first sub-section below collects and 
interprets the relevant comments so as to set the scene for the succeeding sub-sections that 
follow Lindbeck‘s argument in detail. 
                                                       
17 ‗The rules formulated by the linguist or the logician…express propositional convictions about how language or 
thought actually work. These are, however, second-order rather than first-order propositions and affirm nothing about 
extra-linguistic or extra-human reality‘ (ND 80). 
18 On the first-order/second-order distinction, see pp. 40-42 above.   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    159 
5.2.1  Propositionalism and the ‘Third Approach’ 
As noted earlier, among the alternatives to his own proposal Lindbeck initially identified not 
only the two main candidates, but also other approaches in which he saw modified or hybrid 
forms of the first two.19 While his response to such approaches made little or no contribution to 
his argument with experiential-expressivism, his reasoning at that point anticipated an important 
feature of the later engagement with propositionalism, and thus will repay further attention. 
When Lindbeck divides ‗the currently most familiar theological theories of religion and doctrine‘ 
into three types, the ‗third approach‘, after the cognitive and experiential-expressive views with 
which we are now familiar, is one that finds both these approaches religiously significant and 
valid, and tries to combine them (ND 16). Lindbeck allows that such ‗two-dimensional outlooks‘ 
have been influential, but he finds little reason to give them separate consideration: ‗like many 
hybrids, this outlook has advantages over one-dimensional alternatives, but for our purposes it will 
generally be subsumed under the earlier approaches‘ (ND 16). 
Despite repeatedly acknowledging its advantages,20 Lindbeck does not treat this outlook as a 
genuine third alternative, for two reasons. Firstly, approaches of this type have difficulty in 
coherently combining propositional and experiential-expressive perspectives without resorting to 
‗complicated intellectual gymnastics‘. The resulting explanations of the phenomena of ecumenical 
doctrinal agreement ‗tend to be too awkward and complex to be easily intelligible or convincing.‘ 
Secondly,  these  approaches  are  ‗weak  in  criteria  for  determining  when  a  given  doctrinal 
development is consistent with the sources of the faith‘, and hence rely on the magisterium for 
such decisions to a greater extent than many Catholics, and all Protestants, find desirable (ND 17). 
In essence, Lindbeck finds these approaches too complex and tendentious, with complexity 
being the greater flaw. He concludes that ‗there would be less skepticism about ecumenical 
claims  if  it  were  possible  to  find  an  alternative  approach  that  made  the  intertwining  of 
variability and invariability in matters of faith easier to understand‘ (ND 17). 
Thus, Lindbeck‘s comments on the apparently comprehensive accounts of doctrine offered by 
Rahner and Lonergan are more concerned with form than substance. He finds them lacking in 
purity. They are ‗hybrids‘, neither one thing nor another, and do not really offer anything that is 
not already present for refutation in their simpler relatives.21 Since they lack simplicity they are 
neither aesthetically pleasing nor ‗easily intelligible‘, in contrast to Lindbeck‘s own offering. A 
                                                       
19 See p. 20 above. 
20 E.g., ‗theories of the third type…are equipped to account more fully than can the first two types for both variable 
and  invariable aspects  of  religious traditions‘ (ND  17)  and  ‗two-dimensional  views are  superior  for  ecumenical 
purposes  in  that  they  do  not  a  priori  exclude  doctrinal  reconciliation  without  capitulation  as  do  simple 
propositionalism and simple symbolism‘ (ibid.). 
21  Near the end of his first chapter, Lindbeck observe s  that  the  ‗major  current  alternative  to  one-dimensional 
experiential-expressive views of doctrine is provided by Roman Catholics such as Rahner and Lonergan‘ (ND 24). 
This  turn  of  phrase  flags  Lindbeck‘s  opinion  that  the  ‗hybrid‘  does  not  equally  combine  the  cognitive  and 
experiential-expressive  emphases,  but  rather  seeks  to  find  room  for  cognitive  doctrinal  affirmations  within  an 
experiential-expressive framework. That is, it is less an even-handedly ‗two-dimensional approach‘ than a ‗two-
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substantive issue (ecumenical non-neutrality) is mentioned, but the emphasis lies on the formal 
aspects. Lindbeck‘s preference for clear and distinct ideas, rather than complexity and difficulty, 
will emerge as an important theme in his main engagement with propositionalism. 
If,  in  the  first  half  of  ND,  Lindbeck  treats  Rahner  and  Lonergan  as  relatively  enlightened 
experiential-expressivists, he does not ignore the propositional strand in their theologies. Indeed, 
his appreciation of this aspect of their work is such that they also appear in the second half of 
ND as representatives of historicised propositionalism, which is identified as the most viable 
contemporary alternative to Lindbeck‘s own proposal.22 This is the other guise in which a ‗third 
approach‘ appears in Lindbeck‘s text. 
Acknowledgment of the existence of a more sophisticated propositionalism comes relatively 
late in ND. Even near the end of his introduction to ‗Doctrines and their Problems‘ in chapter 4 
(ND  78),  the  propositionalism  Lindbeck  describes  is  the  same  simple  propositionalism 
introduced  in  his  first  chapter  and  referred  to  as  ‗cognitivism‘  or  ‗propositionalism‘.  Here, 
however, he begins to use a qualifying adjective, as in his summarised critical assessment of 
‗traditional  propositional  notions  of  authoritative  teaching‘  (78).  This  makes  the  following 
reference to ‗modified propositional‘ theories of doctrine (79) a little less sudden, but it is the 
first indication in ND that not only experiential-expressivism, but propositionalism too, might 
exist in more and less worthy formulations. 
At this point Lindbeck is leading up to the account of ‗doctrine as grammar‘ summarised above. 
He  indicates  that  the  argument  will  concern  the  abilities  of  various  theories  of  doctrine  to 
explain how doctrines ‗can be both firm and flexible, both abiding and adaptable‘ (ND 79). On 
this question, the field of possibilities comprises just two protagonists. Lindbeck‘s own cultural-
linguistic  proposal,  with  its  regulative  theory  of  doctrine  is,  of  course,  included.  We  have 
already  seen  (and  Lindbeck  repeats  here)  that  experiential-expressivism  is  excluded.  The 
rigidities of traditional propositionalism (‗once true, wholly true, always true‘) not only render it 
incapable  of  providing  an  adequate  account  of  both  continuity  and  change  in  doctrine,  but 
‗contributed to discrediting the whole doctrinal enterprise‘ (ND 78). Hence, for Lindbeck, the 
only theories that can rival his own as explanations of the phenomena of doctrine are ‗modified 
propositional‘ ones. He also refers to these as ‗modern‘ (ND 80), ‗contemporary‘ (ND 104) and 
‗historicized‘ (ND 105), of which I will generally use the last, since, for Lindbeck, the crucial 
modification of these theories is precisely their historical awareness. 
When introducing his rule theory, Lindbeck describes ‗some modern forms of propositionalism‘ 
that seek to overcome the defects of ‗classical‘ propositionalism – 
                                                       
22 Lindbeck‘s economy with opponents may have contributed to two shortcomings in his argument. Firstly, some of 
his criticisms of Rahner and Lonergan as propositionalists apply rather to the experiential-expressive aspect of their 
positions,  as  will  be  noted  later.  Secondly,  other  significant  alternatives  have  been  overlooked.  In  particular, 
Lindbeck never addresses propositionalists who entirely eschew experiential-expressive views while including among 
their propositions the implication of all propositions in human finitude and frailty.   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    161 
by  distinguishing  between  what  a  doctrine  affirms  ontologically  and  the  diverse 
conceptualities or formulations in which the affirmation can be expressed. They thus allow 
for the possibility that doctrines have both unchanging and changing aspects (ND 80). 
Lindbeck does not, at this stage, compare such theories with his own regulative theory. Rather, the 
remainder of chapter 4 explores the possibility of treating doctrines as rules, proceeding by way of 
an exposition of the double metaphor of ‗religion as language, doctrine as grammar‘ (Section II, 
80-4), and a discussion of the ways in which a regulative theory can account for the phenomena of 
doctrinal change, firstly in practical (ethical) doctrines and then in theological dogmas (Section III, 
85-7). Much of the fifth chapter is taken up with the application of rule theory to ‗the hard 
cases‘—the unconditionality of the Trinitarian and Christological creeds, the irreversibility of 
Marian dogma, and the infallibility of the church‘s teaching office. Only then, near the end of his 
fifth chapter, does Lindbeck argue that his rule theory is superior to its remaining rival. 
It is while discussing the test cases, and not before, that Lindbeck begins to critically compare rule 
theory  with  historicised  propositionalism.  Since,  by  this  point,  both  of  Lindbeck‘s  original 
opponents—not only experiential-expressivism but also ‗traditional propositionalism‘—have been 
excluded from consideration, the precise identity of the new protagonist is of considerable interest. 
We will keep this question in mind as we follow the argument of Lindbeck‘s fifth chapter. 
5.2.2  Rule Theory and Historicised Propositionalism: Three Test Cases 
In his test cases, Lindbeck‘s main concern is not with comparisons, but with showing how a rule 
theory of doctrine works. However, such comparative comments as he offers in the course of 
this discussion are relevant to the arguments he employs in the last section of the chapter, where 
comparison with propositionalism becomes the focus of attention.23 
In his treatment of the unconditionality of the Nicene creed ( ND 92-6), Lindbeck remarks that, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  propositional  theories  share  with  the  regulative  theory  an  ability 
lacking  in  experiential-expressive  theories—the  ability  to  separate  form  from  content.  The 
problem for experiential-expressive theories is that 
form, when taken in conjunction with context, is inseparable from content (i.e., experience) 
in the case of nondiscursive symbols, with the result that when the form or context alters, so 
does the content or substance of the symbol (or of the doctrine insofar as it is construed as a 
symbol). Thus…those who argue that calling God ‗he‘ or ‗she‘ changes the very substance 
of the doctrine are quite right from some experiential-expressive perspectives.24 
                                                       
23 The following survey of Lindbeck‘s test case discussion should not be treated as a balanced summary, since it 
seeks out the comparative aspects and to that extent does not reflect the main concern of Lindbeck‘s text. 
24 ND 93. In the same place, Lindbeck also cites the case of those who attack the classical doctrine of the incarnation as a 
picture of God descending and taking on human flesh. ‗They sometimes object to the hierarchical and authoritarian 
attitudes  which  they  think  this  myth  evokes and  reinforces.  One  reply  to  this objection  is  that  context  also  helps 
determine the evocative import of a symbol. The myth of the incarnation may function in some cultural or psychological 
settings to strengthen the self-respect of the downtrodden and oppressed, rather than, as happens in other contexts, to 
legitimate the condescension of superiors.‘ Lindbeck‘s argument regarding the ‗separability‘ of form and content in non-
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In contrast to this, it is self-evident that both first-order and second-order propositions (e.g., 
rules)  are  separable  from  the  forms  in  which  they  are  articulated.  One  and  the  same 
proposition  can  be  expressed  in  a  variety  of  sentences  employing  a  variety  of 
conceptualities (ND 93). 
Perhaps the ‗self-evidence‘ of this assertion is debatable, but Lindbeck intends only a practical 
judgement, not a mathematical proof, of the equivalence of different forms (and hence of the 
separability of form and content). Acknowledging the impossibility of separating content from 
form  as  such  (content  without  any  form  is  simply  nonexistent),  he  observes  that  relative 
independence between particular contents and particular forms may be demonstrated by restating 
those contents in another form that is judged to be equivalent.25 But although propositional and 
regulative accounts of doctrine both allow for it, such a restatement is ‗easier to do if the doctrines 
are taken as expressing second-order guidelines for Christian discourse rather than first-order 
affirmations about the inner being of God or of Jesus Christ‘ (94). This is the sole comparative 
comment in this section of Lindbeck‘s text, and it is completely devoid of supporting argument. 
The remainder of the section discusses and illustrates a regulative approach to the Nicene creed.26 
Lindbeck  finds  it  ‗beyond  the  scope  of  this  essay  to  examine  the  historical  evidence  for  a 
regulative rather than propositional interpretation of the origins of the ancient creeds‘ (94). 
Lindbeck‘s discussion of the Marian dogmas (ND 96-8) focuses on the capacity of rule theory to 
accommodate irreversibility as well as reversibility in relation to these doctrines. The doctrines of 
Mary‘s immaculate conception and bodily assumption reflect the grammar of a faith that affirms 
Mary‘s sinlessness. Their emergence can be viewed as the application of ‗permanently essential 
rules‘ in the context of particular views of sin and human freedom. That is, the rules underlying 
the Marian dogmas are permanent but conditional: affirmations should be considered reversible 
when they draw on rules (e.g., concerning sin and human freedom) that appear to be temporary. 
In this discussion Lindbeck is concerned with the flexibility and neutrality of rule theory. The 
theory itself does not prejudge the issues, and is therefore ‗available‘ to assist debate. Yet, since 
one finds propositionalists aplenty both supporting and denying the doctrines of immaculate 
conception and bodily assumption, propositionalism would appear to be equally flexible and 
‗neutral‘. But Lindbeck does not make this point, and indeed does not mention propositionalism 
at all in this context. 
Turning to the doctrine of infallibility (ND 98-104), Lindbeck notes that it has more to do with 
the nature of the church than with the nature of doctrine. 
                                                       
25 ND 93. Presumably, equivalence will be judged by those fully conversant with the various forms and contents 
involved. The crucial question of competent or authorised judgement is taken up in Lindbeck‘s consideration of the 
church‘s teaching office (infallibility). See p. 164 below. 
26 The particular illustrations are (1) Athanasius‘ dictum that whatever is said of the Father is said of the Son, except 
that the Son is not the Father; and (2) three rules that Lindbeck believes were operative during the four centuries of 
Trinitarian and Christological development. He concludes that ‗these creeds can be understood by Christian and non-
Christian alike as paradigmatically instantiating doctrinal rules that have been abidingly important from the beginning 
in forming mainstream Christian identity‘ (ND 95). But this remains at the level of possibility. There is no normative 
argument  here,  nor  indeed  anything  that  could  function  as  a  criterion  for  preferring  a  regulative  theory  to  an 
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It is not doctrines but the doctrinal decisions of a community or of teachers within the 
community  which are said to be infallible. Doctrines, in contrast, are not infallible but 
‗irreformable‘ (though not in the sense that the formulations cannot be changed, but in the 
sense that they were correct in their original contexts and thus always hold whenever the 
contexts are in relevant respects sufficiently similar) (ND 98). 
He  also  notes  contemporary  Roman  Catholic  views  to  the  effect  that  infallibility  means 
immunity ‗not from every conceivable defect (for this is true only of God), but from a particular 
kind of defect. Infallibility…is immunity from ultimately serious error, an error that divides the 
church definitively from Jesus Christ.‘27 Lindbeck finds a regulative presentation of this view of 
infallibility to be relatively straightforward: 
Doctrinal  definitions  are  thought  of  as  comparable  to  grammatical  decisions  about  the 
correctness  or  incorrectness  of  particular  usages.  They  need  not  involve  any  grand 
generalizations about the structure of a religion‘s language, much less about ontological 
realities. To affirm infallibility is simply to claim that the church and/or its magisterium 
does not mortally violate the grammar of the faith in its solemn decisions on particular 
issues that are essential to the church‘s identity or welfare (ND 98). 
Here at last Lindbeck provides some warrant for his assertion that a regulative view of doctrine 
is superior to a propositional one. Admittedly, he does not explicitly mention propositionalism, 
but apparently has it in mind as a view that makes ‗grand generalizations about…ontological 
realities‘. It seems that a regulative interpretation has the advantage of a greater economy of 
assumptions: it refrains from generalising about the structure of a religion‘s language or its 
ontology. It is difficult to take this ‗advantage‘ with any seriousness. Lindbeck explains ‗the 
grammar of the faith‘ in terms of his rule theory (and cultural-linguistic theory) according to 
which, in view of its grammatical function, doctrine as such does not refer to extra-linguistic 
reality. But the cultural-linguistic theory is, precisely, a grand generalisation about the nature 
and structure of religious language, and the rule theory is, precisely, a grand generalisation 
about the relation between doctrine and ontological realities. Perhaps these generalisations are 
less ‗grand‘ than those made under propositionalism, but there is no argument to this effect. 
Another advantage Lindbeck attributes to a regulative formulation of the doctrine of infallibility 
is  that it  enables  the  doctrine to  be  given  a  ‗partly  empirical‘  meaning,  in  that  it  suggests 
explanations  for  how  the  Holy  Spirit  operates  to  preserve  the  church  from  error.  Thus 
‗regulative versions of the doctrine cannot as easily be accused of vacuity as propositional 
ones‘.28 Lindbeck supports this assertion with an account of the empirical dimension of the 
regulative understanding of the doctrine of infallibility. 
                                                       
27 ND 98. Lindbeck cites Rahner as an example. Hans Küng‘s view of infallibility as ‗indefectibility‘ is similar. 
28 ND 99. The ‗thus‘ is an interpolation. Lindbeck himself does not supply a connective here, but I think it is clear 
that he sees the relative non-vacuity of regulative versions of infallibility as following from or being a corollary of the 
empirical dimension of the regulative formulation. Lindbeck also notes that ‗non-Roman Catholic Christians need not 
entirely dissent from infallibility when it is thus understood (although the attribution by Vatican I of an infallibility 
not derived from the consent of the church [non ex consensu ecclesiae] to papal definitions may be irreconcilable 
with what they could accept)‘ (original brackets and italics). However, it seems to me (and Lindbeck‘s parenthetic   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    164 
The empirical meaning given to infallibility under a rule theory of doctrine (but not, apparently, 
under a propositional theory) arises from consideration of the question noted earlier in relation 
to the Nicene creed: who are the competent judges of the meaning of the faith?29 Lindbeck‘s 
answer to this question relies on a grammatical interpretation of the concept of the consensus 
fidelium or consensus ecclesiae. 
Just  as  the  contemporary  linguist  tests  technical  grammatical  formulations  by  seeing 
whether their ordinary-language consequences are acceptable or unacceptable to competent 
speakers  of  the  language  being  investigated,  so  the  student  of  a  religion  submits  the 
consequences of doctrinal formulations to the judgement of competent practitioners of that 
religion: ‗Are they offensive to pious ears?‘ to quote a familiar adage (ND 99). 
As Lindbeck immediately notes, there are special difficulties in applying such a procedure to 
pluralistic religions such as Christianity. ‗Who are the competent practitioners? Who have the 
pious ears? Are they Arians or Athanasians, Catholics or Protestants, the masses of conventional 
churchgoers or an elite of saints or theologians?‘ The identification of competent practitioners 
would seem to be rather more difficult in religions viewed as cultural-linguistic systems than is 
the case in natural languages, but Lindbeck notes several tests that may be employed in trying to 
answer this admittedly difficult question. 
Firstly, the investigator will wish to draw upon as wide a consensus as possible, and to that end 
can reasonably refer ‗to tradition, to magisterial pronouncements (as voices of the tradition and 
of  consensus),  and  to  the  canonical  writings‘.  These  criteria  will  allow  delimitation  of  the 
mainstream of the religion in question (ND 99-100). 
But, secondly, membership in the mainstream is no guarantee of competence. ‗Most Christians 
through most of Christian history have spoken their own official tongue very poorly. It has not 
become a native language, the primary medium in which they think, feel, act, and dream.‘ 
Linguistic competence is to be sought among those who display an interest in communicating 
widely. In other words, they must be ‗what in the first centuries was meant by ―catholic‖ or 
―orthodox‖, and what we now generally call ―ecumenical‖‗ (ND 100). 
Thirdly,  their  competence  ‗must  to  some  extent  be  empirically  recognizable.‘  Like  native 
speakers of natural languages, they will not be tied to fixed formulae but will be able to use their 
religious vocabulary with grammatical deftness, both faithfully and flexibly. 
One might, perhaps, call them flexibly devout: they have so interiorized the grammar of their 
religion that they are reliable judges, not directly of the doctrinal formulations (for these may 
be too technical for them to understand), but of the acceptability or unacceptability of the 
consequences of these formulations in ordinary religious life and language (ND 100). 
Lindbeck acknowledges that the application of these tests and the verification of consensus may 
present  insuperable  difficulties,  yet  ‗a  kind  of  unshakable  empirical  certitude  is  theoretically 
                                                                                                                                                             
comment also indicates) that greater ecumenical acceptance is more likely to be related to his ecclesial understanding 
of the doctrine than to his grammatical reconstruction of it. 
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available and asymptotically approachable‘ by this means. Indeed, we are already familiar with 
this kind of certitude: ‗common knowledge‘ of mechanics, gravitation, astronomy, and so on, rests 
on the consensus of those acknowledged as competent in these areas. So with religious doctrines: 
They also, given a cultural-linguistic approach, are matters of empirical knowledge. They 
can be infallibly known as ‗Christian‘, as ‗intrasystematically‘ even if not ‗ontologically‘ 
true.  (The  latter  kind  of  certainty  is  of  a  logically  different  kind,  for  it  is  faith  in  the 
Christian message, not knowledge about it.)30 
Such is the ‗empirical dimension‘ of a regulative understanding of infallibility. Does it support his 
assertion that ‗regulative versions of the doctrine [of infallibility] cannot as easily be accused of 
vacuity  as  propositional  ones‘?31  It  seems  reasonable  to  claim  that,  since  even  in  its  more 
moderate formulations the doctrine of infallibility concerns the divine preservation of the church 
in its relation to Jesus Christ (as in Rahner and Küng), Lindbeck‘s separation of the doctrine from 
ontological realities operates precisely to empty it of meaning.32 Moreover, Lindbeck has not 
indicated what exactly he means by the (relative) vacuity of propositional versions of the doctrine 
of infallibility. If he has in mind a ‗traditional‘ propositionalism that ignores the finitude and 
fallenness of those proposing the propositions, then such a view is indeed vacuous insofar as it 
ignores the proposers‘ humanity. But if he means to refer to an historically aware propositionalism 
that knows its own vulnerability, then it must be objected that he has not provided any indication 
that such a view cannot also take into account the empirical dimension he describes. The ideas that 
a regulative understanding of infallibility is less vacuous than a propositional one, and that an 
‗empirical approach‘ to consensus supports this assertion, appear, on this analysis, to be vacuous. 
Among possible objections to Lindbeck‘s account of infallibility, the one that has aroused most 
concern  among  the  propositionally  inclined  concerns  the  adequacy  of  the  certitude  that 
Lindbeck  claims  for  doctrine.  Lindbeck  himself  sums  up  this  objection:  ‗Do  not  believers 
depend on the infallible testimony of the Holy Spirit, or of Scripture, or of the magisterium, 
rather than on an empirically based confidence that the consensus fidelium cannot mortally err?‘ 
(ND 101). But for Lindbeck this objection is misguided, in that it depends for its cogency on a 
mixture of misunderstanding, modernist prejudice and theological error. The misunderstanding 
is a failure to appreciate the significance of the distinction between intrasystematic consistency 
and ontological truth. The proper question in relation to infallibility is not the apologetic or 
ontological question ‗Is Christianity true?‘ but the exegetical or grammatical question ‗What is 
Christian?‘.  An  answer  to  the  first  requires  ‗what  is  now  fashionably  called  existential 
commitment and what was traditionally termed supernatural faith‘. The modernist prejudice is 
the  Cartesian  presumption  that  only  complete  certainty  will  do  in  the  quest  to  overcome 
                                                       
30 ND 101. The distinction here between (on the one hand) what is known to be ‗Christian‘, and (on the other hand) 
what  is  known  to  be,  parallels  Schleiermacher‘s  distinction  between  doctrine  as  description  of  Christian  self-
consciousness and knowledge as description of what is objectively the case. 
31 ND 99. See also on p. 163 above. 
32 It is worth noting that even Lindbeck‘s grammatical formulation of the doctrine retains an ontological reference in its 
concern that the grammar of the faith not be ‗mortally violated‘ on issues ‗essential to the church‘s identity or welfare‘ 
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universal  doubt.  But  this  presumption  has  now  long  been  criticised.  As  a  matter  of 
anthropological fact, conventional certitude always comes first. To doubt without reason what is 
generally accepted is a pathology. Since all truth is socially constructed and mediated, atheists 
can easily share with Christians a common criterion for deciding whether the affirmations of the 
Apostle‘s creed are authentically Christian. The theological error to which Lindbeck refers is an 
inadequate  supernaturalism  which  assumes  clear  distinctions  between  reason  and  nature, 
empirical certitude and the assurance of faith (ND 101-2). 
The  other  objection  considered  by  Lindbeck  relates  to  the  locus  of  infallibility:  where  do 
infallibility, and the teaching authority associated with it, reside (ND 102-4)? Lindbeck canvasses 
the different kinds of answers given in the Orthodox (infallibility belongs to the church as a whole 
and is not localised), Roman Catholic (it resides in the magisterium) and Protestant (it resides in 
Scripture) traditions. In an informative and insightful discussion, his main concern is to show that 
rule theory is sufficiently flexible to accommodate and make sense of each of these positions, as 
well as providing a means by which they might (perhaps) be reconciled. However, he again draws 
a comparison with propositionalism that is not supported by his analysis. 
The comparison follows an explanation of how, on a regulative interpretation, the three theories 
of infallibility ‗become diverse formulations of the same rule, or at least compatible rules of 
action‘ (ND 103). Lindbeck then remarks, ‗if doctrines are rules, then it follows that they will 
often be reconcilable in circumstances where propositional truths remain adamantly opposed‘ 
(ibid.). But this argument relies on (1) Lindbeck‘s view that the doctrine of infallibility belongs 
more properly in the sphere of ecclesiology than in that of revelation (‗it has more to do with the 
nature of the church than with that of doctrine‘, ND 98); and (2) his awareness that doctrinal 
formulations  are  social  constructions  that  reflect  particular  situations,  and  are  therefore 
provisional. He has not given any reason why historicised propositionalism could not proceed 
from the same premises and reach the same conclusion. Moreover, the remark noted above 
implies  that  ‗propositionalism‘  is  unable  to  take  into  account  the  circumstances  in  which 
doctrines are formulated. This might be so for the simplistic views that Lindbeck earlier referred 
to as ‗traditional‘ or ‗classical‘ propositionalism, but it does not touch the historically-aware 
forms of propositionalism that (he says) are the main rival to his proposal. 
We have now noted all the comparative comments Lindbeck makes in the course of presenting a 
regulative approach to the ancient creeds, the Marian dogmas and infallibility. He says that, in 
comparison with propositionalism, rule theory makes it easier to state the same doctrine in 
different  but  equivalent  terms  (ND  93-4),  refrains  from  grand  linguistic  and  ontological 
generalisations (98), and protects the doctrine of infallibility from accusations of vacuity by way 
of an empirical understanding of the consensus fidelium (99-101). The first claim is completely 
unsupported, and the second and third do not distinguish the competing views—rule theory 
most certainly makes grand generalisations, and there is no reason why a propositional approach 
could not appropriate an empirical approach to the consensus fidelium. While comparison of 
regulative and propositional approaches was not Lindbeck‘s main goal in this material, such 
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Two other features of the discussion call for comment. Firstly, although Lindbeck ruled out 
‗classic‘ propositionalism as an alternative and apparently intended to engage with historicised 
propositionalism, he has for the most part continued to refer to ‗propositionalism‘ without any 
qualifying adjective, and some of his comments raise the question as to whether he is really 
addressing a modified or historicising propositionalism, or merely assimilating it to the simple 
propositionalism  he  has  already  dismissed.  That  is,  the  rival  position  remains  ill-defined. 
Secondly, the discussion unfolded as an exercise in theological imagination: this is how one 
may go about imagining doctrines as rules. There is little to justify the validity of such a view. 
Justification is needed even if Lindbeck‘s concern is only with the availability, rather than the 
superiority, of his proposal.33 The necessity is still greater if, as we have seen, Lindbeck wants 
us to consider treating doctrines as rules rather than as first-order propositions. In the end, he is 
not content to offer his rule theory as a useful perspective on the doctrinal function of sentences. 
For him, the essence of a doctrine (or, strictly, of the doctrinal function of a sentence) is that it 
functions as a rule rather than as a first-order proposition. That is, regulative function is, and 
propositional function is not, the proper function of doctrine qua doctrine.34 But the negative 
part of this assertion remains unsupported. 
Lindbeck‘s main aim in this material was more to display the possibilities of his theory than make 
comparisons, and he is content to claim in conclusion that a regulative theory is compatible with 
the  dogmas  of  the  major  historic  traditions  and  thus  provides  ‗a  framework  within  which 
ecumenical agreements and disagreements can be meaningfully discussed‘ (ND 104). On this 
basis he turns in the final section of the chapter to specifically address ‗a comparison of regulative 
and modern propositional views.‘ Having described rule theory in chapter 4, and having argued 
for its ‗availability‘ for ecumenical discussion in the first three sections of chapter 5, Lindbeck will 
now make a case for its superiority over the only viable alternative. 
5.2.3  The Theoretical Superiority of Rule Theory: Ockham’s Razor 
Lindbeck begins his argument for ‗The Superiority of a Regulative View‘ (ND 104-8) with the 
observation that there are several points on which regulative and ‗contemporary propositional‘ 
views of doctrine agree. Firstly, a propositional interpretation does not deny that doctrines are 
rules. Practical doctrines (such as the ‗law of love‘) can hardly be taken otherwise.35 Secondly, 
                                                       
33 This is Lindbeck‘s description of the main thesis of his book (ND 91). 
34 A point already made explicitly at  ND 80. It should always be remembered that Lindbeck is speaking not of 
statements themselves but of the uses to which they may be put, the ways in which they may function. He is not 
denying that statements that  function doctrinally  may also  function propositionally. He is saying that these two 
functions are distinct, and that the propositional or assertory function is not properly a doctrinal function. 
35 Lindbeck first refers to ‗practical doctrines‘ at ND 85-6. Among these he includes the law of love for God and 
neighbour, Christian participation in war, care for the poor, sexual ethics, and the condemnation of slavery. These are 
distinguished from ‗doctrines that concern beliefs‘ (85-86). Practical doctrines are referred to here because they are 
by definition rules, and so the discussion of their regulative characteristics is relatively straightforward. As rules, they 
may be unconditionally or conditionally  valid. Conditionally valid doctrines may be permanent or temporary in 
application (depending on the persistence of the relevant conditions). Again, conditional temporary doctrines may be 
reversible or irreversible. Finally, some doctrines may be neither conditionally nor unconditionally necessary, but 
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both approaches allow that what is essential to the church in one situation may not be essential 
in another, and thus what is doctrinally significant varies from age to age. Thirdly,36 ‗Lonergan 
and other propositionalists now generally insist in opposition to classical propositionalists that, 
although a doctrinal proposition is permanent, its formulation may vary greatly from period to 
period and from culture to culture.‘ Lindbeck‘s summation of the extent of agreement is of 
particular  interest:  ‗Because  of  these  considerations,  modified  or  historicized  propositional 
theories seem no less capable of admitting historical change and diversity than is a rule theory 
(although, as we shall note, they do so in peculiarly complicated ways)‘ (ND 103). 
This comment may be at odds with Lindbeck‘s earlier remark about the separability of form and 
content  under  the  two  approaches  (i.e.,  that,  while  both  allow  for  it,  it  is  ‗easier‘  under  a 
regulative approach). However, in view of my negative evaluation of his earlier comments I am 
content that he begins here from an assumption of relative parity. The parenthetical comment 
indicates that the complexity of historicised propositional theories will feature in the ensuing 
argument.  This  echoes  Lindbeck‘s  earlier  disdain  for  the  complexity  of  ‗two-dimensional 
experiential-expressive‘ approaches.37 
Lindbeck‘s argument for the superiority of a regulative view consists of a theoretical strand, 
examined  below,  and  a  practical  strand,  examined  in  the  following  sub-section.  The  basic 
question is this: if, as Lindbeck argues, rule theory is available as a genuine option, and if, as he 
now concedes, historicised propositional theories are ‗no less capable of admitting historical 
change and diversity than is a rule theory‘, why should rule theory be preferred to its rival? The 
‗major theoretical dispute‘, as Lindbeck puts it, ‗turns on the proper application of Ockham‘s 
razor‘ (ND 105). That is, the regulative view of doctrine is to be preferred because it is more 
economical with hypotheses: ‗From the regulative perspective, propositional interpretations are 
superfluous. If doctrines such as that of Nicaea can be enduringly normative as rules, there is no 
reason to proceed further and insist on an ontological reference‘ (ND 105-6). 
This programmatic statement nicely captures the logic of the argument. Lindbeck is arguing 
from, rather than for, a regulative view. He is continuing the imaginative exercise used for the 
test cases, and will now describe how the propositional approach to doctrine appears from a 
regulative perspective. From that perspective, propositional interpretations will of course appear 
to  require  an  ‗extra‘  hypothesis.  But  a  description  of  how  things  look  from  a  particular 
standpoint cannot by itself constitute a reason for standing at that point. Such a description is 
necessary to an argument for superiority, but it is by no means sufficient. The fact that ‗in 
debates between fundamentally different outlooks, there is no neutral point of view from which 
to  adjudicate  differences‘  (ND  73)  does  not  mean  that  a  comparative  conclusion  can  be 
sustained without a real comparison. Rather, it calls for a different kind of comparison, in which 
                                                       
36 Lindbeck has here ‗Second‘, but I did not find a ‗First‘ to which it attaches. This point appears to be a third item of 
agreement between the regulative and historicised propositional views of doctrine. 
37 See ND 16-7 and pp. 20 and 159 above. In view of Lindbeck‘s resort to Rahner and Lonergan as examples of both 
historicised propositionalism and two-dimensional experiential-expressivism, we should be alert to the possibility that 
he is merely seeing the same ‗complexity‘ from different perspectives, rather than finding complexity in different 
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both  standpoints  are  taken  up  and  each  is  described  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  other.  The 
accuracy of the descriptions can be debated, but a comparative conclusion will always involve 
some assessment of the viewpoints‘ relative cogency and comprehensiveness, and their relative 
economy with hypotheses.38 After all, propositionalists might argue from their standpoint that a 
regulative  approach  requires  ‗extra‘  hypotheses  about  the  appropriateness  of  applying  a 
linguistic metaphor to religion, the nature and function of grammar, and the distinction between 
first- and second-order propositions. Thus, with as much (and as little) justification as Lindbeck, 
they might say that an ‗Ockhamist‘ argument indicates the ‗superiority‘ of their own view. 
Lindbeck does not consider this or attempt the necessary comparison. 
But even Lindbeck‘s account of how things look from a regulative standpoint is not without its 
difficulties, and we will note these before directly addressing his ‗Ockhamist‘ argument. After 
his introductory statement, Lindbeck continues the example of the Nicene creed: 
Rule theory does not prohibit speculations on the possible correspondence of the Trinitarian 
pattern of Christian language to the metaphysical structure of the Godhead, but simply says 
that these are not doctrinally necessary and cannot be binding. They are like discussions of 
whether  there  is  a  substance-attribute  structure  of  finite  entities  corresponding  to  the 
subject-predicate structure of sentences. Some philosophers…hold that there is…, but this 
is  irrelevant  to  the  linguist.  [It]  makes  no  difference  for  most  purposes  to  the  subject-
predicate way in which we must speak in order to make sense of the world; and similarly, 
ontological  interpretations  of  the  Trinity  do  not,  or  should  not,  be  made  communally 
normative for the way Christians live and think (ND 106). 
The linguistic metaphor seems to control Lindbeck‘s argument here: questions of the relation of 
doctrines to reality are like questions of the relation to reality of the subject-predicate structure 
of sentences. Such questions may be important for some purposes, but, in view of the nature of 
language (or doctrine), they are of no interest to linguists (or theologians). Just as questions of 
ontological  correspondence  are  ‗irrelevant  to  the  linguist‘,  they  are  also  irrelevant  to  the 
theologian constituted as grammarian of the Christian language. 
However, the same passage shows that ontology is not so easily dismissed. Lindbeck says that 
one‘s answer to the question of whether the structure of reality corresponds in some way to the 
grammatical  structure  of  sentences  ‗makes  no  difference  for  most  purposes  to  the  subject-
predicate way in which we must speak in order to make sense of the world.‘ Surely, if humans 
use language  ‗in  order to  make  sense  of the  world‘,  this  implies some  kind of  ontological 
relation?  Or,  if  Lindbeck  really  wants  to  keep  ontology  at  arm‘s  length  as  a  dispensable 
hypothesis, then the phrase ‗of the world‘ is an unfortunate slip; it should have been omitted or 
                                                       
38 A similar problem is evident in Lindbeck‘s use of Ockham‘s razor to indicate the dispensability of the expressivist 
hypothesis of pre-linguistic (or ‗unthematised‘) purely private experiences (ND 38). He argues that because religious 
experience can be accounted for without resorting to the expressivist hypothesis, the hypothesis is not needed and can 
be dispensed with. But he is not so much removing an unnecessary hypothesis from an otherwise coherent group of 
hypotheses, as replacing one group of hypotheses (which includes experiential-expressivism) with another (which 
doesn‘t). As in the present case, a more extensive argument would be required to deal with alternative groups of 
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replaced with ‗to each other‘. Then ‗making sense (to each other)‘ would be a matter of the 
proper (i.e., ruled) use of the various elements of the shared language. 
In any case, the element of necessity (‗the way in which we must speak‘) reflects the givenness 
of language. And language is given in the fact that each human being is born into a pre-existing 
particular linguistic community. This pre-existence determines how we must speak if we are to 
make  sense  to those  who  already  speak  this  way,  and  we  do  speak  because  language  is a 
primary means by which they engage with us and enable us to engage with them as, together 
with them, we engage the world. That is, the world is also given, and, for humans, never given 
without language. Nor is language given without world: each is received in and with the other—
we never have them as separable entities.39 Separation of language and world may be possible 
for beings that can separate themselves from the world, but such a being is a pure Cartesian  res 
cogitans and not a human. To the extent that Lindbeck‘s rule theory entails or assumes the 
possibility of such separation, it is unavailable for human use. 
To illustrate the point that ontological reference is both unnecessary and irrelevant to doctrine 
qua doctrine, Lindbeck invokes a comparison with scientific theories. 
These,  like  Trinitarian  and  Christological  theories,  need  not  be  given  a  metaphysical 
interpretation, although in both cases it might be legitimate for certain purposes to give 
such an interpretation. Aristotelian, Newtonian, and Einsteinian theories of space and time, 
for example, are evaluated scientifically quite independently of the metaphysical question 
of which is closer to the way things really are.40 
This is simply false. It may be that philosophers of science such as Polanyi, Kuhn and Lakatos 
have made us aware that scientific theories are accepted or rejected, not simply on the basis of 
experimental data, but for a whole complex of explicit and tacit reasons. However, acceptance 
of their insights by no means entails the conclusion that scientific evaluation of theories is ‗quite 
independent  of  the  metaphysical  question  of  which  is  closer‘  to  reality.  Granted,  scientific 
theories should not be taken as direct metaphysical descriptions of reality, but they do describe 
the kind of reality that might respond in the ways in which reality actually responds when we 
interrogate it in certain ways. Perhaps we cannot be as confident of the veracity of scientific 
theories  as  we can  of  the  veracity  of  empirical  data,  but it is  only  our  theories, creatively 
inferred from the data and complex traditions of inquiry, that give data meaning.41 
                                                       
39 This is one of Wittgenstein‘s basic insights, well brought out in Kerr 1997, and in Patterson 1991. 
40 ND 106. Lindbeck considers alternative evaluations of these three theories: evaluated ontologically (assuming 
‗relativity is ontologically true‘), Aristotle and Einstein are superior to Newton; but evaluated scientifically (‗e.g., for 
predictive purposes‘) each is superior to the theories that preceded it historically. But this entirely misses the point. 
Ontological  evaluation  is  simply  unavailable  other  than  through  some  combination  of  predictive  power, 
comprehensiveness, fruitfulness, simplicity, elegance, and other ‗scientific virtues‘ mentioned in the literature of the 
philosophy of science. But while direct ontological evaluation is unavailable, it is nevertheless ontological curiosity 
(together  with  commercial,  military  and  political  ambition)  that  drives  scientific  endeavour.  The  fact  that  all 
ontological conclusions are creative inferences and provisional hypotheses should not be allowed to obscure their 
function as working hypotheses concerning what reality is and how we may deal with it. 
41 For this reason I would not want to overstress the distinction between the kind of veracity we impute respectively 
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Lindbeck suggests that ontological reference is ‗similarly‘ dispensable in theology as he thinks 
it is in science. In the debate over the distinction between the economic and immanent trinities, 
some theories ‗may or may not correspond better to the triune reality of God‘ than others, but 
this  question  is  ‗unanswerable  this  side  of  the  Eschaton‘  and  is  in  any  case  ‗irrelevant  to 
theological assessment‘ (ND 106). Let us take these objections in order. Since Lindbeck notes 
that Rahner and Lonergan, at least, find the question answerable (even if their answers differ), 
his own view that the question is ‗unanswerable‘ shows only that he has not (yet) found decisive 
arguments on either side. If the reference to the Eschaton is more than rhetorical, it is puzzling: 
the provisionality of any conclusions does not make the trinitarian question at all unusual—all 
knowledge is provisional to some degree. Lindbeck‘s unequivocal language here may indicate 
that,  by  ‗unanswerable‘,  he  means  ‗cannot  be  answered  with  absolute  certainty‘.  Taking 
definitive  ontological  reference  to  be  impossible,  he  opts  to  make  ontological  reference 
dispensable. But definitive ontological reference and dispensable ontological reference have this 
in common: they are possible for Cartesian egos, not for human beings. A better alternative is 
not to make reference dispensable, but to dispense with the desire for Cartesian certainty.42 
Turning  to  the  assertion  that  ontological  reference  is  ‗irrelevant  to theological  assessment‘, 
Lindbeck proposes the following theological criterion: 
Which theory is theologically best depends on how well it organizes the data of Scripture and 
tradition with a view to their use in Christian worship and life. In terms of these specifically 
theological criteria, there may be good or bad theories on both sides of the ontological dispute 
regarding the economic and immanent aspects of the Trinity. The question of the ontological 
reference of the theories may often be unimportant for theological evaluation (ND 106). 
Here I sympathise with Alister McGrath‘s frustration over Lindbeck‘s relaxed attitude towards the 
origin of theological ‗data‘.43 Lindbeck distinguishes sharply between the data of scripture and 
tradition on the one hand, and ontology and metaphysics on the other, in that he wants theological 
evaluation to be based only on the former and not on the latter. For him, scripture and tradition 
seem to be simply there, without provenance or historical connection to a wider reality. But I 
question whether Christians can use these data in worship and life while leaving aside the question 
of their relation to reality.44 Lindbeck might object that he is not speaking of the use of Scripture 
and tradition in Christian worship and life, but calling for the theological assessment of doctrinal 
proposals to be conducted having regard to those sources used in that way. This distinction, 
                                                                                                                                                             
ways.  But,  at  the  same  time,  no  data is  mere  data,  but  is  always perceived  in  the  framework  of  some  kind  of 
theoretical understanding. The ‗theory-ladenness of data‘ is a point stressed by Lindbeck. 
42 Other objections to seeing ‗unanswerability‘ as a problem will be taken up shortly. 
43 Speaking more in terms of what he sees as Lindbeck‘s ‗grand retreat from history‘, McGrath (GD 34) finds that 
Lindbeck  ‗reduces  doctrine  to  little  more  than  a  grammar  of  an  ahistorical  language,  a  language  which—like 
Melchizedek—has no origins. It is just there. It just happens to be located in history. It is given. The historian, 
however, will wish to inquire concerning its origins and its historical points of reference.‘ 
44 In this regard, one might be inclined to consider theologians of a non-realist persuasion, such as Don Cupitt and 
Daniel Liechty. However, they do not so much leave this question aside as answer it definitely in the negative 
(religion is not about any external reality but expresses the creativity of the human spirit). They do not join Lindbeck 
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between Christian life and worship as ‗first-order‘ activities and the formulation and evaluation of 
doctrine as ‗second-order‘ activities, is crucial to Lindbeck‘s whole discussion of doctrine, and is 
examined it later in this chapter.45 Here I merely highlight a tension within Lindbeck‘s theory 
between the Christian ‗language‘ and its theological/doctrinal ‗grammar‘. 
Lindbeck wants technical theology to set aside the question of truth as it sets about discerning, 
formulating and evaluating the ‗grammatical‘ patterns of Christian life and worship. But it can 
do so only if it also sets aside any claim to be really dealing with Christian life and worship. For 
it is basic to that life and worship that they are vitally concerned with the living God; Christians 
do not worship their own tradition and its scriptures, but rather the living God to whom the 
tradition and scriptures bear witness. This being so, Lindbeck‘s bracketing of the question of 
truth  prejudges  the  issue.  In  a  significant  respect,  he  has  predefined  what  the  grammar  of 
Christian language must be, and has determined that any elements falling outside that definition 
will be ignored. That is, even a ‗pure‘ rule theory cannot escape ‗the problem of reference‘: if 
doctrine and technical theology refer only to the grammar (and not to the truth) of the Christian 
‗cultural-linguistic system‘, they should nevertheless refer to that system (or that complex of 
systems), not to an idealised system that is in conspicuous ways predetermined so as to be more 
amenable to scholarly grammarians who prefer not to be surprised.46 
Earlier, we noted Lindbeck‘s criticism of the cognitive and experiential-expressive approaches 
for  their  indebtedness  to  modernity  (ND  51).  We  have  now  seen  that  his  own  proposal  is 
similarly  indebted.  His  disdain  for  ‗hybrid‘  hypotheses  reflects  a  strong  preference  for 
simplicity, and for clear and distinct ideas, and his separation of language from world (implied 
in the dispensability of ontological reference) requires a disembodied Cartesian self. Related to 
this,  Lindbeck‘s  rule  theory  requires  a  separation  between,  on  the  one  hand,  scripture  and 
tradition as these form and inform Christian life and worship, and, on the other hand, ontology, 
so that doctrinal proposals may be assessed in terms of the former and not the latter. I have 
argued (briefly, at this stage) that such separation is at odds with the ‗grammar‘ of Christian 
faith as evidenced in scripture, tradition and Christian life and worship. 
Now, in maintaining that Lindbeck‘s rule theory does not adequately account for the realities of 
human existence generally, and of Christian life in particular, I am assuming the priority of reality 
over  theory,  and  this  is  precisely  the  point  at  which  Lindbeck‘s  argument  is  not  a  ‗proper 
application of Ockham‘s razor‘. Ockham‘s razor—‘universals should not be multiplied beyond 
necessity‘—is two-edged, involving both economy with hypotheses and attention to necessity, 
which  Lindbeck  understands  differently  to  Ockham.  We  have  seen  that  Lindbeck  assumes  a 
regulative viewpoint and discards hypotheses that are ‗unnecessary‘ to that viewpoint. That is, his 
‗necessity‘ is formal: it reflects the requirements of logic and coherence. Ockham‘s necessity, 
however, was very much a material one reflecting the contingency of creation. For him, God‘s 
                                                       
45 See p. 191 below. 
46 The terminology of ‗systems‘ reflects Lindbeck. It will be clear from earlier sections (especially 3.2 A ‘Cultural-
Linguistic’ Liberal Theology commencing on p. 63) that I find the idea of religions as unitary systems unsatisfactory. 
That the tension identified here is such that Lindbeck‘s proposal is seen to be not merely wrong, but internally 
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omnipotence meant that all things were contingent (i.e., manifestations of divine grace) and, in 
this sense, nothing was necessary. Thus the great necessity for hypotheses is that they take into 
account and explain what actually (contingently) is. Perhaps the usual English expression of the 
razor, given above, emphasises the principle of parsimony, whereas Ockham sought to combine 
parsimony  and  particularism,  with  the  former  serving  the  latter:  ‗evidence  and  meaning  for 
universals must be derived from the knowledge of individuals.‘47 Granted, hypotheses should be 
multiplied only so far as the data require, but equally, they should be removed only so far as the 
data allow, which may not be so far as allowed by one‘s preferred theory. In that he allows the 
cultural-linguistic  metaphor  to  lead  him  into  unrealistic  separations  (language  from  world, 
doctrine and scripture from reality), Lindbeck‘s argument is less Ockhamist than reductionist.48 
The theoretical strand of Lindbeck‘s argument for the superiority of rule theory does no more than 
describe what might follow if a certain premise were granted. His discussion arrives at rule theory 
because it proceeds from it, and always sees the nature of doctrine from a regulative standpoint. 
There were no substantive reasons (real comparisons) or successful formal reasons (Ockham‘s 
razor) to justify adopting this position, and examination of Lindbeck‘s examples provided reasons 
to the contrary. The view he describes can hardly be available to human beings. 
5.2.4  The Practical Superiority of Rule Theory: Doctrinal Theology and Christian Life 
Although the theoretical strand of Lindbeck‘s argument does not succeed, consideration of the 
practical application of rule theory might indicate the possibility of desirable outcomes. If so, 
this would warrant further consideration of the theory, if in a modified form. Lindbeck suggests 
that the application of rule theory would result in two positive outcomes that a propositional 
approach would not achieve. Firstly, rule theory would be more inclusive of divergent points of 
view than a propositional approach. The trinitarian example continues: 
If the doctrine is a rule or conjunction of rules for, among other things, the construction of 
Trinitarian  theories,  then  both  types  of  theory  we  have  mentioned  [i.e.,  those  that 
distinguish  between  the  immanent  and  economic  trinities,  and  those  that  don‘t]  can  be 
doctrinally correct, providing they conform to the same rules. If, however, the doctrine is a 
proposition with ontological reference, only one of type of theory has a chance of being 
true because the theories disagree on what the ontological reference is. 
This is not simply a technical divergence: the practical disadvantages of the propositional 
view are considerable. The propositional view suggests that one of the two main streams of 
Christian theological thinking about the Trinity is unwittingly heretical, even though the 
church has not yet made up its mind which one. Given this grave implication, there must be 
                                                       
47 Cunliffe-Jones and Drewery 1978, 286 (editorial note appended to the essay by Dom David Knowles). 
48 Compare McGrath: ‗A necessary prelude to any theory of doctrine is a precise understanding of the genesis of 
doctrine,  of  the  factors  which  stimulate  and  govern  doctrinal  formulation,  in  all  their  historical  and  systematic 
complexity.  Lindbeck‘s  theory  of  doctrine  ultimately  rests  upon  his  perception  that  ‗cultural-linguistic‘  insights 
already  finding  application  within  the  social  sciences  ought  to  find  their  way  into  theological  reflection:  the 
phenomenon of doctrine is then effectively reduced to this model, with history being treated in an atomistic manner 
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very good reasons indeed for saying that the doctrine of the Trinity is propositional as well 
as regulative, but it is not at all apparent that either party to the dispute has even attempted 
to supply them (ND 106-7). 
On a regulative view, then, theories that conform to the same rules will have the same status vis-
à-vis orthodoxy. But if doctrines are rules or conjunctions of rules, it follows that the differences 
between the trinitarian theories reflect differences between underlying sets of rules. It seems, 
then,  that  we  must  distinguish  between  two  classes  of  rules:  those  that,  in  the  church‘s 
judgement, define the limits of orthodoxy and are therefore essential; and those that don‘t, and 
are therefore optional. If a theory is considered orthodox, this reflects a judgement that it does 
not transgress any of the rules currently considered essential. But perceptions of rules are just as 
much  subject  to  human  construction  and  judgement  as  are  perceptions  of  reality.  Unless 
doctrinal development is ruled out, we must allow that the church might decide in future to 
acknowledge as essential a new rule or one previously considered optional. Unless fallibility is 
ruled out, we must allow that the church might decide that a rule previously considered essential 
should really be made optional.49 Either possibility might result in at least one of the trinitarian 
theories being ruled unorthodox. That is, rule theory can be exclusive as well as inclusive. 
On  the other  side,  propositionalism‘s  alleged  disadvantage  arises not from  the  problems  of 
ontological reference but from Lindbeck‘s tendentious description, in which propositionalism‘s 
metaphysical inclinations cannot rest short of an ultimate clarity in which one theory alone 
remains orthodox and all others are shown to be heretical. An approach so totally ignorant of its 
own  vulnerability  and  provisionality  as  human  knowledge  is  hardly  responsible  Christian 
theology,50 but rather an extreme form of the simplistic propositionalism mentioned early in ND, 
with the addition here of an inability to appreciate the difference between truth and orthodoxy.51 
An historically-aware propositionalism could avoid such errors by proposing that human 
intellectual and moral capacities are finite and time -bound; that reality may be absolute, but 
human access to it is not; that truth may be one, but human perceptions of it are legion. 
Lindbeck‘s claim that ‗only one type of theory has a chance of being true‘ is beside the point. It 
may be that neither, or one, or both of the theories reliably intimates some aspect (or different 
aspects) of the divine reality. To the extent that the theories‘ truth status can be assessed at all, 
this can be done only by examining the same evidence available under a regulative approach, 
though without a priori ruling out reference to reality. The church in its wisdom or otherwise 
might find such assessments inconclusive, so that neither theory could be definitively judged 
superior. And even if a definitive judgement were thought possible on certain questions, it has 
always  been  the  case  (and  would  that  it  had  been  more  the  case!)  that  the  church  has 
                                                       
49 Doctrinal development or fallibility would be ‗ruled out‘ if their affirmation transgressed one of the essential rules. 
50  Perhaps  some  of  the  Protestant  scholastics  come  close  to  such  ignorance.  But  even  i n  the  post-Reformation 
controversies, when disputants commonly agreed (if only implicitly) that ‗truth is one and error legion‘ and thus felt duty 
bound to consign each other to hell, there was a general acknowledgment that human knowledge was at best partial, a 
matter of ‗seeing in a glass darkly‘. Human knowledge of the disputed matters was seen as incomplete in the manner of 
all human thought, but not any less truly knowledge on that account. For an informative discussion, see Soskice 1993. 
51  It  is  not  c lear  from  Lindbeck‘s  text  whether  this  misunderstanding  should  be  attributed  to  Lindbeck‘s 
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acknowledged a diversity of opinions within orthodoxy. The question of truth is not precisely 
the same as the question of orthodoxy. If the church ‗has not yet made up its mind‘, that does 
not  mean  that  it  must  do  so  eventually,  nor  even  that  it  should  desire  to  do  so.  That  is, 
historicised propositionalism can be inclusive as well as exclusive. 
I suggest that neither view of doctrine is intrinsically advantaged or disadvantaged with respect 
to inclusivity.52 The first ‗practical advantage‘ of rule theory over propositionalism owes less to 
the theories themselves than to the respectively inclusive and exclusive attitudes imputed to 
their exponents. Moreover, Lindbeck has once again miscast his opponent. The propositionalism 
he  finds  wanting  is  clearly  of  the  Cartesian  variety.  He  finds  grave  difficulties  with  this 
propositionalism, as well he might, for it implies an anthropology that has no place in Christian 
thinking.  This  propositionalism  does  indeed  have  ‗considerable  practical  disadvantages‘  in 
comparison  with  rule  theory,  and  even  more  so  in  comparison  with  the  historicised 
propositionalism that is meant to be, but in fact is not, the alternative view in the comparison. 
The second ‗practical advantage‘ that Lindbeck identifies is that under a regulative approach 
‗theological reflection on doctrine becomes directly relevant to the praxis of the church‘ as 
‗attention is focused on the concrete life and language of the community‘. In contrast, under a 
propositional  approach  doctrinal  theology  becomes  mere  word-play,  an  ‗endless  process  of 
speculative reinterpretation‘ (ND 107).53 Lindbeck supports this claim with a contrast ‗between 
interpreting a truth and obeying a rule‘,54 beginning with propositionalism‘s disadvantage. 
Perhaps the best way to sum up the practical difference between propositional and regulative 
approaches is by considering the contrast between interpreting a truth and obeying a rule. If, 
to shift examples, the immortality of the soul is a first-order proposition, then those who stand 
in a tradition for which this has been doctrine, but find its mind-body dualism unacceptable, 
are obligated to discover what truth it enunciates, however improbable this truth may seem 
from the dualistic viewpoint of the original formulators. They are virtually forced into that 
                                                       
52 I would argue that, in relation to doctrine, inclusivity and exclusivity have more to do with the church‘s attitude to 
diversity and its understanding of the ecclesial function of declarations of orthodoxy. They have less to do with 
whether diversity and orthodoxy are understood grammatically or ontologically. 
53 In view of the earlier careful distinction between doctrines and assertions about reality, the claim that rule theory 
results in doctrinal theology of greater concreteness and communal relevance is surprising to say the least. Indeed, 
reduction of theology to mere word-play would seem to be particularly likely in a proposal that (a) likens doctrine to 
formal grammar, and (b) dismisses the question of ontological reference as irrelevant. 
54 ND 107. Lindbeck illustrates the contrast with quotes from Wittgenstein‘s Philosophical Investigations: ‗there is a 
way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ―obeying a rule‖ and 
―going against it‖ in actual cases‘ (§201); and ‗Any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, 
and cannot give any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning‘ (§198). Lindbeck has mistaken 
the topic here. Wittgenstein is considering rules and their meaning, i.e., what we mean by ‗following a rule‘, and his 
point is that the meaning of rules remains indeterminate in the absence of concrete actions to which they are taken to 
be relevant. He is not distinguishing between ‗rule‘ and ‗truth‘, nor between ‗following a rule‘ and ‗interpreting a 
truth‘. Rather, the distinction he makes is that between interpreting a rule and following it. Interpretation of truth may 
not be entirely irrelevant, but it is not part of Wittgenstein‘s comparison. In view of later argument (see below, 5.3.1 
Learning from Wittgenstein beginning on p. 181) it is worth noting that Wittgenstein‘s remarks on rules appear within 
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endless  process  of  speculative  reinterpretation  which  is  the  main  stock-in-trade  of  much 
contemporary theology, both Protestant and Catholic (ND 107). 
It  seems  that,  as  background  presuppositions  change,  propositionalists  are  forced  into  an 
‗endless  process  of  speculative  reinterpretation‘.  Lindbeck  clearly  presupposes  that  the  end 
result of propositionalist reflections must be the preservation, in however tenuous a form, of the 
doctrine in question, as though propositionalists had no other option than ‗reinterpretation‘. But 
to the extent that a doctrine is bound up with concepts or ways of thinking that are now judged 
inadequate, the doctrine itself must be questioned as to its adequacy. One would hope that the 
original formulators of the doctrine were genuinely seeking to respond to their intellectual and 
cultural milieux in ways that authentically reflected the dynamic of the gospel and its witness to 
Jesus Christ. But there are other possibilities: the possibility that the intellectual and cultural 
tools available to them were inadequate to the task; the possibility (or likelihood) that they 
remained unaware of some their most basic presuppositions and hence (or otherwise) failed to 
consider that these might conflict with the gospel (let alone with later knowledge); and also the 
possibility of flaws in their theological reasoning. And the same possibilities are ever-present 
also for us. But that neither excuses a propositionalist from responsibly putting the question of 
truth,  nor  invalidates  the  exercise  of  that  responsibility.  Lindbeck‘s  criticism  once  again 
addresses a ‗classical‘ (once true, exactly true, always true) propositionalism, but hardly touches 
one that knows the difference between human knowledge and that of angels. 
As to the ‗speculative‘ nature of reinterpretation, this criticism may be better applied elsewhere. 
Lindbeck is presumably contrasting a ‗speculative‘ theology with one that fulfils his own vision 
for a theology that draws on one source only, namely, Christian scripture and tradition.55 Leaving 
aside the fact that this is precisely what Lindbeck himself has not done, it seems to me that those 
most engaged in ‗speculative reinterpretation‘ of doctrine are not propositionalists but modernist 
and  revisionist  theologians  (process  theologians  might  be  a  good  example)  who  reinterpret 
doctrine in terms of contemporary philosophy. Although such reinterpreters are propositionalists 
in their own way, in Lindbeck‘s typology they belong to the ‗experiential-expressivist‘ group. 
Lindbeck‘s ‗propositionalists‘, who exalt scripture and tradition (with some professing to draw on 
these sources only), are among those least likely to indulge in ‗speculation‘. If they are what 
Lindbeck calls ‗traditional‘ or ‗classical‘ propositionalists, who do not recognise the humanity and 
therefore the vulnerability of doctrine and of their own reflections on it, then they can be charged 
with failing to recognise and correct their tacit adoption of modernity‘s infamous ‗view from 
nowhere‘. But this is less an act than an omission: they are not so much guilty of ‗speculation‘ as 
innocent of proper critical and biblical reflection. Historicized propositionalists, asking ‗what must 
we  now  say,  based  on  scripture  (and  tradition)?‘,  know  that  theology‘s  work  is  intrinsically 
endless, not because of a speculative method or basis, but because the church constantly engages a 
changing ‗now‘. Thus Lindbeck‘s criticism of ‗propositionalism‘ once again misses its mark. 
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From  the  ‗practical  disadvantage‘  of  propositionalism‘s  endless  reinterpretations,  Lindbeck 
turns to the practical advantage which accrues to rule theory because it focuses attention on the 
concrete life and language of the community. 
Because the doctrine is to be followed rather than interpreted, the theologian‘s task is to 
specify the circumstances, whether temporary or enduring, in which it applies. In the first [i.e., 
the propositional] case, as Wittgenstein might say, language idles without doing any work, 
while in the second case, the gears mesh with reality and theological reflection on doctrine 
becomes directly relevant to the praxis of the church. The question raised in reference to 
Nicaea and Chalcedon is not how they can be interpreted in modern categories, but rather how 
contemporary Christians can do as well or better in maximizing the Jesus Christ of the biblical 
narratives as the way to the one God of whom the Bible speaks (ND 107). 
This completes the contrast: if doctrine is ‗followed rather than interpreted‘ not only is endless 
reinterpretation avoided but theological reflection becomes directly relevant to praxis. It does so 
because, in a regulative approach, the theologian‘s work is not ‗reinterpreting‘ doctrine-as-truth 
but ‗specifying the circumstances‘ in which doctrine-as-rule applies. This argument relies on at 
least three presuppositions: that the doctrine to be followed is already definitively known, so 
that doctrinal criticism is unnecessary; that ‗specification of circumstances‘ is distinct from 
interpretation (‗doctrine is to be followed rather than interpreted‘); and that such specification 
engages reality while reinterpretation does not. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
Regarding the first presupposition, recall that for Lindbeck doctrine is not available directly or 
completely, but must be inferred from scripture as it is used in Christian life and worship.56 Yet 
here theological reflection on doctrine bypasses this limitation and the inferential work imposed 
by it, focussing instead on ‗specifying the circumstances‘ in which a given doctrine should apply. 
But how is a given doctrine ‗given‘? And how could it be given so clearly and unequivocally that 
inquiry into its origins or warrantability would be unnecessary? Since, as Lindbeck acknowledges, 
every formulation of doctrine reflects the circumstances of its time and place,57 and since humans 
receive doctrine only in historically conditioned formulations, doctrinal criticism is essential to 
theological reflection even under rule theory. Indeed, rule theory requires that an attempt be made 
to distinguish changeless rule from transient circumstance in every doctrinal formulation, since 
what is to be followed is the abiding rule rather than its circumstantial trappings. 
The  second  presupposition  underlying  rule  theory‘s  ‗practical  advantage‘  is  the  distinction 
between interpretation of truth and specification of circumstances. This distinction is spurious, for 
three reasons. Firstly, as Lindbeck insists, meaning is bound up with context. If, as he also insists, 
the contexts relevant to doctrines are the forms of life in which they are used and in which they 
acquire truth value when appropriately followed as rules, then ‗specification of circumstances‘ 
                                                       
56 See p. 157 above. 
57 In relation to the Nicene creed and Chalcedonian definition,  ND 96: ‗though the ancient formulations may have 
continuing value, they do not on the basis of rule theory have doctrinal authority. That authority belongs rather to the 
rules they instantiate. …it is at least plausible to claim that Nicaea and Chalcedon represent historically conditioned 
formulations  of  doctrines  that  are  unconditionally  and  permanently  necessary  to  mainstream  Christian  identity. 
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would  seem  to  be  just  as  much  concerned  with  questions  of  meaning  as  are  propositional 
‗reinterpretations‘.58 Secondly, as Lindbeck‘s Christological example reminds us, what is to be 
followed is not the credal formulation itself but the unchanging rules it instantiates. But whether or 
not such unchanging rules exist, our knowledge of them cannot be unchanging, and the process of 
discerning them (and specifying the relevant circumstances) will necessarily be an interpretive 
one.  Nor,  unless  Lindbeck‘s  cultural-linguistic  regulators  are  somehow  less  human  than  his 
propositionalist reinterpreters, is there any reason to think that the interpretations by the former 
will be any less endless than those of the latter.59 Thirdly, Lindbeck has not noted Wittgenstein‘s 
careful  distinction  between  actually  following  a  rule  and  only  talking  about  doing  so.  For 
Wittgenstein, such talk is always interpretation. In PI §202 he says: ‗And hence also ―obeying a 
rule‖ is a practice. And to think one is obeying (folgen) a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule ―privately‖: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same 
as obeying it.‘ The first ‗hence‘ follows on from §201 which distinguished between interpreting 
and following rules.60 Although one can think one is obeying a rule when one actually is obeying 
it (though in such an action the rule itself would not usually be the focus of one‘s attention), 
merely  to  think  one  is  obeying  a  rule  is  not  to  obey  a  rule.  Lindbeck‘s  ‗specification  of 
circumstances‘ seems to me to be at least as abstract as the ‗thinking of obeying‘ remarked on by 
Wittgenstein.61 The specification of circumstances surely requires, at the very least, consideration 
of what ought and ought not to be involved in following su ch-and-such a rule, that is, it is 
interpretation. In sum, the presence or absence of (re)interpretation is not a criterion that allows 
the regulative and propositional approaches to be distinguished.  
The third presupposition required for rule theory‘s ‗practical advantage‘ is that specification of 
circumstances engages reality while reinterpretation does not. This, too, is mistaken. Lindbeck 
suggests that in propositionalism‘s reinterpretations ‗language idles without doing any work‘, 
but the identity of his opponent remains problematic. The metaphor of idling language might be 
applied to a liberal/revisionist theologian seeking to reinterpret traditional beliefs so as not to 
offend sophisticated (post)modern ears. It might also be applied to a traditionalist theologian 
                                                       
58 Wittgenstein makes much the same point. Having indicated that an interpretation of a rule does not exhaust its 
meaning, and that a rule can be grasped in a way that is not interpretation but can nevertheless be exhibited, he 
concludes §201 of the Philosophical Investigations with the following observation: ‗Hence, there is an inclination to 
say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term ―interpretation‖ to the 
substitution of one expression of the rule for another.‘ Wittgenstein does not want to say that each following of a rule 
is (or even displays) an interpretation, but this is because ‗interpretation‘ (Deuten) in common usage refers to verbal 
re-expression rather than practical demonstration. There is no question that both following (folgen) and interpreting 
(deuten) deal in meaning, but meaning is a matter, not of words only, nor of dumb action only, but of an engagement 
with and participation in the world using the techniques of action (including the action of speech). Compare the 
remark in On Certainty §65: ‗When language-games change, then there is a change in concept, and with the concepts 
the meanings of words change‘ (cited in Lash 1984, 26). 
59 Of course, I believe Lindbeck‘s regulators are ‗somehow less human‘. It has been my intention in the preceding 
discussion to indicate various ways in which Lindbeck‘s proposal subtly assumes the existence of regulators who, 
while appearing in human form, are members rather of the Cartesian race. 
60 See n54 and n58 above. 
61 I discuss Lindbeck‘s use of Wittgenstein more fully below (see 5.3.1 Learning from Wittgenstein, p.181).   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    179 
glorying in the preservation and repetition of yesteryear‘s formularies. Such theologies, where 
they exist, provide more comfort than engagement. They tell soothing bed-time stories that let 
the hearers relax in the illusion that the tale is familiar and the end already known. They do not 
tell open stories into which the hearers are invited, and in which the hearers participate in the 
outworking of events. It seems to me that theologies, whether propositionalist or expressivist, 
that genuinely embrace and support the church‘s engagement with the world cannot really be 
said to produce language that ‗idles without doing any work‘. In particular, such a criticism does 
not touch the historicised propositional approach with which Lindbeck is supposedly engaging. 
On a regulative view, ‗the gears mesh with reality and theological reflection becomes directly 
relevant to…praxis‘ because it focuses on ‗specifying the circumstances‘ in which a doctrine 
applies.  What  Lindbeck  means  by  ‗circumstances‘  is  indicated  in  his  earlier  classification  of 
doctrines according to their applicability (ND 84-8).62 Introducing this discussion, he noted that 
‗the disagreement [between regulative and propositional approaches] centers on beliefs about what 
is ontologically true, rather than on practical doctrines (which are by definition rules rather than 
truth  claims)‘.63  The  impression  of  separation  between  belief  and  ethics  is  reinforced  by  a 
distinction between ‗practical doctrines‘ and those that ‗propose‘ or ‗concern‘ beliefs (ND 85, 
86).64  Consistent  with  this  distinction,  the  circumstances  Lindbeck  finds  relevant  to  the 
applicability of practical doctrines concern the practical environment (the possibilities of nuclear 
war, reproductive technology, etc, ND 85-6), while the circumstances relevant to ‗doctrines that 
propose  beliefs‘  are largely  conceptual  (ND  86-7).  That  is,  the circumstances  relevant to  the 
doctrines at the centre of the disagreement between regulative and propositional approaches are 
not very ‗concrete‘ after all. ‗Circumstances‘ such as mind-body dualism or the cultural relativism 
of late modern capitalism are scarcely more concrete than the changing worldviews that provoke 
the  allegedly  ‗idle  language‘  of  propositionalism‘s  reinterpretations.65  Lindbeck‘s  distinction 
between  ‗practical  doctrines‘  and  ‗doctrines  that  concern  beliefs‘  suggests  that  the  degree  of 
concreteness in theological reflection mostly reflects the content of the doctrine being reflected on. 
To summarise, the claims of ‗practical advantage‘—that a regulative view of doctrine provides 
greater  inclusivity  of  outcomes  and  greater  concreteness  of  reflection  than  a  propositional 
approach—are not warranted by the arguments Lindbeck provides. Church councils‘ inclusion 
                                                       
62 I have already briefly mentioned this section of ND. See p. 167 above, especially n35. 
63 ND 85. By ‗practical doctrines‘ Lindbeck means ethical prescriptions (e.g., ‗the law of love‘, pacifism, feeding the 
poor, sexual ethics, slavery) and customs (e.g., Sunday and Christmas celebrations, driving on the right (or the left)). 
64 This distinction can be disputed (e.g., while actions that are  merely customary could be described as rules rather 
than truth claims, this is not so for ethical prescriptions, because beliefs are always intimately involved in ethics). 
However, the point here concerns what follows from this distinction in Lindbeck‘s argument. 
65 Lindbeck‘s text hints at the possibility that his assertion of greater concreteness has simply been carried over from 
the earlier discussion of ‗practical doctrines‘. Having set out his ‗taxonomy of doctrines‘ using examples drawn from 
practical doctrines (which are undoubtedly rules), he asserts that ‗if doctrines that propose beliefs are treated as rules, 
the same scheme can be applied to them‘ (ND 86). Admittedly, Lindbeck explicitly applies the ‗this is really the same 
as that‘ argument only in respect of his taxonomical scheme, but the question of the relative concreteness of the 
relevant circumstances is otherwise absent from the text until it resurfaces in the passage we have been considering, 
on p. 107. Whether or not Lindbeck‘s claim of greater concreteness for regulative theology actually arises in this way, 
I have not found any other support for it in his text.   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    180 
or exclusion of proposed doctrines probably has more to do with delegates‘ attitudes to doctrinal 
diversity  than  the  theories  of  doctrine  to  which  they  subscribe.  Under  rule  theory  and 
propositionalism alike, theological reflection on doctrine is an ongoing critical and interpretive 
process. The level of concreteness achieved in theological reflection is likely to be similar under 
both approaches, being determined mainly by the content of the doctrine being considered. Not 
only does each argument fall short of demonstrating the practical superiority claimed for rule 
theory, but the case as a whole displays faults observed in earlier material: as noted in relation to 
the  three  test  cases,  Lindbeck  engages  simple  propositionalism  rather  than  its  historicising 
relative; and, as in his theoretical case for rule theory, he assumes a Cartesian viewpoint that is 
unavailable to humans who are essentially, and not optionally, bodily embedded in the world. 
5.2.5  Engagement Unfulfilled 
I have found Lindbeck‘s whole engagement with propositionalism to be dogged by misdirection 
and misconception: having identified historicised propositionalism as an approach that might 
rival his own proposal, he never actually engaged this rival, and his arguments would not have 
succeeded against it. The rival he actually engaged was always the simplistic propositionalism 
he had previously dismissed—an approach that is unaware of its own human vulnerability and 
that  of  its  doctrinal  and  scriptural  raw  materials.  To  the  extent  that  some  of  Lindbeck‘s 
arguments  succeeded  against  this  opponent,  they  did  so  by  exposing  its  lack  of  reflexive 
awareness—a lack that reflects insufficient appreciation of one‘s own human reality rather than 
any  ‗unnecessary‘  preoccupation  with  reality  as  such.  Such  arguments  do  not  challenge  a 
propositionalism that knows its own humanity and historicity. 
Lindbeck‘s preference for clarity and simplicity, noted in the earlier part of ND, reappeared 
when he misconstrued the logic of Ockham‘s razor by emphasising economy with hypotheses at 
the  expense  of  attention  to  reality.  The  ‗practical‘  arguments  were  unconvincing.  Neither 
accommodation of diversity nor avoidance of re-interpretation provided grounds for declaring 
an advantage in favour of either rule theory or propositionalism. The claim that theological 
reflection becomes more concrete under a regulative approach had little to commend it, and was 
in any case rendered problematic by other aspects of Lindbeck‘s argument. 
At no stage did Lindbeck offer a genuine comparison of the competing approaches, but always 
portrayed doctrine and theology, and propositionalism too, from the perspective of rule theory. In 
the course of this exercise in theological imagination the Cartesian dualism of Lindbeck‘s position 
became increasingly evident as, implicitly or explicitly, he assumed the possibility of freedom 
from ontological reference, the separability of language from world, doctrine from Christian life. 
Of the issues raised in the course of this critique, two in particular merit further attention. 
Firstly, since Lindbeck has not critically engaged historicised propositionalism, I will offer such 
an engagement in the next chapter, not from a cultural-linguistic viewpoint, but rather on the 
basis of the confessional and critical stance developed in the enquiry so far. Secondly, the 
Cartesian character of Lindbeck‘s argument has been noted at various points without being 
substantially addressed. This is rectified in the following section, which critically examines the 
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5.3  THE PATTERN OF SOUND TEACHING 
Our inquiry into the sources and logic of Lindbeck‘s rule theory begins with a contradiction. On 
the one hand, the Cartesian cast of rule theory is most evident where Lindbeck insists that 
doctrine-as-grammar  refers  not  to  the  realities  affirmed  by  religious  adherents  but  to  the 
timeless pattern instantiated in their affirmations. In such contexts Lindbeck makes much of 
phrases  borrowed  indirectly  from  Ludwig  Wittgenstein.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Cartesian 
distinction between language and world was for Wittgenstein one of the greatest blind alleys of 
Western philosophy.66 How then do Lindbeck‘s ideas relate to those of Wittgenstein? While 
Lindbeck‘s use of Wittgenstein contributed to a perception in some circles that Wittgenstein 
provides philosophical support for Lindbeck‘s regulative account of doctrine, I argue that the 
reality is otherwise, to the extent that Wittgenstein‘s insights do not lend support to Lindbeck‘s 
rule theory, but rather expose its frailty. This material was foreshadowed earlier, as the second 
part of an argument aimed at destabilising conventional perceptions which align Schleiermacher 
with liberals against Lindbeck, and align Wittgenstein with Lindbeck.67 
Although  some  of  the  conceptual  tools  deployed  in  Lindbe ck‘s  rule  theory  came  from  a 
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein, those tools did not determine the nature of the theory Lindbeck 
was trying to build. A second line of critique examines the practical and conceptual context that 
constrained  Lindbeck‘s  thinking,  focussing  on  his  a  priori  commitment  to  the  possibility  of 
doctrinal permanence, and concluding that this commitment, and with it the rule theory itself, is 
theologically  and  philosophically  untenable.  The  chapter  closes  with  some  reflections  on  the 
nature of scripture under rule theory before taking leave of doctrine as timeless pattern. 
5.3.1  Learning from Wittgenstein 
In this study we have repeatedly noted the importance of the metaphors of religion-as-language68 
and doctrine-as-grammar in Lindbeck‘s argument. Religion-considered-as-language is sui generis, 
a semiotic system complete in itself that does not require external support and may not be fully 
translatable. This metaphor challenges experiential-expressive views of religion by recasting the 
                                                       
66 Lindbeck says that his knowledge of Wittgenstein is largely indirect, and he acknowledges a debt to Paul Holmer ‗for 
his understanding of  what is theologically important  about Wittgenstein‘ (ND 28 n28). Not being acquainted  with 
Holmer‘s work, I have not tried to trace Lindbeck‘s appropriation of Wittgenstein through him, though this may well 
provide an informative study. Some  comments made by others (e.g., McGrath 1996, 28) give the impression that 
Lindbeck‘s view of Wittgenstein is indeed largely that of Holmer. Whatever Holmer‘s role in this genealogy, it will be 
quite clear by now from the foregoing text and notes that Lindbeck and I understand Wittgenstein differently, and that I 
find Lindbeck still deeply entrenched in just those ways of thinking that Wittgenstein sought to expose as illusions. 
Lindbeck  acknowledges  that,  while  Wittgenstein‘s  strong  influence  in  some  theological  circles  served  as  a  major 
stimulus to his thinking, that stimulus  may be ‗in ways that those  more  knowledgeable in  Wittgenstein  might not 
approve‘ (ND 24). There is no other indication in ND that Wittgenstein‘s legacy might be contested. 
67 See p. 116 above. The first part of the argument  takes up sections 4.2 and 4.3 above. Perception that Lindbeck 
draws heavily on Wittgenstein is illustrated by David Tracy (1985a, 465) and James Miller (1989, 19n) 
68 Lindbeck‘s own short description of his overarching metaphor was ‗religions resemble languages‘, but I have often 
called it ‗religion-as-culture‘ in view of Lindbeck‘s emphasis on the concrete context of language and in order to 
facilitate comparison with other accounts of culture in chapter 3 above. For the purposes of this subsection, however, 
I will revert to Lindbeck‘s terminology while retaining his emphasis.   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    182 
notions  of  translatability  and  intelligibility.  By  analogy  with  grammar,  doctrine  describes the 
implicit rules of Christian language, and is not concerned with grounding language in reality. On 
this view ontological reference is unnecessary to doctrine and should not be imposed on it. When 
expounding these metaphors and engaging alternative views Lindbeck employs terms borrowed 
from Wittgenstein: ‗language game‘ (ND 33), ‗form of life‘ (ND 18, 64), and ‗deep grammar‘ (ND 
82).69 But, as we shall now see, Lindbeck‘s use of these terms is very different to Wittgenstein‘s. 
As Lindbeck explains at the outset, the point of his general linguistic metaphor is not simply 
that ‗religions resemble languages‘, but that 
religions  resemble  languages  together  with  their  correlative  forms  of  life  and  are  thus 
similar  to  cultures  (insofar  as  these  are  understood  semiotically  as  reality  and  value 
systems—that is, as idioms for the construing of reality and the living of life).70 
As  Lindbeck  uses  them  in  his  first  three  chapters,  and  especially  in  his  discussion  of 
‗intrasystematic truth‘ (ND 64-8), the phrases ‗form of life‘ and ‗language game‘ reflect the 
view that words acquire meaning as they are used in determinate contexts, with ‗form of life‘ 
indicating the concreteness of context and ‗language game‘ its boundedness. Taking ‗form of 
life‘ first, Lindbeck sees here a key difference between his cultural-linguistic proposal and its 
major rivals. In contrast to their ‗intellectualist‘ view of context, which remains linguistic and 
conceptual, a cultural-linguistic view of context includes ‗not only other utterances but also the 
correlative forms of life‘.71 With this relatively concrete view of language use and language 
users Lindbeck approaches Wittgenstein‘s insight that neither language nor its users may be 
radically distinguished from the world, for they are the world, just as much as rocks, trees and 
houses are the world. A distinguishing feature of language is that it is a socially-mediated and 
socially-modulated  technique  of  engagement  with  the  world,  a  means  of  participation.72  A 
distinguishing feature of its users is that they use it. These features do not in the least  separate 
either language or its users from the world, though they do unfortunately allow the possibility 
that language users might assume, imagine, or desire this to be the case. 
Another aspect of concreteness is specificity, and in this regard Lindbeck employs the phrase 
‗language-game‘, along with ‗form of life‘, to support his case for the intrasystematic derivation 
of  religious  meaning,  arguing  that  religious  meaning  is  determined  only  through  (real  or 
imagined)  participation  in  a  specific  religious  ‗language-game‘  (i.e.,  a  religion).73  Hence, 
                                                       
69  Even  the  idea  of  treating  doctrine  as  grammar  may  derive  from  a  parenthetical  remark  of  Wittgenstein‘s 
concerning ‗theology as grammar‘. See the references and discussion in Kerr 1997, 145-8. 
70 ND 18, emphasis added. 
71 ND 64. Lindbeck illustrates by contrasting Christianity with Euclidean geometry. ‗The difference is that in the 
Christian case the system is constituted, not in purely intellectual terms by axioms, definitions, and corollaries, but by 
a set of stories used in specifiable ways to interpret and live in the world‘ (in loc). 
72 ‗Socially mediated‘ refers to the way in which we learn language by means of particular social practices. ‗Socially 
modulated‘ refers to the fact that the meanings of language are bound up with complex and continually-evolving 
social  customs.  The  first  half  (or  so)  of  Wittgenstein‘s  Philosophical  Investigations  is  much  occupied  with  the 
investigation of (or rather, a disciplined wonderment concerning) these matters. 
73 The right use of religion-as-language ‗cannot be detached from a particular way of behaving‘ (ND 64). That is, the 
essential context is both concrete and particular. See also the discussion at ND 68: one must be ‗inside the relevant   LINDBECK‘S RULE THEORY OF DOCTRINE    183 
interpretation and translation cannot establish what the meaning ‗really‘ is, though they may 
provide some insight for non-participants. In this way, an appreciation of the specificity of 
concrete forms of life and the boundedness of language-games undergird Lindbeck‘s view of 
the limited translatability of religious meaning and the consequent occurrence of apologetics in 
ad hoc, rather than systematic, encounters or pronouncements.74 
Lindbeck‘s understanding of the relation between ‗language-games‘ and ‗forms of life‘ broadly 
reflects Wittgenstein, as does his use of these terms to indicate the concreteness of the contexts 
in which language is used; but when he refers to whole languages, cultures and religions as 
‗language-games‘,75 he quite decidedly differs from Wittgenstein, who was speaking of very 
elementary practices. For example, the meaning of the word ‗hallo‘ when people shake hands 
differs from its meaning when one encounters something unexpected. Wittgenstein‘s point was 
that  linguistic  meaning  becomes  determinate  only  in  the  context  of  (real  or  imagined) 
participation in small concrete activities. What ‗hallo‘ means depends on the form of life of 
which it is part. A language-game is a form of life considered from the aspect of language use.76 
A properly Wittgensteinian argument, then, would not focus on the large -scale phenomena of 
whole religions but on small-scale interactions in which people engage with each other, with 
language, and with the world in ways that might or might not be considered ‗religious‘: singing, 
prayer, cooperative work, hospitality, discussion, recital, argument, meals, sharing a beer, etc. 
The  idea  of  language-games  as  small  concrete  engagements  between  people  and  world, 
mediated by language and world, allows that translation and interpretation may be difficult, but 
this  is  not  its  emphasis,  which  is  rather  on  the  fact,  and  therefore  the  possibility,  of  such 
engagements and the (relatively) determinate meanings they enable. The concept highlights not 
                                                                                                                                                             
context‘ in order to use religious affirmations meaningfully, i.e., to achieve the possibility of either truth or falsity 
rather than mere meaninglessness. 
74 Lindbeck mentions ‗ad hoc apologetics‘ only in his last chapter, at ND 129, 131 and 135. The first two occasions 
clearly indicate the link with limited translatability. 
75 For example, at ND 33: ‗[J]ust as a language (or ―language game,‖ to use Wittgenstein‘s phrase) is correlated with 
a form of life, and just as a culture has both cognitive and behavioral dimensions, so it is also in the case of a 
religious tradition.‘ Fergus Kerr 1997, 28-31 briefly describes the genealogy of this error and notes its contribution to 
Kai Nielsen‘s article ‗Wittgensteinian fideism‘ published in Philosophy in 1967. What Nielsen describes is certainly 
fideism, but just as certainly not Wittgensteinian. 
76 Lash 1984 provides a generally helpful treatment of the scope of Wittgenstein‘s ‗language games‘ and ‗forms of 
life‘, and his conclusions, though they focus on inter-religious dialogue rather than apologetics, are quite compatible 
with these comments. I would, however, offer a correction in one respect. Although Lash rightly takes issue with 
Norman Malcolm‘s remark that ‗religion is a form of life‘, Malcolm‘s definition of a language-game (‗language 
embedded in action‘, as cited by Lash pp. 20, 22) is preferable to Lash‘s (‗the linguistic component of a form of life‘, 
Lash pp. 23-4). Lash can refer to the possibility that this or that  discourse might be a language game, the only 
difficulty being that an entire discourse is far too large in scope to be what Wittgenstein had in mind. But it is also too 
purely linguistic to be what Wittgenstein intended. For documentation of this claim, one need look no further than the 
copious examples supplied by Lash. A language game is indeed ‗language embedded in action‘—not the notionally 
separable ‗linguistic component‘ of a form of life, but a form of life considered from the viewpoint of the language 
employed in it. Lash appreciates that the term ‗form of life‘ refers to specific behaviours, ‗micro-practices‘, including 
the language embedded in them. The difference between ‗language game‘ and ‗form of life‘ has less to do with 
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only  the  concrete  particularity  but  also the  ubiquity  of  the  people-language-world  nexus in 
myriad small encounters. Thus, while Lindbeck correctly suggests that the idea of language-
games points to an ad hoc rather than a systematic apologetic, the emphasis should not be on the 
limitation of apologetics to ad hoc encounters, but on the proliferation of such encounters in 
daily life. That is, the small scale of Wittgenstein‘s language-games strongly counters any idea 
of  a  religion  as  a  self-contained  system.  Rather,  it  indicates  that,  in  pluralist  societies,  the 
‗boundary‘ of a religion is constantly being formed and tested in every concrete context in 
which adherents and non-adherents meet. In each such encounter, the language-game (buying, 
selling,  ordering,  following,  learning,  serving,  hiring,  caring,  etc)  is  an  occasion  of  shared 
meaning that might, or might not, develop in other directions (such as an apologetic direction). 
Wittgenstein‘s notion of ‗forms of life‘ and ‗language-games‘ can help us appreciate the fluidity 
and porosity of the ‗boundaries‘ of religions, and may lead us to ask whether ‗boundary‘ is not 
too settled and systemic a concept for describing such phenomena. 
The other Wittgensteinian theme in ND lies near the centre of Lindbeck‘s argument: the metaphor 
of doctrine-as-grammar, and the related ideas of ‗surface grammar‘ and ‗deep grammar‘. Using 
this metaphor Lindbeck argues that, just like formal grammar, doctrine affirms nothing about 
reality,  but  only  about  religious  affirmations.  We  have  noted  that  this  view  of  grammar 
presupposes a radical distinction between language and world, a distinction that is clearly in 
tension with the concreteness of context Lindbeck emphasises in relation to his general religion-
as-language metaphor. Whereas in the first part of ND Lindbeck emphasised that religion, like 
language, is embedded in particular concrete contexts (and hence is not fully translatable), in the 
second part he argues that doctrine, as the grammar of the Christian ‗language‘, is completely 
disengaged from the realities to which Christian affirmations refer. As such, it is unchanging, 
unlike the continually changing concrete contexts in which it is implicitly used. We have also 
noted that Lindbeck does not regard discernment of the grammar of Christianity as a trivial matter. 
Doctrines  are  instantiated  in  historically  situated  formulations  that  include  transitory  ‗surface 
grammar‘, i.e., temporary rules relevant to specific circumstances. Reflection on these may yield 
insight into the abiding ‗deep grammar‘ that is invariant across all times and places. 
Wittgenstein‘s  ideas  of  ‗grammar‘  and  ‗depth‘  may  be  illustrated  from  a  passage  in  his 
Philosophical  Investigations.  In  the  vicinity  of  §664  he  is  considering  the  verb  ‗to  mean‘, 
proceeding,  as  usual,  by  presenting  and  pondering  over  numerous  examples  of  use  (i.e., 
language games). Then he invites a more theoretical kind of wonder: 
§664.        In  the  use  of  words  one  might  distinguish  ‗surface  grammar‘  (Oberflächen-
grammatik) from ‗depth grammar‘ (Tiefengrammatik). What immediately impresses itself 
upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the 
part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in by the ear. —— And now compare the 
depth grammar, say of the word ―to mean‖, with what its surface grammar would lead us to 
suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about. 
Wittgenstein‘s ‗surface grammar‘ is what we usually call ‗grammar‘. That is, it is ‗formal‘ 
grammar—it deals with parts of speech; it analyses language insofar as it may be spoken and 
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What  can  be  ‗taken  in  by  the  ear‘  is  merely  part,  or  an  aspect,  of  its  use.  Language  is  a 
technique of engagement with the world. As such, its basic units are not sentences (as in formal 
or ‗surface‘ grammar), but actual uses (language games). ‗Depth grammar‘ is concerned with 
the use of words in forms of life; it explores the function or contribution of words in concrete 
engagements. Thus, depth grammar is concerned with language games as surface grammar is 
concerned  with  formal  language.  Although,  on  this  reading,  depth  grammar  would  include 
surface grammar within its scope (as a surface might be ‗the surface of the deep‘), its focus is on 
use as engagement. The difficulty with this, and the basic reason for Wittgenstein‘s method of 
disciplined wonder that has been a source of frustration for so many (myself included), is that 
such a ‗grammar‘ cannot be fully described in words, but only in the implicit patterns of myriad 
Lebensformen. Here, we probe the limits of language: Wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber 
mu  man  schweigen.77  Because  of  its  engagement  with  the  world,  Wittgenstein‘s  ‗depth 
grammar‘ passes beyond words and their generality, and into the flux of life. 
Lindbeck‘s ‗depth‘ and ‗surface‘ are the reverse of Wittgenstein‘s. Lindbeck‘s ‗deep grammar‘ 
is the unchanging doctrinal core that lies hidden beneath the changing circumstances reflected in 
temporary rules and historically-situated doctrinal formulations. He probes the shifting surface 
in order to fathom the unchanging deep. The surface is the realm of worldly engagement; the 
deep is a realm of detachment where constancy is possible. For Wittgenstein, surface grammar 
was the formal grammar of words-in-themselves, words which may be engaged or non-engaged, 
idle  or  fruitful;  the  dimension  of  ‗depth‘  was  precisely  the  dimension  of  engagement  or 
language-at-work. Thus, although Lindbeck nods towards Wittgenstein when he speaks of ‗deep 
grammar‘, his insistence that doctrine does not engage the world ensures that his doctrine-as-
grammar never goes beyond what Wittgenstein called ‗surface grammar‘.78 
Lindbeck‘s  reversal  of  Wittgenstein‘s  ‗depth‘  and  ‗surface‘  highlights  the  different  views  of 
language in his two main metaphors. We have noted the relative concreteness of ‗language‘ in his 
overarching religion-as-language metaphor, where the Christian ‗language‘ (or semiotic system) 
includes and presupposes particular ways of relating to the world, and even is a way of engaging 
the  world.  Moving  from  this  general  metaphor  to  the  more  specific  doctrine-as-grammar 
metaphor, the analogy is to a grammar that refers only to language and not to the world. The 
language referred to is neither part of the world, nor fundamentally a way of engaging the world, 
but only a way of speaking which may be considered in itself, without reference to the world. 
In summary, Wittgenstein‘s insight that language use is a social behaviour embedded in concrete 
actions is reflected in Lindbeck‘s exposition of religion-as-language but not carried through into 
his  account  of  doctrine-as-grammar.  Other  Wittgensteinian  elements  are  grossly  distorted: 
Lindbeck has mistaken the scale of language-games, and his understanding of depth in relation to 
the grammatical analysis of language use is the opposite of Wittgenstein‘s. These conclusions tell 
strongly against any perception that Lindbeck‘s rule theory of grammar can be supported by 
                                                       
77 ‗Whereof one cannot speak, thereon one must be silent.‘ 
78 In this light, Lindbeck‘s view of doctrine has a distinctly Platonic hue. What is more real, form or matter? Lindbeck 
wants the dimension of ‗depth‘ to be one in which doctrine can be unchanging, like Plato‘s forms. But Wittgenstein‘s 
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reference to Wittgenstein. I do not, however, draw further conclusions as to the theory‘s validity 
on this basis. Such conclusions would presuppose a theological engagement with Wittgenstein, a 
task that I have not attempted, and which in any case lies well beyond the scope of this enquiry. 
The following paragraphs briefly ponder the likely shape of a more truly Wittgensteinian cultural-
linguistic proposal and what such a proposal has to offer Christian theology. 
What  might  the  cultural-linguistic  proposal  look  like  if  the  elements  borrowed  from 
Wittgenstein remained true to their source? I argued earlier that Lindbeck‘s view of religions as 
language-world  systems  (i.e.,  complete  semiotic  systems  with  their  own  fields  of  meaning 
which are at best only partially translatable) might be serviceable if idealised notions of culture 
and language were discarded and the dynamic, open and permeable nature of language were 
recognised. The small scale and concrete simplicity of Wittgenstein‘s language-games support 
this modification, and indicate that languages and cultures are not best described as ‗systems‘. It 
is not that these aspects of human society lack structure, but such structure as they have is an 
emergent  feature  of  countless  concrete  situations  to  which  verbal  signs  contributed.79  The 
doctrine-as-grammar metaphor could be fruitful if it embraced the concreteness of language use 
and a truly Wittgensteinian understanding of ‗depth‘. But it would then be quite impossible to 
think of doctrines as unchanging rules that say nothing about the world, for language would be 
world, and doctrine-as-grammar would be a grammar of religious engagement with the world by 
means of world. Worldliness would be utterly unavoidable. 
Such a view of doctrine may help us to probe the limits of the analogy with grammar and also the 
limits of doctrine itself, as I will briefly illustrate by outlining a concrete view of language and 
indicating some consequences for the doctrine-as-grammar metaphor. In view of Wittgenstein‘s 
exposure of the illusion of Cartesian dualism, we will be on guard against the temptation to 
separate language from reality, for language is as real as anything else. It is the reality of vocal and 
textual signs generated in human communities through myriad customary agreements made in, 
and in response to, the encounters of daily life. Grammar is an emergent structure arising from 
language use itself, i.e., it does not arise from anything outside language use. This is as true for 
depth grammar in relation to forms of life as it is for surface grammar in relation to forms of 
words. Depth grammar, then, is the emergent structure of language understood as the vocal and 
textual tool by means of which humans engage reality (including the reality of each other, and that 
of language itself). On this view, the study of depth grammar will attend to linguistic and non-
linguistic reality in order to discern the structure of linguistic engagement with it, but its concern 
will be to elucidate the nature of the engagement rather than the reality engaged. 
Christianity acknowledges Jesus Christ as the decisive revelation of God, and hence aims to 
pattern itself not on itself but on Christ, and to engage the world on the basis of faith in him as 
living Lord of church and world. It is of the essence of Christianity that the pattern of its 
engagement with the world arises outside itself in the action of the living God in history. Unlike 
language, Christianity is not simply the product of ‗myriad customary agreements made in, and 
in response to, the encounters of daily life‘, even if it describes such encounters in terms of a 
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particular set of stories or scriptures. Nor is it simply an inherited communal tool that is quasi-
transcendent  in  relation  to  its  present  users.  But  if  Christianity  is  not  simply  these  things, 
nevertheless it is these things by virtue of being a language-drenched, historically extended, 
reasonably cohesive way of engaging the world, i.e., by virtue of its nature as tradition. Herein 
lie both the limitation and the value of seeing doctrine as a depth grammar. The difference 
between true transcendence and quasi-transcendence distinguishes true worship from idolatry, 
thus identifying a crucial limitation of the metaphor. Yet, if human beings offer any worship at 
all, they do so in and through engagement with quasi-transcendent and transient reality; and so 
depth grammar, as an aid to disciplined reflection on this engagement, may yield useful insights 
into the nature of doctrine and doctrinal development. 
Christian  doctrine  cannot  be  fully  comprehended  through  an  analogy  with  grammar,  even  a 
properly conceived depth grammar. Yet awareness of the limits of analogies may lead to their 
better use. An understanding of culture and language can be helpful for understanding Christianity 
and other religions, and Christian doctrine can be compared fruitfully with a depth grammar. I 
suggest  that  there  are  two  main  areas  in  which  Christian  theology  can  benefit  from  critical 
engagement with cultural studies and the philosophy of language. Firstly, these disciplines aid the 
construction of robust theological anthropologies. Secondly, they provide salutary commentary on 
the human vulnerability of doctrine and the practices through which it is constructed, debated, 
adopted and communicated. Taken together, these contributions indicate that real progress in 
ecumenical  discussions  may  depend  less  on  a  common  belief  that  doctrine  is  an  ahistorical 
changeless grammar, than on a common belief that one‘s self and one‘s own tradition share fully 
in human vulnerability and are therefore implicated in patterns that reflect not only the grammar of 
the gospel but also the grammars of personal and institutional self-legitimation. 
5.3.2  The Possibility of Permanence 
If  Lindbeck‘s  misunderstanding  of  Wittgenstein  contributed  to  his  view  of  doctrine  as  an 
ahistorical grammar, it does not explain the direction of his argument. Curiosity regarding such an 
explanation is heightened by the foregoing critique, which used Wittgenstein to expose problems 
in Lindbeck‘s argument and point it toward a different conclusion. Something like a hermeneutic 
of suspicion is called for: why does Lindbeck judge the success of his (or any) theory of doctrine 
by its ability to allow for ‗the possibility of doctrinal normativeness and permanence‘ (ND 107)? I 
approach this question by engaging firstly with the background commitments that made doctrinal 
permanence important to Lindbeck, and secondly with the means by which he accommodated it in 
his rule theory. We will then be well-placed to address the question directly. 
In his Foreword to ND Lindbeck emphasises the meta-analytical nature of his inquiry. He does 
not wish to decide any doctrinal issues, but to provide a conceptuality that is more adequate to 
the phenomena of doctrine (ND 7). Under existing theories, some of these phenomena seem 
anomalous—permanence and change, conflict and compatibility, unity and disarray, variety and 
uniformity. Lindbeck‘s theory will coherently allow for all of these possibilities, dissolving the 
anomalies by rendering them intelligible (ND 9). Because of the ‗embarrassingly wide‘ range of 
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matters. This  restriction is  not  a  matter  of  practical  convenience  only,  for  it serves  one  of 
Lindbeck‘s requirements for an ecumenically useful theory of doctrine: ecumenical neutrality. 
As is appropriate in a theoretical inquiry more concerned with how to think than with what to 
assert about matters of fact, the proposals advanced in this book are intended to be acceptable 
to all religious traditions that fall within its purview. They are, in other words, meant to be 
ecumenically and religiously neutral. They do not in themselves imply decisions either for or 
against the communally authoritative teachings of particular religious bodies.80 
Lindbeck intends a comprehensive and inclusive neutrality. His proposal will show no partiality 
between Christian traditions (ecumenical neutrality), or between Christians and adherents of other 
religions or none (religious neutrality). It will be inclusive by accommodating the ‗possible truth‘ 
of the doctrinal claims of the various religious traditions.81 This acritical inclusivity operates as the 
major premise of a syllogism in which the minor premise is the fact that at least one Christian 
tradition holds to the permanence of doctrine, the conclus ion  being  Lindbeck‘s  criterion  for 
success: a viable theory of doctrine must be able to accommodate the permanence of doctrine. 
Lindbeck repeatedly assures his readers that his idea of the nature of doctrine is of this kind.82 
Thus, Lindbeck‘s requirement that a theory of doctrine be open to the possibility of permanence 
follows logically from his prior commitment to an acritical ecumenical neutrality. However, there 
are  strong  theological  and  philosophical  reasons  for  challenging  this  commitment.  The  basic 
concern with neutrality and the distinction between ‗how to think‘ and ‗what to assert about 
matters  of  fact‘  reflect  the  Enlightenment‘s  epistemological  preoccupations,  notwithstanding 
Lindbeck‘s disavowal of foundationalism and the quest for certainty. He is less concerned with 
foundations than with how to build, and so he speaks of categories and methods, suggesting that if 
we can agree on a framework then meaningful discussion can take place; if we can agree on a 
method then we can move towards agreement on substantive issues.83 But categories and methods 
always already imply assertions about matters of fact, 84 and Lindbeck‘s ‗theoretical inquiry‘ is 
                                                       
80 ND 9. The ‗purview‘ Lindbeck has in mind is primarily that of Christian religious traditions, but he admits of 
wider hopes for the applicability of his argument in the nontheological study of religion and perhaps also for non-
Christian ecumenical and theological purposes (see ND 7-8). 
81 This accommodation underlies the ‗availability‘ of Lindbeck‘s proposal to adherents of various traditions. 
82 Apart from explicit statements in which Lindbeck is at pains to show that his proposal ‗does not in any way 
contradict  the  official  Roman  Catholic  view  that  all  church  doctrines  are  permanent‘  (ND  87),  various  passing 
references indicate a presupposition that constancy is intrinsic to doctrine. For example, when Lindbeck says that his 
rule theory of doctrine ‗does not locate the abiding and doctrinally significant aspect of religion in propositionally 
formulated truths…‘ (ND 80), it appears that the phrase ‗abiding and doctrinally significant‘ should be taken as a 
hendiadys, or as if the word ‗therefore‘ appeared after the ‗and‘. For Lindbeck, constancy or permanence is one of the 
defining ‗traditional characteristics‘ of doctrine (ND 79). See also ND 84: ‗the difficulty with locating the constant 
element in a religion on the level of either objective description or inner experience is that this tends to result in the 
identification of the normative form of the religion with either the truth claims or the experiences appropriate to a 
particular world‘ (emphasis added). Apparently, normativity requires constancy; constancy cannot be found in any 
‗particular world‘; and so neither can normativity. Thus whatever is normative must also be beyond history. 
83 That is, this is a modern, liberal approach shorn only of what can no longer be retained, namely, a belief in the 
availability of indubitable foundations. 
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precisely  an  assertion  of  what  to  think  in  relation  to  social  anthropology  and  the  nature  of 
language. How can a proposal that asserts a definite anthropology be non-prejudicial towards the 
doctrines of many traditions (Lindbeck‘s notion of ‗neutrality‘) when, insofar as they mean to be 
relevant  to  human  beings,  those  traditions  and  their  doctrines  are  vitally  interested  in 
anthropology? In particular, since the formulation of doctrine is a human and ecclesial activity, 
doctrines  concerning  doctrine  are  necessarily  connected  to  anthropology  and  ecclesiology.  A 
theory of doctrine that relies on a definite social anthropology could be neutral or non-prejudicial 
in Lindbeck‘s sense only as a strictly pretheological theory. Such ‗neutrality‘ presupposes the 
circumscription of Christ‘s Lordship, hardly a non-prejudicial idea for Christian traditions.85 
But such objections may be unnecessary in view of Lindbeck‘s recognition that ‗what is taken 
to be reality is in large part socially constructed‘ (ND 82), and that ‗there is no neutral point of 
view‘  for  adjudicating  ‗debates  between  fundamentally  different  outlooks‘  (ND  73).  Such 
affirmations contradict the claim of neutrality: to deny the possibility of neutral vantage points 
while  offering  a  neutral  vantage  point  is  a  direct  self-contradiction.86  Moreover, although 
Lindbeck‘s hopes for the nature of doctrine are much the same as the Enlightenment‘s hopes for 
the nature of knowledge, he develops his proposal using the very tools that have shown such 
hopes to be illusory for human beings. 
The inclusiveness of Lindbeck‘s neutrality requires a simultaneous enabling and withholding of 
judgement.  His  proposal  will  treat  the  ‗communally  authoritative  teachings  of  particular 
religious bodies‘ as meaningful (i.e., as possibly true or false rather than merely meaningless) 
without prejudging their truth or falsity. But for Lindbeck, affirmations are meaningful only to 
the extent that the categories they employ are adequate to the reality being described,87 and his 
‗test cases‘ indicate that the affirmations for which he requires meaningfulness are not so much 
traditional doctrines as the traditional claims that doctrines are unconditional, irreversible and 
infallible.88 That is, these claims about doctrine, more than doctrine itself, are the primary data 
                                                                                                                                                             
the conceptual categories of an interpretive framework are adequate to reality (ND 48). Yet he regards ‗grammar‘ 
and ‗rules of the game‘ as equivalent terms for ‗categories‘ (ND 48) and later employs the grammatical analogy 
precisely because grammar asserts nothing about extra-linguistic reality (ND 69). 
85 See the conclusions offered above in 4.5.2 The Idea of Particularity in Christian Theology beginning on p. 150. 
86 Lindbeck might object that he has denied the existence of neutral vantage points only for adjudicating between 
‗fundamentally  different  outlooks‘  such  as  experiential-expressivism,  propositionalism,  and  his  own  cultural-
linguistic  theory.  But  if  neutrality  is  impossible  only  in  relation  to  ‗fundamentally  different  outlooks‘,  then  an 
intention to be neutral ecumenically and religiously but not theologically (ND 9-10) implies that differences between 
theological  perspectives  (intratextual,  propositional,  liberal)  are  seen  as  fundamental,  but  differences  between 
religious denominations or between whole religions are not. And this, in turn, implies that a theological perspective 
reflects an ultimate commitment while religious faith does not—which is nonsensical. In anthropological perspective, 
the  impossibility  of  neutrality  is  a  corollary  of  embodiment.  Neutrality  as  espoused  by  the  Enlightenment  and 
intended by Lindbeck is not available to embodied, and therefore situated, beings, regardless of their judgements as to 
what constitutes a ‗fundamental‘ difference. 
87 See 5.1.1 The Nature of Truth commencing on p. 154 above. 
88 Recall that the test cases are not simply doctrinal affirmations, but characteristics of doctrinal affirmations. What 
his theory must accommodate are ‗the unconditionality of the classic Christological (and Trinitarian) affirmations, the 
irreversibility of the Marian developments, and the infallibility of the teaching office‘ (ND 91). Only the last case is 
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for rule theory. Lindbeck does not ask whether the claims and/or their underlying conceptual 
categories are adequate to the reality of doctrine as human construction. Rather, taking the 
‗possible truth‘ of the claims as a given, he seeks conceptual categories that are adequate to this 
‗reality‘, assuming that such categories will also be adequate to the reality of doctrine itself. In 
this way, rule theory conforms to Lindbeck‘s idea of a grammar: just as rule theory presents 
doctrine as the grammar of the gospel, the theory itself is a grammar of doctrinal claims. Neither 
grammar is interested in the truth or the humanity of its object. 
Given  the  finitude  and  moral  frailty  of  human  understanding,  the  humanity  of  doctrinal 
construction  suggests  that  there  are  more  ways  of  ‗making  sense  of‘  traditional  claims  for 
doctrine than accommodating their ‗possible truth‘. One can also make sense of beliefs in terms 
of historical pressures for self-legitimation, the projection of power, and the delusions of the 
human ego. But Lindbeck gives no indication in ND that a hermeneutic of suspicion might be 
relevant in ecumenical discussions in view of the implication of communally agreed norms in 
historical processes of communal self-definition and self-legitimation, not to mention religious 
geo-politics,  the  interests  of  nation-states,  and  clerical  ambition.  To  use  a  crude  analogy, 
pluralistic western societies may be said to operate on the basis that all religions are equally true 
in public, equally false in the academy, and equally useful to the state.89 Lindbeck may prefer 
the neutrality of the people to th at of the philosophers, but he can ill afford to ignore the 
neutrality of the politicians, who are rather more cynical (though perhaps more realistic) 
concerning human motivations and the human capacity for self-deception. 
In summary, the requirement that  a theory of doctrine be able to accommodate doctrinal 
constancy  follows  from  Lindbeck‘s  commitment  to  ‗ecumenical  neutrality‘.  The  standpoint 
implicit  in  this  neutrality  is  inimical  to  the  confession  of  Christ  as  Lord,  but  perhaps  this 
observation should be a mere footnote: after all, the standpoint cannot be inhabited by human 
beings, but only by disembodied Cartesian egos. Moreover, Lindbeck‘s ecumenical neutrality 
takes  form  as  an  acritical  inclusivity  in  which  traditional  claims  about  doctrine  are  treated 
implausibly as simple data that need not be questioned concerning their vulnerability as human 
constructions. There is no hint in ND that the claim of neutrality and the acritical attitude to 
traditional claims may be questionable, let alone untenable. 
Despite  the  impression  that  may  be  given  by  his  determination  to  be  acritically  inclusive, 
Lindbeck  is  not  ignorant  of  the  critical  methods  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  He  does, 
however, apply them selectively. We have seen that he did not apply, or even consider applying, 
                                                       
89 Apologies to Edward Gibbon (1737-94), who actually wrote: 
The policy of the emperors and the senate, as far as it concerned religion, was happily seconded 
by the reflections of the enlightened, and by the habits of the superstitious, part of their subjects. 
The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the 
people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally 
useful. And thus toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even religious concord 
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such a critique to his own claim to neutrality; yet he was very much aware that historicism and 
the social construction of knowledge severely limited the possibilities for the accommodation of 
doctrinal constancy.  Since  human  existence  and  understanding  are  thoroughly  historical,  he 
could not impute constancy to any human construct; and doctrine could be constant only insofar 
as it was free of historical influences and was not a human construct. That is, in providing for 
doctrinal constancy Lindbeck does not so much forget the historicity and humanity of doctrine 
as carefully define doctrine to be something that does not originate in human activity. Thus, 
given  the  possibility  of  doctrinal  permanence,  the  ahistoricity  of  doctrine  arises  not  in  the 
absence of, or in spite of, but precisely because of an appreciation of human historicity. The 
problem is one of distinction in relation. Since permanence is incompatible with historicity, 
Christian  doctrine  must  be  radically  distinct  from  Christian  knowledge.  Yet,  as  Christian 
doctrine, it must be essentially related to Christian knowledge. Lindbeck resolves the puzzle 
with a concept from his alethiology: conceptual categories do not affirm anything about reality, 
but merely provide an idiom in which affirmations may be made. 
This idea enables Lindbeck‘s distinctions between intrasystematic utterances and their implicit 
categorial scheme, between affirmations and their enabling interpretive frameworks, and the 
related  distinction  between  first-order  and  second-order  discourses.  Affirmations  and 
intrasystematic utterances belong to first-order discourse and as such are thoroughly historical, 
situated, plural, mutable, and prone to error. In contrast, Christian doctrine is the normative 
pattern of first-order Christian discourse. As such, it is ahistorical and unitary, and is what it is 
unconditionally, irreversibly and infallibly. Together with scripture it defines the conceptual 
categories,  the  interpretive  framework,  of  the  Christian  cultural-linguistic  system.  Doctrinal 
theology is a second-order discourse concerned with elucidating the content of doctrine.90 
For these distinctions to be viable, conceptual categories must be not only non -affirmatory, but 
also enduringly distinct from affirmations or knowledge. Unfortunately, neither requirement can 
be met, since use of a category is always an implicit affirmation which may become explicit at 
any time. Consider Lindbeck‘s example concerning the category ‗size‘. 
It is…meaningless to say that one thing is larger than another if one lacks the…[property] 
of size. …[C]ategorial adequacy does not guarantee propositional truth, but only makes 
meaningful statements possible: if something is quantifiable, statements about its size have 
meaning, but not necessarily truth.91 
To make the example more specific: if someone said ‗topology is smaller than a size 10 shoe‘, I 
could  not  make  sense  of  this  as  an  affirmation,  because  I  do  not  regard  the  mathematical 
                                                       
90 Note that doctrine itself is neither a discourse nor the product of a discourse (for then it would be a mutable human 
construct). Rather, it is simply there as the normative pattern of first-order discourse. Doctrine is the object into 
which second-order discourse enquires. 
91 ND 48, modified. The original text around the second ellipsis reads ‗if one lacks the categorial concept of size‘. 
But what is the ‗one‘ which lacks this concept? It would not be one of the things being compared, since ‗things‘ do 
not have concepts. Yet it would not be the general personal pronoun, either, since without a concept of size one could 
not have said that one thing was larger than another. I think Lindbeck meant to refer to one of the things being 
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discipline of topology as having the property of size.92 However, the statement could ‗make 
sense‘ if topology did have that property, if a metaphor was intended and recognised, or if, 
rather than affirming anything about topology and size 10 shoes, the speaker was making a joke 
or providing an example contrived to illustrate a point of grammar or logic.93 What is meant by 
‗making sense‘ differs between affirmations, metaphors, jokes, and illustrative examples. The 
sense of an affirmation is evaluated by reference to the objects it mentions. A speaker intending 
affirmation  will  intend  to  make  this  kind  of  sense;  and  a  hearer  recognising  the  speaker‘s 
intention will expect and look for this kind of sense. Hence, ‗topology is smaller than a size 10 
shoe‘, when intended as an affirmation and taken as such, implicitly affirms that topology has 
the property of size. The general point is that, when making affirmations, speakers implicitly 
affirm  the  adequacy  of  the  categories  they  employ,  and,  as  Lindbeck  himself  notes,  this 
adequacy  is  adequacy  to  reality.94  In other words,  when used in affirmations, conceptual 
categories are implicit affirmations about reality. 
But implicit affirmations may become explicit at any time, usually when misunderstanding or 
resistance occurs. If someone says ‗What did you mean by ―topology is smaller than a size 10 
shoe‖?‘ or ‗Is it valid to speak of topology as if it had the property of size?‘, then the ‗category‘ 
immediately becomes subject to direct inquiry concerning its status as knowledge, i.e., it is no 
longer an implicit but an explicit affirmation. Thus, the distinction between explicit and implicit 
affirmations, though real, is transient, being reconstituted as each affirmation or question is 
uttered. There are no bounded self-identical sets of conceptual entities such as ‗knowledge‘ (or 
‗affirmations‘)  and  ‗categories‘.  Rather,  every  use  of  a  word  or  concept  is  informed  by  a 
dynamic web of intersignifications and socio-cultural assumptions, as well as by the concrete 
context of the particular use. These observations indicate that conceptual categories are neither 
non-affirmatory  nor  enduringly  distinct  from  explicit  affirmations.  Lindbeck‘s  view  of 
conceptual categories, by means of which he asserted the possibility of doctrinal permanence, is 
just as untenable as the acritical standpoint from which he found that possibility to be necessary. 
Having described and criticised the origin and implementation of the possibility of doctrinal 
permanence in Lindbeck‘s argument, it is worth noting that the discussion has accounted for the 
                                                       
92 One could perhaps blur the boundaries here by saying that topology has ‗size‘ in relation to other mathematical 
disciplines (though ‗scope‘ might be a more appropriate term), and that shoe size remains an equivocal measure 
without specifying the size standard (e.g., U.S., European, etc). At the very least, however, topology does not have 
size in the same way that shoes have size. 
93 Recognition of jokes, metaphors, contrived examples, affirmations, irony and other verbal genres depends on the 
practical skills of speakers in exploiting, and of hearers in interpreting, the verbal and non-verbal contextual cues that 
are conventional in their linguistic community. 
94 ND 48. See also ND 63, where Lindbeck speaks of categorial adequacy in terms of whether or not a cultural-
linguistic system has (or lacks) ‗the concepts or categories to refer to the relevant realities‘ (compare ND 50). He 
thinks that categories can enable reference to reality without themselves referring to it. The enabling of reference is 
emphasised early in the third chapter of ND, while from the Excursus onwards the emphasis moves to the alleged 
non-referentiality of categories. The present argument takes up Lindbeck‘s view that adequate categories enable (and 
inadequate categories frustrate) the making of meaningful affirmations. Since, by definition, affirmations are meant to 
be meaningful, they necessarily (if implicitly) affirm the adequacy of the categories on which they rely. But that is to 
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major features of his proposal without once invoking its well-known linguistic and grammatical 
metaphors.  It  seems  that  these  metaphors  do  not  so  much  control  Lindbeck‘s  argument  as 
illustrate it, and this impression is reinforced by the different levels of concreteness achieved in 
the two metaphors: religion-as-language is enmeshed in concrete contexts, while doctrine-as-
grammar is a detached and timeless pattern.95 The source of this shift from engagement with the 
world to detachment from it is not the metaphors themse lves, but the requirement that the 
possibility of doctrinal permanence be accommodated. 
Without its major metaphors, the argument of  ND may be narrated as follows. The goal was a 
theory  of  doctrine  that  met  two  major  requirements:  it  had  to  explain  the  phenomenon  of 
ecumenical  discussions  in  which  doctrinal  reconciliation  was  achieved  without  changing 
established doctrinal positions; and it had to be ‗available to‘ (i.e., able to be adopted without 
prejudice by) diverse religious traditions, and hence able to facilitate future agreements. With a 
view to securing this availability, Lindbeck proceeded from a position of acritical ecumenical 
neutrality, a corollary of which was the adoption of the possibility of doctrinal permanence as 
overarching criterion. The key to his argument was an account of particularity gleaned from 
mid-twentieth  century  philosophy  and  cultural  theory,  an  account  that  emphasised  the 
comprehensiveness and ultimacy of culturally-embedded interpretive frameworks, as well as 
their stability and internal coherence. Lindbeck found that experiential-expressive approaches 
did not take doctrines seriously as attempts to describe reality, but subsumed them under the 
ultimacy  of  modern  philosophy,  and  explained  them  (away)  as  expressions  of  human 
psychological  states.  Accordingly,  serious  ecumenists,  who  do  acknowledge  the 
comprehensiveness  and  ultimacy  of  religious  commitments,  have  little  use  for  experiential-
expressivist  reductions.  Among  approaches  that  engage  seriously  with  doctrine,  traditional 
propositionalism  becomes  unconvincingly  unwieldy  as  it  faces  the  challenge  of  historical 
relativity, but a cultural-linguistic approach finds a fruitful analogy between doctrine and the 
interpretive  frameworks  of  cultures.  For  Lindbeck,  these  stable  and  internally  coherent 
frameworks provide conceptual categories that are non-affirmatory, enduringly distinct from 
knowledge, and unaffected by the flux of history. He accommodates doctrinal constancy in his 
rule theory by identifying doctrine proper with such a framework: it is the invariant pattern or 
‗grammar‘ of Christianity; what are commonly referred to as ‗doctrines‘ are really historically-
conditioned instantiations of that unchanging grammar. 
The foregoing critical narration of the argument has brought its difficulties into sharp relief. 
Lindbeck‘s acritical inclusivity defined a space in which past communal decisions could be 
received  without  interrogation  concerning  their  implication  in  human  finitude  and  moral 
vulnerability, a space inimical not only to Christian confession, but also to human existence. His 
idea of conceptual categories overlooked the dynamic interpenetration of language and world 
and the fact that humans use language with the intention of ‗making sense‘ in concrete contexts. 
The limitations of his static and monolithic understanding of culture were noted earlier.96 In 
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short, two of the three conceptual pillars of Lindbeck‘s argument cannot bear any weight, while 
the third (his understanding of culture) requires substantial renovation. 
In the previous subsection I argued that, while linguistic and grammatical metaphors could be 
fruitful for inquiry into religion, tradition and theology, realisation of that potential would rule 
out the possibility of doctrinal permanence.97 Here we have seen that Lindbeck‘s commitment to 
this possibility damages both the Christian identity of his proposal and its philosophical and 
anthropological  cogency.  That  this  commitment  crucially  constrained  his  entire  argument 
suggests that rehabilitation of the argument without that basic commitment would be a work of 
wholesale reconstruction—no mere modification could suffice. 
We can now address the question which is the goal of this discussion: why was the possibility of 
doctrinal permanence so important to Lindbeck? We saw that the logical roots of this possibility 
lay in Lindbeck‘s stance of acritical ecumenical neutrality, which in turn served his aim of 
offering a theory of doctrine that could be accepted by diverse religious traditions actually or 
potentially engaged in ecumenical dialogue. Or, looking forwards from this origin, we may say 
that Lindbeck wanted his theory to be acceptable to a certain audience, and that this desire 
predisposed him towards accommodation of his audience‘s presuppositions, notably those of the 
Roman Catholic Church, which was the main dialogue partner in the test cases of his fifth 
chapter, as through much of his ecumenical career.98 
There is more than a faint echo here of liberal theology‘s concern for credibility in the academy 
and its adoption of some of the academy‘s presuppositions concerning scientificity. Earlier, I 
criticised  Lindbeck  (and  the  liberal  tradition)  for  employing  supposedly  ‗neutral‘  or 
‗pretheological‘ notions of particularity without critically engaging such ideas from the standpoint 
of the gospel.99 I argued that this way of proceeding amounted to a circumscription of Christ‘s 
Lordship and a qualification of allegiance to him. It is now clear that Lindbeck‘s ecumenical 
‗neutrality‘ and his commitment to the possibility of doctrinal permanence are vulnerable to a 
similar critique. Indeed, the vulnerability is greater, since we are speaking here of an avowedly 
intra-Christian argument. Within the Christian church, of all places, should not the question of 
responsible Christian confession be raised with greatest urgency? ‗Jesus is Lord‘ means that even 
the academy‘s ‗common discourse‘ lies, however uneasily, under Christ‘s Lordship. A fortiori, 
Christian traditions, which embrace this confession, owe him whole-hearted allegiance. 
However, the present form of Christ‘s Lordship, under which Christian confession is yet a frail 
and vulnerable thing, does not allow the assumption that Christian traditions‘ allegiance to Christ 
is  not  problematic  simply  because  they  confess  his name.  On  the  contrary,  those  in  Christ‘s 
service should be especially aware of human frailty and their own relation to it. That is, the church 
                                                       
97 See p. 186 above. 
98 ‗What kind of meaning can [cultural-linguistic approaches to religion] give to the notion that doctrines are not only 
normative but permanent? Most  Christian traditions have held that their doctrines have this character,  and Roman 
Catholicism in addition maintains that its teaching office when making de fide pronouncements is infallible. If the 
regulative  or  rule  theory  appropriate  to  cultural  and  linguistic  models  excludes  these  claims  of  normativeness, 
permanence, and infallibility, it is theologically useless for many theologians and ecumenically useless for all.‘ (ND 73) 
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knows that it constantly depends on divine grace as it discharges its commission to bear witness to 
Christ in and through its own human frailty for the sake of all the other frail humans for whom, 
also, Christ died and was raised. This being so, it is intrinsic to the church‘s task that it be open to 
(though  not  uncritically  accepting  of)  external  criticism,  and  that  it  critically  engage  its  own 
traditions, and not only those of others, for the sake of the Lord it confesses.100 
5.3.3  Leaving Lindbeck’s Theory 
We have found that, at its core and in its execution, Lindbeck‘s argument has a decidedly 
Cartesian character, but it is not alone in this. Lindbeck‘s basic and most telling charge against 
cognitivists and expressivists lay in the same area. Recall his point that genuine disagreement 
exists  only  where  there is  prior  agreement  concerning  the  categories in  terms  of  which  an 
argument  is  conducted.  In  the  argument  between  cognitivists  and  expressivists,  Lindbeck 
identified  that  tacit  agreement  as  an  intellectualist  bias,  a  common  failure  to  recognise  the 
epistemological importance of human bodiliness and the social mediation of knowledge and 
meaning.  While  cognitivists  and  expressivists  disagree  on  the  intellectual  basis  of  religion 
(scripture and tradition on the one hand, science and philosophy on the other), and on the 
intellectual tools through which religion should be represented in the public realm (dogma and 
evangelism on the one hand, apologetic or mediating theology on the other), Lindbeck drew 
attention to their implicit agreement concerning the nature and sources of religion, namely, that 
that  nature  and  those  sources  are  amenable  to  appropriation  by  a  disembodied  Cartesian 
reasoner. One located the norm of reasoning outside religion, and the other located it within, but 
the nature of the presupposed reasoner was the same in each case. 
Lindbeck sided with propositionalists against expressivists in locating the norm of reasoning 
within a faith tradition, and in taking seriously the comprehensiveness and ultimacy of religious 
claims.101 He further agreed with propositionalists that religious norms are fixed, but parted with 
them  over  the  historicity  of  these  norms  and  their  relation  to  human  interpretation. 
Propositionalists find Christianity‘s fixed norm in the tradition and/or its scriptures, and, in 
focusing  on  that  norm,  give  insufficient  attention  to  the  frailty  and  finitude  of  human 
interpretation.  Lindbeck  saw  that  a  truly  fixed  norm  must  be  ahistorical,  and  that,  whether 
religious norms be fixed or fluid, inferences based on them are fluid, since religious reasoners 
are human and therefore immersed in the flux of history. For Lindbeck, the propositionalists 
were right about the fixity of doctrine, but wrong in thinking that this fixity could be maintained 
in time—they did not face up to the ineluctable historicity of every human proposition. 
                                                       
100 In his essay ‗Postmodern Theology and the Judgement of the World‘ (1989), Rowan Williams nicely uses the 
ambiguity of his title to make a similar point. While the church is called to judge the world (and must therefore be 
critically  and  therapeutically  engaged  with  it),  it  must  also  be  open  to  hear  God‘s  judgement  on  itself  in  the 
judgement passed upon it by the world (op. cit. 106). 
101 We have seen that the location of the norm of religion explains the pattern of Lindbeck‘s engagement with his rivals. 
Because expressivists locate the norm of reasoning outside religion, he argues with them over the nature of religion (and, 
indeed,  of  reason  itself),  but  finds  that  they  cannot  even  enter  the  debate  over  the  nature  of  doctrine.  But  since 
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Lindbeck‘s insistence on the historicity of the human reasoner distinguishes him from both sets of 
opponents. Humans are bodied beings, and therefore necessarily placed—physically, temporally, 
socially and culturally located. A human cannot be without being somewhere in particular, and 
nowhere else. Hence, on the one hand, doctrines cannot be simply explained away on the basis of 
a supposedly objective knowledge that presumes to place others while ignoring its own historicity. 
On the other hand, doctrinal formulations cannot be simply, objectively, and eternally true, for 
they are always conditioned by the location of the bodies doing the formulating. 
Yet Lindbeck, too, succumbed to a form of Cartesian distortion by placing his bodied, socio-
historically located humans in interpretive frameworks that are invariant through time. I have 
argued that this position is both theologically untenable and, in the end, inconsistent with a 
recognition  of  human  embodiment.  My  critique  focused  on  some  dualisms  implicit  in 
Lindbeck‘s rule theory—especially those of language and world, and grammar and assertion. 
Further dualisms then appeared as corollaries of the notion of invariant frameworks, as some 
aspects of the making of meaning were associated with the framework and therefore regarded as 
invariant (doctrine, scripture, tradition), while others were located in the flux of history and 
hence regarded as fluid (religion, worship, Christian life). 
The nature and role of scripture must be counted among the most intractable difficulties arising 
from the distinction between invariant frameworks and their fluid historical expressions. How 
do ahistorical frameworks come to be expressed in history? How do humans, as bodied and 
therefore  socio-historically  located  beings,  access  an  invariant,  ahistorical  interpretive 
framework? Lindbeck suggests that they do so by reading scripture and receiving early tradition. 
Thus,  he associates  scripture  with the interpretive  framework,102  a move that pulls towards 
treating scripture ahistorically.103 Yet he also speaks of scripture and the creeds as historically 
conditioned paradigmatic instantiations of unchanging ahistorical rules, 104 thus distinguishing 
between historical scripture and ahistorical framework. 105  The difficulties surrounding the 
nature and role of scripture in Lindbeck‘s proposal are clearly substantial, but I will not pursue 
them further, having already concluded that Lindbeck‘s account of interpretive frameworks is 
untenable. 
                                                       
102 Recall that the Christian categorial framework consists, not of doctrine alone, but of ‗the biblical narratives 
interrelated  in  certain  specified  ways  (e.g.,  by  Christ  as  center)‘  (ND  80),  and  that,  by  analogy  with  language, 
scripture functions as the lexicon, and doctrine as the grammar, of Christianity. See the earlier discussion of Doctrine 
as Grammar: Lindbeck’s Rule Theory commencing on p. 156 above. 
103 See my comments on the Lindbeck–Tracy debate, under Theologies of Distinction commencing on p. 60. 
104 On the creeds, see ND 96. Lindbeck speaks similarly of scripture when describing intratextual theology: scriptural 
religions treat their scriptures ‗as exemplary or normative instantiations of their semiotic codes‘ (ND 116); faithful 
theological  descriptions correspond  to  the  ‗semiotic  universe  paradigmatically  encoded  in holy  writ‘  (ibid.);  the 
immanent meanings of scripture are ‗the meanings immanent in the religious language of whose use the text is a 
paradigmatic instance‘ (ibid.); the normative or literal meaning of the text must be ‗what the text says in terms of the 
communal language of which the text is an instantiation‘ (120). 
105  It appears that, to the extent that he views scripture historically, Lindbeck subordinates it to the ahistorical 
framework.  Recall  the  close  association  between  permanence  (or  constancy)  and  authority  (or  normativity)  in 
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Abandonment  of  the  notion  of  ahistorical  interpretive  frameworks  frees  us  to  consider  the 
implications of pervasive historicity for a theological understanding of scripture and doctrine. 
What is the significance for Christian theology of the fact that everything that actually informs, 
or might inform, the making of meaning comes to us in the flux of time and space? Not only 
Jesus Christ himself, but also our confession of him; not only the scriptures that bear witness to 
Christ, but also the doctrines that guide, and to some extent misguide, our reading of scripture—
all share in the vulnerability of historical existence. All are susceptible to (mis)appropriation by 
human  understanding.  All  are  implicated  in  human  networks  of  desire  and  power.  What 
becomes of Christian confession, doctrine, and scripture when Lindbeck‘s ahistorical constancy 
is set aside? These are among the questions examined in the next chapter as we take up the 
inquiry Lindbeck foreshadowed but never quite embarked upon: a critical engagement with 
historicised propositionalism. 198 
6 
 
DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY: 
A VIABLE PROPOSITIONALISM? 
Although the term ‗historicised propositionalism‘ is Lindbeck‘s coinage, and may be thought to 
suffer by association with his problematic argument in the later part of ND, it is reasonably apt 
as a label for theological approaches that look to the authority of traditional sources with a 
measure of awareness that the sources themselves, and all their past and present interpreters, 
exist in particular historical contexts. In this chapter I explore such an approach by following a 
course parallel to that adopted in Chapter  3. There, I presented and engaged with a liberal 
account of the culture-theoretical terrain traversed by Lindbeck. Here, I present and engage a 
‗conservative‘ treatment of the same terrain. 
Generally,  conservatives  welcomed  Lindbeck‘s  advocacy  of  the  primacy  of  scripture  for 
Christian existence and his understanding that doctrine-as-rule must be ruled by scripture, but 
they were concerned that his metaphors of language and lens appeared to distance scripture and 
doctrine  from  historical  reality.  After  all,  the  lexicon  and  grammatical  rules  of  a  natural 
language make assertions only about the language—in and of themselves they say nothing about 
extra-linguistic reality; and even the best lens provides only clarity—it is not itself a vision of 
anything.  Such  misgivings  reflect  underlying  concern  for  the  truth  of  the  gospel.  For 
traditionalist and biblicist Christians, the gospel cannot be good news unless it is true news; and 
it cannot be true news unless it conforms to divine revelation in Holy Scripture.1 Yet, short of 
merely reading out the Scriptures in public, contemporary expression of the gospel requires 
doctrinal  reflection  on  Scripture.  Consequently,  conservative  thinkers  are  uneasy  with 
Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory, in which Scripture and doctrine differ in their truth status, 
and neither can be directly affirmed as ‗true‘. 
In what follows, as we review a conservative critique of Lindbeck‘s proposal, the intention is 
not to reinforce the negative conclusions of the previous chapter. Rather, the question now 
before us is whether a consistently confessional approach to theology can offer an account of 
truth, doctrine and scripture that is more robust than those offered by Lindbeck and his liberal 
critics. In particular, we must test the self-consistency of the confessional and critical stance that 
emerged in the course of the preceding chapters, a stance that clearly has some affinity with the 
‗historicised propositionalism‘ misunderstood by Lindbeck. The ‗conversation‘ in this chapter is 
constructed so as to illuminate this line of inquiry. 
                                                       
1 On the question of how the Bible is to be interpreted so as to facilitate a true understanding of divine revelation, 
Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Anglican traditions are more inclined to acknowledge the role of tradition, while 
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The foremost conservative respondent to Lindbeck is Alister McGrath, principally in The Genesis 
of Doctrine.2 McGrath is a valuable conversation partner because he not only offers a substantial 
evaluation of  ND,  but  goes  on  to  develop  an  account  of  the  nature  of  doctrine  that  is  both 
propositional and historically aware. As in the Lindbeck-liberal exchange, parallel reading of 
Lindbeck and McGrath uncovers some mutual misunderstandings, and these indicate possible 
improvements in McGrath‘s account of doctrine. Once again, immanent critique yields important 
insights into the coherence of the view under investigation, though in McGrath‘s case it is not so 
much the basic standpoint as its outworking that stands in need of review. The first two sections 
below present McGrath‘s response to Lindbeck and survey his account of the nature of doctrine. 
The third section moves to critical engagement, drawing attention to the relation between theology 
and ideology as an area in which McGrath‘s work is incomplete, and pointing to the need for a 
theological rationale for addressing ideological distortions in biblical texts. The fourth and fifth 
sections explore this theme in conversation with Karl Barth and Francis Watson respectively. 
6.1  ALISTER MCGRATH‘S RESPONSE TO LINDBECK 
Among  responses  to  Lindbeck  from  theologians  of  propositionalist  inclination,  the  most 
substantial  is  that  of  Alister  McGrath,  who  has  cautiously  explored  common  ground  while 
insisting that Lindbeck‘s proposal displays major shortcomings.3 In particular, McGrath‘s The 
Genesis of Doctrine is ‗a study of how the phenomenon of doctrine arose, how it has been 
understood, and how the past has been restructured and reappropriated by Christian theologians, 
especially in the modern period.‘4 Based on this descriptive material, the work offers theological 
and prescriptive claims informed by a keen awareness of the ‗delicate interplay…between the 
historically  descriptive  and  the theologically  normative‘  (GD  ix).  Such  prefatory  comments 
promise a thoroughly historical treatment of the origin and development of doctrines, tempered 
by a responsible self-consciousness of McGrath‘s own historical locatedness. 
GD focuses on the origin of doctrine, what it actually is, how it develops, and what authority 
ought to be ascribed to the past in Christian doctrinal reflection.5 Thus, McGrath‘s inquiry 
                                                       
2 McGrath 1990, abbreviated hereafter as GD. 
3 The following summary of McGrath‘s response to Lindbeck is based on the first and second chapters of GD and 
McGrath‘s contributions to a postliberal-evangelical symposium held in 1995 (McGrath 1996). The latter repeats 
large sections from GD and contains little new material relating to Lindbeck. Apart from changes reflecting the 
audience and occasion for the paper, McGrath reworked the material critical of liberal theology (pp. 24-5 are new), 
gave some attention to Paul Holmer‘s The Grammar of Faith (an important influence on Lindbeck, pp. 28-9), and 
extended his comments to cover Stanley Hauerwas and Hans Frei (pp. 39-43). New material on Lindbeck consists of 
about a page of text on Lindbeck‘s account of truth. 
4  GD  viii.  There  is  a  clear  similarity  between  this  description  of  the  development  of  doctrine  as  a  particular 
(re)construction of the past, and some of Delwin Brown‘s descriptions of the nature of tradition. 
5 In his introductory first chapter, McGrath states and discusses these questions more fully. His fuller summary of the 
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overlaps  those  of  Lindbeck  and  Brown,  while  giving  greater  attention  to  the  historicity  of 
doctrine‘s origin and development. His introductory comments foreshadow a view that, while 
Lindbeck may be asking some of the right questions and attacking some of the right adversaries, 
a different assessment may be order in respect of his constructive proposal.6 
6.1.1  On Recognising Propositionalism 
McGrath begins his discussion of ND by noting the book‘s general content and Lindbeck‘s 
motivations for writing it. He then considers each term of Lindbeck‘s three-fold taxonomy of 
doctrine before offering a preliminary evaluation. Concerning the cognitive-propositional theory 
(GD 16-20), McGrath immediately notes that Lindbeck‘s criticism of it appears to be 
based  upon  a  questionable  understanding  of  the  ‗cognitive-propositional‘  position, 
apparently grounded upon the belief that those inclined towards this position hold that it is 
possible to state the objective truth about God definitively, exhaustively and timelessly in 
propositional form.7 
McGrath argues that it is a misrepresentation to say (or to assume) that all who might admit to the 
appellation ‗propositionalist‘ must think in this way, for this is demonstrably not true of either the 
contemporary post-critical forms of propositionalism or their earlier classical counterparts.8 He 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the first place, we are obliged to consider the manner in which the past may  be in any sense 
authoritative for the present articulation of Christian doctrine. In what sense are our options 
limited, our horizons defined, our mental worlds already shaped, by what has happened in the 
past? To what extent are we free to break away fro m the heritage of the past? In the second 
place, we are obliged to give an account of the genesis of doctrine. Why did doctrinal 
formulations evolve, and what is their significance? What significant pressures —whether 
religious or social—may be detected as having precipitated doctrinal affirmations? And in the 
third  place,  the  theme  of  doctrinal  criticism  emerges  as  significant.  How  does  a  doctrinal 
statement relate to its historical context? The suggestion, still occasionally encountered, that 
theological attitudes in general or doctrinal statements in particular may be totally abstracted 
from their historical situation is seriously deficient, given the conceded insights of the sociology 
of knowledge (GD 7, correcting ‗in any be‘ with ‗be in any‘ in the first line). 
6 GD viii, 13. The latter reference is to the comments with which McGrath concludes his first chapter and looks 
forward  to  the  treatment  of  Lindbeck‘s  work  that  follows  in  chapter  2.  He  offers  the  preliminary  opinion  that 
‗although it is my conviction that Lindbeck‘s categorization of  the history of doctrine is perhaps seductive and 
misleading, his criticism of certain experientially orientated theories of doctrine appears timely and persuasive.‘ 
7 GD 15-6. This is similar to my earlier observation that Lindbeck did not manage to engage an historically-aware 
propositionalism (see Engagement Unfulfilled on p. 180 above). 
8 McGrath‘s accusation here may involve a slight misunderstanding. Lindbeck sees the propositional approach as non-
classical, and in various writings (not just ND) makes clear that he sees his objective as a recovery of pre-modern ways 
of  reading  the  Bible.  For  him,  the  approaches  he  calls  ‗propositionalist‘  and  ‗experiential-expressivist‘  are  equally 
children of the Enlightenment. The authors McGrath cites as ‗classical‘ propositionalists would quite likely be claimed 
by Lindbeck as classic pre-modern ‗world-absorbers‘ and thus fore-runners of the postliberal approach. Yet Lindbeck   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    201 
finds Lindbeck‘s description to be a caricature in that it imputes to propositionalism an all-or-
nothing  inflexibility  in  which  a  statement  is  either  simply  true  or  erroneous.  This  caricature 
ignores the idea of ‗relative adequacy‘, in which adequacy ‗can be assessed both in terms of the 
original historical context of a doctrinal formulation and [in terms of] whatever referent it is 
alleged to represent‘ (GD 16). He shows that most medieval theologians understood dogma as a 
dynamic concept, ‗a perception of divine truth, tending towards this truth.‘9 The point is not that 
doctrines define reality, much less capture it. Rather, they seek to convey a perception of it. By and 
large,  the  medieval  theologians  understood  that  ‗doctrines  are  reliable,  yet  incomplete, 
descriptions  of  reality‘  (GD  17).  The  point  of  challenge  for  a  doctrine  is  not  whether  it  is 
absolutely and completely true, but whether and to what extent it is adequate as a representation of 
the independent reality it means to describe, always recognising that the extent to which such 
assessment is possible may be strictly limited. If it conveys, does it do so reliably? 
McGrath maintains that the notion of relative adequacy is not peculiar to doctrinal language, but 
arises  from  an  appreciation  of  the  nature  and  operation  of  language  in  general.  If  some 
propositionalists fail to appreciate this, so much the worse for them. But this does not at all 
constitute an argument against propositionalism as such. He remarks: 
The impatience of many modern theological writers with ‗cognitive‘ theories of doctrine 
seems at times to represent little more than impatience with the vexatious nature of human 
language, and a reluctance to engage with its ambivalence and polysemy (GD 19). 
This appears to be aimed at those who see the language-world relation as an intractable problem 
and are impatient with cognitivist claims because they believe they cannot be made plausible. 
For McGrath, such impatience reflects a refusal of engagement, the ‗peace in our time‘ of 
appeasement, rather than the fruit of serious grappling with the issues. But this does not touch 
Lindbeck, who set out with the problems of language firmly in his sights and did not reach his 
conclusions without struggle, even if he did partly mistake his opponents. Moreover, precisely 
on the basis of his own engagement with these issues, he criticised propositionalist approaches 
to doctrine for being far too careless in their assumption of access to reality.10 
                                                                                                                                                             
himself has muddied the waters here by referring to Aquinas as an ‗apparent propositionalist‘ (ND 123), notwithstanding 
that, having studied Aquinas at length, he often turns to him for support in the course of ND, or that he gratefully 
received Bruce Marshall‘s reading of himself as Aquinian and Aquinas as postliberal (Marshall 1989, see above p. 96 
n3).  Understandably,  Lindbeck‘s  ‗propositionalist‘  tag  is  most  apt  when  applied  to  North  American  ‗conservative 
evangelicals‘ and to Catholic traditionalists. The point made by conservative critics of Lindbeck is that there is a lot more 
to what might be called ‗propositionalism‘ than these two relatively narrow, albeit vocal, streams. 
9 GD 16, citing a work by J.M. Parent. 
10 Lindbeck‘s criticism of propositionalists bears comparison with McGrath‘s complaint against liberal theologians 
(clearly the intended referent of ‗many modern theological writers‘). Both authors allege a lack of engagement with 
the problems of language. For Lindbeck, propositionalists‘ non-engagement with these problems reflects ignorance of 
their importance or presumption of their tractability. For McGrath, moderns‘ non-engagement reflects a judgement or 
presumption that these problems are overwhelmingly difficult. On the one side, the problems of language do not exist 
or can be dismissed or easily avoided. On the other side, the problems are insuperable and defeat has been conceded. 
Of course, the charges are rebutted in each case. McGrath argues that the truth of Lindbeck‘s charge in relation to 
some propositionalists does not make it valid in respect of propositionalism as such. Liberal theologians can object to 
McGrath‘s criticism in much the same terms: if some liberals are impatient with the problems of language, many   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    202 
As  to  specific  criticisms,  McGrath  notes  that  Lindbeck  finds  propositionalism  ‗voluntarist, 
intellectualist, and literalist, even making the suggestion that those who ―perceive or experience 
religion  in  cognitivist  fashion‖  are  those  who  ―combine  unusual  insecurity  with  naiveté‖‗.11 
McGrath takes particular exception to the charge of ‗literalism‘, apostrophising it several times 
though it is really his own coinage.12 Lindbeck hardly mentions ‗literalism‘, addressing it only to 
defend and advocate the ‗literal‘ reading of scripture as a literary reading that takes scripture 
seriously as a literary rendition of the identity and character of God, Jesus, humanity, etc.13 In this 
sense, he promotes ‗literalism‘ as a reading practice and maintains that we must deal with the 
Bible as a literary work, as a whole and in the form in which we find it. He does not use the terms 
‗literal‘ or ‗literalism‘ to describe a more-or-less direct relation between doctrines or words and 
reality, which appears to be the sense in which McGrath takes such a charge to have been made. 
If  McGrath  overemphasises  the  importance  of  ‗literalism‘  among  Lindbeck‘s  criticisms,  he 
nevertheless accepts that the charge is not entirely misplaced. He allows that ‗Lindbeck has 
provided a valuable corrective to deficient cognitive models of doctrine‘ (for example, neo-
scholastic  understandings  of  revelation),  even  if  ‗not  all  cognitive  theories  of  doctrine  are 
vulnerable in this respect.‘ In conclusion, while maintaining that ‗there is a genuinely cognitive 
dimension, component or element to doctrinal statements‘, McGrath wants propositionalists to 
acknowledge that ‗doctrinal statements need not be—and…should not be—treated as purely 
cognitive statements‘.14 
McGrath‘s response to Lindbeck‘s account of propositionalism may be summarised as follows: 
after identifying the shortcomings of Lindbeck‘s account (GD 15-6), he describes and promotes 
                                                                                                                                                             
liberal scholars are very much aware of these problems and engage with them constantly. Despite their allegations, it 
seems that neither Lindbeck nor McGrath could have much objection to theologians of whatever persuasion who, 
seeing ‗the vexatious nature of human language,‘ find in it an invitation to critically constructive engagement. 
11 GD 15. McGrath does not document the voluntarist and intellectualist charges, but these may be found at ND 35, 
where the focus of the discussion is on the ability of a cultural-linguistic approach to accommodate the characteristic 
emphases of the other two approaches (ND 34-6). Here, Lindbeck argues that his proposal accommodates both the 
experiential and the expressive aspects of ‗experiential-expressivism‘ rather better than does a cognitive approach, 
which, by contrast, is ‗intellectualist‘ and ‗voluntarist‘. The (somewhat oblique) reference to ‗insecurity with naiveté‘ 
is at ND 21. The status of the alleged charge of ‗literalism‘ is more problematic, as I argue in the current paragraph 
(and see n12 below). McGrath does not address Lindbeck‘s more substantial critical comments on propositionalism, 
which may be found in his ‗Excursus on Religion and Truth‘ (ND 63-9). 
12 See GD 18-9. Lindbeck‘s only reference to ‗literalism‘ is a passing mention in which he asserts that ‗fundamentalist 
literalism, like experiential-expressivism, is a product of modernity‘ (ND 51). But ‗literalism‘, as a charge laid against 
propositionalists, is not the focus of the argument here. More substantially, Lindbeck‘s ‗Excursus on Religion and Truth‘ 
(ND 63-9) contains material in which one finds (his construction of) propositionalism charged with (a) ignoring the 
concrete (bodily) context within which statements are made (64); (b) ignoring the importance of speakers‘ intentions and 
actions (65-6); (c) locating the truth value of a statement in the sentence uttered rather than in the act of utterance taken 
in the context of the life of the utterer (65-6); (d) neglecting the epistemological humility proper to human assertions (66-
7); and (e) ignoring the speaker‘s existential relation to the semiotic context in which the utterance is made (68). These 
are Lindbeck‘s major charges against propositionalism, and ‗literalism‘ is not among them. Even if, by ‗literalism‘, 
McGrath means to refer to objection (c) above, this use of the word remains his, rather than Lindbeck‘s. 
13 See the section headed ‗Faithfulness as Intratextuality‘ (pp. 113-24, especially pp. 119-22). 
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a sophisticated and appropriately humble propositionalism that is not ‗crudely literalist‘ (GD 16-
20); against Lindbeck, and supporting his fellow propositionalists, he finds that propositionalists 
need not fear the charge of ‗literalism‘, provided they realise what a viable propositionalism 
entails, and, perhaps more importantly, what it excludes. 
The chief problem with McGrath‘s response is that Lindbeck does not charge propositionalists 
with ‗literalism‘. He does not deny that doctrines may have cognitive import, or rather, that 
doctrinal statements may function cognitively, as in propositional assertions. He does, however, 
hold that the specifically  doctrinal function of such statements is to express the communal 
understanding of the rules governing the construction of propositional assertions. The locus of 
Lindbeck‘s distinction is not the content of a sentence, but the use to which it is put. McGrath, 
however, refers to the cognitive or propositional as a ‗dimension‘ or ‗element‘ of doctrinal 
statements  themselves,  along  with  other  aspects  such  the  evocative,  the  semiotic,  and  the 
rhetorical.15 The contrast lies less  in the descriptions than in the referents: where Lindbeck 
speaks of the function for which a speaker uses a sentence , McGrath speaks of the sentence 
itself. Lindbeck‘s point is that words are used by people in order to do things. To the extent that 
McGrath has continued to speak of words-in-themselves, without addressing their function in 
the context of human engagement with the world, his response nicely illustrates Lindbeck‘s 
primary charge against propositionalism: it fails to discern the body, that is, it is ‗intellectualist‘. 
A  less  serious  difficulty  is  that  McGrath  appears  to  have  mistaken  the  role  of  absolutes  in 
Lindbeck‘s  critique.  Where  Lindbeck‘s  ‗propositionalists‘  hold  a  view  that  could  be  called 
‗absolute propositionalism‘, McGrath portrays a propositionalism that is not absolute, but contents 
itself with relative adequacy. Where Lindbeck criticises propositionalists for taking the import of 
doctrinal sentences to be purely cognitive,16 McGrath objects that, while doctrinal sentences are 
cognitive, they are also more than cognitive—there is more to be said about them than that they 
have cognitive content. Such defences address the degree of guilt more than the substance of the 
charge, as if McGrath were content to plead: ‗Guilty, but not absolutely!‘17 However, it is not for 
its  alleged  absoluteness  that  Lindbeck  attacks  propositionalism—after  all,  his  own  regulative 
theory presupposes the absoluteness of doctrine. Rather, his main objection has to do with the 
location of absoluteness (it lies beyond history and its availability within history is only ever 
implicit), and with the indirectness of our linguistic dealings with the world (our grasp of the 
world is limited by the adequacy of our conceptual categories). These aspects of historicity and 
                                                       
15 McGrath‘s expressions at this point (GD 18-20) seem to indicate an understanding of the cognitive, the evocative, 
the  semiotic,  the  rhetorical,  etc,  as  aspects  or  components  of  statements.  The  language  of  perspective  (aspect, 
‗dimension‘) is perhaps less problematic in this regard than the language of componentry (‗component‘, ‗element‘), 
which may carry an implication of notionally separable parts. But this is not the point at issue here. 
16 That is, they treat doctrines as little other than ‗informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities‘ 
(ND 16, cited in GD 15-6). 
17 The logic of McGrath‘s response seems to be as follows: propositionalists, charged (as he thinks) with ‗literalism‘, are 
guilty, but not entirely so. For they have been charged with an absolute literalism, whereas in fact they espouse (or ought 
to espouse) a moderate literalism. The falsity in the charge is thus less in its substance than in its degree. Thus, if 
propositionalists are charged with absolute literalism (as McGrath thinks Lindbeck has done) then they are innocent, 
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hermeneutics are the main locus of Lindbeck‘s ‗intellectualist‘ charge against propositionalism. 
McGrath‘s  non-engagement  with  these  issues  is  probably  related  to  his  preoccupation  with 
correcting what he sees as an absolutist (and ‗literalist‘) caricature of propositionalist approaches. 
Although Lindbeck‘s account of propositionalism is indeed a caricature, McGrath‘s attempt to 
correct the picture does little to engage the real thrust of Lindbeck‘s critique, which has more to 
do with ‗intellectualism‘ than ‗literalism‘. McGrath shows awareness of issues relevant to the 
‗intellectualist‘ charge when he ‗concedes‘ the insights of the sociology of knowledge (GD 7), 
but he makes this concession without acknowledging that some major themes of the sociology 
of knowledge resonate deeply with major themes of Christian theological anthropology, and 
that, to the extent of this resonance, sociological insights should be not so much ‗conceded‘ as 
embraced.18 In that embrace McGrath‘s modest propositionalists might re-encounter their own 
humanity, more fully appreciate the hermeneutic significance of the fact that humans exist as 
bodies, and so work towards a ‗propositionalism‘ that truly engages Lindbeck‘s objections. By 
mistaking the nature of the challenge, McGrath largely bypasses this field of engagement. 
6.1.2  On Experiential-Expressivism: Joining the Attack 
Whereas McGrath found much to criticise in Lindbeck‘s account of propositionalism, he is very 
positive towards Lindbeck‘s account of experiential-expressivist theories of doctrine (GD 20-6), 
finding little to criticise and much to affirm. He thinks Lindbeck‘s account of such theories is 
‗fair and accurate‘, and that his critique is ‗persuasive and effective, and may well be judged to 
be the most significant long-term contribution he has made to the contemporary discussion of 
the nature of doctrine‘ (GD 20). 
McGrath accepts without demur Lindbeck‘s description of experiential-expressive theories of 
doctrine  as  those  in  which  doctrine  refers  to  ‗ubiquitous  private  prereflective  experience 
underlying all religions‘.19 He documents this view in Schubert Ogden‘s work of the 1960s and 
David  Tracy‘s  Blessed  Rage  for  Order  (1975)  (GD  21),  but  gives  no  attention  to  liberal 
objections that Lindbeck‘s description ignores liberal theology‘s critical engagement with its 
own roots.20 In this material, McGrath expresses reservation only in relation to Lindbeck‘s quite 
conventional identification of Schleiermacher as an expressivist.21 
                                                       
18 This is particularly unfortunate in view of McGrath‘s extensive deployment of sociology-of-knowledge techniques 
(such as ideological critique) in his attack on liberal theology. A major part of my response to McGrath is taken up 
with  exploring  the  nature  of  a  propositionalism  that  is  able  to  see  and  engage  its  own  ideological  weaknesses 
(including ‗intellectualism‘) from the standpoint of the gospel. 
19 GD 20, 22. McGrath does not provide a reference for this paraphrase of Lindbeck, but a number of passages would 
serve equally well. For example, see ND 21. 
20 Some of these objections were canvassed in chapter 3 above, beginning from p. 55. 
21 McGrath has an appreciative understanding of Schleiermacher (see, for example, GD 66-7, 70-1, 77-8). He regards 
Lindbeck‘s description of Schleiermacher as an ‗experiential-expressivist‘ as inaccurate (GD 25-6), and notes similarities 
between Lindbeck‘s proposal and the approach taken by Schleiermacher in The Christian Faith (GD 26, 28). McGrath 
observes that the rise of experience-orientated religious theories has occurred ‗since the time of Schleiermacher‘ (GD 
20), but does not directly implicate Schleiermacher in their origin. Although Schleiermacher ‗might be taken as the 
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McGrath  identifies  the  principal  objections  to  the  experiential-expressive  approach  as  ‗its 
obvious  phenomenological  inaccuracy,‘22  and  ‗its  inherent  resistance  to  verification  or 
falsification.‘23  Having  reorganised  some  of  Lindbeck‘s  objections  under  these  headings, 
McGrath amplifies the critique with three further objections. He maintains, firstly, that doctrine 
is not necessarily an expression or reflection of experience, but may in fact be opposed to it, and 
sometimes radically so, as in Luther‘s theology of the cross. Thus, doctrine often confronts our 
understanding of experience, and challenges us to re-imagine our experience in another way.24 
Secondly, McGrath argues that the assumption that the present experience of an individual is the 
primary datum of religion leaves the experiential approach unable to giv e an adequate account 
of religious conversion, or of apostasy, or of loss of faith. Are not the experiences on either side 
of such events really quite different? And if they are taken as not really different, how does this 
differ from a refusal to take them seriously as human experiences? Finally, McGrath objects that 
the experiential model of religion and doctrine leaves us without any grounds on which we can 
say that the experience we are attempting to express or symbolise is an experience  of God, 
rather than a Feuerbachian projection—a fond (or terrible) thing vainly invented. ‗Experience 
may indeed seek expression—but it also demands a criterion by which it may be judged.‘25 
I will not engage McGrath‘s additional objections to experiential-expressivism, other than to 
point out that, like Lindbeck,  he is mostly criticising nineteenth century positions from the 
vantage point of a later critical orthodoxy. To the extent that such objections are valid, they are 
so in relation to positions and people already subject to similar criticism from liberal writers. 
Contemporary  liberal  theologians  are  by  no  means  uncritical  of  the  earlier  hypothesis  of  a 
‗ubiquitous private prereflective experience underlying all religions‘, and, as we have seen in 
                                                                                                                                                             
distinguishing Schleiermacher‘s position from these approaches in respect of his emphasis on the particularity of Jesus 
Christ and the communal formation of religious experience (GD 22). 
22 GD 21. McGrath‘s comments on this point are mostly concerned, not with accounts of empirical observation of 
religions  or  of  doctrinal  development,  but  with  the  possibility  of  deriving  corroborative  evidence.  He  notes 
Lindbeck‘s observations that, for experiential-expressivism, (a) the idea that the diverse manifestations of religious 
experience share a common prereflective core is ultimately an axiom, and (b) there would appear to be ‗at least the 
logical possibility that a Buddhist and a Christian might have basically the same faith, although expressed very 
differently.‘ McGrath then claims, apparently as a consequence of these observations, that ‗the theory can only be 
credible if it is possible to isolate a common core experience from religious language and behaviour, and demonstrate 
that the latter two are articulations of or responses to the former.‘ But this claims too much. If, as McGrath concedes, 
‗the  insights  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge‘  must  be  taken  seriously,  the  possibility  of  isolating  a  religious 
experience from religious language and behaviour seems extremely dubious. The equivalence or otherwise of two 
religious experiences would have to be a matter of practical judgement. 
23 GD 21-2. A characteristic it shares with more ‗scientific‘ theories such as those of Freud, Darwin, and Adler. 
These thinkers proposed theories that were, in their own fields, all-encompassing interpretive frameworks. Indeed, so 
all-encompassing were they that they appeared able to absorb almost any fact without allowing it to seriously threaten 
the theory. This comment is not meant to disparage these theories, but to draw attention to the complex of problems 
surrounding verification, falsification, and the status of theories as ‗scientific‘. 
24 McGrath notes: ‗Luther, taking the event of the crucifixion as a paradigm, argues that experience is corrected by 
doctrine; that experience is properly interpreted, even to the point of being contradicted, by and within a theological 
framework.  Experience,  in  other  words,  is  the  explicandum,  rather  than  the  explicans;  it  is  what  requires  to  be 
interpreted, rather than the interpreting agent itself‘ (GD 25, original italics). 
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this study, the works of David Tracy and Delwin Brown (to name but two) show the fruit of 
substantial  critical  engagement  with  such  assumptions.  These  theologians  offer  accounts  of 
religion and doctrine in which the classic liberal hypothesis is seen as problematic and in need 
of further development, and substantial attention is given to precisely the objections mounted by 
Lindbeck and McGrath (though perhaps without answers that they would find satisfying).26 
Earlier, we saw that the real challenges for contemporary liberal th eologies emerge from a double-
edged anthropological critique of classic liberal universalism. 27  One of these challenges is 
reflected in the charge of ‗intellectualism‘ that Lindbeck levels against both propositionalists and 
expressivists.  Contemporary  liberal  thought  acknowledges  that  the  Enlightenment‘s  a  priori 
universalism must be abandoned, but struggles to cease longing for it. In this light, the lingering 
liberal  propensity  for  viewing  the  academy  as  a  privileged  evaluative  forum  is  a  kind  of 
acquiescence, a settling for second best when one‘s first and best hope is admittedly out of reach, 
but remains a cherished ideal. A not-quite-universal rationality will have to do. Lindbeck‘s charge 
(largely ignored by McGrath) is that by lingering on this course liberal theology shows that it has 
not grasped the epistemological significance of human embodiment and sociality. In his view, 
neither propositionalists nor experiential-expressivists discern the body. This charge remains far 
more relevant than those of ‗literalism‘ on the one hand, and ‗universalism‘ on the other. 
The  other  challenge  follows  from  the  recognition  that,  although  appreciation  of  human 
particularity is native to Christian theology, the Christian confession ‗Jesus is Lord‘ remains 
stubbornly universal—it affirms Jesus‘ ultimate importance and universal significance. That is, 
Jesus is Lord of all locations, including those locations in which we find ourselves theorising 
about  particularity.  In  academies,  no  less  than  in  offices,  homes,  factories,  parliaments, 
hospitals, schools and armies, Christians are called to live as those who, in advance of all 
creation, acknowledge Jesus of Nazareth as Lord. This is not to claim that multiple allegiances 
(e.g., to Christ and to academic culture or institutions) are impossible. It is to say that allegiance 
to Christ is primary, and other allegiances, be they many or few, may find their true and rightful 
places just to the extent that they cohere with and support Christians‘ anticipation of the coming 
universal acknowledgement of Jesus‘ Lordship. Granted, our understanding of that Lordship, 
our awareness of our other allegiances, and our understanding of their proper relations to Jesus‘ 
Lordship, are as vulnerable as any other human pursuit, since they are forged through critical 
engagements that are necessarily finite, ongoing and provisional. But what cannot be allowed to 
Christian theology, because it is simply not a Christian possibility, is that Jesus‘ Lordship be 
supplanted  or  limited  by  any  other.  This,  then,  the  question  of  allegiance,  is  the  second 
challenge  for  liberal  theology.  I  argued  above  that  Christian  allegiance  is  compromised 
implicitly whenever questions are settled, or even accepted on their own terms, without being 
critically engaged from the standpoint of Christ‘s Lordship. In view of its quest for credibility in 
                                                       
26 Brown‘s proposal is vulnerable in relation to McGrath‘s third objection (in Boundaries of our Habitations he does 
not in fact speak of God much at all), but provides material that addresses the first two. Tracy‘s various works, 
especially from 1985 onwards, address all the points that McGrath raises. 
27 For a summary, see Liberal Virtues and the ‘Religion-as-Culture’ Metaphor, commencing on p. 90 above, and The 
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the academies of Western culture, we must ask liberal theology, as it must ask itself, whether it 
understands the radical difference of standpoint between speaking with the voice of Christ‘s 
academy and speaking with the voice of the academy‘s Christ. 
In this chapter we are trying to clarify the promise and the pitfalls of propositional approaches to 
doctrine.  We  have  seen  that  Lindbeck  levels  the  charge  of  intellectualism  as  much  against 
propositionalists  (conservatives)  as  against  experiential-expressivists  (liberals),  and  that  this 
charge is also relevant to his own proposal. What is the situation in relation to the question of 
allegiance?  Conservative  theologians  have  often felt  that liberal theology,  as  a  whole  or  at 
various times and places, transferred its primary allegiance from Jesus Christ to the modern 
academy in whose eyes it hoped to find credibility.28 Lindbeck concurs in this judgment insofar 
as he sees liberal theology as a native of an alien discourse in terms of which it explains doctrine 
away rather than really explaining it on its own terms (i.e., in terms of its witness to Jesus 
Christ). In the previous chapter, I argued that Lindbeck‘s proposal, too, is vulnerable on the 
question of allegiance, because it explains religion in terms of a theory that is never critically 
engaged from the standpoint of the gospel, and because it explains doctrine on the basis of a 
‗neutrality‘ that excludes certain historically contingent human judgements from the sphere of 
Christ‘s  Lordship.  What  of  conservative  theologies?  Lindbeck  does  not  challenge  his 
‗propositionalists‘ on the question of allegiance. Are their theologies also vulnerable on this 
question? Later in this chapter I argue that they are, though in different ways to the theologies of 
Lindbeck and (at least some) liberals. The nature of the conservative compromise will emerge 
more clearly from critical engagement with McGrath‘s account of doctrine in section 6.3 below. 
6.1.3  On Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory: A Question of Origins 
McGrath provides a sound overview of Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory (GD 26-8) before 
offering a critical appraisal (GD 28-34).29 His various lines of critique presuppose the historicality 
of Christianity and explore the ways in which Lindbeck‘s proposal quarantines doctrine from 
historical inquiry. For McGrath, Christian faith requires an acknowledgment that the definitive 
action of God in history has occurred in Jesus of Nazareth. He finds that, in treating cultural-
linguistic frameworks as static systems, Lindbeck bypasses the question of their historical origins, 
thus  also  bypassing  questions  of  revelation  and  truth.  McGrath  agrees  that  doctrine  has  a 
regulative  function,  but  insists  that  regulation  cannot  be  any  more  valid  than  its  underlying 
ontology, and that doctrinal discussion is concerned with arriving at formulations that provide a 
reliable guide to ontology. For him, the essence of Christian doctrine is not grammatical analysis, 
but an attempt to speak truly in the light of the history of Jesus of Nazareth. 
                                                       
28 This suspicion remains a potent factor in contemporary debates over Christian ethics, especially in relation to 
homosexuality, human reproduction and euthanasia. 
29 A minor blemish appears in McGrath‘s summary when he notes Lindbeck‘s tentative suggestion that language can 
shape areas of human existence and action that are pre-experiential (GD 27, referring to ND 37, on which see also p. 
24 above). Lindbeck might not entirely welcome McGrath‘s comment that this suggestion provides ‗an important 
qualification  to,  and  extension  of,  the  experiential-expressive  theory.‘  We  have  seen  that  Lindbeck  prefers  an 
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Consistent with this, McGrath does not object to the cultural-linguistic metaphor as such, but 
firmly  rejects  Lindbeck‘s  ahistorical  approach  to  language.  Not  only  Jesus,  but  Christian 
language about him, has a history: 
The Christian idiom is not a perennial feature of the intellectual landscape: it came into being, 
and developed within history. What pressures brought it into being? What factors governed its 
development?…The history of the evolution of the Christian language is the essential prelude 
to the evaluation of that language and its grammatical regulators. For that language is not just 
‗given‘ in scripture or tradition: it was developed in a process of evolution which is partly 
susceptible to historical analysis and theological evaluation (GD 31). 
Thus, McGrath raises the question of the genesis of doctrine, and the fact that this question is 
the overall theme of his investigation indicates the extent to which his book arose as a response 
to Lindbeck‘s proposal. In addition, McGrath notes the weakness of the models Lindbeck set up 
as alternatives to his own (GD 32); Lindbeck‘s reluctance to allow that all three models may be 
needed as complementary witnesses to ‗the polymorphic and polyvalent character of doctrine‘ 
(33); and the fact that Lindbeck exploits history to selectively illustrate a theory derived from 
one corner of the social sciences ‗without any serious attempt to engage with the total historical 
phenomenon of doctrine‘ (33). McGrath finds Lindbeck‘s proposal strongly reductionist, and he 
ventures to develop a more nuanced account that will allow ‗the complexity of doctrine as an 
historical phenomenon to be more fully appreciated‘ (34). 
McGrath‘s response to Lindbeck thus indicates that his own approach will be recognisably 
‗propositional‘ while giving full weight to the historicity of doctrine and all its sources. 
6.2  DOCTRINE AND HISTORICITY ACCORDING TO MCGRATH 
6.2.1  McGrath’s Theses on Doctrine 
McGrath began his first chapter with programmatic statements that identified Jesus of Nazareth 
as ‗the precipitating cause of Christian faith and Christian doctrine‘, and the history of Jesus as 
the  overriding  criterion  of  doctrinal  development.30  The historical cast of these statements 
foreshadowed the central theme of his response to Lindbeck in chapter 2. Turning now to his 
own account of doctrine, McGrath does not advance a theoretical or theological justification of 
his opening statements, but rather offers ‗a descriptive account of the essential elements of 
doctrine  as  an  historical  phenomenon,  which  any  theory  of  doctrine  must  be  capable  of 
accommodating‘ (GD 37). These elements, presented in four interrelated theses, operate ‗both 
as the historical starting point of any future theory of doctrine, and as an implicit criticism of 
past theories‘ (GD 37). Detailed exposition of the theses occupies the third chapter of GD (The 
Nature of Doctrine: Four Theses). Briefly stated, the theses are as follows: 
1  Doctrine functions as a social demarcator. 
                                                       
30 ‗The precipitating cause of Christian faith and Christian doctrine was and is a man named Jesus…‘ (GD 1) and 
‗The history of Jesus of Nazareth was and is the crucible of Christian doctrinal possibilities, the controlling paradigm 
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2  Doctrine is generated by, and subsequently interprets the Christian narrative. 
3  Doctrine interprets experience. 
4  Doctrine makes truth claims (GD 37). 
 
Superficially, the first three theses appear to agree with Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory, 
and  only  the  last  clearly  diverges  from  it.  However,  McGrath‘s  whole  approach  contrasts 
strongly with Lindbeck‘s. Firstly, McGrath insists that he is not proposing a different theory, 
because he is not proposing a theory at all, but offering a descriptive account of what doctrine 
has in fact been, rather than a normative account of what it ought to be.31 Secondly, he provides 
a wealth of historical examples while minimising (at this point) overt theoretica l argument. 
Thirdly, he avoids the clear distinctions characteristic of Lindbeck‘s treatment, insisting that the 
various aspects of doctrine ‗cannot be isolated as non-interactive and independent entities, but 
are rather to be viewed as mutually interacting constituents of a greater whole‘ (GD 37). 
Beginning with doctrine‘s social aspect, and ranging well beyond the function of demarcation, 
McGrath finds that the development and deployment of doctrine is thoroughly implicated in 
socio-historical  processes,  pressures  for  communal  self-definition,  and  political  aspirations 
within and without the church (GD 37-52). Turning to his second thesis, McGrath observes that 
the character of the Christian community derives from the narrative of Jesus Christ with which 
it is historically and theologically continuous. Scripture is primarily (though not exclusively) 
narrative because it purports to tell of God‘s dealings with humanity, climaxing in the history of 
Jesus  of  Nazareth,  and  it  is  the  uniquely  privileged  source  for  doctrine  on  account  of  the 
historicity  of  its  formulating  communities.  Doctrine  provides  a  conceptual  framework  for 
interpreting scripture, but is valid only insofar as it may be discerned within scripture. ‗The 
narrative is primary, and the interpretative framework secondary‘, and there is an ongoing and 
necessary oscillation between the generative narrative and the interpretative framework.32 
                                                       
31 This is somewhat self-contradictory. McGrath is familiar with the major themes of sociology and the philosophy of 
science in the twentieth century. Indeed, he devotes a chapter and various smaller sections of text to these issues. Yet, 
notwithstanding his awareness of the theory-ladenness of observation (see GD 70-1), he (a) claims to completely 
avoid ‗prejudging the question of what doctrine ought to be‘; (b) suggests that, ‗as a matter of historical fact, doctrine 
has  been  understood  to  possess  four  major  dimensions‘  as  he  describes  them;  and  (c)  stresses  that  he  is  ‗not 
concerned with presenting a theory of doctrine, but rather a descriptive account of the essential elements of doctrine 
as an historical phenomenon, which any theory of doctrine must be capable of accommodating‘ (GD 37, original 
emphasis).  I  do  not  believe  what  (a)  implies,  namely,  that  McGrath  thinks his  ‗factual‘  description  will  not  be 
prejudiced  towards  theoretical  accounts  that  make  use  of  the  philosophers  and  theorists  that  have  informed  his 
understanding of social history. Further, while (c) implies an historical account of doctrine, (b) implies an historical 
account of understandings of doctrine. These accounts are of different (albeit related) things. It will not do to equate 
them by saying (as McGrath seems to do) ‗my account is a factual description of doctrine because it describes the 
ways  in  which  doctrine  has  actually  been  understood‘.  This  begs  the  question  of  the  adequacy  of  those 
understandings, a question that cannot be answered without recourse to theory. 
32 GD 53-66. In this discussion, McGrath always speaks of ‗the Christian community‘ and ‗the scriptural narrative‘. For 
example, ‗The sola scriptura principle is ultimately an assertion of the primacy of the foundational scriptural narrative 
over any framework of conceptualities which it may generate‘ (p. 64). Community and scriptural narrative appear as 
unitary givens, and we may ask whether McGrath includes the idea of ‗the foundational scriptural narrative‘ among the 
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Discussing thesis three, McGrath finds a ‗delicate interplay of cognitive and experiential elements 
in doctrinal formulations‘ (70). Every experience includes and is modified by interpretation. ‗The 
cognitive dimension of Christian doctrine is the framework upon which Christian experience is 
supported, the channel through which it is conveyed.‘ It is also a critical apparatus by which our 
intimations of reality may be interpreted and evaluated, or occasionally contradicted. ‗Experience 
is…an  inadequate  foundation  for  theological  affirmation;  nevertheless,  on  being  interpreted, 
experience affords central insights into the existential dimension of the Christian faith‘ (66-72). 
The  last  thesis  concerns  truth,  which  McGrath  sees as  an  unavoidable,  if  difficult,  aspect  of 
doctrine. Christian doctrine ‗purports to be a representation, however inadequate or provisional, of 
the  way  things  really  are,  in  response  to  the  questions  arising  from  the  history  of  Jesus  of 
Nazareth.‘ As such it includes an ‗ineradicable cognitive element‘. In that doctrine is derived from 
‗the formative transmitted narratives of the Christian tradition‘, ‗the question of the veridical 
character of these narratives is…of central importance‘. Doctrine is also ‗concerned with the 
internal consistency of Christian truth-affirmations‘, and Lindbeck‘s insights on this point are to 
be  welcomed.  Further,  doctrine  is  oriented  towards  faith;  the  task  is  not  merely  objective 
explanation but is carried on so that believers may relate to God in faith. That is, doctrine not only 
has to do with ‗veridicality, rationality and comprehensive elucidation‘ but it is also directed 
towards  enabling  encounter  with  the  truth  in  and  of  Jesus  Christ.33  McGrath concludes his 
exposition by stressing that the social function of doctrines depends on acceptance of their claims 
to truth, rather than vice versa; they are not simply invented to serve social functions.34 
This summary of McGrath‘s four theses is too brief to convey adequately either the nuances of 
his description or the strong socio-historical cast of the entire account. McGrath is acutely aware 
that full acknowledgment of human historicity appears to be in tension (to say the least) with 
some  of  the  accounts  of  doctrine  that  have  been  advanced  in  the  past.  However,  unlike 
Lindbeck, he understands historicity to be of the essence of the gospel, and he rules out any 
attempt  to  quarantine  doctrine  or  the identity  of  Christianity  from  the flux  of  history.  It  is 
appropriate, then, that the remainder of McGrath‘s book (three-fifths of the text) addresses the 
implications of the historicity of both doctrine and its critics. 
                                                       
33 GD 72-80. McGrath is careful to set his discussion of truth claims in the context of a discussion of the nature of truth. 
His concluding summary indicates the care with which he proceeds in this regard. ‗To speak of doctrine as making truth-
claims is thus to note the significant affinities, points of contact and parallels between ‗doctrine‘ and ‗truth‘, as the latter 
term is employed in human discourse and reflection. It is most emphatically not to commit oneself exclusively to a 
‗correspondence  theory  of  truth‘,  or  any  other  theory  of  truth;  rather,  it  is  to  observe  the  significant  degree  of 
isomorphism that exists between the inherently polyvalent concepts of doctrine and truth, and to register an historically-
informed unwillingness to reduce either concept to univocity. The concepts of doctrine and truth each cover a broad 
spectrum of meaning; our concern is to suggest that there exists such a degree of overlap between those spectra that it is 
meaningful and legitimate to continue to speak of doctrine making ‗truth-claims‘ (GD 79-80). 
34  McGrath  observes  ‗Doctrines  are  not  invented  to  serve  social  functions;…rather,  their  claims  to  truth  are 
foundational for their social function.‘ The either/or tone of this sentence contrasts with his general appreciation of 
the interpenetration of power and truth claims. He could perhaps have been more careful to distinguish between 
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6.2.2  Doctrine and Historicity 
In his fourth chapter, On Being Condemned to History, McGrath considers the consequences of 
historical awareness and the insights and inadequacies of various kinds of cultural relativism. He 
notes the intrinsic self-reference of historical and cultural relativism—it, too, is relativised or, 
where  it  lacks  self-reference,  lacks  credibility  also  (GD  89)—and  outlines  a  ‗defensible‘ 
historicism in three principles: (1) all thought is historically located; (2) historical insight is 
essential to self-understanding; and (3) flight from history is improper and impossible (GD 92). 
For  McGrath,  sociology  of  knowledge  contributes  to  doctrinal  criticism  by  applying  such 
principles  to  investigating  the  origins  and  persistence  of  beliefs,  i.e.,  through  ideological 
analysis.35 By ‗ideology‘ McGrath means, essentially, a network of ideas reflecting the needs and 
interests of a social group or movement. He sees ideology as commonly, but not necessarily, 
implicated in relations of domination, and distances his concept of it both from Marx‘s ‗false 
consciousness‘ and from Mannheim‘s ‗unrealised situationally transcendent ideas‘.36 Sociology of 
knowledge quickly disarms  modernist critiques of Christianity ( GD  90-1),  but  indicates  that 
Christianity is fully exposed to historicity and investigations into the ‗causes of its credibility‘.37 
Any belief is open to the question ‗not merely why anyone should believe that, but how that belief 
came to be expressed, articulated or conceptualized in the specific form which it assumes‘.38 
The belief of particular interest to McGrath in this regard is the attitude to the past displayed in 
various modern approaches to Christian doctrine, investigation of which comprises his fifth 
chapter, The Authority of the Past in Modern Christian Thought, easily the largest in GD. Here, 
amid much historical detail, McGrath surveys the attitudes to the past exhibited in the Italian 
Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation (magisterial and radical), the German Enlightenment 
and the historians of dogma. The Renaissance (GD 104-17) was marked by a new historical 
consciousness that saw the past as disclosing possibilities for refashioning the present so as to 
recover the standards and values of the New Testament and classical Rome.39 The ‗Middle 
Ages‘—an  ideological  construct  of  the  Italian  Renaissance—was  seen  as  a  period  of 
‗ineloquence‘ that produced poor translations of classical and biblical texts and unwelcome 
accretions to their contents, thereby hindering rather than enabling creative reappropriation of 
classical culture and early Christianity (GD 111). 
The early Swiss Reformation under Zwingli sought to reform the life and morals of a city on 
Renaissance humanist principles, though direct recourse to the New Testament was justified less 
on humanist grounds of antiquity and eloquence than on the basis that the New Testament is the 
                                                       
35 McGrath deconstructs the definite article in ‗the sociology of knowledge‘ (GD 93) and surveys the historical 
development of the discipline (pp. 93-101), noting with approval that more recent sociology has recognised the 
problematic nature of the earlier ‗assumption of privileged status on the part of the sociologist as an observer‘ (p. 94). 
That is, sociology has realised that it, too, is historically conditioned. 
36 He first defines ‗ideology‘ at GD 89, later accepting Davis‘s definition of it as ‗an integrated system of beliefs, 
assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class at a 
particular time in history‘ (GD 103, citing Davis 1975, 14). See also GD 223 n1. 
37 This phrase is from Barnes and Bloor, in a lengthy passage which McGrath quotes in full twice (pp. 100-1, 157). 
38 GD 101, original italics. 
39 Notwithstanding the obvious divergence between these exemplars, discussed at GD 113.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    212 
Word  of  God  (118-21).  In  contrast,  because  of  its  subject  matter,  curriculum  reform  in  the 
theological  faculty  at  Wittenberg  focussed  on  theological  criteria  from  the  outset,  despite 
humanism‘s pervasive influence. Luther, too, with all Christendom, accepted scripture as self-
evidently the Word of God and therefore authoritative, but he also developed a Christological 
criterion: since God can be fully known only through Jesus of Nazareth, the proper subject of 
theology is ‗God‘ as defined in the saving event of Jesus Christ.40 Thus the New Testament took 
priority in virtue of its witness to Christ and its role in communicating Christ to the believer; for 
hermeneutical guidance, Christians were referred, not to humanist criteria, but to the witness of the 
Holy Spirit and the interpretations offered by the present and past Christian community (129-30). 
The radical reformers aimed less at reformation than revolution, and their motivations lay less in 
theology than in social alienation and the perception of oppression. They found theological 
legitimation for social revolution in an emphasis on apocalyptic imagery and the right of every 
believer to interpret scripture without reference to traditions or communities. The ‗authority of 
the past‘ was a burden perpetuating present social injustice. The past, with its representative 
institutions, was due for destruction (GD 131-2). 
The German Enlightenment saw the past as a corrupt and dead thing that served the interests of 
outdated structures of political, moral and intellectual authority. McGrath locates the fertile soil 
that nurtured this perception in a crisis of social dislocation, fragmentation and loss of cultural 
legitimacy  among  the  German  professional  classes  in  the  late  eighteenth  century.  The 
opportunities for political action being very limited, the ensuing social alienation found expression 
mainly in intellectual forms, with the universities becoming arenas of radical challenge to the 
intellectual ancien regime. Since German universities enabled social mobility and bureaucratic 
advancement, ‗the Aufklärung was seen [at the time] as a general programme of modernization, 
centring upon academic institutions but extending from there to influence those in positions of 
social and political authority‘ (GD 135). To us, it appears to be ‗the expression of…an ideology, 
firmly grounded in and directed towards the prevailing social and political situation‘ (136). 
McGrath emphasises the axiomatic status of Enlightenment attitudes to doctrine and history. It 
was not that rigorous critical scrutiny had shown the intellectual legacy of the past to be worthless; 
rather, the past was known a priori to be ‗an irrelevance which could be, and generally was, 
ignored‘ (GD 137-8). He notes that the history of dogma was ab initio written by those who 
sought dogma‘s elimination. Doctrine was seen as historically conditioned, and hence susceptible 
to historical criticism. Historical events were incapable of universal significance (though they 
could perhaps illustrate a truth established through reasoned reflection on current experience). 
Moreover, so-called ‗knowledge‘ of the past was fragmentary, corrigible and dependent on the 
testimony of the dead (GD 138-45). Notwithstanding the obvious ideological commitments in the 
work of Harnack, McGrath appreciates Harnack‘s insistence on historical criticism: 
                                                       
40 GD 121-5. McGrath also explores the Wittenberg preference for Augustine among the fathers, finding its basis 
partly in a belief that Augustine‘s doctrine of grace provided a reliable guide to the New Testament, and partly in 
perceived parallels between Augustine‘s struggle with Pelagius and the Reformers‘ struggle with Rome (GD 125-9).   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    213 
the assertion that history must be permitted to criticize doctrine remains valid, to the point 
of being of crucial importance in the contemporary task of evaluating and reappropriating 
the doctrinal heritage of the Christian tradition….Theology needs its Harnacks…(GD 151) 
Reflecting on his historical survey, McGrath suggests that ideological factors strongly influence a 
theologian‘s attitude to the past.41 As illustration, he considers the relation between the attitudes to 
the past found among the Lutheran, Reformed and Radical strands of the Reformation and that 
already prevalent in the Renaissance. He concludes that the divergent strands of the Reformation 
‗represent a fundamental clash of ideologies, rather than mere differences of theological method or 
substance‘ (GD 153). It is less a matter of choosing an attitude to the past than of absorbing the 
attitude presupposed among the group to which a theologian belongs. Thus, while exceptions 
exist, conservative and progressive ideologies tend to find cognate theological expression, so that 
‗tensions which might be represented as a quest for ―truth‖ might more properly be described as 
the inevitable outcome of conflicting foundational ideologies‘ (GD 154). 
Amid further historical examples, McGrath notes that conservative and progressive ideologies 
are  equally  susceptible  to  sociological  explanation.  His  insistence  that  the  Enlightenment 
attitude to the past is ideologically conditioned is not intended to dismiss it from consideration, 
but to challenge its alleged objectivity (GD 157-8) and make it clear that criticism of a position 
for being ‗conservative‘ is not an argument but expresses a preference for progressive values. 
McGrath  sees  ideology  as  a  large,  though  largely  unacknowledged,  aspect  of  many  recent 
debates in North Atlantic theology, the sterility of which derives in part from ‗the failure to 
recognise  that  they  cannot  be  isolated  from  the  much  broader  debate  concerning  the 
contemporary cultural attitude towards the past‘ (164). 
McGrath predicts that attitudes to the doctrinal legacy of the past within the Christian church 
will continue to reflect to varying degrees the ideology dominant in society. In particular, the 
decline in ―liberal ideology‖ since the 1960s means that attitudes towards doctrine within the 
Christian community are likely to become more positive. 
The theologian may be reduced to despair by the fact that is ideological considerations, 
rather than a precise theoretical analysis, which tend to govern attitudes to the past, in 
however  pre-theoretical  a  manner;  nevertheless,  the  importance  of  ideology  in  shaping 
attitudes and conditioning outlooks can hardly be ignored, especially by those committed to 
the notion of religion as a cultural system (GD 164). 
Notwithstanding this situation, one‘s attitude to the past cannot be maintained without engaging 
the critical questions raised against it, whatever the ideology of the questioner. 
McGrath rounds off this long chapter with a theoretical counter to the Enlightenment claim that 
the past is, as a matter of fact, dead (GD 165-71). Seeking a model that makes sense of ‗the 
obvious cultural tendency to remember‘, he finds it in Walter Benjamin‘s ‗Theses on the Concept 
of  History‘,  in  which  historical  development  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  recollection  and 
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creative and critical reappropriation of the past. The processes of Christian doctrine illustrate a 
general tendency of human historical and cultural reflection described in Benjamin‘s model.42 
6.2.3  The History of Jesus as Source and Criterion of Doctrine 
McGrath‘s final chapter addresses the function of the past in Christianity with particular reference 
to theology as the conceptual, and doctrine as the socio-conceptual, expression of that function. 
The chapter‘s title—Tradition: Access to the Identity-Giving Past—indicates that McGrath‘s view 
of tradition has much in common with that of Brown: tradition is the living mediation of its own 
sources of identity to those who in some measure share its central commitments. However, unlike 
Brown, who relies on the academy to resolve canonical inadequacies,43 McGrath accepts the logic 
of faith in Christ as faith in Ch rist‘s ultimate adequacy. ‗If the generative event, the primary 
explicandum of Christian theology is Jesus of Nazareth, it follows that we are invited to reshape 
our mental horizons and reconsider any prior understandings of God and human nature in the light 
of the story of Jesus of Nazareth‘ (174). 
Therefore, an appeal to history is intrinsic to Christianity; an appeal directed not only to the 
New Testament itself but also, implicitly or explicitly, to the community that through history 
read the New Testament and ordered its life around the worship of Jesus (176-9). McGrath, like 
Brown (and Tracy, and Tanner44), gratefully receives Gadamer‘s critique of the Enlightenment‘s 
prejudice  against  tradition  (179-83),  adding  his  own  remarks  on  the  manifest  ideological 
conditioning of that prejudice (184-5). Yet he notes that this argument merely disarms a certain 
line of critique; it does nothing to justify Christianity‘s reliance on its own textual and living 
traditions. ‗The Enlightenment criticism of tradition is valid to the extent that it reminds us of 
the need to interrogate this tradition closely concerning its authenticity and reliability‘ (185). 
McGrath then turns to ‗the psychology of human memory‘ to defend the historical reliability of 
the textual traditions of the New Testament (185-7). He concludes that while such considerations 
‗do  not  allow  extravagant  conclusions  concerning  the  historical  reliability  of  the  traditions 
                                                       
42 I will not rehearse either Benjamin‘s work (with which I am not familiar) or McGrath‘s comments on it, since the 
details are not important to our discussion. Suffice to say that McGrath, like Lindbeck, Brown, and Schleiermacher, 
utilises a general theory in which (an aspect of) Christianity appears as a perfectly ordinary socio-historical example. 
In  this  case,  Benjamin‘s theory  allows the  conclusion  that  ‗the  phenomenon of  reappropriation  of  the  doctrinal 
heritage of the past involves no special claims for Christian theology; rather, it illustrates a general tendency of 
human  historical  and  cultural  reflection‘  (GD  169,  original  italics).  When  Benjamin‘s  model  is  ‗reworked 
Christologically, with the history of Jesus of Nazareth assuming the function which Benjamin assigns to Paradise‘, it 
becomes clear that ‗there are no fundamental difficulties raised by the suggestion that the memory of Jesus is a 
fundamental impulse to contemporary doctrinal reflection‘ (GD 170). 
43 See above, pp. 81–88. 
44 Kathryn Tanner‘s Theories of Culture (Tanner 1997) is another work that sets religion and theology in a culture-
theoretical context. Her approach is perhaps the most irenic and robust among those who have engaged with culture 
and theology after Lindbeck, though she, too, first expounds a view of culture and then applies it to religion and 
theology, without considering the need for critical engagement between Christian theology and the cultural analysis 
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concerning Jesus to be drawn‘, they ‗point to such traditions being generated and remembered 
under the optimum conditions available to human memorization processes at the time‘.45 
For McGrath, the Jesus traditions recorded in the New Testament now function in ongoing 
communities that, in historical continuity with the earliest Christian communities, continue to 
draw on those traditions for access to and understanding of the identity and significance of Jesus 
(GD 191). Since these communities continually receive and reappropriate the history of Jesus as 
central to their worshipping life, they also constitute the sphere within which the discipline of 
doctrinal criticism is properly conducted (192). In making this assertion, McGrath is not trying 
to render Christian doctrine impervious to external critique and evaluation, but he hopes that we 
are now beyond the stage when critics can presume to look condescendingly on tradition-bound 
Christianity while assuming the transhistorical objectivity of their own standpoint and criteria. 
His substantive argument concludes in the following paragraph: 
All criteria have a history; for Christianity, however, history itself is a criterion. As has been 
argued  throughout  this  work,  Christian  doctrine  is  a  response  to  the  history  of  Jesus  of 
Nazareth. Its achievements and successes, its failures and weaknesses, are all to be judged 
with  reference  to  that  history.  That  history  is  mediated  through  a  tradition,  and  socially 
embodied  in  a  tradition-orientated  community,  whose  anamnesis  of  its  foundational  and 
legitimizing event shapes its sense of identity, commitment and purpose. Doctrinal criticism 
finds its natural context within that community. Outside the community of faith, Jesus of 
Nazareth will continue to be interpreted according to rival theories of truth and reason; within 
the community of faith, however, Jesus of Nazareth remains the central object of worship, 
adoration and wonder. And in that sense of wonder lies the genesis of doctrine (GD 193). 
Two  further  sections  of  text  function  as  a  denouement.  In  ‗The  Future  of  Doctrine‘  (193-8) 
McGrath describes two socio-historical trends that now favour the continuing importance and 
development of doctrine, namely, aggressively secular cultures that force Christian self-definition 
as  a  survival  strategy,  and  a  growing  acceptance  of  religious  particularity  combined  with  an 
increasing (if not yet general) scepticism of hegemonic rationality.46 In ‗Conclusion‘ (198-200, 
more of a postscript than a telos for the foregoing argument) McGrath finds that liberal theology‘s 
impatience with doctrine reflects an underlying impatience with Christianity itself. Further— 
The analysis presented in this study suggests that evangelism is of major future importance 
for the survival and well-being of the Christian church, in that it is only through individuals 
coming to stand within the Christian tradition that they will fully understand its values, 
aspirations – and its doctrines. …The liberal suggestion that we defend Christianity by 
making its ideas acceptable to the secular world has been tried, and found wanting; we must 
                                                       
45 GD 187. McGrath moves on from this topic with a somewhat dismissive comment: the generation of the formative 
Christian traditions may well be an interesting subject, but he is less interested in the origin of those traditions than in 
their function (original italics). This side-step is a little strange in view of his earlier assertion of the importance of 
historical reliability, and of the appropriateness of questioning tradition in this regard 
46 The rise of aggressive secularism was also noted by Lindbeck, who saw his postliberal proposal, coupled with 
‗sociological sectarianism‘, as offering a viable path to Christian communal self-definition. See the final chapter of ND.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    216 
now commend the Christian proclamation of judgement and conversion through Christ, 
with the invitation to stand within the Christian tradition, as an alternative strategy (198-9). 
McGrath further suggests that, while apologetics may play a part in this strategy insofar as it 
facilitates evangelism, it cannot have a dominant role. Apologetics may build a bridge, but 
should not be allowed to define the territory into which travellers are invited to cross (199). 
6.3  THE GENESIS OF DOCTRINE: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
The standpoint from which McGrath responds to Lindbeck and advances his own proposals is 
similar to that developed in the present study. Not only are both standpoints of ‗historicised 
propositionalist‘ type (as Lindbeck might say), but they are ‗confessional and critical‘ (in the 
terms I prefer). It may serve clarity, then, if I state my own position more fully before engaging 
McGrath‘s argument.47 In so doing I am foreshadowing conclusions that will gain in depth and 
definition through the remainder of the chapter. 
The confessional aspect is the affirmation that Jesus is Lord, from which two main corollaries 
follow:  firstly,  Christian  theology  must  hold  itself  accountable  to  Christ  at  every  point  of 
theological  construction;  and  secondly,  in  view  of  the  universality  of  Christ‘s  Lordship, 
Christian theology cannot accept that there are any ‗pretheological‘ or ‗neutral‘ matters that may 
be  settled  without  reference  to  Christ.  The  critical  aspect  is  the  affirmation  that  Christian 
theology, together with Christian doctrine as its communally agreed expression, is a responsible 
human activity undertaken in obedience to Christ. Hence, in view of the finitude and fallenness 
of the humans who undertake every point of theological construction, Christian theology and 
doctrine are vulnerable to questioning as to the quality of the obedience expressed in them. 
Similar questioning is appropriate in relation to the sources on which theological construction 
relies, insofar as those sources arose or were preserved and passed on through human activity. 
The two aspects are not independent. It might be better to say that my standpoint is confessional 
and therefore critical: the confessional aspect is primary, and the critical aspect follows certain 
implications of acknowledging an anthropology that can stand under the confession of Christ‘s 
Lordship.  But  if  the  critical  aspect  is  secondary,  it  nonetheless  reflexively  informs  the 
confession, recognising that confessing Christ as Lord, understanding the words ‗Christ‘ and 
‗Lord‘,  and  describing  basic  standpoints, are  human  activities  and  therefore  vulnerable  and 
provisional. Yet the confession is ventured: insofar as such human activities can stand, the 
standing that really matters is found in the service of Christ. 
McGrath‘s basic stance in GD has much in common with this position. He locates the genesis and 
development of doctrine in a community in which ‗Jesus of Nazareth remains the central object of 
worship, adoration and wonder.‘48 For this community, Jesus forces ‗the redrawing of conceptual 
boundaries and mental horizons, demanding that we rethink and refashion our understanding of 
such matters as God, and human nature and destiny‘ (GD 174). McGrath‘s account of the origin, 
                                                       
47 For earlier statements see section 4.4.2 The Shape Of Christian Particularity (p. 131) and section 4.5.2 The Idea of 
Particularity in Christian Theology (p. 150). 
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transmission, and development of Christian doctrine is thoroughly historical, being permeated 
with an awareness that the processes of tradition are susceptible to distortion, and that a valuable 
commentary  on  such  distortions  is  provided  by  the  critical  techniques  of  the  sociology  of 
knowledge. Indeed, allowing for differences of emphasis, the opening pages of his final chapter 
(GD 172-79) may be read as a statement of the confessional and critical standpoint just outlined. 
Far from precluding critique, such accord on basic issues not only provides a well-defined 
ground on which meaningful engagement may occur (as Lindbeck might say), but also provides 
the possibility that engagement may expose unresolved issues in my own position. I take issue 
with McGrath on four main points. Firstly, I allow Lindbeck a brief rejoinder, recalling his 
charge  that  modern  theologies,  both  conservative  and  liberal,  tend  to  ‗intellectualism‘. 
Secondly, I query McGrath‘s use of ‗attitude to the past‘ as an explanatory category, and his 
related attack on the Enlightenment as a proxy for theological liberalism. Thirdly, and of greater 
import, his view of the relation between theology and ideology does not cohere with his (our) 
confessional  stance.  Finally,  although  McGrath  acknowledges  that  socio-historical  critique 
requires a double hermeneutic addressing the ideologies of both observed and observer, he does 
not attempt to identify (let alone engage) ideological aspects of his own position. These last two 
points set the agenda for the remainder of the chapter. 
6.3.1  A Lindbeckian Rejoinder 
A  kind  of  Lindbeckian  rejoinder  to  GD  is  provided  by  drawing  attention  to  passages  that 
illustrate the ‗intellectualism‘ Lindbeck saw as problematic in propositionalist approaches to 
doctrine. We have already noted one example in McGrath‘s misunderstanding of Lindbeck‘s 
comments on propositionalism.49 Further instances include McGrath‘s view that humans are 
‗condemned to history‘, and, perhaps, his promotion of ‗evangelism‘ as an alternative to the 
failed liberal strategy for commending Christianity to western culture. 
McGrath repeatedly uses the striking phrase ‗condemned to history‘ to describe the relation of 
humans to their historical existence.50 The fact that the Enlightenment attitude to the past (which 
he attacks relentlessly) was often expressed in similar language seems not to have troubled him, 
even when he notes that more recent acknowledgment of universal condemnation to history (an 
acknowledgment he shares) is merely the Enlightenment attitude reflexively extended to include 
the  thinker.51  Later, speaking of tradit ion‘s  hermeneutical  significance,  McGrath  cheeringly 
                                                       
49 See p. 203 above. 
50 The main locus for this language is McGrath‘s fourth chapter, which bears the title ‗On Being Condemned to 
History‘.  The  phrase  ‗condemned…to  history‘  appears  twice  in  that  chapter‘s  first  paragraph  together  with  an 
amplifying simile that likens historicity to ‗an intellectual prison‘. 
51 ‗The confident and restless culture of the Enlightenment experienced the past as a burden, an intellectual manacle 
which inhibited freedom and stifled creativity. To ascribe authority to the past, or even to particular features of the 
past, was seen as becoming incarcerated – needlessly – in a prison of one‘s own making‘ (GD 81). This passage 
occurs immediately after McGrath‘s introductory affirmation that ‗we are all condemned to live and speak in history 
and historical forms‘. Later, in relation to cultural relativism, he notes that ‗the relativity of the past is paralleled by 
the relativity of the present, reminding us that we are all condemned to speak and think in history and in historical 
forms, which threaten to distort as much as to convey our ideas‘ (99). McGrath sees the Enlightenment‘s mistake in 
its presumption that incarceration in history was someone else’s problem, i.e., that it was a problem only for those   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    218 
observes that, although we are condemned to live in history, ‗that imprisonment does not take 
the form of solitary confinement. We exist within communal traditions…‘ (GD 190). That is, 
McGrath agrees with Enlightenment thinkers that the past is a prison, but insists that the thinker 
cannot claim an external vantage point. Yet, if we cannot escape our prison through critical 
thinking, we can at least find comfort in the company of one or other group of fellow inmates. 
How significant is this language for McGrath? Can we ask what the transgression was that led 
to our ‗condemnation‘? How might McGrath‘s argument be modified if he understood human 
historicity, not as condemnation, but as a manifestation of divine grace?52 I cannot answer these 
questions on his behalf, but I wonder whether an understanding of finitude as condemnation 
implies that what could have been available to us, but for some unspecified misdemeanour, is 
just what the Enlightenment sought, namely, the disembodied knowledge of an ahistorical ego. 
An ‗intellectualist‘ tendency is also evident in McGrath‘s concluding advocacy of evangelism.53 
Here, while the polemic against liberal theology follows reasonably well from earlier argument, 
McGrath ventures onto softer ground in claiming that, with the failure of the apologetically-
motivated liberal strategy, evangelism now ‗commends itself as of strategic importance in the 
present  situation  within  western  culture.‘54  Unfortunately,  since  ‗evangelism‘  was  seldom 
mentioned in GD,55 its prominence in the conclusion is inappropriate—its content is not well-
defined, and it is not clear that it can ‗succeed‘ where the liberal strategy has ‗failed‘.56 
What McGrath means by ‗evangelism‘ must be taken from the immediate context, where he 
describes  it  as  ‗the  deployment  of  strategies…by  which  individuals  are  brought  within  the 
community  of  faith‘,  or, more  concretely,  as ‗the Christian  proclamation  of judgement  and 
conversion through Christ, with the invitation to stand within the Christian tradition‘. He allows 
that, within a broad evangelistic strategy, apologetics may be useful as a bridge providing those 
outside the Christian community with a glimpse of Christian values and aspirations, and of what 
Christian commitment might mean, but ‗historicist and sociological insights…[have] rendered 
traditional apologetics highly questionable‘ insofar as it presupposes universally valid patterns 
                                                                                                                                                             
who granted authority to tradition. But now, he says, contemporary theorists realise that incarceration in history is 
everyone’s problem, and rightly so. Thus he implicitly accepts the evaluative baggage attached to the language of 
‗incarceration in‘, or ‗condemnation to‘, history. 
52 For an interesting discussion of finitude as grace, see Allik 1993b. 
53 See GD 198-200, from which all the quotations in this paragraph are taken, and p. 215 above. 
54 GD 199, and see the passage quoted on p. 215 above. 
55 It appears at pp. 69-71 in McGrath‘s account of ‗Doctrine as Interpretation of Experience‘, where the evangelistic 
importance of doctrine is in view. Here, ‗doctrine is able to address, interpret and transform human experience, 
correlating it with the parameters of the Christian proclamation.‘ That is, doctrine supports the apologetic-cum-
evangelistic practice of displaying the way in which human experience makes sense and takes on ‗new and hitherto 
unexpected depths of meaning‘ when seen from a Christian point of view. It appears again, though more in the guise 
of catechesis, in relation to ‗the hermeneutical importance of a community tradition‘ (189). It is also the subtext of 
McGrath‘s comments on doctrine being ‗orientated towards faith, representing a demand for personal involvement, 
rather  than  passive  assent‘,  and  thus  possessing  ‗an  emotional  impact  and  life-changing  power  rarely,  if  ever, 
associated with scientific discovery‘ (on ‗Doctrine as Truth Claim‘, p. 78). 
56 McGrath‘s logic here invites the observation that ‗failure of Plan A does not by itself mean that Plan B is any better‘.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    219 
of reason and thought. For McGrath, evangelism ‗combine[s] the merits of epistemological 
rigour, cultural realism, and social pragmatism.‘ 
Now, we must bear in mind that McGrath intended GD to serve as a prolegomenon to later work 
on doctrinal criticism (GD viii, 198), and so what seems clouded here may be clarified in later 
works. Still, apart from the brief comments just outlined, GD offers neither an account of the 
nature  of  Christian  evangelism  nor  warrant  for  the  claim  that  evangelism  is  the  (only?) 
alternative  to  the  liberal  strategy.  The  comments  McGrath  offers  in  these  pages  could  be 
interpreted so that evangelism is taken to be more than preaching, but such an interpretation is 
not encouraged by use of the words ‗proclamation‘ and ‗invitation‘, and his view of apologetics 
as ‗explanation‘. Quite apart from the inadequacy of turning to evangelism by default, McGrath 
does not indicate that awareness of human historicity and the hermeneutic importance of faith 
communities might have considerable implications for one‘s view of what evangelism is. He 
rightly says that the sociology of knowledge calls into question any apologetics that assumes 
common  modes  of  rationality,  but  it  also  encourages  us  to  see  apologetics  as  more  than 
‗explanation‘  and  evangelism  as  more  than  ‗proclamation‘.  It  seems,  then,  that  if  liberal 
apologetic theology were to be dismissed in favour of McGrath‘s evangelism, this could be 
described, at least to some extent, as the exchange of one intellectualism for another. Thus 
McGrath‘s idea of evangelism is open to Lindbeck‘s charge.57 
Yet, neither McGrath‘s misconstrual of Lindbeck‘s critique, nor his negative view of human 
historicity, nor even his somewhat facile advocacy of evangelism, can rank as a substantial flaw, 
for none of these matters is crucial to his main point concerning the genesis of doctrine. One can 
imagine a revised argument making the same point while avoiding such lapses. That is, this 
‗Lindbeckian rejoinder‘ does not so much weaken McGrath‘s account of doctrine as indicate 
how some parts of it could be made more robust. 
6.3.2  Attitudes to the Past 
Issues of greater moment arise from an immanent critique that asks how well some aspects of 
McGrath‘s argument cohere with the basic standpoint that we share, beginning with his use of 
‗attitude to the past‘ as a key criterion. McGrath began GD by asserting that ‗the precipitating 
cause of Christian faith and Christian doctrine was and is a man named Jesus‘, and that the 
history of Jesus of Nazareth was and is the overriding criterion of Christian doctrine.58 On the 
basis of these observational statements, he found Lindbeck to be insufficiently attentive to the 
essential historicity of Jesus and the doctrinal traditions that try to express his significance (GD 
chapter 2). In response, McGrath described how doctrine actually functions in the communities 
                                                       
57 McGrath resists intellectualism elsewhere when he criticises the usual manner of writing historical theology as a 
history of academic theology, and especially of that academic theology that reflects a progressive ideology (GD 159-
61). He foreshadows a theory of doctrinal development (to be addressed in a later work) that would give ‗a fully 
nuanced account of the relation of doctrinal developments  at every level of Christian articulation to ideological 
shifts‘ (original italics), that is, it would range across ‗the entire spectrum of Christian opinion, from popular religion 
on the one hand to academic theology on the other‘ (161). 
58 GD 1. In McGrath‘s words, the second assertion is ‗The history of Jesus of Nazareth was and is the crucible of 
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that construct it (chapter 3), and explored the implications of the historical specificity of both 
doctrine and its critics (chapter 4). He applied this descriptive and theoretical material in socio-
historical analyses of the attitudes to the past found in various movements from the Renaissance 
onwards, with special critical attention directed towards the progressive ideology of the German 
Enlightenment and its offspring (chapter 5). His conclusion reformulated the initial assertions in 
the  light  of  the  intervening  discussion,  that  is,  in  terms  that  acknowledge  the  role  of  faith 
communities and the function of tradition in mediating access to the past (chapter 6).59 
In the context of an historical survey of modern approaches to doctrinal criticism, itself situated 
in a work that displays strong historical sensibilities, it is quite reasonable that McGrath should 
discuss  ‗attitudes  to  (the  authority  of)  the  past‘;  yet,  as  the  various  movements  in  which 
McGrath is interested are successively viewed through this lens, the variations in explanatory 
power  are  notable.  On  McGrath‘s  account,  the  radical  Reformation  and  the  Enlightenment 
operated with conceptual schemes in which a dismissive ‗attitude to the past‘ is both readily 
discernible and largely explicable as a response  to social alienation. In contrast, the Italian 
Renaissance and early Swiss Reformation did not have an attitude to ‗the past‘ as such, but quite 
distinct attitudes to the classical and biblical period (in which they found inspiration) and the 
Middle Ages (in which they found ineloquent barbarism). A further contrast is found in the 
German and later Swiss magisterial Reformations, for which authority resides neither in ‗the 
past‘ as such, nor in any particular periods within it, nor indeed in the present; rather, authority 
resides in scripture because it is the Word of God, and because it bears witness to Christ who is 
the content of salvation.60 Granted, insofar as divine revelation has occurred and is reported and 
interpreted in scripture, scripture deals with past events; but this is less a matter of an attitude to 
(the authority of) the past, than of an attitude to (the authority of) God in Christ.61 
From its lack of purchase on the criteriology of the magisterial Reformers and its particular 
suitability to, and extended deployment in, socio -historical critique of the Enlightenment, it 
appears  that,  as  an  explanatory  category,  ‗attitude  to  the  past‘  is  not  native  to  McGrath‘s 
constructive  proposal,  but  belongs  rather  to  a  polemical  sub-text,  namely,  an  attempt  to 
delegitimise theological liberalism within Christian thought. In outline, his argument is this: 
1  Since Christian doctrine seeks to express the significance of Jesus of Nazareth, an appeal 
to the past is intrinsic to Christianity. 
2  The Enlightenment was pervaded by a progressive ideology which a priori disparaged the 
                                                       
59 The conclusion cited above on p. 215 displays these elements. McGrath‘s initial comments in chapter 1 already 
referred to community and tradition, but the emphasis at that stage was on the historicity of the origin of doctrine and 
of the criteria applied in doctrinal development. The intervening chapters discussed the historicity of the people who 
developed doctrine, and of the processes by which they did so. 
60 McGrath notes (GD 124): ‗The basis of Luther‘s theological criteriology…has virtually nothing to do with such 
matters as antiquity or eloquence.‘ Rather, the basis is that ‗scripture mediates, in a specific literary and historical 
form, the experience of Christ, the recovery of which appropriate literary and historical techniques may permit.‘ A 
criteriology that has ‗nothing to do with…antiquity‘ can hardly display an ‗attitude to the past.‘ 
61 The magisterial Reformers display something like an ‗attitude to the past‘ in their engagement with the Christian 
tradition of scriptural interpretation, but in McGrath‘s account this ‗attitude‘ appears mainly as a willingness to listen 
to other interpreters of scripture: ‗pastness‘ as such confers neither advantage nor disadvantage to an interpretation.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    221 
authority of the past. 
3  Therefore theological liberalism, as contemporary heir to the Enlightenment and sharing 
its ideology, is fundamentally in tension with Christianity. 
 
That is, McGrath finds within Christianity a preferential option for conservatism, and hence an 
ideological incompatibility with liberalism. This argument raises several issues. 
Firstly, McGrath‘s criticism of the Enlightenment as such is that its refusal to allow the past any 
authority  was  an  a  priori  stance  assumed  in,  and  not  resulting  from,  reasoned  reflection. 
Granting that McGrath has made his case in this regard, we may ask to what extent he has 
thereby made a case against theological liberalism. The answer would be ‗just to extent that 
theological liberalism still maintains an a priori disparagement of the past‘. Clearly, McGrath 
commits  a  genetic  fallacy  here.  For  all  that  the  Enlightenment‘s  progressive  ideology  is 
undoubtedly one of the roots of theological liberalism, it does not follow that contemporary 
theological liberalism stands or falls by that root alone. It  may be that other roots provide 
sufficient nourishment, or that liberalism‘s relation to its Enlightenment roots has changed over 
time and is no longer as simple, or as unreflective, as McGrath takes it to be.62 
Secondly, there was in fact much more to the Enlightenment than a progressive ideology. Some 
proponents of liberalism find their core values in the principles of unconstrained critique and 
acknowledgement of the intrinsic limits of human reason which stem from Kant. 63 McGrath‘s 
high regard for these values is evident in his insistence on historical criticism and his expertise in 
socio-historical  analysis,  techniques  for  which  we  join  with  McGrath  in  thanking  the 
Enlightenment tradition. A different, and I suspect more effective, critique may have emerged had 
McGrath engaged the Enlightenment‘s contemporary heirs within and without theology on the 
basis of these shared values. The discussion in chapters 3 and 4 above suggests that the real issues 
have less to do with attitude to (the authority of) the past than attitude to authority as such,64 and 
may be explored productively in terms of the relation between tradition and critique. 65 
                                                       
62 At GD 162 McGrath indicates awareness of movement and diversity within the liberal tradition, but this does not 
appear to have affected his basic argument. 
63 E.g., Chapman 1998 and Chapman 2002. Chapman acknowledges that the Enlightenment made some excessive 
claims, but the persistence of a progressive ideology is apparent as, following Kant‘s identification of enlightenment 
with maturity, he presents his own position as ‗theology for grown-ups‘. In my experience, ongoing concern with 
being treated as grown-up is more characteristic of adolescence than of genuine maturity. 
64 This is illustrated by Chapman (1998), who concludes from his reading of Kant that ‗Enlightenment is thus to be 
understood  as  an  attack  on  supernatural  authority  and  a  recognition  that  whatever  authority  there  might  be  is 
ultimately located in human reason‘ (384-5). At the same time, recognition of the limits of human reason requires the 
invention of a ‗highest reality‘ that Chapman proceeds to call ‗God‘ (385) and describe as ‗wholly other‘ (though as 
our own invention it cannot address us from its own subjectivity and thus is no ‗other‘ at all). Again, he claims that 
‗God in Christ has shared this very human condition of lack of certainty, of doubt and criticism‘, thereby affirming us 
in a stance that always ‗points beyond the use of power  and towards the denial of  final authority, even divine 
authority‘ (389). One is entitled to wonder on what authority he makes this claim. 
65 This is close to Daniel Hardy‘s formulation: ‗The alternative which liberalism provides is that of a dialectical 
relation between a contemplative traditionality and a liberal and critical modernity‘ Hardy 1991, 303. In Hardy‘s 
view  (in  loc.),  the  core  intra-liberal  argument  concerns  the  manner  in  which  responsible  ‗tradition-recreating   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    222 
Not only is McGrath‘s focus on ‗attitude to the past‘ polemically motivated, and its deployment in 
polemic unsuccessful, but, thirdly, it strains towards incoherence with his basic standpoint, in 
which,  as  he  says,  ‗we  are  invited  to  reshape  our  mental  horizons  and  reconsider  any  prior 
understandings of God and human nature in the light of the story of Jesus of Nazareth‘ (GD 174). 
This becomes clear when we consider the characterisation of ‗the past‘ in the New Testament. 
For the earliest Christian communities the important thing was not an ‗attitude to the past‘ but 
an attitude to Jesus. This attitude naturally included an appreciation of the significance of his 
history for all our histories,66 but we should also note that for the earliest Christians Jesus was a 
contemporary, part of their leaders‘ living memory, and hence identified less with the past than 
with the present, the eschatological now (Rom 3:21; 8:1). For them, the past was the time of 
Moses and the prophets; the new revelation in Jesus marked the inauguration  of ‗these last 
days.‘67 There is a new situation for the Gentile world, too, through Jesus‘ resurrection: ‗Now he 
commands all people everywhere to repent‘.68 A person‘s past could be described as futile or 
worthless insofar as it was not fruitfully related to Christ,69 who was now the criterion of present 
action  and  attitude  and  forerunner  of  the  future. 70  Although  a  historical  sense,  with  its 
distinctions of past, present and future, pervades the New Testament, Messiah Jesus is the 
criterion by which the past is judged and the perspective from which the meaning of the past, 
and indeed of world history (Eph 1:10, 1 Cor 10:11), may be perceived.71 
Thus, insofar as the New Testament writers display an ‗attitude to the past‘, they do so in a way 
that, in McGrath‘s terms, reshapes mental horizons and reconsiders prior understandings…in 
the light of (the story of) Jesus of Nazareth. Precisely because of this, their ‗attitude to the past‘ 
can hardly be characterised as ‗conservative‘ or ‗progressive‘ since at every point the clear 
intent is to render the past Christologically. In that McGrath‘s focus on ‗attitude to the past‘ is a 
response to the Enlightenment rather than to Christ, it acts against the stance he wants to affirm. 
6.3.3  Ideology and Theology 
The fact that McGrath provides a purely ideological treatment of ‗attitude to the past‘, and never 
reconsiders it in the manner suggested by his programmatic statements about the centrality of 
Jesus, invites further attention to his account of ideology and its relation to theology. In his 
review  of  historicism  and  the  techniques  of  sociological  analysis,  McGrath  welcomes  the 
                                                                                                                                                             
interpretation‘ is to be carried on, precisely the question addressed by Delwin Brown. 
66 McGrath notes Barth‘s insistence that revelation demands historical predicates (GD 176). 
67 Heb 1:1-2; cf Rom 16:25f, Eph 3:9f. We must remember, of course, that New Testament writers‘ emphasis on the 
now and the new of Jesus co-exists with their conviction that his life, death and resurrection were, in a deep sense, 
‗according to the Scriptures,‘ i.e., consistent with the overarching historical purposes of the one God. 
68 Acts 17:30 (cf Col 1:21f, 26; 1 Pet 2:10 ). See also Paul‘s early synagogue preaching (Acts 13:16-41), Stephen‘s 
speech to the Sanhedrin (Acts 7, esp 7:52), Peter‘s Pentecost sermon (Acts 2:14-36) and his speech after healing the 
lame man at the Beautiful gate (Acts 3:11-26) and subsequent speech to the temple leaders (Acts 4:8-12,19-20). 
69 1 Pet 1:18, Eph 4:20-4; Col 2:8, Phil 3:7-8, 1 Pet 4:1-3. 
70 As present criterion, see Phil 2:1-11, 1 Pet 2:21-5. As forerunner, 1 Cor 15:20, 45; Heb 12:1-3. 
71 For the general point made in this paragraph, see also Cullmann 1964.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    223 
emergence of a ‗more mature perspective‘ within late twentieth-century sociology according to 
which ‗all belief or value systems – whether religious, secular or agnostic – are recognized as 
being equally open to sociological investigation‘ (GD 96, original italics). In particular, he lays 
considerable  emphasis  on  Giddens‘  argument  that  sociology  has  the  structure  of  a  double 
hermeneutic, the essential point of which is that ‗the frameworks of rationality of both the 
observed and the observer are socially conditioned, requiring social explanation‘.72 Against this 
background, McGrath criticises the Enlightenment for lack of reflexive self-awareness in its 
criticism of tradition, but the same background also brings into sharp relief the one-sided nature 
of his own critique. While he admits to an ideology that some may call ‗conservative‘ (GD 162), 
he makes no attempt to elucidate it or examine it in the light of his core commitments. 
Rather  than  attempting  self-critique,  McGrath  is content  to  allow  that  his  own  conservatism, 
though moderate and chastened, is just as much ideologically conditioned as the progressivism he 
opposes. But if there is no neutral way of choosing between the two attitudes (GD 152), each of 
which is as value-laden, tradition-bound and precommitted as the other (163), how does choice, 
insofar as there is a choice, occur?73 We have already noted McGrath‘s view that ‗history itself 
provides a criterion‘, in that Christianity, by virtue of its intrinsic appeal to the historical figure of 
Jesus of Nazareth, is incompatible with a progressive ideology. There is another sense in which 
‗history provides a criterion‘: ideologies experience fluctuating fortunes in human societies, and 
the balance between progressive and conservative attitudes in Christian churches will broadly 
follow the prevalence of these ideologies in the wider society. McGrath suggests that ‗a growing 
trend  towards  a  conservative  ideology  lends  added  weight‘  to  his  observation  that  Christian 
doctrine inevitably appeals to the past (164-5). This suggestion appears to confuse the prevalence 
of  an  ideology  with  its  justification  (unless  the  ‗weight‘  referred  to  is  merely  the  weight  of 
numbers in a popularity contest). Fortunately, McGrath does not develop further argument on this 
basis, and he is in any case well aware that the dominance of any ideology is transient. 
Thus McGrath offers history as a criterion for ‗choosing‘ between ideologies; and the most 
striking feature of this is not that the arguments are unconvincing, but that he offers no other 
criterion by which such choices may be made. In particular, he does not attempt any theological 
engagement, despite depicting Christianity as a tradition in which everything is reconsidered in 
the light of Jesus of Nazareth. He acknowledges ideology as a crucial aspect of the specific 
contexts  in  which  theologians‘  views  are  formed,  and  thus  as  a  strong  influence  on  their 
                                                       
72 GD 97-8. McGrath refers to Giddens‘ double hermeneutic twice more. On p. 149, he notes the vulnerability of 
Harnack‘s Dogmengeschichte in this regard, in that Harnack ‗appears to fall victim to the naïve tendency of individuals 
to regard their specific historical location, including its associated modes of discourse and frameworks of rationality, as 
providing  a  privileged  standpoint  from  which  others  may  be  evaluated.‘  Against  this,  he  maintains,  the  double 
hermeneutic recognises both the interpreted and the interpreter ‗as being equally open to covert cultural conditioning‘. 
On p. 163, reviewing the preceding socio-historical analysis of modern Christian attitudes to the past, he notes that 
‗criticism and evaluation of these theological attitudes cannot…realistically be undertaken in isolation from the cultural 
systems which they reflect, nor that of the culture to which the critic belongs. A ―double hermeneutic‖…is implicated, in 
which the respective ideologies of proponent and opponent alike condition the resulting debate.‘ 
73 GD 152. McGrath indicates a little later that it is less a matter of choosing or deciding than of presupposing the 
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theologies,74 but does not mention—and indeed appears to rule out—the possibility of influence 
from theology to ideology. Thus, the three divergent strands within the reformation movement 
(Lutheran, Reformed and radical) ‗represent a fundamental clash of ideologies, rather than mere 
differences of theological method or substance‘.75 ‗Attitudes to the past appear to function as 
theological premises, rather than conclusions, reflecting the extent to which modern theology is 
subject to ideological conditioning‘ (GD 154). Tensions between conservative and progressive 
theologies ‗which might be represented as a quest for ―truth‖ might more properly be described 
as the inevitable outcome of conflicting foundational ideologies‘.76 
It appears, then, that the lack of theological engagement with ideology in McGrath‘s discussion 
is  no  mere  oversight.  He  seems  to  think  that  ideological  conflicts  cannot  be  decided  on 
theoretical  (and  hence  on  theological)  grounds,  because  ideology  is  ‗pre-theoretical‘  (and 
therefore, presumably, pretheological). Faced with conflicting ideologies, he is at an analytical 
impasse. It is then indeed fortunate that theology can follow what he takes to be the ideological 
choice implicit in Christianity‘s intrinsic appeal to history. 
It  is  not  clear  from  McGrath‘s  discussion  just  why  he  thinks  ideology  is  inaccessible  to 
theology. Potential grounds for an argument are present in his text, but are not developed. These 
grounds, together with my own brief indications of how they might have been deployed, include 
the following: (1) ideology‘s existential priority—since it is unavoidable, critique cannot free us 
from it; (2) ideology‘s analytical priority—we can never ‗get behind‘ our ideologies in order to 
decide  between  them;  (3)  there  is  no  neutral  vantage  point  from  which  ideology  can  be 
criticised— hence we are obliged to refrain from critique. Since McGrath does not explicitly 
deploy  these  (or  any  other)  reasons  to  justify  theological  non-engagement  with  ideology,  I 
cannot engage his argument at this point, but these grounds, at least, do not bear much weight. 
Grounds 1 and 2 reflect the fact that, as human beings, we are always already immersed in 
complex networks of customary practices, plausibility structures, ideologies, and institutions. But 
‗always already immersed‘ does not imply that critique must be abandoned; it means that it must 
be reflexively self-aware. Even granting that full specification of our own ideologies is necessarily 
elusive, engagement on the basis of partial specification, perhaps leading to partial insights, may 
be valid and fruitful. To deny this would be to deny the worth of any critical engagement with any 
aspect of a tradition. Yet, in large measure, a tradition‘s vitality consists in the multiplicity and 
energy of precisely these kinds of engagements. As for ground 3, the lack of a neutral vantage 
point for critique must be frankly admitted and reflected in the manner of argument—perhaps by 
                                                       
74 The history of Christian theology suggests to McGrath that ‗ideological factors are a major consideration in shaping a 
theologian‘s attitude to the past‘, so that ‗questions of ―truth‖ concerning attitudes to the past may…ultimately reduce, at 
least in part, to the question of whether a conservative or progressive ideology happens to be dominant in a given 
situation‘  (GD  152).  Moreover,  ideological  neutrality  or  non-commitment  is  impossible:  one  inevitably  has  some 
ideology, though all are equally open to challenge (GD 152). Thus, ideology is, inevitably, pervasive in theology. 
75 GD 153. Although McGrath began his discussion of ideology with the disclaimer that he did not wish to ‗reduce 
Christian theology to an ideological epiphenomenon, an ideational superstructure erected upon a socio-economic 
base‘ (GD 152), his qualification of ‗theological method or substance‘ as ‗mere‘ in relation to ‗fundamental‘ ideology 
hints at a view that ideology is somehow deeper than, or prior to, theology. 
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favouring  immanent  rather  than  external  critique,  or  by  employing  the  double  hermeneutic 
suggested by Giddens and welcomed (and ignored) by McGrath. However, the implicit suggestion 
that  neutrality  is  a  precondition  for  critique  is  highly  questionable,  and  may  be  taken  as  an 
indication that the one making the suggestion is to some extent unaware of their own ideological 
precommitments. We have already seen that, from the standpoint of the Christian confession, 
‗neutrality‘ appears as either an encapsulation of Christian theology or an alien intrusion into it.77 
In sum, any and all features of our immersive environment may be critically engaged if and to the 
extent that they are recognised. Critique is impossible only if and to the extent that its object is 
invisible.  But  where,  through  socio-historical  analysis  such  as  McGrath  provides,  implicit 
ideologies are at least partially unmasked, they become available to critical reflection. Granted, we 
can never presume our reflections to be free of ideology, but the fact that a concept or belief 
belongs to a category called ‗ideology‘ does not confer immunity from critique.78 
The  point  is  nicely  illustrated  in  McGrath‘s  account  of  the  attitudes  to  the  Middle  Ages 
displayed  by  Zwingli  and  Luther  (GD  153).  McGrath  notes  that  the  Italian  Renaissance‘s 
ideological  aversion  to  the  Middle  Ages  is  reflected  in  the  writings  of  early  Reformed 
theologians ‗who assume – as a self-evident truth – that there is nothing to be gained by entering 
into dialogue with theologians of the period.‘ In contrast, ‗Luther – who declined to adopt the 
ideology of the Italian Renaissance and its theological implications – insisted on entering into a 
dialogue (however critical) with the representatives of late medieval theology.‘ Both approaches 
are further contrasted with that of the radical reformers who advocated a total break with the 
past. McGrath offers two interpretive comments: 
1  The  contrasting  approaches  ‗represent  a  fundamental  clash  of  ideologies, 
rather than mere differences of theological method or substance‘ (GD 153); 
2  It is not so much that criteria for evaluating the authority of the past are 
‗selected‘, as that ‗a certain outlook on the authority of the past is (possibly 
unconsciously)  presupposed  within  the  group  to  which  the  theologian 
belongs,‘ and thus is ‗received and assumed as self-evidently correct‘ (ibid.). 
The first of these was noted earlier, and the second refers mainly to Zwingli‘s strong humanist 
background. But what of Luther? If he ‗declined‘ to adopt the humanist ideology, he was surely 
making a choice, and, on McGrath‘s analysis, the basis on which he did so appears to have been 
theological and, in particular, Christological (GD 123-5). 
Christian theology is not helpless before ideology, but is called to serve Christ and to enlist every 
thought in his service in the belief that each and every idea can be criticised christologically.79 To 
                                                       
77 See above 4.5.2 The Idea of Particularity in Christian Theology commencing on p. 150, and 5.3.2 The Possibility 
of Permanence commencing on p. 187. 
78 McGrath‘s ‗ideology‘ parallels Lindbeck‘s ‗categorial frameworks‘ at this point—both appear to be immune to 
critique from their inhabitants. Ideology‘s ‗importance…in shaping attitudes and conditioning outlooks can hardly be 
ignored, especially by those committed to the notion of religion as a cultural system‘ (GD 164). 
79 The exception to this is the idea of the ultimacy of Jesus Christ, i.e., the confession of Jesus as Lord. Not that Christ‘s 
ultimacy is a priori unquestionable, but where it does come into question one must face the possibility of answers that 
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say that presuppositions remain uncriticisable even when identified is to grant them an ultimacy 
that is extremely problematic in a theology predicated upon the ultimacy of  Christ. It is not 
ideology as such, but rather its subtle and hidden operation, that confers on it any degree of 
immunity from criticism. Recognition of ideology enables critical engagement. Indeed, making 
the implicit explicit is vital to McGrath‘s project of doctrinal criticism: only what is explicit can be 
examined concerning its faithfulness to Christ, and anything that is explicit may be so examined, 
ideologies  not  excepted. The  view  that  ideology  is  necessarily  prior to  theology  implies  that 
Christ‘s Lordship over theology is limited, or even circumscribed, by it. Or perhaps the implied 
limitation is anthropological: our nature may be such that we are helpless in the face of ideology, 
and are unable to act in a way that fully acknowledges Christ‘s Lordship over our theological 
constructions. The former could not be a Christian position, while the latter may be questioned on 
philosophical and theological grounds—it is hardly consistent with a Christian anthropology. 
Insofar  as  what  is  at  stake  here  is  Christ‘s  Lordship  over  theology,  the  presence  of 
progressivism, conservatism or any other ideology in theological reflection raises the question 
of theologians‘ allegiance. That is, the question is not only ideological, but also political—its 
political nature coming to light when implicit ideologies are unmasked, perhaps through socio-
historical analysis. To the extent of their unmasking, ideologies may be interrogated concerning 
their relation to Christ. Lack of such interrogation, whether intentional or not, limits the extent 
to which a proposal can claim to stand in Christ‘s service, however much or however explicitly 
it may affirm it. McGrath‘s acceptance that ideology is essentially prior to theology parallels the 
priority  of  transcendental  anthropology  in  Schleiermacher  and  of  social  anthropology  in 
Lindbeck. McGrath rightly sees that a priori progressivism is incompatible with the priority of 
Christ, but wrongly attributes the incompatibility to ‗fundamental‘ ideological conflict between 
progressivism and Christianity‘s allegedly intrinsic conservatism. Nevertheless, the unmasking 
of ideologies is valuable, as it allows the basic political question to be asked. And the answers to 
that  question  indicate  not  only  that  an  a  priori  progressivism  cannot  stand  under  Christ‘s 
Lordship (as McGrath saw), but also that the bringing of all things into theological subjection to 
Christ may be as relevant to conservative ideologies as to progressive. 
6.3.4  Ideology and the Word of God 
Reflection  on  McGrath‘s  hermeneutic  of  suspicion  has  illuminated  the  ideological  aspect  of 
‗pretheological‘  or  ‗nontheological‘  arguments,  whether  those  arguments  be  serving  liberal, 
postliberal, conservative or any other interests. Further, it has indicated that an ideology that is not 
engaged  theologically  necessarily  has  a  destabilising  effect  on  a  theology  that  claims  a 
Christological focus. It is a matter of some importance, then, that theology be conducted with 
ideological awareness, and that ideology, where it is brought to light, be questioned as to its 
relation to Christ. Due to the structure of the discussion so far, I have noted mainly liberal and 
postliberal examples in this regard. As attention now turns to conservative viewpoints, it is not 
enough to provide merely equal treatment in the interests of ‗fair play‘. Rather, this study should 
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obvious conservative affinities of the confessional aspect of my own standpoint; and the fact that 
‗unmasking arbitrariness in others may always be a defence against uncovering it in ourselves.‘80 
McGrath points the way in this regard when he notes that, for Luther and Zwingli, scripture was 
‗self-evidently‘ the Word of God,81 and that, because of ‗the presuppositions of his age, Calvin has 
little to say on the problem of how belief in scripture and faith in Christ were related‘.82 But it is 
precisely  in  the  case  of  ‗self-evident‘  truths  reflecting  ‗the  presuppositions  of  the  age‘  that 
ideological analysis is most relevant (as McGrath found with the German Enlightenment‘s attitude 
to the past), and it is especially such ‗truths‘ that theology is called to critically engage from the 
standpoint of Christ‘s Lordship. In the previous subsection we saw that McGrath did not seek out 
and engage his own precommitments or those of the magisterial reformers (of whom he clearly 
approves), a fact highlighted by his own ideological critique and his promotion of a method of 
‗double hermeneutic‘. Having now identified ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ as a precommitment 
in the reformers‘ thinking, we are in a position to partly redress the one-sidedness of McGrath‘s 
discussion by holding this ‗conservative‘ religious ideology answerable to Jesus Christ. 
Earlier, I foreshadowed an argument that the question of allegiance is relevant, not only to some 
liberal  theologies  and  to  Lindbeck‘s  proposal,  but  also  to  theologies  of  a  more  conservative 
character.83  The  basic  direction  of  this  argument  now  emerges.  While  liberal  theology 
compromises  Christ‘s  Lordship  insofar  as  it  allies  itself  to  autonomous  reason  or  its  lightly-
chastened surrogates, and Lindbeck does so via an independent anthropology and an a priori 
doctrinal ‗neutrality‘, conservative theology compromises Christ‘s Lordship insofar as it allies 
itself to principles that have not been interrogated (or are excluded from interrogation) concerning 
their place within that dominion, most notably the presupposition that the Bible (and/or tradition) 
is the Word of God. That this presupposition is commonly used to defend or to promote Christ‘s 
Lordship shows worthy intent but is not a sufficient answer. Much liberal theology, and no doubt 
Lindbeck‘s, too, is done out of reverence for Christ. In that conservatives understand themselves 
to be promoting Christ‘s Lordship, the argument may be more subtle in some respects, but it is 
also more direct in that the principal ground of engagement is already agreed.84 The question is not 
whether a divine Bible is ‗necessary‘ in order to secure Christ‘s Lordship, but to what extent and 
in what manner Christ‘s Lordship is in fact exercised through the Bible. 
                                                       
80 Noted by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 72) as a discovery of Freud. 
81  Zwingli‘s  assumption  that  the  New  Testament  is  the  Word  of  God  ‗is  treated  as  axiomatic,  requiring  no 
demonstration‘ (GD 120). At Wittenberg ‗the authority of scripture resided…in its being the Word of God. Luther 
and Karlstadt, like Zwingli, regarded this identification as self-evident, requiring no further demonstration….Some 
such identification…was the common heritage of medieval theology.‘ (GD 123) 
82 GD 227 n100. In his note McGrath refers to E.A. Dowey‘s classic study of The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s 
Theology, which reaches one of its key insights in demonstrating the lack of integration between Calvin‘s doctrine of 
scripture  and  his  ‗exclusively  Christocentric  doctrine  of  faith‘  (Dowey  1994,  160-161).  Dowey  also  helpfully 
describes  Calvin‘s  ‗principle  of  correlation,  by  which  we  learn  the  intimate  connection  that  exists  between  the 
knowledge of God and of ourselves‘ (ibid. 18). This ‗correlation‘ is not like that of David Tracy, but lays out very 
similar conceptual territory to the ‗confessional and critical‘ orientation described in this study. 
83 See p. 207 above. 
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Discussion of this question, which takes up the next two sections, contributes to this study on 
several levels: as a theological engagement with ideology it lends substance to my criticism of 
McGrath for discounting this possibility; as an investigation of the relation between divine Word 
and human word in the Bible it further addresses the question posed at the end of the previous 
chapter concerning a fully historical view of Christian confession, doctrine and scripture; and by 
setting the Bible‘s vulnerability within a theological framework it further clarifies the confessional 
and therefore critical hermeneutic that comprises my counter-proposal to Lindbeck‘s cultural-
linguistic  account  of  religion  and  doctrine.  The  final  section  of  the  chapter  will  review  the 
argument in terms of these contributions. 
6.4  WORD AND SCRIPTURE IN KARL BARTH‘S CHURCH DOGMATICS 
With  this  issue,  we  have  reached  the  intersection  of  two  strands  of  argument,  one  mainly 
historical, and the other mainly theological. On the one hand, having absorbed Delwin Brown‘s 
account of the historicity of tradition and Alister McGrath‘s description of the historicity of 
doctrine, we are facing the question of the historicity of scripture, in respect of which neither 
those authors nor Lindbeck provided satisfactory answers. On the other hand, in view of the 
Christian confession of Christ as Lord, and recognising that Christ‘s Lordship does not allow for 
independent, ‗neutral‘ or pretheological principles, we are asking in what manner this Lordship 
is exercised through scripture. We are thus at the point where the idea of scripture‘s historicity 
intersects with its ecclesial role in relation to revelation. 
I will not pursue this inquiry through a socio-historical hermeneutic of suspicion, though that may 
well have been illuminating in its own way.85 Rather, from the confessional and critical standpoint 
of this study, the important questions are those arising in a theological critique that interrogates the 
assertion ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ concerning its service to Christ as Lord and in view of its 
vulnerability as a human statement. Such a critique exists in the first volume of Karl Barth‘s 
Church Dogmatics, and I survey the relevant material below. Barth‘s structuring of the issues 
addresses the question of how to attend to the humanity of biblical texts for the sake of hearing 
God‘s Word. I find the main principles of his approach to be quite satisfactory, and suggest that 
aspects of his treatment of the Bible‘s unity and vulnerability are in tension with those principles 
and should be modified. The resulting modified Barthian view of scripture is, I believe, a more 
robust theological account of the relation between human word and divine word in the Bible. On 
this basis section 6.5 goes on to clarify the appropriate trust and suspicion involved in reading 
faithfully while identifying and dealing with scripture‘s vulnerability to ideological distortion. 
                                                       
85 Such inquiry lies beyond both my competence and the scope of this study. I am not assuming any particular results 
from it, other than that, as a human belief, a view of scripture as the Word of God will be found to be implicated in 
institutional legitimation, the projection of power and political aspirations. Such findings might provide a salutary 
commentary on human nature and moral frailty, but would achieve little in the way of justifying or destabilising the 
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6.4.1  ‘The Bible is the Word of God’ 
Barth set his doctrine of scripture in the context of an overarching doctrine of the Word of God, 
which comprises the first volume (in two parts) of his Church Dogmatics. Essentially, by ‗Word 
of God‘ Barth means the triune God‘s gracious revealing and reconciling address to humankind 
in  Jesus  Christ.  Importantly,  the  Word  of  God  is  always  the  event  of  God‘s  address  to 
humankind, notwithstanding that, in scripture and in proclamation, it takes place in the form of 
human words. Consistent with this, Barth explains quite early in CD that when he says ‗the 
Bible is the Word of God‘, the ontological verb is not meant in the sense of direct identity.86 
The detailed argument is set out in Barth‘s first thesis on Holy Scripture, §19 (CD I.2 457) which 
concludes: ‗Scripture is holy and the Word of God, because by the Holy Spirit it became and will 
become to the Church a witness to divine revelation‘. That scripture is ‗(human) witness to divine 
revelation‘ is the basic concept from which the whole exposition unfolds. In §19.1 Scripture as a 
Witness to Divine Revelation Barth distinguishes between witness and revelation as follows: 
If we want to think of the Bible as a real witness of divine revelation, then clearly we have 
to keep two things constantly before us and give them their due weight: the limitation and 
the positive element, its distinctiveness from revelation, in so far as it is only a human word 
about it, and its unity with it, in so far as revelation is the basis, object and content of this 
word. (CD I.2 463) 
The humanity of scripture must not be ignored for the sake of its divinity. Rather, it must be 
studied, ‗for it is here or nowhere that we shall find its divinity.‘87 Paying attention to the human 
words of scripture means attending to each writer‘s situation in all its human specificity so that 
we may hear what it is they intended to say.88 Barth wants us to hear the message, and receive it 
as meant—as witness to divine revelation. 
In  §19.2  Scripture  as  the  Word  of  God  (CD  I.2  473-537),  Barth  further  unfolds  his  basic 
principle (that scripture is a witness to divine revelation) in six clarifications. (1) Scripture as we 
have it reflects the Church‘s historical, and therefore provisional, judgement concerning the 
canon (473-81). (2) The various parts of the canon are all scripture in the same sense, namely, 
that they attest the Messiah. Only in its totality is the biblical witness the witness of divine 
revelation. The unity of this witness follows from the unity of God in his revelation.89 (3) The 
self-attestation of scripture consists ‗generally and indirectly‘ in the fact that it is witness to 
                                                       
86 See §4.2 The Word of God Written (CD I.1 99-110, especially p. 110). 
87 ibid. Here, and elsewhere, Barth draws a parallel with the humanity and divinity of Christ. 
88 CD I.2 463-4. Barth insists that scripture, like any other human word, points away from itself, and indeed away 
from the speaking self; that is to say, the writers intended to bear witness to something. They did not intend to give an 
account  of  their  religious  emotions,  or  their  religious  genius,  or  their  spiritual  values.  To  treat  the  exegesis  of 
scripture as the exegesis of the witnesses is thus to completely mistake the nature of scripture as witness, as human 
address about something. Barth‘s target here is the classic liberal exegetical practice that exegeted the messenger‘s 
humanity and thus failed to respect him or her as messenger. 
89 CD I.2 481-5, especially 482. On this ground Barth maintains that the Church must hear the scriptural canon in its 
entirety, without any exclusions, preferences or devaluations. He does not note any tension between this insistence on 
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Jesus  Christ,90  but  also  ‗specifically  and  explicitly‘  in  the  fact  that  it  attests  the  historical 
existence of the biblical witnesses (485-92). Hence, (4) in regard to revelation we are tied to the 
biblical texts, and hence biblical criticism may contribute greatly to our understanding of their 
witness,  if  it  is  indeed  their  witness  that  it  seeks  to  elucidate.91  (5) The priority accorded 
scripture as human witness to revelat ion neither absolutises a relative, nor compromises the 
priority of God over creation, nor derogates from the proper dignity of other words that speak of 
the one God. Rather, as human witness to the Word of God scripture speaks  from the divine 
priority, not as another priority. Yet direct identity between the Word of God and the human 
words of scripture is impossible. Though real, the identity is indirect, being conditioned neither 
by the nature of God nor by human nature but by the decision and act of God—in this decision 
and act, scripture is the Word of God in the sign of the human word (495-502). (6) Scripture has 
this priority, and, as the witness of divine revelation, is the Word of God—but this does not 
mean that the Word of God is present as an object for us to seize and control. The ‗has‘ and the 
‗is‘ are to be read as recollection (‗had‘ and ‗was‘) and expectation (‗will have‘ and ‗will be‘) of 
the event of the Word of God as ‗what God himself decides and wills and does in divine 
freedom and superiority and power‘ in the divine present (502-6).92 
In view of these clarifications, the assertion that ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ faces difficulties 
on both on the human side and the divine. Facing the Bible‘s all-too-evident humanity, how can 
we believe that we hear a divine word in it? And how can we equate the sovereign freedom of 
the Word of God with the creaturely reality of written texts? 
Addressing  the  first  question  (CD  I.2  506-12),  Barth  gives  a  frank  account  of  scripture‘s 
humanity:  it  is  genuine  witness  by  ‗fallible,  erring  men  like  ourselves‘;  there  are  ‗lacunæ, 
inconsistencies  and  over-emphases‘  (507);  the  biblical  writers  share  our  capacity  for  errors 
(508-9); the Bible‘s capacity for error extends to its religious or theological content; ‗Not only 
part  but  all  that  [the  biblical  writers]  say  is  historically  related  and  conditioned‘  (509). 
Moreover, there is no sense in which the Bible as a whole constitutes a system, nor any way in 
which evident contradictions can be evaded (509). These problems seem insurmountable, and 
Barth finds no way of choosing between or even reconciling conflicting biblical texts. There is 
no ‗single rule by which to make a common order‘, no way of choosing sides, no standpoint 
from which we can pronounce that any biblical author has ‗erred‘, ‗for within certain limits and 
therefore relatively they are all vulnerable and therefore capable of error even in respect of 
                                                       
90 This is much the same point as McGrath noted in the magisterial reformers—that the essence of Christian faith is 
relationship with Jesus Christ, and the Bible is Holy Scripture because it conveys Christ to believers. 
91 492-5. Barth concludes this point with a reference to Calvin‘s commentary on 2 Cor 5:7 (in which Calvin links it 
with 1 Cor 13:12)—‗For we see, indeed, but it is through a glass darkly; that is, in place of the reality we rest upon 
the word.‘ (495) He comments: ‗Biblical theology can be as critical as it will and must—but if it carries out the 
programme outlined in this statement, it will always do good work as ecclesiastical scholarship…‘. 
92 On p. 503 Barth speaks of the event of the Word of God in Holy Scripture as something we can only ever circle 
around, hoping that it will graciously come and take place ‗within our own circling exposition‘. ‗We cannot attain to 
it of ourselves any more than we can—as we saw earlier—to the unity of Scripture.‘ The link with the discussion of 
the unity of scripture will be explored further below. The point is that recognition of the Word of God in Holy 
Scripture means a recognition of the unity of the scriptural witness and of its priority and sovereignty over us. There 
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religion and theology‘ (509-10).93 The humanity of scripture, its nature as genuine witness, 
means that belief in scripture as the Word of God faces ‗barriers which can be broken down 
only by miracle (Wunder)‘ (507). That is, faith that the Bible is the Word of God is a work of 
the Word of God itself, and presupposes that the Word of God has already spoken in the Bible, 
thus grounding the hope that it will be heard in it again.94 
However, it is the second question that poses the ‗real difficulty‘, the problem not of our belief 
but of the fact: how can the equation ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ be made in respect of a 
(relatively) static collection of human words on the one hand and the potent, ineffable and 
majestic Word of God on the other (526-36)? The reality of the equation is another miracle, in 
this case ‗the miracle of the divine Majesty in its condescension and mercy‘. ‗If we take this 
equation on our lips,‘ says Barth, ‗it can only be as an appeal to the promise in virtue of which 
this miracle was real in Jesus Christ and will again be real in the word of His witnesses‘; it 
cannot mean that the Word of God is predicated of the Bible as an attribute, for God is not an 
attribute of anything else; nor can it mean that the Word of God is tied to the Bible, rather, the 
reverse is the case, the Bible is tied to the Word of God. That is, ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ 
does not concern the intrinsic nature of the biblical text, but the free decision of God. 
Having surveyed ‗ways to be taken and avoided‘, Barth offers his positive propositions on 
Scripture as Word of God (CD I.2 527-37). (1) The Word of God is a divine word, and hence 
not under human control and foresight. Therefore, ‗the  Bible is the Word of God‘ is not a 
statement about the Bible as such, but speaks of God‘s freedom and rule in and through the 
Bible. (2) The Word of God is not a state or fact but an event, an act of God that rests on God‘s 
free decision. In faith we approach the Bible in expectation of this event. (3) The Word of God 
is the miracle of God‘s gracious self-communication in the human word of the Bible. (4) The 
fact of this miracle must not in any way compromise the humanity of the biblical witness. 
To the bold postulate, that if their word is to be the Word of God they must be inerrant in 
every word, we oppose the even bolder assertion, that according to the scriptural witness 
about man, which applies to them too, they can be at fault in any word, and have been at 
fault in every word, and yet according to the same scriptural witness, being justified and 
sanctified by grace alone, they have still spoken the Word of God in their fallible and erring 
human word (CD I.2 529-30). 
(5) Since the miracle of the Word of God is an event, the presence of God‘s Word in the Bible 
cannot be an attribute of the Bible in itself. With the church we recollect that we have heard God‘s 
Word in it, and therefore we expect that when we read the Bible in faith we shall, by God‘s grace, 
                                                       
93 This may recall the ‗featureless diversity‘ noted in Delwin Brown‘s account of the canon (see section 3.3.4 A 
Diverse Canon, commencing on p. 79 above). Although he notes that there are ‗distinctions of higher and lower, of 
utterances which are more central and peripheral‘ (CD I.2 509), Barth does not suggest that a synthetic viewpoint 
(e.g., an overall narrative framework) might be inferred from scripture itself and used to discern priorities and decide 
conflicts. Yet his own exegetical practice appears to take the Bible as a single, large narrative focussed on Jesus 
Christ in anticipation (OT) and recollection (NT).  
94 Ibid. At the same time, the humanity of scripture means that all manner of critical questions and tools may aid the task 
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hear God‘s Word in it again. (6) Because the Word of God is the event of God‘s free decision to 
address us, its occurrence is not in our power, but only in God‘s. We cannot attain to God‘s Word 
in  the  Bible  by  any  particular  technique  or  by  discriminating  between  fallible  and  infallible 
elements in it. (7) ‗The Bible is the Word of God‘ points to a dual reality—of the text in its human 
vulnerability,  and  of  the  event  of  the  Word  of  God  in  its  divine  majesty.  The  church‘s 
acknowledgement of this reality, i.e., its faith in the inspiration of the Bible, is known in the extent 
to which its concrete life, and that of its members, ‗is a life really dominated by exegesis of the 
Bible‘. (8) The inspiration of the Bible, as a divine decision continually made in the life of the 
Church and of its members, is an objective reality that cannot be reduced to our faith in it. 
Barth‘s exposition continues through two further theses that deal with the church‘s authority and 
freedom (i.e., its responsibilities) in view of its relation to the Word of God in scripture. Since 
this  material  adds  little  to  the  basic  principles  of  Barth‘s  doctrine  of  scripture  (it  mainly 
illustrates their outworking in the life of the church), we can halt our survey at this point and 
consider the place of ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ in Barth‘s doctrine of the Word. 
Barth affirms not only that the Bible is a collection of texts, and hence as vulnerable to criticism 
as any other human writings, but also that ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘. Clearly, the word ‗is‘ 
operates differently in these two affirmations. The statement ‗the Bible is a collection of texts‘ 
predicates of the Bible an attribute that is characteristic of the Bible as such. The statement ‗the 
Bible is the Word of God‘ precisely does not make such a predication. Rather, it refers to the 
event of God‘s free decision to speak to those who read the Bible in faithful anticipation that 
God will address them through it. Barth‘s discussion makes it plain enough that, in the sense of 
predicating an attribute, and with suitable qualifications, it is at least as valid to say ‗the Bible is 
not the Word of God‘ as to say that it is. 95 
That the ‗is‘ has different meanings in the two affirmations arises from the fact that the nouns 
which it links are both creaturely in the one case, but creaturely and divine in the other. When we 
affirm the Bible‘s humanity, both parts of the statement refer to creaturely realities in relation to 
which we, as creatures, may take (and are called to take) responsible action. The attribution of 
characteristics to the Bible helps us to identify the kind of object it is, and hence the kind of action 
that  is  appropriate  when  dealing  with  it.  Thus,  affirmation  of  the  Bible‘s  humanity  has 
implications for hermeneutics, in which we are obliged to treat the text according to what it is. In 
contrast, when we affirm the Bible‘s divinity we affirm that God, acting in sovereign freedom and 
always as Subject, addresses us in and through the biblical texts. God‘s address to us in the words 
of scripture is never an object at our disposal or in the sphere of our responsibility. Thus, ‗the 
Bible is the Word of God‘ is not a hermeneutic principle, because it says nothing about the nature 
of an object with which we have to deal. Rather, it says something about the Subject that we hope 
will deal with us. On this basis, it calls the reader to a particular attitude: acknowledgement that 
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God spoke through the Bible in the past, anticipation that God will again speak through the Bible 
in the future, and therefore hope that God will now speak though the Bible in the present. 
While Barth‘s basic formula (‗scripture is human witness to divine revelation‘) accommodates 
the more traditional statement (‗the Bible is the Word of God‘) in a carefully qualified form, the 
qualifications negate the sense in which that statement is meant by many traditionalists who 
hold to it, and I could therefore wish that Barth had substituted some other statement that more 
clearly displayed the principles of his exposition. His primary reason for retaining ‗the Bible is 
the Word of God‘ appears to be his conviction that the reality (i.e., the ‗is‘) of the event of the 
Word of God is the centre around which the whole doctrine of scripture must unceasingly 
circle.96 At the same time, he warns that we can  only circle round this event—we cannot attain 
to it; we cannot produce it; we certainly cannot seize and control it. The event of the Word of 
God is God’s present, not ours. It is God‘s work and God‘s action. Doesn‘t Barth‘s warning at 
this point, and the conceptual structure of his doctrine of the Word of God, require that ‗the 
Bible is the Word of God‘ be affirmed, if at all, only with considerable reticence? Is it not 
curious that, despite the pervasive dynamism and actualism of his theology, Barth strives to 
retain an expression couched in the language of equivalence or attribution commonly applied to 
objects that are present to us and for us, and with which we can engage, or not, as we choose? I 
emphasise that what I am querying is not the substance of Barth‘s theology of scripture, but 
rather his retention of a particular verbal formula that strains against that substance. Precisely in 
view of the deeper principles in Barth‘s exposition, I would have expected a formula that clearly 
expressed the dynamic of divine action in and through fallen creaturely reality, rather than one 
that, because of its static essentialist language, must be surrounded with qualifications.97 
Since in my view Barth retains ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ despite and in the face of basic 
characteristics of his argument, I am inclined towards a hermeneutic of (theological) suspicion. 
How does Barth use this statement elsewhere in his argument? What benefit flows from it? In 
that it supports an appropriate attitude in the faithful and expectant reader of scripture, it might 
be suggested that Barth retains it out of respect for traditional piety. But he was certainly not 
trying to forestall criticism from that quarter—his qualifications of the statement are clear, and 
indeed led many traditionalists to view his theology with suspicion, and even to write him off as 
unorthodox. Perhaps he wanted to maintain solidarity with his Reformation heritage? But this 
suggestion is like the first and fails on similar grounds. 
Within his doctrine of scripture, the only point at which Barth takes identity between the Bible 
and revelation as a premise, thus deriving some ‗benefit‘ from it, is the discussion of scripture‘s 
unity (CD I.2 481-5). Engagement with this discussion turns out to have dual relevance for the 
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backwards and forwards can be understood only as a disposing act and decision of God (CD I.2 504). After speaking 
of the sense in which both the Holy Spirit and the biblical writers are genuinely authors of scripture, he returns to ‗the 
mystery of the centre‘ in which the voice of the biblical writers reproduced God‘s voice, and ‗the biblical concept of 
theopneustia‘ which describes ‗what God does in the humanity of his witnesses‘ (ibid., 506). From this discussion 
one might expect a conclusion couched in terms of divine action (e.g., ‗God speaks through scripture‘), but Barth‘s 
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concerns of this chapter: not only does it help to resolve my theological suspicion of Barth‘s 
affirmation of identity between scripture and revelation; it also opens a way to addressing a key 
aspect of scripture‘s historicity, namely, its vulnerability to the distortions of ideology. 
6.4.2  Scripture, Revelation, and Unity 
Barth specifically addresses the unity of scripture in his second clarification,98 in which the core 
affirmations are, firstly, that the unity of scripture really means the unity of God in revelation 
‗as revealed and confirmed first of all in the founding of the Church and then again and again in 
the human variety of [the biblical] witness‘ (CD I.2 482-3), and, secondly, that perception of 
this unity is also a God-given event, in recollection of which the Church expects the unity of 
God in revelation as it reads scripture (483). These statements cohere with the basic principles 
of  Barth‘s  doctrine  of  scripture,  in  that  as  they  reflect  the  distinction  between  scripture  as 
witness and revelation as such, allow room for the plurivocity of the witness as a aspect of its 
human vulnerability, and indicate that talk of the unity of scripture properly refers to the reading 
church‘s expectation of the unity of revelation, i.e., unity is properly attributed to the Word of 
God rather than to scripture as such. 
To these principles we may add the ‗secularity‘ of God‘s speech. At §5.4 The Speech of God as 
the Mystery of God, Barth locates the mystery of God‘s speech to humankind ‗supremely in its 
secularity‘ (or worldliness, Welthaftigkeit)—the fact that God‘s Word comes to us ‗in a form 
which as such is not the Word of God and which as such does not even give evidence that it is the 
form of the Word of God‘. There is a contradiction between its form and its content, i.e., the 
creaturely form in which God‘s Word must come to us if it really is to come to us, and the divine 
content of the Word itself. Moreover, this is a double contradiction—God‘s Word comes to us not 
only in creaturely reality, but in fallen creaturely reality which, as such, is opposed to God.99 Barth 
does not suggest that in the event of revelation God‘s Word communicates any of its attributes to 
the creaturely reality in, through, and in spite of which it reveals itself. Nor does the event of the 
Word of God change the intrinsic nature of that creaturely reality.100 Rather, as we saw earlier, the 
contrast between the human vulnerability of the biblical witness and the divine majesty of the 
Word highlights the fact that the event of the Word of God is  God’s work. 
Barth occasionally makes statements that strain against these principles by attributing unity to 
the witness because of the unity of the revelation (thus communicating a divine attribute to a 
creaturely reality). For example, as he approaches the decisive point regarding scripture‘s unity, 
Barth says that the ‗irreversible distinction‘ between the Testaments is ‗completely relativised 
(völlig relativiert) by the unity of its object‘, i.e., by the unity of revelation (CD I.2 482). This 
could be taken to mean that the greater fact (unity of revelation) forms the context within which 
                                                       
98 CD I.2 481-5, briefly referred to on p. 229 above. 
99 CD I.1 165-74. It is  worth noting that Barth applies this analysis to ‗all  applications of the proposition that 
proclamation, Scripture or revelation is God‘s Word‘ (ibid., 168), i.e., it applies just as much to Jesus Christ himself 
as to proclamation and Scripture. 
100 See Barth‘s discussion of the human and divine aspects of scripture in his fifth clarification (CD I.1 499-501), 
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the lesser fact (diversity of witness) must be interpreted, and such a reading would have the 
virtue of alluding to the interpreting community that reads scripture in faithful expectation of 
hearing the one Word of God. Still, it is hard to know what to make of the absolutising adverb 
völlig (fully, completely), and although Barth brings in the reading Church as the exposition 
unfolds, it is not part of this assertion.101 
A similar sentiment appears earlier, in the initial exposition of The Word of God in its Threefold 
Form  (§4).  Here,  having  identified  revelation  proper  with  Jesus  Christ,  Barth  says  that  to 
understand the Bible is to understand how everything in it relates to him as its centre, and that to 
hear the Bible as God‘s Word means to hear the human words of the Bible as the bearers of this 
word, based on this centre and having it in view in everything they say. He continues – 
The unity of revelation guarantees (gewährleistet) the unity of the biblical witness in and in 
spite of all its multiplicity and even contradictoriness. The unity of the Bible guarantees the 
unity of the Church in and in spite of the difference in the proportion of faith in which the 
Bible becomes revelation to this man and that man and to this man and that man to-day and 
to-morrow (CD I.1 117). 
The first sentence would appear to be self-contradictory if read as attributing both unity and 
‗multiplicity and even contradictoriness‘ to the biblical witness as such, notwithstanding that the 
unity in view is guaranteed or ensured by the unity of revelation.102 We are obliged, then, to read it 
according to the principles set out later at §19, so that unity is not attributed to the biblical witness 
itself,  and  the  ‗guarantee‘  is  realised  in  the  expectant  and  faithful  reading  of  the  Church. 
Unfortunately, this leads to further problems in view of the chain of guarantee operating in this 
passage as the unity of revelation guarantees the unity of the Bible, which in turn guarantees the 
unity of the church. The words appear to speak of the Bible‘s unity as a thing in itself rather than 
an event in God‘s address to the church, notwithstanding the preceding context (‗to hear…as‘). 
Again, in the excursus to the discussion of scripture‘s unity (CD I.2 483-5), Barth sets out the 
‗conclusion and demand‘ to which we are led by a right understanding of the matter. It does not 
mean  that  we  can  abstract  from  the  Bible  an  otherwise  concealed  historical  or  conceptual 
system. Nor can we, in the manner of 17
th century Protestant orthodoxy, treat revelation as a 
presupposition and aspire to describe it as a totality. Rather, the unity of scripture is the unity of 
a single witness: 
This, then, is the conclusion and demand to which we are led by a right understanding of 
the unity of Holy Scripture. And the Church must see to it that we never forget that by 
                                                       
101 In a parallel case just after this example, Barth says that the irreversible distinction between the various biblical 
writers is relativised by ‗the unity of what is said by all these individuals‘, i.e., by a unity of the witness itself (CD I.2 
482). This may be only a passing comment or illustration, but it does appear to attribute unity to the biblical witness itself 
without referring it either to revelation proper or to the reading church‘s expectation in view of the unity of revelation 
102 Of course, there is a substantial body of t heological opinion that makes precisely this move, i.e., it holds that 
scripture necessarily shares in certain properties of the revelation it attests, especially the properties of unity and 
inerrancy. On this view, any multiplicity or error apparent in scripture is merely apparent and not a real multiplicity 
or error, though there may be difficulties that are, as yet, unresolved. Barth rules out this argument with respect to 
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virtue of the content and object of canonical Scripture, which are not at our disposal, we 
have to do with a single witness, i.e., a witness which points in a single direction and attests 
a single truth. If we accept it in and with the Church to which it was given, then that is the 
recollection and it is also the expectation in which we have to read it (CD I.2 484). 
Here Barth speaks of the Bible as a ‗single witness‘ the unity of which derives from (the unity 
of) its ‗content and object‘, namely, revelation. The tension with the principles described earlier 
is clear, notwithstanding that the ensuing sentence refers to the reading church, and hence, 
implicitly if not explicitly, to its faith in the unity of God in revelation. 
Besides tension between these passages and Barth‘s view of the worldliness of God‘s speech, we 
may also note the difference between Barth‘s treatments of diversity and fallibility in the biblical 
witness.  On  the  one  hand,  he  robustly  acknowledges  the  biblical  witnesses‘  fallibility  while 
insisting that God nevertheless speaks his infallible Word through their fallible human word (CD 
I.2 529-30). On the other hand, while he grants that the diversity of the biblical witness is such as 
to render synthesis impossible, he can claim that the Bible presents a single witness because its 
object is the Word of God. If the Bible‘s diversity were treated similarly to other aspects of its 
human vulnerability, we might have expected Barth to say that, notwithstanding the diversity of 
the witnesses, God nevertheless speaks his one Word through their variety and that perception of 
the unity of God in revelation is given in the event of God speaking through them (compare CD 
I.2 483). Of course, he does say this, but then, as we have seen, he can also say that the biblical 
witness is a unity because it attests God‘s revelation. I suggest that these latter statements sit oddly 
within Barth‘s doctrine of scripture and contrast with his approach to the fallibility of witness. 
I took this turn into Barth‘s view of the unity of scripture because it is the only part of his 
doctrine of scripture where identity between scripture and revelation appears as a premise, and I 
wanted to find what ‗benefit‘ he derived from asserting this identity. While Barth does not say 
‗scripture is a unity because the Bible is the Word of God‘, we have noted that he sometimes 
assimilates scripture‘s witness to its object, or asserts the unity of the biblical witness on the 
basis of the unity of revelation. Insofar as they do not refer the unity of scripture to the unity of 
God in revelation, as recollected and expected by the reading Church, such statements strain 
against the basic principles of Barth‘s doctrine of scripture. Thus, far from conferring a benefit, 
the tendency to assimilate scripture to revelation on the question of unity has the detrimental 
effect of making Barth‘s doctrine of scripture less coherent. 
The suspicion piqued by Barth‘s retention of ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ in the face of his 
own  strong  counter-arguments  has  yielded  a  meagre  result.  Having  already  considered  and 
discarded  the  possibility  that  Barth  might  have  retained  this  affirmation  for  the  sake  of 
traditional piety or out of respect for the Reformation, it now appears that its use as a premise is 
problematic, rather than beneficial, for his doctrine of scripture. Then why did he retain it? 
Barth would very likely have said that he affirmed ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ because it is 
true. Because it is true only in the event of the Word of God, and needs careful qualification if it 
is to convey its truth, I suggest that it is not really serviceable as a theological statement and 
should be discarded for a formulation that better reflects the more robust underlying principles 
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Following those principles, I will now revisit Barth‘s discussion of the unity of scripture with 
two reservations firmly in view. Firstly, I will rely on basic principles such as ‗scripture bears 
witness to revelation‘ and ‗God speaks through scripture‘, and avoid treating identity between 
revelation and scripture as either a premise or an affirmation to be guarded (except in the strictly 
circumscribed sense in which it is true). Secondly, for the sake of really attending to the biblical 
witness in all its vulnerability, and thereby patiently and responsibly waiting upon the Word of 
God, I will distinguish between the unity of revelation and that of scripture. 
This is not a matter of rewriting what I take to be Barth‘s core affirmations, which proceed from 
the fact that those who first confessed Jesus as Lord recognised that his coming, his ministry, 
his death and his resurrection took place ‗according to the scriptures‘, and hence according to 
the God of Israel of whom they speak. Acknowledging the one Word of the one God embodied 
in Jesus, the church read scripture as pointing to him, and interpreted him as fulfilling scripture 
even while transcending it. Hence, as Barth says, the unity of scripture means the unity of God 
in revelation as revealed and confirmed in the founding of the church, and as therefore expected 
by the church as it reads the Bible (CD I.2 482-3). By revisiting Barth‘s discussion in the light 
of these principles, I hope to clarify the unity that is proper to the biblical witness itself, and to 
better understand the nature of that patient circling in which we attend to scripture hoping to 
hear the Word of God. 
As noted early in this sub-section, Barth speaks of the distinction between the testaments being 
relativised by the unity of the object of the (one) biblical witness, and of the distinction between 
the individualities of the biblical writers being relativised ‗by the unity of what is said by all 
these individuals‘ (CD I.2 482). He goes on to emphasise that by ‗biblical witness‘ he means 
this witness in its entirety (in seiner Ganzheit), and asserts that the Church arose when this 
witness in this entirety appeared.106 The basis for the assertion is the fact that the church‘s 
preaching of Jesus and the apostolic testimony were at every step an exposition of the Law and 
the Prophets (ibid.). He continues: 
The  one  necessarily  belongs  to  the  other.  We  cannot  separate  either  the  Law  and  the 
prophets, or the Gospels and apostolic writings, or the Old and New Testaments as a whole, 
without at each point emptying and destroying both. If the Church had not from the very 
first heard this whole, it could not have heard what it did hear. It would not have arisen as 
the  Church.  It  is  only  in  this  unity  that  the  biblical  witness  is  the  witness  of  divine 
revelation. And remembering this unity, the Church holds fast to this witness (CD I.2 482). 
Here, Barth mistakes the necessity that is really at work. That the church arose in the conviction 
that Jesus‘ ministry and resurrection took place ‗according to the scriptures‘, and hence that the 
God Jesus called ‗father‘ is the God attested in the Jewish Scriptures, is a historical fact which 
as such is in itself contingent rather than necessary. This contingent fact did indeed create a 
necessity for those subsequently confessing the church‘s faith in Jesus, but the created necessity 
is that of acknowledging Jesus‘ person and work to be continuous with, and indeed the decisive 
revelation of, the person and work of Israel‘s God. This necessity does not entail the idea that 
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the  Old  and  New  Testaments  form  a  ‗whole‘  (Ganz),  a  ‗totality‘  (Ganzheit),  or  a  ‗unity‘ 
(Zusammenklang).107 Nor does it justify ascribing a unity to law and prophets, to gospels and 
epistles, and to Old and New Testaments, such that each is rendered meaningless if separated 
from its partner. Yet when Barth speaks of ‗this whole‘, ‗this unity‘, he is apparently referring to 
the  unity  of  witness  contained  in  these  texts,  rather  than  the  strictly  necessary  continuity 
between Israel‘s God and Jesus, a continuity which accords well with the principle of the unity 
of God in revelation to which he is leading. 
Barth‘s statements in this passage face  historical and theological difficulties. In a historically 
diverse canon, a later work will refer to earlier works, relying on readers‘ familiarity with them in 
order to communicate its own message. Conversely, while earlier works do not refer to later 
works, and did not originally rely on them for meaning, later works inevitably become part of the 
context  within  which  earlier  works  are  interpreted.  That  is,  textual  meaning  is  modified  by 
intertextual associations (among other things), and hence meaning is indeed changed if a text is 
deprived of part of the context in which it was traditionally read; but to say that the meaning of 
both parts is ‗emptied and destroyed‘ is to claim too much. We may also question Barth‘s view of 
the relation between the completion of the biblical witness and the birth of the church. He says 
that the Church arose when the witness as a whole became available,108 but the New Testament 
shows that in fact this was not the case. Barth‘s assertion cannot apply to the Acts of the Apostles 
(which narrates the birth of the church), or to Paul‘s epistles (unless they say nothing that did not 
come from the Jerusalem apostles). The development apparent in apostolic preaching from the 
early sermons in Acts to the letters of Peter and John (quite apart from Paul) indicates that the 
apostolic witness was not a fixed deposit whose completion accompanied the founding of the 
church, but rather a dynamic unfolding of the significance of Jesus in and through the life of the 
fledgling church.109 Further, the supposed ‗wholeness‘ of the apostolic witness is problematic in 
itself.  Our  only  access  to  the  earliest  apostolic  witness  (i.e.,  immediately  after  Pentecost)  is 
indirect, by way of Luke‘s reporting some decades later; and whatever position one takes on 
detailed questions of provenance, the canonical gospels appear to have been written in places that 
are diverse not only geographically, but also culturally and politically. We must acknowledge, 
then, not only the individual viewpoints of the first apostles, of the collectors of their testimonies, 
and of the gospel writers themselves, but also the fact that, having reached their final form some 
thirty to seventy years after the narrated events, the greater part of the transmission of the gospel 
materials  occurred  in  circumstances  all  but  guaranteed  to  generate  further  diversity  in  both 
perspective and factual recollection. In sum, the New Testament itself shows that completion of 
the apostolic (and with it the biblical) witness was not a precondition for the beginning of the 
church; the New Testament writings were not devoid of meaning prior to their collection into the 
canon (i.e., they were not written to make sense only as parts of that ‗whole‘); we have very good 
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More attention is given to this word below. 
108 Allowing that the apostolic witness existed first in oral form, and took written form later (CD I.2 482). 
109 The debate over the Gentile mission and the basis on which Gentiles should be included in the church is the 
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reason to expect real diversity in the New Testament; and it is doubtful (to say the least) that the 
New Testament comprises, or even contains, the ‗whole‘ of the original apostolic witness. 
The history of the Old Testament canon poses further problems.110 We can leave aside for the 
moment the diversity of viewpoints within the Old Testament (a diversity arguably greater than 
that found in the New Testament), because the contents of the Torah an d Nevi‘im were well 
settled by the time of Jesus, and so they, whatever their diversity, provided the acknowledged core 
witness to the God of Israel, whose mission became Jesus‘ mission. In contrast, the scope of the 
Ketuvim had been fluid for a long time and remained so into the second century. Thus, when the 
church  began,  the  core  of  the  canon  was  well-defined  but  its  boundaries  were  not.  That 
Christianity emerged during this period of fluidity and adopted the LXX with its relatively broad 
collection of Ketuvim is a fact whose historical echoes still reverberate two millennia later in the 
differing Old Testament canons of modern Christianity.111 Thus, talk of a ‗whole‘ biblical witness 
as precondition for, or even as midwife to, the birth of the church, begs the question as to what this 
‗whole‘ was, and how it relates to the different biblical canons of modern Christianity. 
Depending on exactly what Barth means by ‗this unity‘ in the above passage, there is also a 
serious theological objection to be considered. If he is referring, not to the necessary unity I 
described above, but to the groups of texts of which he has just spoken,112 then, having regard to 
his exposition in §19.1, his insistence on scripture‘s human vulnerability, and his account of the 
mystery of God‘s speech in its worldliness, we must object when he says: ‗It is only in this 
Zusammenklang that the biblical witness is the witness of divine revelation,‘ albeit with the 
reservation that Barth‘s intention may not have been well served by the translator‘s rendering of 
Zusammenklang as ‗unity‘. The nature of the objection varies with the translation. 
On the one hand, if we read Zusammenklang as ‗unity‘ (with the standard ET) then we read Barth 
as attributing to witness what is properly attributed only to revelation as such. But while revelation 
in  itself  is  always  a  unity,  human  witness  will  always  take  place  in  and  through  limited 
perspectives, vulnerable recollection and ideological distortion. That is, Barth‘s anthropology of 
scripture constrains us to say that only in its vulnerability (including plurivocity) can the biblical 
witness be genuine witness of divine revelation. The possibility of plurivocity cannot be excluded 
a priori on grounds of ‗necessity‘. The scope of the necessity arising from the apostolic witness 
has been delineated above: it concerns the object attested rather than the testimony itself. 
                                                       
110 The following comments on the history of the Old Testament canon are meant to reflect contemporary scholarly 
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canonical status of the entire Vulgate (i.e., including works rejected by Protestants). 
112  Note  Barth‘s  references  to  ‗the  Old  and  New  Testaments  as  a  whole  (im  Ganzen)‘,  and  in  the  succeeding 
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On the other hand, if we read Zusammenklang as ‗harmony‘ or ‗sounding together‘ or ‗complex 
whole,‘113 then we read Barth as saying that it is only the biblical witness as a whole (i.e., the 
canon) that is the witness of divine revelation. But we have already seen that insistence on such 
a whole is neither necessary nor tenable. On the contrary, for good historical reasons we should 
guard against treating canonical ‗wholeness‘ as necessary to the witness. Granted, if we receive 
with due (but not with undue) respect the decision of the early church regarding the limits of the 
canon  (and  perhaps  the  decision  of  the  rabbis  and/or  the  Reformers  in  respect  of  the  Old 
Testament), then it is in reading this collection of acknowledged authentic witness that we have 
reason to expect the event of God‘s Word. But the biblical canon as we have it is a contingent, 
and not a necessary, outworking of God‘s revelation in Jesus Christ. It may ‗sound together‘ for 
us, but it once did so in different ways and to different degrees for its writers and their first 
readers, and as we now hear together what once was heard solo or in smaller ensembles, it is 
hardly surprising if in some respects it sounds unlike ‗harmony‘. 
Neither objection rules out the possibility that scripture has a unity of its own. However, if the 
church expects the unity of God in revelation, it must also expect of scripture that it is genuine 
human witness through which God will speak. Thus, as Barth says, the church will busy itself 
with reading and expounding scripture in expectation of the one Word of God. We may hope 
that perception of scripture‘s unity will emerge from this preoccupation balanced appropriately 
with perception of its diversity, and that these perceptions will together bear witness to the unity 
of revelation without being confused with it. One source of such confusion is misattribution of 
the nature and necessity of unity. The unity of revelation is a personal unity, the tri-unity of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit in outreach to humanity. In that it is grounded in (or rather, is an 
aspect of) the divine unity, this is indeed a necessary unity. In contrast, scripture is witness, and 
therefore its unity is the unity of witness, and its diversity is the diversity of witness. In faith the 
church receives scripture as witness to the one God, Israel‘s God, revealed anew and decisively 
in Jesus. Thus it believes, necessarily, in the unity of the attested revelation, and it recalls that 
this unity has already disclosed itself in and through its witnesses, and therefore expects that it 
will  do  so  again.  At  the  same  time,  it  will  neither  a  priori  require  unity  of  the  witnesses 
themselves, nor impose it upon them, but, acknowledging their priority and intention as original 
witnesses,  it  will  grant  their  freedom  and  frailty  as  particular  human  beings  offering  their 
particular testimonies in service to God‘s Word. 
6.4.3  The Unity and Uniformity of Witness 
In view of its importance to the next section of this chapter, it will be helpful to explore this 
point further through engagement with Barth‘s discussions, firstly of hermeneutical principles 
that in his view transgress the unity of scripture, and secondly of hermeneutical implications of 
scripture‘s human vulnerability. 
Towards  the  end  of  his  excursus  on  the  unity  of  scripture  Barth  provides  examples  of 
interpretive schemes that violate this unity: Luther‘s doctrine of Law and Gospel, ‗the later 
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doctrine of a redemptive history working itself out in many different and ascending stages‘, ‗the 
idea of a development of revelation, which can…so easily become that of a development of 
biblical religion‘, and the elevation of one part of scripture over others.114 
In all these cases the failure to recognise the unity of Scripture involved sooner or later, and 
inevitably, a failure to recognise that it is Holy Scripture. For when we have such arbitrary 
preferences, we do not read even the parts we prefer as Holy Scripture. The same is true of 
any preference, even the most detailed.115 
That  is,  Barth  finds  that  these  interpretive  schemes  breach  scripture‘s  unity  by  following 
‗arbitrary‘ (eigenmächtig) preferences for certain parts of scripture. The further charge of failing 
to treat Scripture as holy arises from his view that scripture‘s unity follows necessarily from its 
holiness. He finds the same reasoning valid for any preference for certain parts of scripture. 
This argument fails for several reasons. Firstly, it is a serious thing to charge Luther (to take just 
one case) with not recognising scripture as Holy Scripture, or to describe his hermeneutic of 
Law and Gospel as ‗arbitrary‘. Luther would say (and Lutherans do say) that this hermeneutic 
arises from scripture itself. It may be appropriate to argue that this hermeneutic is in fact a 
misreading of scripture, but that is quite different from dismissing it as ‗arbitrary‘. 
Secondly, rejection of any preference within a scriptural hermeneutic is problematic. At the 
broadest level, Barth‘s own hermeneutic enacts a preference for the New Testament over the 
Old, in that he treats the New Testament witness to Christ as decisive for the interpretation of 
the Old Testament.116 We should not forget, either, that the idea of a canon in which all texts are 
equally canonical is a post -apostolic innovation. The Judaism from which the church arose 
regarded Torah as the most revered core of scripture, the Nevi‘im as scripture but less revered, 
while the Ketuvim, though well-regarded, were still sufficiently peripheral that their collection 
then lacked a name.117 The church quickly lost the Jewish sense of la yered authority within 
scripture, but the idea of degrees of canonicity has a long history, most obviously in respect of 
the Old Testament, but also for the New Testament —the fourth century and the Reformation 
were especially active periods in this regard. Barth acknowledges this in his discussion of the 
provisionality of the canon, when he notes, without showing any disapproval, that even when 
                                                       
114 CD I.2 484-5/537. Barth mentions the exaltation of the synoptic gospels over John, of the gospels over the 
apostolic  writings,  and  of  the  prophets  over  the  rest  of  the  Old  Testament.  Barth  says  that  such  preferences 
‗correspond to Luther‘s onesidedness‘, a strange comment, since Luther‘s view is, if anything, twosided rather than 
onesided, and Barth can hardly have been unaware that ‗Law and Gospel‘ in Luther was not simply a preference for 
some parts of scripture over others. We might also refer to Barth‘s own view that ‗onesidedness‘ is intrinsic to the 
mystery of divine self-communication (see CD I.1 174-81), such that we experience God‘s word as either veiling or 
unveiling and never as both; and he extends this to other pairs of concepts such as Law and Gospel, letter and spirit, 
God‘s wrath and God‘s grace (ibid. 179), before going on in an excursus to discuss other ‗great one-sidednesses of 
the Bible written and received as God‘s Word‘ (ibid. 181). 
115 CD I.2 485/537. Since reaching his main point, namely, that the unity of scripture means the unity of God in 
revelation, and throughout the excursus, Barth uses Einheit for the ‗unity‘ of scripture. 
116 This is pervasive in Barth‘s theology, but most simply demonstrated in his summary description of the content of 
scripture as ‗Immanuel, God with us sinners‘ (I.1 108). 
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the canon is not disputed, the church generally treats scripture‘s constituent parts with differing 
degrees of emphasis (CD I.2 478). Hence, Barth‘s opposition to the idea of any part of scripture 
being preferred over others is not only questionable in view of the history of the canon, but 
incongruous in view of his own comments on that history. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most basically, there is the nexus that Barth maintains between scripture‘s 
holiness and its unity, affirmed in the words, ‗This is what the Church means when it teaches the 
holiness and therefore the unity of Scripture‘ (I.2 482/534). A complication here is that ‗this‘ 
refers both backwards and forwards. In the backward reference Barth emphasises that the church 
has no control over the Zusammenklang of the biblical witness, nor any control over the fact that 
the biblical witness in its totality becomes the witness of divine revelation. By scripture‘s holiness, 
Barth means that God speaks through it. I have already argued that Barth‘s notion of the Bible‘s 
Zusammenklang (however translated) mistakes the unity (or totality) that is proper to Christian 
scripture. The specific problem here concerns the link between scripture‘s holiness and its unity. 
In fact, the backward reference provides no link between them other than that the Church has no 
control over either. That is, there is no substance to the ‗therefore‘ in Barth‘s affirmation. 
The forward reference of the affirmation linking scripture‘s unity to its holiness arises from the 
following sentence, which begins Barth‘s core affirmation: ‗It means the holiness and unity of 
God in His revelation, as revealed…‘.118 The repetition of ‗it means‘ indicates further exposition 
of  the  same  idea.  In  that  scripture  is  holy  because  God  speaks  through  it,  it  is  clear  that 
scripture‘s  holiness  derives  from  God‘s  holiness.  However,  as  shown  earlier,  Barth‘s 
understanding of the worldliness of God‘s speech means that the unity of revelation need not 
imply  the  unity  of  scripture.  Hence,  even  if  it  were  contemplated,  we  cannot  argue  from 
scripture‘s holiness to God‘s holiness, from God‘s holiness to God‘s unity, and so finally from 
God‘s  unity  to  scripture‘s  unity.  The  chain  is  broken,  and  the  forward  reference,  like  the 
backward, provides no substance for Barth‘s link between the holiness and unity of scripture.119 
Rejection of any preference for parts of scripture implies that the witness of scripture is uniform 
in some sense, or that the same witness is to be found in all its parts. This is true if ‗same 
witness‘ is taken as shorthand for ‗attestation of the same reality‘, which is the main point Barth 
makes  in  this  connection:  all  the  biblical  witnesses  are  Holy  Scripture  in  the  same  sense, 
namely,  that  they  attest  the  Messiah  (I.2  481/533);  the  lines  of  Old  Testament  and  New 
Testament witness ‗always intersect at a single point.‘ (ibid.); ‗we have to do with…a witness 
which  points  in a  single direction  and  attests a  single  truth‘ (I.2  484/536). Because  of  my 
concern for the distinction between the witness and the reality it attests, I prefer not to speak of 
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119 Barth‘s exposition (I.2 482-3/534-5) does in fact follow something like this chain. Beginning from ‗the holiness 
and therefore the unity of Scripture‘, he explains this as ‗the holiness and unity of God in his revelation‘, which the 
church has known in its founding and in the human variety of the biblical witness, and which, as holder of this 
witness, the church is therefore entitled to expect of God. So far, so good. But he continues: Therefore the church‘s 
present ‗can be only…[an] assent to this witness, and therefore to the fulness of this witness in its unity (Einheit).‘ 
Once again, the ‗therefore‘ does not follow. Strictly, the church gives its ‗yes‘, not to the attesting witness, but to the 
attested revelation. A valid conclusion would be that the church is to give unqualified assent to God‘s revelation in its 
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‗a single witness‘ or ‗the same witness‘, but I agree with Barth that from the outset the church 
read the biblical witnesses as attesting, however indirectly, the one object, and that the church is 
still constrained by this understanding. 
Barth further explains his antipathy towards preferences for parts of scripture: 
[F]undamentally, whenever anything which is ―written‖ is overlooked in the exposition of 
Scripture, whenever for the sake of the exposition we are forced to weaken or even omit 
what is written, there is always the possibility that the exposition has really missed the one 
thing  which  Scripture  as  a  whole  attests,  even  when  it  thinks  that  it  has  found  it.  An 
exposition is trustworthy to the extent that it not only expounds the text in front of it, but 
implicitly at least expounds all other texts, to the extent that it at any rate clears the way for 
the exposition of all other texts (I.2 485/537). 
Respect for the church‘s witness to the canon implies that all canonical texts should be listened 
to in expectation that God will speak through them, so it is true that no relevant text should be 
simply omitted in theological exegesis. It may also be true that exegesis which omits or weakens 
a particular canonical text risks missing ‗the one thing attested by scripture as a whole‘, yet the 
same risk attends all exegesis, whether of preferred texts, of marginalised texts, or (if it were 
possible) of all texts without preference. That is, this risk is intrinsic to interpretation, so it is not 
the mere presence of the risk, but rather the extent of its realisation, that may inform assessment 
of exegeses or hermeneutical schemes. However, the reference to scripture ‗as a whole‘ already 
implies that its witness is not homogeneous, which in turn means that the content of the whole 
cannot be stated without emphasising some parts and themes more than others, as is clear in 
Barth‘s own theology, and in most disagreements over scriptural interpretation such as those 
attending contemporary debates on the status of women and diverse sexual practices. A major 
challenge in such debates is to show that one‘s construal of scripture as a whole is in fact a valid 
reading of scripture in its witness to Jesus Christ, that the texts taken as crucial do in fact 
express the intrinsic dynamic of that witness rather than a preference imported from elsewhere, 
and that texts that are deprecated or reinterpreted in the light of other texts are treated that way 
for  reasons  that  are  likewise  intrinsic,  rather  than  alien,  to  the  dynamic  of  scripture.  The 
question is not whether textual preferences are present in a particular reading—they will be 
present, and both the interpretation and its reception will benefit if the preferences are openly 
declared and considered. Rather, the question is the extent to which the preferences inevitably 
involved in a particular reading of scripture are intrinsic to scripture as a whole, or alien to it.120 
Continuing the previous passage, Barth  goes still further, referring to a view held by some 
‗older Protestant theologians‘ to the effect that the prophets did not add anything to the Law, 
‗but as the expounding and confirming of the first witness by a second they made it clearer‘ (I.2 
485/537). He extends this to the adding of the New Testament to the Old. He allows that this 
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view may be too bold, and is in any case unnecessary since in fact we have the whole canon and 
not only one part of it, but he does not think it is wrong.121 Thus the excursus concludes: 
If all Scripture does in fact attest one thing, it cannot be denied that if we only know one 
part of it, it attests it perfectly (vollkommen) even in that part. It does not consist only of 
such a part, but of the whole. Therefore this consideration does not absolve us from taking 
it seriously as a whole. But it is a constant reminder that, instructed and restrained by the 
whole, we have in fact to seek the one thing in the individual part as well. (ibid.) 
Thus, in this excursus, Barth‘s curious advocacy of hermeneutics without preferences for parts 
of scripture extends to the idea of uniformity in the biblical witness itself, such that every part of 
scripture perfectly attests the one thing attested by scripture as a whole. This goes beyond using 
‗same witness‘ as shorthand for ‗witness to the same object‘, and beyond the basic statement 
that ‗the unity of scripture‘ means ‗the unity of God in revelation‘. It seems, rather, that the 
sameness and unity proper to the attested revelation are here attributed to the attestation itself. In 
this  way,  the  excursus  illustrates  my  contention  that  Barth  tends  to  assimilate  witness  to 
revelation on the question of unity. 
To take one of Barth‘s metaphors a little further, lines which intersect at a single point do not in 
fact point in the same direction. Rather, given their different starting points, they can point to the 
same object only by pointing in different directions. Though wary of pressing a metaphor too far, I 
find this one rather apt in one respect: it suggests that, if we read scripture as pointing to a single 
object, then, given the personal and socio-historical diversity of the biblical witnesses, we must 
allow that our appreciation of the one attested object should be guided by careful attention to the 
diversity of the witness itself, i.e., to the different directions in which the witnesses must point if 
indeed they attest the one object. The metaphor is limited in that it ignores the human vulnerability 
of the both the biblical writers and their readers, but this means that the intrinsic diversity of 
biblical interpretation has more dimensions than the metaphor can accommodate. 
In Barth‘s discussion of the unity of scripture we have noted a tendency to assimilate witness to 
its object, and hence to move from the unity of revelation to the unity of witness, even to the 
extent of ruling out preferences for parts of scripture and allowing that scripture‘s witness is 
uniform. This tendency meant that Barth did not, in this discussion, really acknowledge the 
biblical  witnesses  as  genuine  witnesses  in  the  varied  particularities  of  their  individual 
circumstances, a fact that is especially clear, and thus incongruous, in the light of the underlying 
principles of Barth‘s own doctrine of the Word of God. We turn now to consider the other major 
aspect  of  the  biblical  writers‘  humanity,  the  fact  that  they  are  not  merely  creaturely  and 
therefore finite and particular, but also fallen and therefore sinful.122 Inevitably, this has further 
implications for the nature of the diversity to be expected within the biblical witness. 
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‗emptying and destroying‘ them (I.2 482/534). 
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6.4.4  The Frailty of Witness 
Barth first describes scripture‘s human vulnerability as an aspect of the Bible‘s ‗offence,‘ in view 
of which belief that the Bible is God‘s Word is possible only through the miracle of the Word of 
God in which faith believes. I have already noted the extent and nature of the vulnerability that 
Barth  sees  here.123  We  are  now  concerned  wi th  passages  relevant  to  the  hermeneutical 
implications of this vulnerability. Barth‘s excursus addresses in turn the offences of the biblical 
writers‘ susceptibility to errors of fact, their ignorance of our modern distinction between fact and 
value, their fallibility in religious and theological matters, and their thorough Jewishness.124 The 
biblical writers had no ‗compendium of solomonic or even divine knowledge‘. Rather, the contrast 
between their socio-historical particularities and our own means that in scripture we constantly 
encounter presuppositions, statements and judgements that we cannot accept. However – 
Instead of talking about the ―errors‖ of the biblical authors in this sphere, if we want to go 
to the heart of things it is better to speak about their ―capacity for errors.‖ For in the last 
resort even in relation to the general view of the world and man the insight and knowledge 
of our age can be neither divine nor even solomonic. But fundamentally we certainly have 
to face the objection and believe in spite of it! (I.2 508-9). 
In preferring to speak of the biblical writers‘ ‗capacity for error,‘ rather than of actual errors of 
fact, Barth is not retreating from acknowledgement of their humanity, but reminding us that we 
ourselves share fully in their vulnerability. He acknowledges that we will find fault with them at 
many points, but wants us to do so seriously and humbly in view of our own finitude and frailty. 
On the one hand, then, Barth acknowledges that judgement of texts and their writers is intrinsic 
to the task of interpretation. On the other hand, he appears to be calling for a suspension (or at 
least a restraint) of judgement on account of the interpreter‘s inescapable solidarity with the 
writers‘ humanity. At this stage, Barth does not explore this tension (e.g., by considering how 
hermeneutical judgement should be exercised), but calls us to acknowledge the biblical writers‘ 
capacity for error, and believe (that the Bible is the Word of God) in spite of it.125 
From matters of fact, by way  of the distinction between fact and value, Barth comes to the 
vulnerability of the Bible‘s religious or theological content. Here he describes just the kinds of 
diversity of viewpoint, and tensions and even contradictions in witness, that were ‗completely 
relativised‘ by the unity of revelation in the discussion noted earlier. 
[N]owhere are we given a single rule by which to make a common order, perhaps an order 
of precedence, but at any rate a synthesis, of what is in itself such a varied whole. Nowhere 
do we find a rule which enables us to grasp it in such a way that we can make organic parts 
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124 The last and longest paragraph contains a powerful theological attack on anti -Semitism, indicating this issue‘s 
importance for Barth. Our concern, however, is with his comments on the biblical writers human fallibility. 
125 Barth offers a similar response to the Bible‘s ignorance of the distinction between history and legend. ‗We have to 
face up to [the doubts arising from our use of this distinction] and to be clear that in the Bible it may be a matter of 
simply believing the Word of God, even though it meets us, not in the form of what we call history, but in the form of 
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of the distinctions and evade the contradictions as such. We are led now one way, now 
another—each of the biblical authors obviously speaking only quod potuit homo—and in 
both ways, and whoever is the author, we are always confronted with the question of faith. 
Again, we must be careful not to be betrayed into taking sides, into playing off the one 
biblical [writer] against the other, into pronouncing that this one or that has ―erred.‖ From 
what  standpoint  can  we  make  any  such  pronouncement?  For  within  certain  limits  and 
therefore relatively they are all vulnerable and therefore capable of error even in respect of 
religion and theology. …How can they be witnesses, if this is not the case? But if it is, even 
from this angle we come up against the stumbling-block which cannot be avoided or can be 
avoided only in faith (I.2 509-10). 
Although Barth is here considering not hermeneutics but the obstacle to faith posed by the 
Bible‘s all-too-obvious humanity, the description nevertheless has hermeneutic implications. In 
contrast to his earlier assertion of the unity, and even uniformity, of the biblical witness, he now 
sees no way of drawing the disparate and contrary parts into an organic whole. He still rules out 
having preferences for parts of scripture (speaking now more of individual writers than larger 
scriptural units), but on the basis of the witnesses‘ shared fallibility rather than their unity. 
The features of biblical witness that Barth describes here, and which he insists are intrinsic to 
genuine witness, are basic to my critique of his earlier comments on the unity of witness. If it was 
really unity of witness that he meant earlier, then he is ascribing both unity and impossibility of 
unity to the same object at the same time, and I confess that I cannot reconcile the two passages. If 
it is pointed out that Barth reconciles them ‗only in faith‘, that is itself problematised by principles 
he expounds elsewhere. The ‗offence‘ or ‗stumbling-block‘ of the Bible‘s fallibility is not intrinsic 
to the Bible, but arises in us in view of the claim that the Bible is the Word of God (I.2 506-7). 
That is, we are ‗offended‘ at finding ourselves faced with apparently inconsistent assertions. How 
can the Bible be fallible if it is God‘s Word? How can it be God‘s Word if it is fallible? How 
indeed? If, with Barth, we accept the Bible‘s fallibility (or rather, do not require infallibility of it 
because of our understanding of ‗the Bible is God‘s Word‘), then we also accept that, if the Bible 
is God‘s Word, it is not God‘s Word in the way that we thought it was. Barth retains ‗the Bible is 
God‘s Word‘ in carefully qualified form. I discard this statement because, being true only in this 
form, and more usually having a life of its own in isolation from the necessary qualifications, it is 
in large measure responsible for the confusion and ‗offence‘ surrounding this very issue. With 
Barth, I maintain that God‘s speech is always God‘s work and in that sense a ‗miracle‘, that God 
must speak through fallen creaturely reality if he really is to speak to us, and that God has in fact 
spoken thus in the past and may be expected to do so again.126 But if we really do understand 
God‘s speech in this way, then it should be no surprise—and certainly no ‗offence‘—that God 
should speak through fallible human words in the Bible. The real offence is that we find it so 
much easier to take offence at the Bible‘s humanity than to face, and repent of, our propensity for 
forging false notions of God.127 Without derogating from the miracle that is God‘s address to 
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human beings through the words of the biblical writers, prevention or avoidance of the offence of 
which Barth speaks involves not only this miracle, but also faith‘s understanding (i.e., knowledge 
of God) formed in response to God‘s self-revelation. 
In this light, talk of ‗avoiding‘ the offence, even if ‗only in faith,‘ may be less than helpful. 
Since God in sovereign condescension comes to us and addresses us in, with, under and in spite 
of fallen creaturely reality, we must talk of God‘s grace rather than our offence, and of embrace 
rather  than  avoidance.  As  Barth  himself  says,  it  is  precisely  in  the  humanity  that  divinity 
manifests  itself.  Hence,  our  waiting  upon  the  Word  of  God  in  scripture  takes  place  as  we 
gratefully embrace the concrete form in which God graciously addresses us, i.e., as we patiently 
attend to the finite and fallen scriptural word in hope of hearing the Word of God. 
Returning to hermeneutical questions, this passage, too, proposes a suspension of judgement; 
not because of our essential solidarity with those being judged (as in the earlier paragraph), but 
because the biblical writers‘ common vulnerability leaves us unable to choose between them or 
to weigh and evaluate their testimony as we listen to them in hope of encountering God‘s Word. 
Once again, Barth says nothing about engaging the vulnerability of the biblical witness, but 
calls us to face it, and believe in spite of it. In other words, Barth here ignores the implication of 
his  earlier  affirmation  of  scripture‘s  unity.  For  if  Christian  scripture  does  indeed  have  an 
intrinsic unity grounded in the unity of God in revelation, then that unity, and the sense of the 
message of ‗scripture as a whole‘ that derives from it, can function as a ‗rule by which to make 
a common order,‘ as a rule by which we can ‗make organic parts of the distinctions‘, and as a 
standpoint from which judgement of the writers‘ vulnerability (and our own) may and must be 
attempted.128 We saw earlier that Barth himself sees the common order of scripture, its organic 
whole, in its witness to Jesus Christ, though we shall see below that he does not advocate using 
this ‗rule‘ as a criterion for judging the witness of particular texts. 
Barth comments further on scripture‘s vulnerability in his exposition of the positive meaning of 
‗the Bible is the Word of God.‘ Here he warns that, however much we accept the miracle in 
which the Bible becomes the Word of God, and indeed precisely because we accept it, ‗we must 
not compromise either directly or indirectly the humanity of its form and the possibility of the 
offence which can be taken at it‘ (I.2 528). Such compromise would deny the reality of the 
miracle in which the biblical witnesses have spoken the Word of God in their fallible and erring 
human word‘ (ibid. 530). The fact of this miracle means that the event of God‘s Word arises in, 
but not because of, our engagement with the Bible, and is solely the Word‘s free and sovereign 
decision. We cannot make it happen, but only pray that it will graciously do so. The responsible 
action of biblical interpretation, which such prayer attends and informs, is shaped by this reality. 
We are completely absolved from differentiating in the Bible between the divine and the 
human, the content and the form, the spirit and the letter, and then cautiously choosing the 
former and scornfully rejecting the latter. Always in the Bible as in all other human words 
we  shall  meet  with  both.  And  we  may  differentiate  between  them  as  we  do  in  the 
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understanding of a human word. But the event in which the [human] word proves itself the 
Word  of  God  is  one  which  we  cannot  bring  about  by  this  differentiation.  …We  are 
absolved from differentiating the Word of God in the Bible from other contents, infallible 
portions and expressions from the erroneous ones, the infallible from the fallible, and from 
imagining that by means of such discoveries we can create for ourselves encounters with 
the genuine Word of God in the Bible. (I.2 531) 
Barth does not reject any and all differentiation between divine and human in scripture, but warns 
against thinking that such differentiation can produce God‘s Word from the Bible, as if refining 
mineral ore and discarding the dross. In this regard, differentiation between divine and human is 
like every other method of interpretation: since the initiative lies with God, we can only wait 
prayerfully upon God‘s address. The concrete form of this waiting is attention to the biblical 
witnesses, and any interpretative method is valid to the extent that it helps us to really hear their 
witness.  That  Barth  does  not  rule  out  differentiation  between  divine  and  human  in  scripture 
follows from his appreciation that, in view of scripture‘s humanity, it is appropriate to use the 
tools of critical biblical scholarship to help us attend to what the biblical witnesses are saying. 
Knowledge of a writer‘s world will help the interpreter to discern what the writer was trying to say 
in the words and concepts that were available. The writers‘ finitude and fallibility means that we 
cannot expect that each and every concept they express will have been fully reconsidered from the 
standpoint of the witness they wish to bear, and this applies a fortiori to concepts that are not so 
much  expressed  as  tacitly  assumed.  Inevitably,  then,  and  properly,  attention  to  the  biblical 
witnesses will include discernment of divine and human in their testimony. The question is not 
whether such discernment can and should occur (it can and it should), but rather how it will occur, 
what criteria should be applied, and in what spirit it is conducted. 
Finally, Barth again addresses the biblical writers‘ humanity in a hermeneutic context as he 
expounds the Church‘s freedom under the Word (§21.2, I.2 695-740), a freedom which consists 
in  Christians‘  willingness  to  assume  responsibility  for  the  interpretation  and  application  of 
scripture. For Barth, the basic form of responsible exegesis ‗must consist in all circumstances in 
the freely performed act of subordinating all human concepts, ideas and convictions to the 
witness of revelation supplied to us in Scripture‘ (I.2 715). Coming to us as it does in the form 
of  human  words,  God‘s  Word  in  scripture  is  enmeshed  in  conventional  forms  of  human 
(mis)understanding, in which the preconceptions of biblical writers and interpreters enable and 
frustrate communication. Notably, Barth treats the two sets of preconceptions differently. The 
fact that the biblical writers express not only God‘s thoughts but also their own means that, as 
genuine human testimony, it can be interpreted by human hearers and readers (I.2 716). Since 
interpreters come to this testimony with their own preconceptions, misunderstanding is always 
near at hand, and they must take care to subordinate their preconceptions to the Word of God 
(I.2 716-7). Thus, on the one hand, Barth sees the biblical writers‘ preconceptions as enabling 
understanding,  but  he  does  not  suggest  that  the  presence  of  preconceptions  in  the  biblical 
witness  calls  for  any  modification  of  the  interpretive  task.  On  the  other  hand,  he  sees 
interpreters‘ preconceptions as leading to misunderstanding, and attaches such importance to 
this that response to it determines the basic principle of the interpretive task as subordination to 
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the  standpoint  of the  Word.  But  how  is it  that  only  the  interpreters‘,  and  not  the  writers‘, 
preconceptions are to be criticised? If in the Bible we are dealing with genuine human witness 
then interpreters have a responsibility to criticise the witness in the light of its object, rather than 
assuming it to be thoroughly trustworthy in all respects. Indeed, not to criticise the witness in 
this way is to fail to recognise its real humanity, and to acquiesce to a docetic view of scripture. 
This is what Barth appears to do, despite his insistence on the real humanity of the biblical writers, 
when he conflates Scripture with the Word of God as the object which calls forth the interpreter‘s 
freely offered subordination. After the initial statement, quoted above, which identifies this object 
as ‗the witness of revelation…in Scripture‘, he justifies the call for subordination by identifying 
the object as the Word of God (I.2 716). Then, the fact that God‘s Word comes to us in the 
concrete form of the human word of prophets and apostles, means, firstly, that it is susceptible to 
explanation by human interpreters (as already noted), and secondly, that we must subordinate 
ourselves  to  the  word  of  the  prophets  and  apostles  (I.2  717).  Although  Barth  immediately 
distinguishes between subordination to God and subordination to God‘s witnesses for God‘s sake, 
this proves be a distinction without a difference, so far as interpretation is concerned. The ensuing 
discussion concerns our human frailty as interpreters, in view of which – 
Scripture itself as a witness to revelation must have unconditional precedence of all the 
evidence of our own being and becoming, our own thoughts and endeavours, hope and 
suffering, of all the evidence of intellect and senses, of all axioms and theorems, which we 
inherit and as such bear with us (I.2 719). 
Believing, with Barth, in the real humanity of the biblical witnesses, we must do what Barth did 
not:  we  must  ask  the  witnesses  themselves  whether  in  their  witness  revelation  in  fact  had 
unconditional precedence over all the evidence of their own being and becoming, their own 
thoughts and endeavours, etc, which they inherited and as such bore with them. If they could 
answer, they might say that, while that was their intent in obedience to God, and while it may by 
God‘s grace have been partially realised, they would not presume to claim that it was fully 
realised. Knowing that their own subordination was not fully realised, they might ask us to 
direct our subordination to its proper object, and receive their witness in the spirit in which it 
was given, namely, in subordination to the Word of God. 
Although Barth did not suggest that the biblical witnesses be critically engaged in the sense just 
described, his account of the basis of the principle of subordination leads to a hermeneutic in 
which such criticism takes place in a hidden, and therefore unsatisfactory, form. The basis of 
Barth‘s principle of subordination is the content of the  Bible and the object of its witness, 
namely, Jesus Christ as the name of the God who deals graciously with sinful humanity. 
To hear this [name] is to hear the Bible—both as a whole and in each one of its separate 
parts. Not to hear this means eo ipso not to hear the Bible, neither as a whole, nor therefore 
in its parts. The Bible says all sorts of things, certainly; but in all this multiplicity and 
variety, it says in truth only one thing—just this: the name of Jesus Christ…The Bible 
becomes clear when it is clear that  it says this one thing… Interpretation stands in the 
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interpret the Bible, in whole or part, only when we perceive and show that what it says is 
said from the point of view of that concealed and revealed name of Jesus Christ.129 
For Barth, Jesus Christ is the one content of the Bible and the measure of its clarity, and biblical 
interpretation is the service of hearing this name in the Bible as a whole and in each of its parts. 
Exegesis of any biblical text will be valid and clear just to the extent that it hears Christ in the 
text, and it will be invalid and confused to the extent that it does not hear Christ in the text. But 
if  this  were  really  carried  through,  the  frailty  of  the  writer‘s  human  word  would  be  either 
ignored (because we are listening for this name, and only for this name) or mistaken for God‘s 
Word (because the Bible speaks only this name). Barth infers the principle of subordination 
from the fact that the content of scripture is Jesus Christ as the name of the God who deals 
graciously with sinful humanity, doing for us what we cannot do for ourselves. Yet to take this 
name as the overriding criterion for reading each and every biblical text is to be subordinate, not 
to the biblical witness, but to certain understandings of Jesus Christ and of the unity and clarity 
of scripture. What is needed here is Schleiermacher‘s hermeneutic circle, in which interpretation 
of the parts is dialectically related to that of the whole, but Barth does not take that path. Rather, 
having identified Christ as the content of the Bible in whole and in part, thereby subordinating 
the Bible to certain understandings of Christ and scripture, he infers from this the principle of 
subordinating ‗our ideas thoughts and convictions to the testimony of Scripture itself‘ (I.2 721). 
This is not to criticise Barth for characterising biblical interpretation as subordination, or for 
identifying Christ as the content of scripture. Nor is it to imply that he gained his understanding of 
the content and unity of scripture through an inadequate hermeneutic. It is to say, rather, that in 
view  of  the  common  human  frailty  of  the  biblical witnesses  and  their  interpreters,  the  basic 
orientation of biblical interpretation is not subordination ‗to the testimony of Scripture itself,‘ but 
subordination to the Word of God attested in scripture. At the same time, in view of our frailty as 
interpreters, we can never assume a sufficient apprehension of the divine Word that we grant our 
understanding priority over the concrete reality of the text before us. It will always be a matter of 
accepting that God speaks to our frail and finite understanding through the frail and finite witness 
of the biblical authors, yet venturing our interpretation in obedience to the God who speaks. 
6.4.5  Human Witness and Divine Word 
Barth‘s  doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God  has  provided  conceptual  tools  for  interrogating  the 
ideology  represented  in the  sixteenth-century  presupposition  that ‗the  Bible  is  the  Word  of 
God.‘ This statement turned out to be in tension with two facts—the sovereign freedom of God 
and the human vulnerability of biblical texts—to the extent that Barth was obliged to surround it 
with careful qualifications. But why retain it at all? Seeking reasons for Barth‘s attachment to 
identity between revelation and scripture, I surveyed his use of this identity in CD I. I found that 
its  constructive  contribution  was  limited  to  discussions  of  the  Bible‘s  unity,  and  that  this 
contribution was in tension not only with Barth‘s principle of the worldliness of God‘s speech, 
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but  also  with  the  distinction  between  human  witness  and  divine  Word  maintained  in  his 
discussion of the Bible‘s fallibility. 
In short, Barth shows well enough that the idea of identity between revelation and scripture 
strains against logic and language. Moreover, it is in tension with important principles in his 
doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God,  and  is  inconsistent  with  some  closely  related  theological 
argument. For these reasons I see it as more of a hindrance than a help to faithful understanding. 
But if I discard ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘, can I still address the historicity of scripture—
and  especially  the  relation  between  ideology  and  Word  of  God  in  the  Bible—while  still 
accepting scripture as witness to revelation, affirming with the church that God speaks through 
scripture, and distinguishing appropriately between witness and revelation? 
Relevant  conceptual  tools  for  this  emerged  from  reconsideration  of  Barth‘s  discussion  of 
scripture‘s unity and his comments on the human frailty of its witness. The unity of scripture is, as 
Barth says, the unity of God in revelation, and arises necessarily from the historical origin of 
Christianity in the conviction that Jesus of Nazareth is the decisive revelation of the God of Israel. 
This faith is reflected in the New Testament documents and is the faith in which the church reads 
the Old and New Testaments as a biblical canon bearing witness to Christ. But alongside this unity 
that reflects the unity of revelation, we must acknowledge the diversity that reflects the human 
variety of the witnesses: their individual freedom, their socio-historical particularity, and their 
moral frailty. Because of this diversity, which attended every stage of the Bible‘s history, what 
may be called the ‗necessary unity‘ of Christian scripture may not extend beyond the unity of God 
in revelation just described. Any fuller or more detailed conceptions of biblical unity arise from a 
Schleiermacherian hermeneutic—an ongoing dialectic between textual exegesis and discernment 
of the overall witness of the canon (insofar as we think there is such a thing). In this hermeneutic 
we ascribe primacy to the Word attested in scripture, and acknowledge that we inevitably conduct 
our exegesis in and through our overall ideas of what the Bible is ‗about‘. 
We have noted two contexts in which Barth ruled out the holding of preferences for parts of 
scripture. In the discussion of scripture‘s unity, this was related to a supposed uniformity of 
witness in which scripture‘s witness to Christ is the same in all of its parts. In the discussion of 
scripture‘s fallibility, the proscription was based on a supposed uniformity of fallibility among 
the biblical witnesses, a fallibility which could be overcome in faith by reading scripture as 
bearing witness to Christ. Barth‘s uniformity of witness arose because he did not distinguish 
appropriately  between  the  diversity  of  witness  and  the  unity  of  revelation.  In  contrast,  the 
common human  vulnerability of the biblical witnesses led him to an interpretative impasse 
reminiscent of Delwin Brown‘s predicament amid the formless diversity of canon.130 All these 
uniformities—of  witness,  fallibility  and  diversity—served  to  justify  a  lack  of  theological 
engagement with aspects of the biblical witness: uniformity of witness obscures real diversity; 
uniformity  of  fallibility  obviates  the  need  for  critical  engagement  with  that  fallibility;  and 
featureless diversity occludes perception of intrinsic structure. 
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In two of these cases—the common fallibility of the witnesses (Barth) and the allegedly formless 
diversity  of  the  canon  (Brown)—an  aspect  of  scripture‘s  irreducible  humanity  is  seen  as  an 
obstacle to be overcome, and the possibility of an intrinsic structure that could guide interpretation 
is disregarded, obliging the faithful reader to look beyond the text for guiding principles. Brown‘s 
external source is the ‗common discourse‘ of the academy, while Barth‘s is a concept of Christ as 
the content, and therefore the unity and clarity, of scripture.131 As explained earlier, to the extent 
that Brown‘s solution to the perceived problem cedes authority to the secular academy rather than 
working within the Lordship of Christ, it is not an option for Christian theology. Barth‘s solution, 
though explicitly oriented towards Christian faith, does not fully deploy the resources his theology 
offers. I offer the following observations as a development and corrective. 
Firstly, if we respect the worldliness of God‘s speech we will see scripture‘s human vulnerability 
not as an offence to be overcome in faith, but as a grace to be embraced in faith. We will attend to 
its vulnerability, as much as to its majesty, in hope of hearing the Word of God. Secondly, that all 
the  biblical  witnesses  are  human  and  therefore  vulnerable  does  not  invalidate  interpretive 
judgement of their texts, nor does it eliminate, or even reduce, the need for such judgement. After 
all, what distinguishes biblical authors from other authors, and their texts from other texts, is not 
their fallibility but rather the object they attest, in view of which the question of how interpretive 
judgement is to be guided becomes important.132 Thirdly, that the biblical authors are all human 
and therefore fallible does not mean that their actual errors are the same in nature and degree. 
Concretely, we are faced, not with a uniform ‗capacity for error,‘ but with the varied testimonies 
actually offered by particular individuals and communities, with their particular perspectives and 
insights and distortions. Attending to such testimony requires engagement through an inevitably 
complex historically-informed process of discernment. Fourthly, scripture itself, especially when 
viewed in the light of its own history, does in fact provide a rule that points to a synthesis of its 
diversity,  namely,  the  unity  of  God  in  revelation  through  the  history  of  Israel  culminating 
decisively in Jesus of Nazareth. Although, in view of scripture‘s humanity, such a synthesis will 
include internal tensions and contradictions, and although, in view of our own humanity, it will be 
provisional, incomplete and contested, yet its reality follows from the historical origins of the 
church. Fifthly, as human witnesses to divine revelation, what the biblical authors require of us is 
not subordination to their own word, but subordination to the revelation they serve and attest.133 
That is, the biblical witnesses call us to hold their own witness accountable to the Word of God, 
even as, by their witness, they call us to obedience to that same Word.  
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6.5  RESISTING THE TEXT FOR THE SAKE OF THE GOSPEL 
Although  I  have  discarded  ‗the  Bible  is  the  Word  of  God‘  and  criticised  Barth‘s  (lack  of) 
engagement with scripture‘s humanity, the basis on which I have done so is very much a Barthian 
one. That is, I have not so much criticised what I take to be the basic principles of Barth‘s 
theology of scripture in CD I, as attempted by means of those principles to develop a more robust 
theology that can address the relation between ideology and Word of God not only in doctrine but 
in the Bible itself. The extent to which this remains a Barthian perspective is indicated by its 
substantial agreement with Barth‘s later Evangelical Theology: An Introduction,134 especially the 
first four lectures presented therein. For example, the third  lecture concludes thus: 
The  question  about  the  Word  and  this  question  alone  fulfills  and  does  justice  to  the 
intention of the biblical authors and their writings. …―What stands there,‖ in the pages of 
the Bible, is the witness to the Word of God, the Word of God in this testimony of the 
Bible. Just how far it stands there, however, is a fact that demands unceasing discovery, 
interpretation, and recognition. It demands untiring effort—effort, moreover, which is not 
unaccompanied by blood and tears. The biblical witnesses and the Holy Scriptures confront 
theology as the object of this effort.135 
As demonstrated above, such a view of witness and Word derives from the core Christological 
affirmation that Jesus is Lord, and therefore the decisive Word of the one God, the God of 
Israel. This belief, identified as the historic foundation and ongoing lifeblood of the church, 
provided a relatively minimal, yet critically powerful, standpoint from which I interrogated not 
only a traditional doctrinal affirmation such as ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ but also various 
aspects of Barth‘s doctrine of scripture. In this way the argument not only asserted but also 
illustrated Christ‘s Lordship over theology, and the primacy of theology over ideology. Granted, 
I did not demonstrate that ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ functioned as ideology, in Barth‘s 
theology or elsewhere, in the sense of serving vested interests, but its lack of warrant at the 
Reformation and in Barth, and its clear potential to serve the projection of power, justified 
treating it as if it were ideology. While identification of an idea or a complex of beliefs as actual 
or potential ideology may mark it for critical attention, and ideological analysis may bring to 
light its sources and its effects, none of this engages the question of truth, the substance of the 
idea itself. Confession of Christ as Lord implies that this question, however valuably informed 
by  ideological  awareness,  can  be  answered  only  with  reference  to  Christ,  and  hence  the 
fundamental critique is not ideological but theological. 
In essence, then, consideration of the historicity of doctrine and scripture points to a theological 
hermeneutic which acknowledges Christ as Lord and Word of God, and therefore asks how his 
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assimilates the two, and the earlier stress on the unity and clarity of scripture gives way to some emphasis on its 
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1956 essay ‗The Humanity of God‘ (Barth 1960) would have affected the details in CD I. 
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Lordship is exercised in and through scripture, in and through doctrine, and indeed in and 
through  anything  else.  There  is  no  reason  to  regard  scripture  as  being  exempt  from  the 
vulnerability common to all human testimony, but the church, in its historical origins and in its 
ongoing  testimony  to  hearing  God‘s  address  in  scripture,  calls  us  to  join  with  it  in 
acknowledging scripture‘s priority as witness to Christ. As human witness to divine revelation, 
scripture demands to be read according to two things: its intent to bear that witness, and its 
vulnerability as human testimony that is itself accountable to the Word it attests. 
Holding  scripture  accountable  to  the  Word  implies  a  theological  hermeneutic  that  will  be 
prepared to resist particular texts for the sake of some conception of the divine Word, always 
bearing in mind the dialectics between text and canon, and between exegesis and the history of 
interpretation, through which such conceptions are formed. The issue with which I close the 
chapter concerns the characterisation of this intra-scriptural tension: given that the intrinsic logic 
of Christian faith calls us to hold Christian scripture accountable to the Word, or to Christ, or to 
the gospel (the terms are interchangeable for this purpose), how are the opposing forces within 
scripture best described in general terms, and what forms of resistance are most appropriate? In 
particular, is it sufficient to describe the opponent as ideology, and to offer resistance through 
theological critique like that used above? 
One approach to these questions is that of Francis Watson, who in his Text, Church and World136 
suggested that the biblical text must sometimes be resisted for the sake of the gospel. I will briefly 
outline  Watson‘s  overall  proposal  before  engaging  two  aspects  of  it  that  are germane  to  the 
concerns of the previous section, namely, his preference for grounding exegesis in the ‗final form‘ 
of  the  biblical text,  and  his  suggestion  that  resistive  reading  involves  distinguishing  between 
liberating gospel and oppressive law in biblical texts. In response I offer my own proposal for a 
hermeneutic that reads the biblical witness in subordination to the divine Word. 
6.5.1  Watson’s Text, Church and World in Outline 
In his introduction, Watson summarises the discussion of his title as follows: 
…the biblical story itself refuses to permit its own enclosure and confinement within the 
walls of the church, but requires the community of faith to look outwards into the conflict-
ridden sociopolitical sphere in which it is of course already located and implicated. It is 
crucially important to emphasise not only the hermeneutical significance of the Christian 
community as the primary location of the biblical texts, but also the world as the primary 
location of the Christian community. 
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Text, church and world are thus related to one another as three concentric circles. The text, 
the innermost circle, is located within the church, and the church is located  within the 
world, the outermost circle (TCW 11). 
These comments hint at Watson‘s rejection of Lindbeck‘s notion of intratextual reading in an 
enclosed biblical world, and indicate (especially in the concentric circles image) some continuity 
with Barth‘s approach. TCW is essentially an extended essay, with extended exegetical examples, 
on how the church in the world of the late twentieth century may best read the biblical texts for the 
sake of that world. The first part (chapters 1 to 4) presents a strong plea for an ecclesial reading of 
the ‗final form‘ of the text and the rescue of the biblical text from its Babylonish captivity to 
historical criticism. Part 2 (chapters 5 to 8) follows with a theological-exegetical engagement with 
postmodern  literary  theory  and  its  theological  fellow-travellers,  focusing  on  the  motifs  of 
particularity,  (intra)textuality  and  the  construction  of  truth.  The  third  part  (chapters  9  to  12) 
engages  with  feminist  critiques  of  the  Bible  by  attempting  to  identify  and  participate  in  an 
ideological struggle within the biblical text itself, taking the side of the ‗liberating gospel‘ against 
the ‗oppressive law‘ (in this case, patriarchy) with which it is textually entangled. Part 4 (chapters 
13 to 16) offers theological reflection on and justification for the canonical approach taken in part 
1 and the exegetical strategies employed in parts 2 and 3. 
I turn now to the two matters mentioned above: Watson‘s preference for the final form of the 
text as the subject for exegesis, and his proposal for a theological hermeneutic that distinguishes 
between law and gospel in biblical texts.137 
6.5.2  Textual Integrity and the ‘Final Form’ 
Watson offers three reasons for preferring the ‗final form‘ of the text. These are, firstly, that the 
influence of perspectives derived from literary studies leads to renewed appreciation of the 
biblical texts as literary works of art possessed of an integrity that is violated by historical-
critical reconstructions that distract attention from the texts; and secondly, that ‗it is only in their 
final, canonical form that the biblical texts have functioned as communally authoritative within 
synagogue and church‘. But the ‗third and most compelling reason for working with the final 
form [is] that this is the form of the text most suitable for theological use.‘ This suitability arises 
from (i) ‗the fact that theology is an ecclesial discipline and must therefore take seriously the 
ecclesial form of the text‘, and also from (ii) ‗the theological judgement that the subject-matter 
or content of the biblical texts is inseparable from their form‘ (TCW 16-7).138 
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hermeneutics in his 13
th chapter. The third thesis uncontroversially acknowledges that the church can draw on, and 
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on theological grounds—the Bible is a unity because it is (witness to) the one Word of God. Watson‘s argument is 
ecclesial: we must exegete the biblical text in its canonical form because that is the form in which the church uses it, 
and theology is an ecclesial discipline.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    256 
The grounds Watson gives for the theological suitability of the final form of the text are closely 
related  to  his  other  reasons  for  preferring  it.  Ground  (i)  follows  from  the  second  reason 
(communal usage), combined with a view of theology as a practice of the reading community. 
Ground (ii) transposes the first reason into a theological key: historical-critical reconstructions 
violate not only the literary-artistic integrity of the biblical texts, but also the integrity of their 
theological witness. This, too, is closely related to the role of the biblical texts in communities 
which acknowledge their authority  and seek  conformity  to  their  witness.  In  sum,  Watson‘s 
reasons for preferring the canonical form of the text are variations on a single theme: theology is 
an ecclesial practice that serves the church‘s reception of the Bible as holy scripture. 
The  earlier  argument  of  this  chapter  suggests  four  lines  of  critique  that  question  Watson‘s 
preference for the ‗final form‘ of the text. Firstly, he treats the community‘s reading practice as 
self-authenticating—for him, this practice implies and therefore legitimates a certain view of the 
text. Yet the reading community ascribes authority, not to its own practice, but to God who 
speaks  through  scripture.  Hence,  knowing  from  scripture  that  its  practices  are  subject  to 
judgement according to the Word of God, the reading community holds itself accountable to 
that Word and will resist any move to treat its own practices as authoritative in their own right. 
Secondly, Watson thinks that the church‘s reading of a canon points towards a canonical mode 
of exegesis, and in particular a synchronic, rather than a diachronic, approach to the biblical 
texts. Unfortunately, he offers no argument that supports this assumption. The mere fact that the 
church reads a canon of authoritative texts tells us nothing about the validity or otherwise of 
historically-oriented exegesis. What does inform us in this regard is the texts‘ own testimony to 
the historical reality of Jesus Christ as the decisive revelation (and in that sense the ‗final form‘) 
of the Word of God, to the humanity of their authors, and to the finitude and frailty of the 
ongoing community that takes that witness to the world. That is, the canon read by the church 
points to the thorough historicity of God‘s speech to humankind, and the church reading this 
canon will therefore welcome critical enquiry that helps it to clarify and correct its witness to 
God‘s Word. In that the church reads a canon, it will naturally take account of the whole canon 
as it has it, and will therefore tend to read synchronically. At the same time, in view of the 
biblical witnesses‘ historical orientation and the obvious relevance of their historical situations 
to interpretation of their witness, the church will not by any means deprecate historical enquiry. 
Thirdly,  Watson‘s  argument  on  this  point  is  strongly  influenced  by  a  misdirected  polemic 
against historical-critical exegesis. In various places (see especially the summary at TCW 58) 
Watson  takes  historical  criticism  to  task  for  the  irreducible  multiplicity  of  solutions  that 
masquerades as progress, and he welcomes the way in which 
contemporary emphasis on the final form of the biblical text…breaks out of the vicious 
circles that revolve perpetually around the various so-called ‗problems‘ acknowledged and 
licensed by the interpretative community (TCW 58-9). 
It is unclear here (and elsewhere in Watson‘s text) whether this is anything more than the 
passing of judgement on one hermeneutical paradigm from the vantage point of another. A 
practitioner of ‗literary‘ readings may well find historical problems uninteresting, but bypassing 
or de-emphasising this class of problems is unlikely to reduce the diversity of exegetical results.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    257 
Literary theorists have reminded us that texts and their interpretations are inherently plurivocal; 
the ‗combination of acute observation with speculative hypothesis‘ that Watson implicates in 
the production of diverse historical-critical ‗solutions‘ (TCW 58) is characteristic of critical 
study as such, rather than a distinguishing feature of any particular critical approach; and critical 
study in general is fostered in an institutional ambience that encourages novelty in research. 
Thus, it is by no means clear that the diversity of literary readings will be any less ‗irreducible‘ 
than that of historical-critical readings. If there are grounds for preferring one kind of plurality 
to the other, the sheer extent of the diversity is not among them.139 
In theological reflection on this matter (TCW 223-31), Watson approaches a more robust critique 
in dialogue with Barth, noting that the real issue is whether ‗the interpreter is at odds with the 
orientation of the texts‘ (226), and referring to Barth‘s assertion of ‗the inseparability of form and 
content  in  the  biblical  texts‘  (227).  For  Watson,  such  phrases  indicate  the  inadequacy  of  a 
hermeneutic that ignores the self-representation of the biblical texts as witness to the Word of 
God; but they also point to the intrinsic relevance of historical and literary criticism to the service 
of that witness, inasmuch as the biblical authors report and interpret what God has done (i.e., 
historically) in the form of testimony that arose in particular historical circumstances and which, 
through particular historical processes, became texts, i.e., literary works that convey their witness 
by means of various literary devices. Unlike Watson, I do not see that a Barthian framework 
privileges  literary  over  historical  critique.  Granted,  because  of  its  particular  focus  historical 
analysis may be less constructive than literary analysis in its contribution to the basic exegetical 
task of attending to the biblical witness for the sake of the Word of God; yet both approaches are 
valid  ways  of  engaging  the  witnesses‘  humanity,  and,  by  virtue  of  the  biblical  witnesses‘ 
accountability to the divine Word, historical criticism is no less intrinsic to exegesis than its 
literary cousin. The crucial question is not whether one critical approach is preferable to another, 
but whether, in and through its focus on one aspect of the witnesses‘ humanity, each approach 
respects, and even takes upon itself, the orientation of the texts as witness to the divine Word. 
Fourthly, Watson‘s view of the status of unhistorical elements in biblical texts is unsatisfactory, 
in that he insists, against Lindbeck and Frei, that extratextual reference is essential to the nature 
of the biblical text,140 but turns to intratextuality to explain non-historical elements: 
                                                       
139 This echoes my comments on Lindbeck‘s assertion that a regulative understanding of doctrine avoids the ‗endless 
speculations‘ characteristic of modern theology (p. 176 above). See also John Reumann‘s comments on the diverse 
results of both historical and literary approaches (Reumann 1991, 283-8). 
140 Watson‘s attack on Lindbeck‘s intratextuality is quite trenchant: 
The God who may be said, intrasystematically, to have created the world becomes, without 
remainder,  the  product  of  human  linguistic  practices.  It  is  intrasystematically  false  but 
extrasystematically true that the creator conforms to the intrasystematic definition of an idol. 
This means that a purely intrasystematic reading of the creation story, which carefully denies 
that ‗propositional‘ claims are within its remit and claims to be speaking wholly from within the 
text, is impossible without doing violence to that text‘ (TCW 152).   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    258 
The  believer  is  able  to  agree  with  the  unbeliever  about  the  presence  of  non-historical 
elements in the narrative, although they disagree sharply about the significance of this fact. 
For  the  unbeliever,  these  elements  disclose  the  untruthfulness  of  the  whole.  For  the 
believer,  they  are  irreducible,  indispensable  ways  of  speaking  about  the  divine-human 
history, and since interpretation is oriented towards the text in its canonical form, it is often 
unnecessary to decide whether and how far events occurred as narrated (TCW 230-1). 
The difference between Lindbeck and Watson on this point appears to be that, while Lindbeck is 
consistently  intratextual  and  referentially  vague,  Watson  is  selectively  intratextual,  preserving 
extratextual reference as far as possible, but resorting to intratextuality for non-historical features 
which  occur  ‗often‘  in  the  texts.  The  historical  reference  of  the  text‘s  historical  features  is 
important to him, but that of its non-historical features is not. This selectivity is unconvincing, and 
I believe the principles developed earlier in this chapter point towards a more robust solution. The 
church‘s reading practice cannot be treated as self-authenticating but must, like all else, be held 
accountable to the Word of God attested in scripture. As human witness, scripture is vulnerable to 
criticism, and therefore its unhistorical elements are in principle corrigible and not ‗irreducible‘ or 
‗indispensable‘. However, in view of scripture‘s witness to human finitude and frailty, and the 
scarcity of alternative historical sources for the events it reports, we should observe a proper 
reticence  in  identifying  unhistorical  elements  and  in  suggesting  corrections.141  The practical 
difference between my suggestion and Watson‘s may be slight in terms of exegetical results (we 
will both read the text for its witness to the Word despite what we think is its wayward approach 
to historical fact) but I prefer to remain troubled by unhistorical elements because the biblical 
witnesses themselves attest that historicity is crucial to their witness. 
Watson‘s position on the historicity of biblical witness is made more difficult by his advocacy for 
ideological  critique.  If  in  the  Bible  we  find  liberating  gospel  entangled  in  oppressive  law, 
requiring us to distinguish them in order to bear our own contemporary witness to the gospel 
(TCW 155), how is it that the presence of unhistorical elements in the biblical text does not call for 
historical  discernment?  Why  are  unhistorical  elements  ‗irreducible,  indispensable  ways  of 
speaking about the divine-human history‘ while oppressive law must be resisted so that it does not 
distort our proclamation of the gospel? There is no basis for this distinction. Unhistorical reporting 
and ideological bias are both aspects of the human vulnerability of a biblical witness that calls its 
interpreters to hold it, and themselves, accountable to the Word of God. Interpreters who are thus 
accountable, and to that extent adopt the confessional and therefore critical stance I advocate, will 
not only respect and follow the orientation of the witness, and criticise it on the basis of that 
orientation, but will venture upon such following and criticism in an attitude of humility, mindful 
of their own frailty and their need of the grace in which they stand. 
6.5.3  Distinguishing ‘Liberating Gospel’ from ‘Oppressive Law’ 
Watson  develops  his  proposal  for  an  ideological  critique  of  scripture  in  conversation  with 
feminist critiques of biblical patriarchy, a point at which Lindbeck‘s notion of a unitary ‗biblical 
                                                       
141  Compare  this  with  the  situation  in  New  Testament  textual  criticism,  where  alternative  sources  are  plentiful 
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world‘ has been challenged.142 Having surveyed feminist biblical hermeneutics at some length 
(chapters 9 and 10), and having acknowledged that ‗what is at issue is not just one or two 
stories…but the representation of women across a very wide range of biblical material‘ (TCW 
188), Watson remains dissatisfied with feminist scholars‘ constructive proposals. What then can 
be done to save the Bible as ‗holy scripture‘? Watson‘s strategy is to search the biblical texts for 
elements that resist patriarchal oppression: 
If  these  resistant  elements  are  construed  merely  as  scattered  fragments,  then  one  is 
acknowledging that, in their native context, their power of resistance is low; they are usable 
in themselves, but they cannot restore the concept of the Old Testament as holy scripture. 
If, on the other hand, they belong to the fundamental structure of Old Testament narrative, 
then an internally grounded critique becomes a possibility. Criticism would then be not an 
extraneous imposition but an interpretation of the text‘s own capacity for self-criticism.143 
That is,  rather  than  maintaining  that  the  Bible is  holy  scripture and the Word  of  God and 
therefore a unity (as Barth does), Watson seeks ideological plurality in the Bible in order to save 
it as holy scripture. But an unstructured plurality, from which we might choose the ideologically 
acceptable elements according to extra-biblical criteria, will not be sufficient. Watson seeks an 
ideological plurality that is structured by the biblical text itself to the extent of resisting the 
                                                       
142 For examples, see Graeme Garrett (1997), who argues that Lindbeck‘s three regulative principles (alluded to 
above on p. 162 n26, see ND 94) need to be supplemented by a fourth rule concerning gender equity, because ‗any 
attempt  to  talk  about  God  which  hopes  to  be  taken  seriously  today  must  confront  the  challenge  of  [feminist] 
theology‘.  Others question the biblical warrant  for such suggestions, and are therefore  more sceptical about the 
possibility of developing an intrinsically biblical response in which ‗there is no male and female‘ (Gal 3:28). Sandra 
Schneiders (1989), asks whether the undeniably patriarchal Bible can continue to claim Christians‘ allegiance. ‗On 
this question the jury is still out‘ (p. 60). Her concluding comments bear quoting at length: 
It is not certain that the text can be saved; but it is certain that it cannot be saved as a simple 
container of revelation or literal transmitter of divine truth. Furthermore, feminist hermeneutics 
has made it clear that revelation cannot be equated with history in the sense of what actually 
happened, nor can the Bible be considered, without further ado, as a normative archetype for 
contemporary Christian life. In short, the questions that are being raised by liberation theology 
in general and feminist criticism in particular are not merely concerned with how the oppressed 
can relate to a  patriarchal  text but,  more  fundamentally,  how the  Christian  community  can 
appropriate its sacred literature in a postmodern world. Unless I held out some hope that we 
would find an answer to this question, I would long ago have abandoned the field of biblical 
scholarship (pp. 70-1). 
This is very much the appeal that Watson has heard and is trying to meet. 
143 TCW 190, original italics. The focus on Old Testament texts follows on from Watson‘s rejection of approaches 
that assert the superiority of the New Testament over the Old Testament and attribute the famously troublesome New 
Testament passages to residual Jewish attitudes within the early church. Watson finds such ‗solutions‘ unacceptably 
Marcionite and anti-Semitic (189). He is not content to reinterpret the Old Testament by means of the New, but wants 
to show how the Old Testament itself enables the pervasive patriarchy of its texts to be resisted.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    260 
imposition of other structures. Without such an immanent textually-structured plurality, Watson 
doubts that the feminist challenge can be met and the Old Testament saved as holy scripture. He 
explains his approach to ideological critique as follows: 
In the  Christian canon, the  paradigmatic  expression of this biblical  self-criticism is the 
Pauline  law/gospel  antithesis,  which  asserts  that  ‗gospel‘  (that  which  points  towards 
liberation) and ‗law‘ (that which oppresses) are both to be found in holy scripture, but that 
the former is somehow more fundamental than the latter. Thus in Gal. 3 the law which 
brings a curse is enclosed within the prior promise of blessing and the fulfilment of that 
promise in Christ, to indicate that ‗law‘, despite its formidable presence in holy scripture, 
does not have either the first or the last word.144 
Whether or not the Old Testament actually offers an immanent ideological critique of its own 
pervasive patriarchy must be established exegetically, and to this end Watson offers substantial 
exegetical argument in chapter 11 before exploring the somewhat different problems presented 
by patriarchy in the New Testament in chapter 12. While I find little to criticise in Watson‘s 
exegesis, his use of ‗the Pauline law/gospel antithesis‘ as a paradigm for ideological critique 
raises a substantial theological problem and distorts an important theme in biblical theology. 
Paul‘s  theology  of  /Torah  is  not  straightforward,  and  the  exegesis  of  Galatians  and 
Romans, not to mention other letters in which law is less prominent, must take into account 
their quite different rhetorical and pastoral strategies. Watson‘s use of ‗law‘ and ‗gospel‘ is also 
somewhat fluid. In some  passages he places the terms in quotes, apparently using them as 
ciphers for ‗that which oppresses‘ and ‗that which liberates‘. The suggestion appears to be, not 
that Paul‘s approach to law and gospel should be applied in the present as an ideologically 
conscious reading strategy, but that the relation between oppression and liberation in biblical 
texts  may  be  analogous  to  the  relation  between  law  and  gospel  in  Paul.145  In other places 
                                                       
144  TCW  190-1.  Watson  continues,  ‗Whatever  the  difficulties  posed  by  Pauline  elaborations  of  this  theme,  the 
framework seems worth preserving over against both the biblicism which will always seek to mute any protest that is 
raised against the texts, and the hardening of that protest into a comprehensive rejection which permits the salvaging 
only of a few fragments.‘ But dissatisfaction with such biblicism on the one hand and wholesale rejection on the other 
indicates only that some kind of resistive reading strategy is needed. It does not point to any particular approach. 
145 This impression (viz., that Watson is more concerned to describe the nature of the relation between liberation and 
oppression in the biblical text than to identify oppression with law and liberation with gospel) is strengthened by the 
fact that his first reference to oppression and liberation in biblical texts makes no mention of law and gospel at all 
(TCW 74). This reference occurs near the end of his ideological reading of the Joseph narratives. Here, Watson raises 
the question whether there is after all any point in identifying ‗the ideological deficiencies of a three-thousand year 
old narrative‘, but he goes on to point out that—   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    261 
Watson speaks straightforwardly (without quotes) of ‗liberating gospel‘ and ‗oppressive law‘. 
For example, introducing Part 3, ‗Holy Scripture and Feminist Critique‘, he indicates the path 
he will take, distancing his use of the term ‗holy scripture‘ from ‗neo-conservative‘ approaches: 
The concept of holy scripture does not inevitably lead to a neo-conservative hermeneutic 
which  denies  the  legitimacy  of  the  exposure  and  critique  of  inner-biblical  ideological 
constructions. It calls instead for an attempt, never completed and always provisional, to 
distinguish  the  biblical  witness  to  the  liberating  gospel  from  its  entanglement  in  the 
oppressive law, resisting the latter not for the sake of the satisfactions of negation but as a 
contribution to the appropriate contemporary expression of the gospel.146 
What exactly does Watson mean by ‗law‘ in the phrase ‗oppressive law‘? The question becomes 
acute when we remember that, for all Paul‘s relativisation of law (as both Torah and as legal code) 
with respect to Christ, the biblical law (in whatever sense) remained God’s law. Does Watson‘s 
proposal implicitly cast God as oppressor? Or does he actually mean by ‗law‘ something quite 
different to what Paul meant? The answer to both questions appears to be ‗Yes‘: 
[Through  feminist  critique]  there  has  gradually  come  to  light  a  new  dimension  of  the 
oppressive law whose presence within these texts and the interpretative traditions they have 
generated is such a crucially important hermeneutical factor. The oppressive law is, in one 
of its aspects, the law of patriarchy, the law of the Father, which defines the human place in 
God‘s world in terms which privilege men and marginalize women. If ‗holy scripture‘ does 
not also offer the theological basis for resisting the law of the Father, then this concept 
should be rejected as an irredeemable ideological construct…(155-6). 
                                                                                                                                                             
The text in question is…communally acknowledged as canonical, and it is at least arguable that 
the entire history of biblical interpretation should be read as a history in which oppressive and 
liberating uses of the texts are ambiguously intertwined. If that is the case, and if this situation 
persists into the present, then an analysis of the texts in the light of this broader context is a 
theological imperative.…[T]he rhetoric of the canonical text of a dominant religious community 
should not be abstracted from the contemporary context in which it still operates, but should be 
brought to light in such a way as also to disclose, indirectly, certain of the realities of this 
context.…Thus,  although  criticism  has  necessarily  been  directed  against  the  telling  of  the 
story…, the ultimate intention is not to criticize the text but to use it as an indirect means of 
exposing the workings of the rhetoric of oppression. In this sense, a ‗positive‘ role is assigned to 
the text (TCW 74). 
What Watson is still seeking at this point is a theological basis on which to conduct his ideological critique. Later, he 
finds this basis in the relation between law and gospel in Paul (especially Galatians). 
146 TCW 155. A similar identification is evident in a later summary where Watson describes his approach as ‗an 
application of the law/gospel antithesis to Old Testament androcentrism‘ (221).   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    262 
As in much of Watson‘s work, there is an element of rhetorical self-consciousness here (should 
‗Father‘ appear in quotes? 147). Nevertheless, ‗the law of patriarchy‘ appears in apposition to ‗the 
law of the Father‘, and we are offered the prospect that, in order to be recoverable as ‗holy 
scripture‘,  the  Bible  must  provide  the  means  by  which  the  Father‘s  law,  and  hence  by 
implication the Father himself, can be resisted. Now, I do not think that Watson intends to assert 
the Bible as holy scripture over against God the Father, and he does not in fact do so in his 
exegesis. Yet, if ‗law‘ stands for ‗that which oppresses‘ then resistance of that which oppresses 
implies resistance of the law, and hence resistance of lawgiver. Implication of God in textual 
oppression indicates a significant theological problem in Watson‘s use of the term ‗law‘.148 
On more exegetical matters, Watson‘s description of the relation between law and gospel as 
‗antithesis‘ is problematic, for in Gal 3:21 Paul anticipates that such a conclusion might be 
drawn from his argument, and pre-empts it with an emphatic repudiation. For Paul, the idea that 
the law is opposed to God‘s promises is theologically untenable. It seems, then, that whatever 
the relation between liberation and oppression in biblical texts may be, it is not ‗the Pauline 
law/gospel antithesis‘.149 
In broader perspective, Watson‘s view of the relation between liberation and oppression ignores 
important dynamics of biblical theology. For example, he rightly takes Paul‘s references to the 
enslaving  powers  in  Gal  3:28  and  4:1-8  as  aligning  the  significance  of  Christ  with  the 
paradigmatic saving event of the exodus. That is, Christ liberates from slavery to the , 
of which law is one. Well and good. But Watson concludes that ‗the exodus is therefore the 
prototype of the divine act that liberates from the oppressive law and that fulfils the promise 
given in the beginning‘ (199). However, Torah (especially in Exodus and Deuteronomy) makes 
                                                       
147 That ‗Father‘ should be in quotes is suggested by Watson‘s later exegesis of the story of the prodigal son. It 
transpires that the ‗Father‘ who is the author of the law of patriarchy is emphatically not the Father of Jesus the Son. 
The father revealed by Jesus the son in this story is not a patriarch but ‗a father  who hardly even understands 
patriarchy‘ (212). But this does not remove the problem with which I am concerned. For who then is the ‗Father‘ who 
authored the ‗oppressive law‘? Perhaps the author was not the Father at all. At several points Watson refers to ‗the 
oppressive, non-divine law‘ (195), the ‗non-divine law of patriarchy‘ (195, 199), ‗the non-divine powers that divide 
Jew from Greek, slave from free, male from female‘, slavery to which ‗entails slavery to their law of patriarchy‘ (195, 
referring to Gal 3:28; 4:1-8). Watson has already argued for the secondary nature of patriarchy as neither primal nor 
ultimate but as consequent on and symptomatic of the rift between God and humankind narrated in Gen 3. But this is 
too easy. An exegetical argument for the secondary nature of patriarchy may be granted, but the problem of divine 
origin remains: the text of Gen 3 represents the consequence as a consequence decreed by God. Watson‘s assertion of 
the non-divinity of the ‗law of patriarchy‘ derives analogically from Paul‘s description of the law as ‗administered 
through angels‘ (‘ Gal 3:19) and therefore inferior to the promise which was given directly by 
God. Even if one does not make allowances for the extremity of Paul‘s rhetoric here, it is claiming too much to say, 
as Watson does, that Paul sees the law as ‗deriving from non-divine powers‘ (194, italics added). Rather, ‗even in 
Galatians the law is ultimately God’s law (if only by implication)‘ (Bruce 1982, 175, original italics). If Watson 
wants to categorise law as ‗non-divine,‘ Paul cannot help him. 
148 The problem can be magnified christologically, in that, although he does not emphasise the theological derivation 
of his notions of liberation and oppression, Watson is taking the gospel  of Jesus Christ to be a gospel of liberation, 
and this gospel might then be taken as being antithetical to ‗the law of the Father‘. Is Watson asserting Christ over 
against God the Father? No, but his characterisations of ‗law‘ and ‗gospel‘ point in this direction. 
149 That the ‗law/gospel antithesis‘ is in fact not Paul‘s but Luther‘s will be addressed shortly.   DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY    263 
it clear that the exodus established Yahweh‘s credentials as ‗a righteous God and a saviour‘ and 
thus  his  claim  to  Israel as  his  people. That is, liberation in the  Old Testament is  not only 
liberation from slavery, but liberation for service to Yahweh, and any ‗liberation‘ that is not 
directed towards the service of Yahweh is simply not liberation in the Old Testament sense. The 
legal code in Torah sets out the concrete form and content of that service. That is, a strong 
strand of Old Testament tradition sees law, even as legal code, standing firmly on the side of 
liberation over against the oppression constituted by the service of lords other than Yahweh. For 
Paul, the law is ‗holy and just and good‘ but nevertheless exists in the realm of the  by 
virtue of its nature as letter, that is, its potential to function as mere code independent of, and 
even  over  against,  the  grace  of  God,  and  especially  the  grace  of  God  as  now  definitively 
revealed in Jesus Christ. For the form and content of the service of God is now given not in a 
code but in a person, the person of Jesus Christ. The form of our service is now identified with, 
and inseparable from, the person of the redeemer. 
I do not claim that this sketch of the relation between law, liberation and Christ is wholly 
adequate in contrast to Watson‘s insufficiently nuanced account, but it indicates something of 
the biblical dynamic of liberation, and the role of law within it, that is apparent in the better-
known texts, and thereby points to what is lacking in Watson‘s proposal: the terms ‗oppression‘ 
and ‗liberation‘ need to be critically engaged and given content based on biblical theology; and 
the  pairing  of  ‗law‘  with  ‗oppression‘  and  ‗gospel‘  with  ‗liberation‘  must  be  brought  into 
dialogue with theological exegesis of the role of law in the Bible, and especially in Paul. My 
brief exegetical observations indicate a likely result of such investigations: that the use of ‗law‘ 
as a foil for ‗gospel‘ is an inappropriate, and even misleading, way of characterising ideological 
deficiencies in biblical texts. 
These criticisms should not detract from the considerable extent to which Watson succeeds in 
taking textual oppression seriously while seeking out and displaying the text‘s ability to transcend 
itself by pointing to a quite different end, an end that fulfils what was promised in the beginning 
and is ‗already making its presence felt, in fragmentary and anticipatory form, in those inner-
historical events and actions to which the future belongs‘ (199). My concern, rather, is with the 
theological framework and terminology in which he clothes his proposal. In the following sub-
sections I suggest that ‗gospel and tradition‘ is preferable to ‗gospel and law‘ for this purpose 
because it better characterises the relation between human word and divine Word in scripture, 
including especially the accountability of the human word to the divine Word it attests. 
6.5.4  Towards a Theological Critique of Scripture 
Watson‘s theological reflections on the theme of law and gospel in biblical texts appear in the 
thirteenth chapter of TCW, in the discussion following his second hermeneutical thesis: 
2.  Since  theological  interpretation  must  distinguish  the  law  from  the  gospel  within  the 
biblical text, the decision to work with the canonical form does not render the text immune 
from criticism.150 
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Watson‘s discussion of this thesis pursues the issue of ‗whether a critique of aspects of the 
biblical text can be justified on inner-biblical, theological grounds‘ by developing his earlier 
suggestion regarding the Pauline law/gospel antithesis with reference to Luther‘s comments on 
this matter in his 1535 commentary on Galatians. He notes Luther‘s transcription of Paul‘s 
understanding of the law in Israel‘s redemptive history culminating in Christ into a continual 
cycle  or  dialectic  of  fear  and  faith  in  the  lives  of  Christian  believers.151  Recognising this 
transcription as a distortion of Paul, Watson nevertheless retains it, offering two reasons in 
support. Firstly, he takes it to be a truthful description of Christian existence — 
The  duality  in  Christian  experience  represented  by  the  law/gospel  distinction  becomes 
hermeneutically significant when interpreted as a twofold relation to the biblical text: for 
the twofold relation to God as the harsh judge to be feared and as the merciful redeemer to 
be loved is textually  mediated. It is holy scripture that  both repels and attracts…. The 
conflict of law and gospel represents an irreducibly dual response to the text which occurs 
in reading and which may therefore underlie formal interpretation (232). 
Secondly, it provides ‗theological justification‘ for Watson‘s hermeneutic: 
Luther‘s distinction between the true and the false Christ of holy scripture is of genuine 
hermeneutical significance, for it provides theological justification for the interpreter who 
wishes  to  resist  the  plain,  literal  meaning  of  scriptural  texts  where  that  meaning  is 
oppressive and tyrannical, where a demand is addressed to will or intellect which cannot 
and perhaps should not be fulfilled.…the theological hermeneutic outlined here by Luther 
enables us to recognize the oppressive text and to resist its literal meaning, not because the 
latter is a simple misunderstanding but because the authority of the gospel is greater than 
the authority of the text (234). 
Unfortunately, although Watson is seeking an ‗inner-biblical, theological‘ basis for resisting 
oppressive biblical texts, his proposal lacks coherence insofar as he has not provided ‗inner-
biblical, theological‘ reasons for adopting a law/gospel antithesis as his resistive hermeneutic. 
To begin with, the law/gospel antithesis is clearly a Lutheran reading of Paul, and Watson‘s 
persistence  with  it  despite  his  awareness  of  this  fact  immediately  weakens  his  claim  to  a 
genuinely biblical resistive hermeneutic. His reasons serve only to beg the question. Recalling 
one of Lindbeck‘s helpful insights, we are entitled to wonder whether the alleged existential 
warrant  owes  less  to  an  ‗irreducibly  dual  response  to  the  text‘  than  to  the  Western  (and 
                                                                                                                                                             
which  the  terms  ‗law‘  and  ‗gospel‘  come  to  dominate  Watson‘s  discussion  (taking  over  from  ‗oppression‘  and 
‗liberation‘) as he looks away from the biblical text towards more theological concerns. By way of context, the other 
theses  are:  ‗1.  Access  to  the  reality  of  Jesus  is  textually  mediated‘  (223,  discussion  223-31)  and  ‗3.  Insights 
originating  in  the  secular  world  outside  the  Christian  community  can  have  a  positive  role  in  assisting  the 
community‘s understanding of holy scripture‘ (236, discussion 236-40). 
151 ‗What for Paul is an irreversible linear movement (the time of the law is superseded by the time of the gospel) has 
become for Luther a circular movement from law to gospel and (by implication) from gospel back to law‘ (TCW 
232). In Watson‘s n15 near this passage he cites G. Ebeling with approval: ‗When we turn from the Reformers‘ 
doctrine of law and Gospel to Paul, the most striking difference is that the successive elements in a unique transition 
which can never again be reversed are turned by the Reformers‘ schema into a peculiarly simultaneous conjunction, 
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especially Lutheran) understanding of sin and grace that inevitably informs our responses but 
nevertheless  stands  in  need  of  on-going  biblical  critique.  The  ‗theological  justification‘  is 
utilitarian—Watson wants a resistive reading strategy, and here is one ready to hand—whereas a 
theological justification calls for theological engagement. Watson is aware that for Luther the 
law/gospel distinction was not a property of the text as such but of our relation to the text as that 
relation is formed, informed and deformed by the discourses we inhabit.152 Hence, 
law  and  gospel  are  not  fixed  entities,  inherent  within  the  texts  and  therefore  easily 
identifiable and subject to our control. It would be mistaken to regard Luther‘s difficulty 
with certain of the sayings of Jesus as a timeless theological problematic with which we 
must struggle in essentially the same way as he did (236). 
Quite so. Luther‘s law/gospel antithesis arises from the meeting of an oppressive theology with 
the reading of holy scripture in an intense and spiritually sensitive young man living in a time of 
cultural, political and intellectual ferment.153 It is not a ‗timeless theological problematic.‘ And 
yet, on this basis, Watson goes on to speak of the contemporary theological-exegetical task of 
distinguishing the law from the gospel in biblical texts. To the extent that he has not subjected 
to historical and theological critique the terms in which that task is set, he is, precisely, treating 
it as if it were a timeless theological problematic, for all that he wants our engagement in it to be 
‗genuinely  contemporary,  originating  in  the  role of the  scriptural  texts in  the  religious  and 
theological discourse of our own time‘. 
Watson‘s  law/gospel  proposal  lacks  both  biblical  warrant  and  logical  coherence,  yet  his 
references to ‗resisting the text for the sake of the gospel‘ resonate with themes developed 
earlier in this study. Recall the last clause of a passage cited on the previous page: ‗the authority 
of the gospel is greater than the authority of the text‘; or Watson‘s final reflections on the 
hermeneutics of resistive reading: 
The criterion by which the ‗plain meaning‘ of certain texts must be resisted and rejected is 
the gospel itself; but since the gospel is not accessible to us in transparent, uninterpreted 
form, the process of discrimination will not be a mechanical one but a constant struggle for 
discernment, taking place above all in dialogue with others (236). 
The text is to be criticised by means of the gospel discerned in the text, because the authority of 
the textually-mediated gospel is greater than the authority of the text. This, without any mention 
of ‗law‘, is much closer to a viable statement, though Watson‘s partiality to Luther‘s law/gospel 
antithesis suggests that ‗gospel‘ here remains Luther‘s gospel-as-opposed-to-law. Still, if the 
                                                       
152 Concerning Luther‘s agonised dilemmas over the false Christ who torments and accuses, Watson finds that Luther 
is aware that the temptation to see Christ in this way ‗lies not in the texts which speak of Christ as lawgiver and judge 
considered in isolation, but in these texts insofar as they entered the discourse surrounding the young Luther and were 
internalized by him. These texts are law for Luther because of their role in a religious discourse which he now 
repudiates as oppressive and contrary to the gospel, and it is this contemporary situation that give[s] his resistance its 
critical hermeneutical significance‘ (235). 
153 Though it should now be read in the light of later scho larly criticism (to which Lindbeck contributed), Erik H. 
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content of ‗the gospel‘ is taken to be ‗Jesus Christ,‘ or ‗the Word of God‘ as those terms were 
discussed in section 6.4 above, such statements agree well enough with a framework in which 
witness and Word are distinguished, and the former subordinated to the latter. 
But what of that which must be resisted in the text? What is it, if not ‗law‘? I suggest that we 
call it ‗unredeemed tradition‘.154 Several of the writers we have heard in this ‗conversation‘ take 
a positive view of tradition, asserting its value and seeking its rehabilitation in the face of 
Enlightenment  prejudice.155  The name of Hans -Georg Gadamer is frequently heard in this 
connection. But such treatments of tradition rarely escape the Enlightenment‘s preoccupation 
with knowledge, whereas, if we learn anything from Nietzsche and his heirs as commentators on 
human finitude and fallenness, it is that in tradition we also have to deal with the human will to 
power (for which the pursuit of knowledge is a common mask). Tradition is always tempted to 
justify itself, and claims of divine origin are one means of doing so, whereas tradition is always 
already implicated in fallen creatureliness, and is indeed, if only in part, the socio-historical 
trace  of  particular  entanglements  of  knowledge  and  power.  As  such,  tradition  constantly 
threatens to nullify the grace of God,156 just as patriarchy threatens to nullify the gospel, as 
feminist critics have noted. Consequently, the mediation of truthful witness through tradition 
requires the constant but judicious and humble practice of suspicion by those who have ‗taken 
on‘ the tradition.157 In view of the Christian tradition‘s anthropology, such suspicion will begin 
reflexively with the interpreter, continue with the tradition and extend to scripture itself, seeking 
at each point to hold witness accountable to the divine Word that scripture attests. 
A gospel/tradition tension avoids the theological problem of attributing oppression to God‘s law 
and hence to God, which Watson sought to resolve by saying that the law was  not God‘s. 
Although speaking of ‗tradition‘ rather than ‗law‘ does not avoid the problem that some aspects 
(and some large sections) of the Old Testament legal code are in tension with the gospel, at least 
this is an intrinsic biblical problem, and does not require unbiblical statements (Watson‘s ‗non-
divine law‘) or cast God as oppressor. Thus, identifying the antagonist as ‗tradition‘ rather than 
‗law‘ avoids the problems of Watson‘s proposal while still providing a rationale for resistance 
where the text is seen as opposed to the gospel. Moreover, one can revisit Watson‘s exegetical 
examples and find that speaking of ‗gospel and tradition‘ rather than ‗gospel and law‘ makes 
more sense of the conclusions.158 
                                                       
154 By ‗unredeemed‘ I mean ‗still in bondage to powers opposed to God.‘ 
155 I have in mind Tracy, Brown, and McGrath. Lindbeck speaks less of tradition than of cultural systems. 
156 See Matt 15:1-20 par Mark 7:1-13, Col 2:8, 1 Pet 1:18, Gal 1:14, 2 Thess 2:15, 3:6. 
157 Recalling Delwin Brown‘s usefully ambiguous employment of this expression (see n68 on p. 73 above). 
158 For example, in the parable of the prodigal son (TCW chapter 12), Watson sees Jesus‘ picture of the fatherhood of 
God undermining traditional patriarchy as the wisdom tradition, specifically the ‗wisdom‘ of a dominant patriarchal 
status quo, is subjected to the withering critique of the father‘s extravagant love. Watson‘s point is, in part, that 
although the New Testament writings bear the marks of patriarchal tradition, their theological assertions nevertheless 
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6.5.5  Scripture, Tradition and Word 
Describing  scripture‘s  fallen  creatureliness  as  ‗unredeemed  tradition‘  resonates  with  several 
aspects of this long enquiry. Firstly, it acknowledges that scripture came about in and through 
processes of human cultural production and is fully susceptible to analysis as a cultural artefact. 
In this respect scripture is like the ongoing tradition that reads it and tries to live by it; it is a 
collection of writings from diverse strands and periods within what is, with all its diversity and 
inner conflicts, ‗a‘ tradition. The insights into tradition and canon that arose in conversation 
with Brown and McGrath are fully relevant here, perhaps emphasising Brown on tradition‘s 
intrinsic diversity and conflict (though not its structure), and McGrath on tradition‘s identity. 
Scripture may have the relative fixity of text; it may be received in the church with the authority 
of divine address; and it may therefore function as the basic authority of Christian tradition; but 
for all that it is no less a product of tradition than are the countless lives and events shaped by it 
through the community that reads it in expectation of hearing the Word of God. 
Secondly, ‗unredeemed tradition‘ in scripture arises in the context of, and despite the fact of, 
scripture‘s fundamental orientation to redemption. Undeniably, Christian scripture and tradition 
have a particular orientation. They bear witness to the good news that Jesus Christ is Lord and that 
in him God was reconciling and renewing the world. This is an all-embracing claim: Jesus is the 
one true Lord to the glory of the one true God and there is nothing that lies beyond his rule. The 
fact that Jesus reveals a God who undertakes sacrificial service, faces humiliation for humanity‘s 
sake, and calls those who follow him to a similar service and humility, means that his Lordship is 
not what humans usually call lordship, but this in no way reduces the universal scope and absolute 
nature of the claim. The universal Lordship of this Jesus who reveals this God is the gospel to 
which scripture, tradition and church are oriented. Theology, as an activity of the church, serves 
the church by continually reminding the church (and therewith itself) of this orientation, and by 
challenging  the  church‘s  (and  therewith  its  own)  beliefs  and  activities  on  the  basis  of  this 
orientation. In view of this particular orientation to a universal claim, there can be no question of 
allowing Christ‘s Lordship to be compromised by other claims or circumscribed by ‗autonomous‘ 
discourses, such as those of science or social anthropology. Nor can there be any question of 
theology harbouring principles whose standing in Christ‘s service is either unclear or resistant to 
interrogation,  and  here  I  have  in  mind  supposedly  ‗neutral‘  frameworks  aimed  at  fostering 
dialogue,  ideologies  of  any  kind  (e.g.,  conservative,  progressive,  patriarchal), and  well-meant 
statements of faith, such as ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘. The presence of such principles, 
whether in theology, in tradition, or in scripture, does not bear witness to Christ, but rather attests 
the witnesses‘ vulnerability and inevitably compromises the integrity of the witness they mean to 
offer. By interrogating theology, tradition and scripture from the standpoint of Christ‘s Lordship, 
we serve not only Christ, but scripture‘s fundamental orientation. 
Scripture and tradition, in their witness to the divine Word, speak of God reaching out in love to 
finite and fallen humanity. In this witness, they participate in God‘s outreach to humanity (so 
that God is reaching out through them). In this witness, because they exclude themselves neither 
from human finitude nor from the human waywardness that God comes to redeem, they remain 
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and accountability to the Word are intrinsic to this witness: scripture and tradition, precisely 
because of their orientation to redemption, attest that their own redemption is as yet incomplete. 
Hence, while the presence of unchallenged principles inevitably compromises the integrity of 
witness, such principles are inevitably present. 
Christian scripture, then, is a collection of artefacts from the history of a tradition, a collection 
that calls the ongoing tradition to a fundamental orientation to redemption in Jesus Christ and, 
within  and  because  of  that  orientation,  acknowledges  that  its  own  redemption  is  not  yet 
complete. Several consequences flow from this. Firstly, insight into the vulnerability of witness 
makes an important contribution to the truthfulness of witness. Such insight can be gained from 
the  anthropology  attested  in  scripture  and  tradition,  and  from  any  critical  discourse  that 
addresses the human condition. No insight can be dismissed out of hand if it genuinely engages 
the humanity of the witnesses, for in doing so it may aid interpretation of their witness. Yet all 
potential insights will be critically engaged from the standpoint of the divine Word, and will be 
accepted just to the extent that they enable a more truthful witness to that Word. 
Secondly, vulnerability is as much of the essence of biblical witness as is accountability to the 
Word of God, and the two are closely entwined. Where vulnerability is denied, then, to the extent 
of the denial, accountability to the Word is avoided. For scripture and tradition alike, there can be 
no retreat from historical vulnerability—no infallible text, no unchanging grammar of the gospel, 
no  static  biblical  world,  no  monolithic  unanimity,  and  no  self-constituting  ecclesial  reading 
practice. Text, doctrine, world-view, unity, reading—all are vulnerable, and therefore accountable 
to the Word; equally, all are accountable, and therefore vulnerable to critique. Moreover, witness 
is vulnerable in its fallenness as well as in its finitude: there is not only simple error, but also 
ideological distortion; the witness of redemption is not itself fully redeemed. 
Thirdly, scripture calls its interpreters to share in  both its orientation to redemption and its 
confession of vulnerability. It calls them to trust in the divine Word, to whom both witnesses 
and interpreters are accountable. It calls them to insight into the finitude and frailty in which 
human witnesses and interpreters share. Interpretation of the witness of scripture and tradition 
requires  an  attitude  of  compassionate  humility:  compassion  in  view  of  the  solidarity  of 
interpreter  and  interpreted  in  human  vulnerability;  humility  in  view  of  their  solidarity  in 
subordination to the Word. As for the witnesses, so, we may hope, for us who interpret: the 
treasure of the gospel in jars of clay. 
A  view  of  scripture  and  tradition  in  which  orientation  and  vulnerability  are  basic  properties 
coheres with, and indeed corresponds to, the confessional and therefore critical stance developed 
in the course of this enquiry. The orientation and confession acknowledge the priority of gracious 
divine action in outreach to humanity; the vulnerability and critical reflection acknowledge that 
human witness is finite and frail, and hence accountable to the divine Word. A subtext of my 
engagement with Barth was that we serve scripture best by speaking of both what God does and 
what scripture is, and that it is potentially (and often actually) confusing to equate what scripture 
is with what God does through it. For while ‗the Bible is the Word of God‘ and ‗the Bible is holy 
scripture‘ are true in a sense, so too, in another sense, are ‗the Bible is not the Word of God‘ and 
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and vulnerability discussed above, without assimilating divine action to creaturely reality, it is 
difficult to improve on Barth‘s suggestion: ‗the Bible is human witness to divine revelation‘. 
6.6  DOCTRINE, SCRIPTURE AND HISTORICITY 
I began this chapter having already found that Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic theory did not 
provide viable accounts of Christian particularity or the nature of doctrine. This was by no 
means a wholly negative result, as the discussion to that point had highlighted particularity and 
historicity as crucial issues to be addressed by any proposal offered as an advance on that of 
Lindbeck. Moreover, the discussion had suggested the basic outlines of such a proposal in terms 
of a confessional and therefore critical theological hermeneutic. 
Lindbeck‘s critiques of liberal and conservative approaches to religion and doctrine are well-
known as controversial aspects of his proposal. In earlier chapters, I too found problems in these 
critiques, though I also found elements of enduring value. In my view, the main problem with 
Lindbeck‘s critique of conservative approaches is the curious and extended non-engagement 
with historicised propositionalism that winds through the second half of ND. 
In this chapter I have taken up these threads, asking whether a confessional and therefore critical 
hermeneutic can adequately address the issues of particularity and historicity, and wondering 
whether such a hermeneutic really amounts to the same thing as historicised propositionalism. It 
will be evident that my answer to both questions is ‗Yes‘, although the main terms of these 
questions have acquired subtly different, and sharper, definitions in the course of this chapter. 
I will not add to the conclusions already offered at the end of sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, other than 
to draw out some overarching themes. My confessional and therefore critical hermeneutic has 
emerged from this chapter with greater clarity and robustness in each of its three parts. Confession 
of Christ as Lord corresponds to the christological focus of Christian doctrine and to scripture‘s 
orientation to the Word of God. Criticism corresponds to the intrinsic vulnerability of all human 
activity  (including  understanding,  speech  and  writing).  The  ‗therefore‘  indicates  that  critical 
reflection,  including  self-reflection,  is  intrinsic  to  Christian  theology  because  theology  is  a 
vulnerable human activity, and that the criterion of critique and locus of accountability is the 
Word whom theology serves. 
Both confession and criticism have a universal aspect. The confession of Christ as Lord is meant 
absolutely  and  without  reserve.  It  cannot  be  otherwise  if Jesus  of  Nazareth  is  the  decisive 
revelation of the one God. I asserted and sought to show in operation that this claim is itself a 
hermeneutical principle that theology must apply in developing doctrine, in borrowing ideas 
from  other  discourses,  and  in reflecting  on  its  own  identity  and  methods.  Criticism  is  also 
universal in that all the raw material of theology comes to it in vulnerable form.  Not only 
contemporary discourses, not only doctrines of lesser or greater pedigree in Christian tradition, 
but also scripture itself, are vulnerable as products of human activity. 
This chapter has answered the question with which the previous chapter concluded, concerning 
the  implications  of  pervasive  historicity  for  a  theological  understanding  of  scripture  and 
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as itself an artefact of tradition. In this sense, historicity goes ‗all the way down‘, encompassing 
not  only  what  is  usually  considered  ‗tradition‘,  but  also  tradition‘s  authoritative  sources. 
However,  Christian theology  reminds  us that  ‗historicity‘  is  insufficient as a description  of 
tradition‘s vulnerability unless it is taken to include not only finitude but also moral frailty—it is 
fallen creatureliness that goes ‗all the way down.‘ 
Fallen creatureliness permeates not only the past, but also the present, including ourselves. 
Interpreters,  tradition  and  scripture  exist  in  inescapable  solidarity,  in  view  of  which  the 
necessary and appropriate critique, while learning much from the hermeneutics of finitude and 
suspicion,  and  not  retreating  at  all  from  their  genuine  insights,  will  see  itself  rather  as  a 
hermeneutic of compassion. There is no question of assuming a superior position as critic of 
scripture and tradition. However, there is a position, or rather an orientation, to which witnesses 
and interpreters alike are accountable, namely, the reconciling and renewing Word of God. 
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CONFESSION AND CRITICISM: 
DIVINE DISCOURSE, HUMANLY SPEAKING 
We  have  now  surveyed  Lindbeck‘s  argument  in  ND  and  listened  to  two  main  streams  of 
response,  trying  to  identify,  engage  and  develop  the  substantive  issues  underlying  the 
conversation. It is tempting to say that these issues were comprehensiveness/particularity in the 
conversation with liberal theology, and historical/ideological vulnerability in the conversation 
with conservative theology, but this would be too simplistic—both issues are relevant to both 
streams, albeit in different ways. My aim in this concluding chapter is to take stock of the 
conversation as a whole by reflecting further on the inter-relationships between the protagonists, 
the underlying issues, and my proposed theological response. Firstly, having in the previous 
chapter presumed  to  specify  the  theological  core  of  Christianity,1  I increase the number of 
protagonists from three to four: not only Lindbeck, liberal theology and conservative th eology 
as before, but now in addition Christianity itself. Perhaps surprisingly, this rather presumptuous 
move helps to focus attention on the issues rather than on competing theological traditions. 
Secondly and thirdly, I address each of the  major issues in turn—the comprehensiveness of 
religious claims and the vulnerability of human discourse—describing how they relate to the 
protagonists, the challenges they bring, and the responses they might elicit. Lastly, I suggest that 
the confessional and therefore critical theological hermeneutic that emerged from engagement 
with  these  issues  offers  a  better  way  of  addressing  not  only  the  problems  that  concerned 
Lindbeck, but also persistent ideological divisions within Christianity. 
7.1  ISSUES AND PROTAGONISTS 
Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic proposal arose within, and was offered as a contribution to, the 
practice of ecumenical theology. It was shaped by his perception that, in order to achieve wide 
acceptance in this field, his proposal needed to be, and be seen to be, both religiously neutral 
and hospitable to traditional claims about doctrine (and in that sense doctrinally neutral). 
Although formulated in ‗pretheological‘ terms, Lindbeck‘s proposal was theologically partisan 
at  the  level  of  religion  because  acceptance  of  the  particularity  and  comprehensiveness  of 
religious  claims  served  to  marginalise  ‗experiential-expressivist‘  approaches.  Turning  to 
doctrine,  Lindbeck  suggested  that  it  describes,  not  reality,  but  the  language  with  which 
Christians  describe  reality,  and  is  in  that  sense  analogous  to  grammar.  He  criticised 
‗propositionalist‘ theologies for ignoring the complex semiotic systems through which people 
engage  the  world.  They  tried  to  grasp  directly  at  reality,  whereas  engagement  is  mediated 
through practices and implicit categories that may or may not be adequate to the encountered 
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reality. He charged both sets of opponents with viewing religion and theology in intellectualist 
terms that overlooked the hermeneutic significance of embodiment. 
Although Lindbeck formulated his cultural-linguistic proposal in response to observations made 
during a substantial career in ecumenical theology, and offered it mainly for the consideration of 
others engaged in this field, it reverberated through the broad stream of late twentieth-century 
Christian  theology.  In  large  measure,  these  echoes  arose  from  the  polemical  strands  of  his 
argument, and especially from his construction of the views he opposed, which were rightly taken 
to (mis)represent the broad ‗liberal‘ and ‗conservative‘ options in Christian theology. Lindbeck‘s 
polemics reflected more than challenged these polemical alignments, and thus contributed to the 
ensuing debate being less constructive than it might have been, as those criticised often responded 
by defending their precommitments against his misrepresentations, and then, not unreasonably, 
felt justified in challenging his proposal on the basis of their own positions. Although this study, 
too, reflects the structure of Lindbeck‘s polemic, I have tried to engage his critique, the responses, 
and the customary polemical alignments, so as to identify and engage substantive issues. 
In broad terms, the substantive issues are the comprehensiveness of religious claims and the 
vulnerability of human discourse (including religious discourse). By ‗comprehensiveness‘ is 
meant the universal intent with which religious claims are made, and which gives them their 
‗religious‘ character. ‗Vulnerability‘ indicates that human discourse, whether or not it includes 
religious claims, is conducted by finite beings whose understanding is certainly not universal, 
but rather finite and fallible. In the course of this study we have addressed vulnerability in terms 
of particularity, embodiment, historicity, finitude and moral frailty. Not surprisingly, the scope 
of these issues reflects the basically anthropological nature of Lindbeck‘s argument, and is in 
turn reflected in the confessional and therefore critical hermeneutic I proposed. The content of 
these issues and the relations between them is the main theme of this chapter. 
In the foregoing brief summary of key issues, I have avoided explicit reference to Christian faith 
because I want this summary to serve as a basis for engagement between four overlapping 
discourses, of which Christianity is one.2 The other discourses are those of Lindbeck, liberal 
theology  and  conservative  theology.  Immediately,  this  list  of  ‗discourses‘  raises  several 
problems: it implies that Lindbeck, liberal theology and conservative theology are,  to some 
extent, not Christian; it treats complex traditions (Christianity, liberal theology and conservative 
theology) in the same terms as the work of an individual scholar; and the reader may well 
suspect that what I mean by ‗Christianity‘ is in fact my own position. I plead guilty on all 
counts, and offer the following comments in the hope of placating the reader. 
Firstly, as Kathryn Tanner has put it, Christianity is a community of argument about following 
Jesus.3 Part of that argument involves asserting that the real meaning of following Jesus lies 
here rather than there, and hence that some varieties of Christian thought are ‗off-centre.‘ In this 
chapter I am concerned with the core commitments of certain ‗discourses‘, and the implications 
of those commitments. I am not concerned with drawing boundaries. The ‗discourses‘ I am 
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engaging  undoubtedly  overlap,  and  the  boundaries  of  Christianity  may  well  completely 
encompass those of the other three. Certainly, all four have enough in common that this study 
has  been  able  to  identify  genuine  disagreements,  or  in  Tanner‘s  terms,  a  ‗community  of 
argument‘,  underlying  the  misunderstandings.  I  suggest,  then,  that  these  discourses  are 
distinguished  less  by  their  boundaries  than  by  their  core  commitments,  or  perhaps  by  the 
standpoints from which they relate themselves to the same centre. 
Secondly, while Lindbeck and the three complex traditions are in many ways different kinds of 
entity,  this  is  unlikely  to  be  misleading  in  view  of  the  fact  that  their  content  and  their 
interrelations have been recurring themes of this study. However, while Lindbeck‘s proposal has 
already been sufficiently defined, his descriptions of the three traditions have been contested, so 
I will now summarise what I take their content to be. I take Christianity to be centred on Jesus 
Christ as the decisive revelation of the one God, the redeeming God of Israel. I have also spoken 
of this centre as ‗the Word of God‘ (emphasising divine communication) and as ‗the gospel‘ 
(emphasising announcement of Jesus‘ Lordship). This study began, and will soon end, with this 
understanding  of the  centre  of  Christianity,  and  we have  seen  it asserted,  though  variously 
implemented, by Lindbeck, Schleiermacher, Barth and McGrath. In dialogue with McGrath and 
then  Barth  I  indicated  why  I  believe  it  to  be  not  only  the  centre  of  Christianity,  but  the 
originating affirmation of the Christian church and the unifying principle of Christian scripture. 
In asserting that Christianity has this centre, I have said little about its boundaries. It is not that 
boundaries  are  unimportant,  but  that,  where  boundaries  are  needed,  their  discernment  and 
definition must be guided by this centre. 
We  have  seen  that  the  labels  ‗liberal‘  and  ‗conservative‘  are  problematic  when  applied  to 
Christian theologies. Insofar as they reflect entrenched alignments in contemporary Christianity, 
their continued use may hinder the emergence of fresh insight. Yet this very entrenchment, 
together  with  socio-historical  inquiry  of  the  kind  employed  by  McGrath,  indicates  the 
ideological character of certain commitments within these broad movements, and hence the 
importance of questioning them concerning the extent to which their ideological commitments 
help or hinder their following of Christ. The terms ‗liberal‘ and ‗conservative‘ are not only more 
convenient and more general than Lindbeck‘s ‗experiential-expressivist‘ and ‗propositionalist‘, 
they are also less tendentious. Objections to Lindbeck‘s polemics arose in part from perceptions 
of argumentative sleight of hand—that he treated limited and already outdated positions as 
proxies for the complex traditions within which they occurred, and assumed that by engaging 
these parts he thereby engaged the larger wholes from which they emerged. 
By the terms ‗liberal theology‘ and ‗conservative theology‘ I mean complex intellectual traditions 
that through a combination of religious interest and ideology produce different accounts of the 
significance of Jesus. By ‗ideology‘ I do not mean the conventional left/right dichotomy between 
progressives and conservatives. These categories are used by social and political movements, 
especially by those identifying themselves as ‗progressive‘. I mean, rather, complexes of ideas that 
include positions taken or assumed in respect of the issues identified in this study and summarised 
above in terms of the comprehensiveness of religious claims and the  vulnerability of human 
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been derived in dialogue with Lindbeck and his respondents and assume a standpoint oriented to 
seeing everything in terms of its place within the universal Lordship of Jesus. This is already a 
claim that Jesus‘ Lordship is fundamental, and that other ideological commitments are not. Am I, 
then,  like  Lindbeck,  offering  explanatory  categories  that  prejudge  the  issue  so  far  as  liberal 
theologies are concerned? I point out that, unlike Lindbeck, I find that conservative theologies can 
also be challenged by the comprehensiveness of their own religious claims, and to this we must 
add that they often give insufficient attention to the vulnerability of those claims. In short, I find 
weaknesses and strengths in both these approaches, as well as in Lindbeck, when viewed from 
what I take to be the central commitments of Christian faith. 
As to the content assumed under these labels, I agree with Lindbeck‘s respondents that the 
liberal tradition is not defined by ‗experiential-expressivism‘, and conservative theology is not 
defined by ‗propositionalism‘ and/or ‗cognitivism‘. In each case, what Lindbeck criticised is but 
one  possible  manifestation  of  an  ethos  whose  underlying  commitments  must  be  described 
otherwise. Each manifestation once seemed viable, but has since been criticised and modified 
(or even abandoned) by those who identify with its originating ethos. I suggested earlier that the 
ethos of liberal theology lies in its affirmation of the critical discourses of western secular 
societies and its sense that religious claims must be criticised by these discourses.4 Much of the 
rich variation among liberal religious thinkers arises from differing views of the  balance of 
authority between secular and religious discourses and of the extent to which religious claims 
must be questioned and reinterpreted. The ethos of conservative theology is its orientation to 
religious tradition, represented especially in the aut hority ascribed to the tradition‘s sources. 
This, too, is a broad stream that includes various views of the relation between authorities 
within the religious tradition, and of the relation between religious and non-religious authorities. 
In general, conservatives see contemporary societies as vulnerable to critique to the extent that 
those societies have not yet heeded the witness of the religious tradition. I am, then, describing 
conservatives and liberals in terms of their acknowledgement of authorities and the relations 
they see between various authorities. By itself, this theme cannot unfold into a full account of 
these two broad approaches, but it is at least a major discriminant between them, and a key 
element  in  arguments  between  them.  I  suggest,  further,  that  both  approaches  tend  to  be 
insufficiently reflexive, in the sense of not reflecting on the consequences of their assertions for 
the viability of their presupposed standpoints, and I argue below that where such reflection 
occurs it may produce a measure of convergence between them. 
Returning to my list of ‗discourses‘, it may be objected, lastly, that I regard my own position as 
the ‗Christian‘ one and therefore superior to the others. This is partly true. I have defined the 
adjective ‗Christian‘ to mean, in essence, ‗affirming that Jesus is Lord‘, or ‗acknowledging 
Jesus  of  Nazareth  as  the  decisive  revelation  of  God‘.  I  do  think  that  my  position  has  this 
orientation, and follows through some of its implications. Yet this has come about through 
engagement  with  Lindbeck  and  certain  liberal  and  conservative  Christian  thinkers,  and  so, 
despite my avowed orientation, some polemical distortion is all but inevitable.5 Besides, in view 
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of my discussions of reflexivity and human vulnerability, I can hardly assume that my position 
is intrinsically less vulnerable than other positions. I have, however, indicated what I believe to 
be the identity and nature of Christian criteriology. I hold myself and others accountable to 
Jesus Christ, and hope that others will respond in kind. 
The issues and discourses just described can be used as a matrix covering the ground traversed in 
this thesis. In one direction (say, the rows), we can view the ground in terms of the discourses—
Lindbeck,  conservative  and  liberal  theologies,  and  Christianity;  in  the  other  direction  (the 
columns),  we  see  it  in  terms  of  issues—the  comprehensiveness  of  religious  claims  and  the 
vulnerability of discourse. Having spent nearly the whole of the inquiry to this point investigating 
the discourses and the relationships between them, I will structure my concluding remarks in 
terms of the issues. This approach will emphasise the constructive results of the discussion, not so 
much retreating from the earlier polemics as drawing out the lessons to be learned from them. I 
hope, too, that it will reduce the likelihood of a problem that was notable in the post-Lindbeck 
debate, namely, the perception that the author thinks s/he is critically engaging a whole tradition 
when in fact s/he is not. I have engaged with Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic proposal; I do not think 
that I have engaged liberal and conservative theologies as whole traditions. In reflecting on what I 
think are the ‗real issues‘ underlying the debate over Lindbeck‘s proposal, I will indicate that 
certain challenges are particularly relevant to this or that approach. It is entirely possible that 
liberals and conservatives will think that they can answer these challenges using resources they 
regard as their own. Indeed, one function of the immanent critiques I have attempted in both main 
parts of this thesis is to draw attention to resources within each tradition that could support such 
answers. If deployment of these resources pulls against some other commitments that are held 
dear, then there may be decisions to be made, or perhaps life-giving tensions to be recognised. I 
hope to show that, where such resources are deployed to meet the challenges I will raise, the result 
is convergence around the confession of Christ. 
7.2  COMPREHENSIVENESS 
By  emphasising  the  comprehensiveness  of  religious  life,  Lindbeck  problematised  his  own 
proposal, which had its basis not in Christian theology but in secular social anthropology. Any 
comprehensive  semiotic  system  that  accepted  his  proposal  without  challenging  it  from  the 
standpoint of its own intrinsic claims would thereby surrender its claim to comprehensiveness. 
For its part, Christianity, to which Lindbeck‘s proposal is mainly addressed, most basically 
expresses its comprehensive claim and particular identity in the gospel proclamation, ‗Jesus is 
Lord!‘ While this proclamation has many ramifications and can be explained only in the light of 
the historical context in which it originated, it certainly announces that Jesus of Nazareth is of 
ultimate significance for human existence. The extent to which Lindbeck‘s proposal joins in the 
service of Jesus is the extent to which Christianity can welcome it. Thus, Christian faith can 
affirm Lindbeck‘s assertions regarding comprehensiveness and particularity but must highlight 
the self-contradiction inherent in basing such assertions on an anthropology that frames the 
entire discussion including the supposedly comprehensive religious claims. On these issues, and 
with  these  internal  contradictions,  Lindbeck  stands  closer  to  Schleiermacher  than  do  the 
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Dialogue  with  Delwin  Brown  suggested,  and  reading  of  Schleiermacher  confirmed,  that 
Lindbeck misconstrued the relation between his own approach and that of liberal theology. Like 
Schleiermacher, and indeed more like him than many liberals, Lindbeck‘s mode of argument 
contradicted his orientation to piety. For Lindbeck and Schleiermacher, everything in Christian 
faith is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ, or, in conventional Christian 
language, Christian faith affirms that Jesus is Lord. Yet Lindbeck and Schleiermacher both 
defined the sphere encompassed by ‗everything in Christian faith‘ in terms that owed nothing to 
Christian faith, thereby encapsulating ‗Christian faith‘ within whatever discourse provided their 
respective  definitions,  and  denying  the  possibility  that  Christian  faith  could  be  truly 
comprehensive. If liberal theology has less to do with ‗experiential-expressivism‘ than with 
granting some measure of authority to ‗contemporary discourse‘ (however defined), such that 
Christian faith is taken to be less than truly comprehensive, then Lindbeck‘s mode of argument 
is very much ‗liberal‘. Divergence occurs when, although still arguing in a way that implicitly 
denies  the  comprehensiveness  of  religious  claims,  Lindbeck  nevertheless  asserts  their 
comprehensiveness. Liberal theology avoids such incoherence by trying to be clear about its 
sources of authority, but this also raises more sharply the issue of comprehensiveness. 
Is Christianity a comprehensive faith? If ‗Jesus is Lord‘ means that Jesus of Nazareth is the 
decisive revelation of the one God, the God of Israel, and if this confession is and has always been 
the Church‘s raison d’être as I argued above,6 then Christianity is indeed a comprehensive faith in 
which everything whatsoever is believed to find its true place under Jesus‘ Lordship. That is, the 
universal scope of Christian claims for Jesus is intrinsic and fundamental to Christian faith, and 
Christian theology will therefore critically engage all discourses, and especially its own, on the 
basis that Jesus is the decisive revelation of God. There is, then, a challenge for liberal theology 
concerning its identity and allegiance. Does it, like Delwin Brown‘s proposal, offer a liberal 
Christianity in which the comprehensiveness of Christian faith is contained within and interpreted 
by a super-comprehensive ‗common discourse‘ whose overriding allegiance is to liberal society? 
Or does it offer a Christian liberalism whose overriding allegiance is to Jesus and which therefore 
critically engages contemporary discourse from the standpoint of the divine liberality displayed in 
him? I have argued that the comprehensiveness of Christian claims for Jesus makes this challenge 
unavoidable,  that  acceptance  of  Jesus‘  Lordship  has  important  implications  for  theological 
method, and hence that only the second option can claim a Christian identity. I hasten to add that 
this challenge is not faced by liberal theology as a whole (if there is such a thing). Nor is it faced 
by liberal theology alone. It is, however, a challenge for those of liberal inclination in view of the 
history of the tradition of which they feel themselves to be a part. Each can answer only for her- or 
himself, or show that the terms in which I have posed the challenge are false. 
Because Christianity is a comprehensive faith, those who stand within it face the challenge of 
understanding everything, including their own understanding, from the standpoint of its central 
claims. Thus, on the basis of his own claim for the centrality of Jesus, I queried McGrath‘s use of 
‗attitude to the past‘ as key criterion, and his theological non-engagement with ideology.7 Beyond 
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this, two substantial challenges emerged which are relevant to tradition-oriented theologies: the 
need to query their own privileged sources from the standpoint attested in those sources, and the 
need to relate the tradition and their interpretation of it to the anthropology attested in the tradition. 
I illustrated the first of these challenges with a theological critique of ‗the Bible is the Word of 
God‘, a presupposition of sixteenth-century Christianity and of modern conservative theologies. If 
conservatives object to my conclusions, I hope they will agree with the basis of the critique, and 
then go on to show how the confession ‗Jesus is Lord‘ should lead to a different result. The second 
challenge arises through Christian tradition‘s native awareness of its own vulnerability. That is, in 
its  comprehensiveness  Christianity  comprehends  the  vulnerability  of  human  discourse  and 
recognises scripture, tradition and their interpretation as examples of such discourse. The content 
and consequences of this vulnerability will be addressed in the following section. The point here is 
that Christian confessionalism points towards, not away from, its own vulnerability. 
My confessional and therefore critical hermeneutic confesses that Jesus is Lord, and therefore 
seeks to understand everything, including the content and vulnerability of this confession, in 
relation to him. This study provides some examples of how this can work in theology, that is, in 
relation to themes and ideas usually thought of as residing within Christian discourse. I now 
offer some brief comments on the relation between Christian discourse and other discourses. 
The validity of a confessional standpoint may be defensible, but it is not demonstrable. It can 
hardly  be  otherwise  with the  ultimate  and  comprehensive  commitments  that are  commonly 
called ‗religious‘. If the validity of such a standpoint could be demonstrated, then the standpoint 
from which the demonstration was provided would have proved itself to be at least as ultimate 
and at least as comprehensive as the one whose validity was in question. That is, any such 
demonstration would be self-refuting. Moreover, for any tradition that is able to see itself as a 
tradition, the ultimate standpoint is not in fact available to humans, but lies beyond them. This is 
certainly the case for Christianity, which confesses not its own lordship, but that of Jesus. A 
confessional standpoint, then, is necessarily taken in trust, one aspect of which is trust that this 
standpoint provides a way of living in the world, including a way of making sense of it. 
Since Christianity understands humans to be fallen creatures, it does not expect their living and 
understanding to be always and everywhere successful, and therefore some unknown but finite 
measure of failure can be tolerated by adherents before they are led to question the object of 
their faith. Because the allowable measure of failure is finite, Christianity must continually 
engage with other discourses, especially those seen as being ‗successful‘, in order to provide the 
faithful with sufficient confidence that their faith is ‗true‘, i.e., that it continues to offer a truly 
comprehensive  way  of  living  in  the  world  and  making  sense  of  it.  Provocation  to  such 
engagement arises in myriad encounters between believers and non-believers in the conduct of 
daily life as well as in larger scale and more intentional meetings over matters of common 
concern. The task of Christian reflection on these encounters is, in part, to show how these other 
discourses, other ways of life, unexpected discoveries or common concerns find their true sense 
under Jesus‘ Lordship. This will include showing how Christianity recognises and rejoices in 
the truth that they bear, how it recognises and heals their distortions, how it recognises and 
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response,  Jesus  the  redeeming  and  reconciling  Word  of  God  remains  the  criterion  of 
discernment. As Christian reflection, this will not be simply an exercise in self-justification, but 
a limited example and enactment of Jesus‘ loving and redeeming embrace of all creation. 
It is no accident that this somewhat lyrical description of how Christianity can engage other 
viewpoints carries more than a faint echo of Delwin Brown‘s description of the way in which 
‗our  common  discourse‘  takes  care  of  religious  traditions  and  their  canons.  The  parallel 
highlights  the  religious  nature  of  Brown‘s  commitment  to  liberal  society.  There  are 
dissimilarities, too. For Brown, the academy has, or should have, authority over the conceptual 
and affective content of religious traditions. For its part, Christianity has authority just to the 
extent that it bears faithful witness to Jesus Christ. It wants to be free to bear this witness and 
wants people to be free to respond. It is not concerned with shaping other traditions by deciding 
on the scope and content of their resources. Now, it may be that liberal societies need not relate 
to religions in the way that Brown suggests, and it is certainly the case that Christianity has 
often acted coercively and so betrayed its commitment to Jesus‘ servant Lordship. Nevertheless, 
because it confesses Jesus as  Lord, Christianity is obliged to see any discourse that claims 
greater comprehensiveness as making a competing claim to ultimacy, and hence as following 
another confession, whether or not that discourse understands itself to be ‗religious‘. 
We  have  seen  that  the  comprehensiveness  of  Christian  faith  poses  a  logical  problem  for 
Lindbeck, challenges conservative theologies to deeper reflection on their commitment to Jesus, 
and offers a particularly sharp challenge for some liberal approaches. Lindbeck asserts this 
comprehensiveness through an argument that stands outside it, thus undermining the coherence 
of his assertion. Conservative theologies, in their orientation to Christian tradition, accept the 
comprehensiveness of Christian claims for Jesus, and precisely on this basis may be called to 
greater thoroughness in their acceptance, to reconsider subsidiary doctrinal claims (making sure 
that they are subsidiary) and to embrace the critical reflection more usually associated with 
liberal  approaches.  Liberal  theologies,  to  the  extent  that  they  rely  on  authorities  seen  as 
independent  of  Christian  tradition,  are  obliged  to  relativise,  and  thus  deny,  its 
comprehensiveness. But if comprehensiveness is essential to Christian claims for Jesus, as I 
have argued it is, then reliance on independent authorities contradicts the basis of Christian faith 
and compromises either the coherence or the Christian identity of theologies that take this path. 
This is not to say that independent authorities are not useful, or are not often truthful. Nor is it to 
say that they should never be relied upon. It is to say that if Jesus is Lord then no truth is 
ultimately  independent  of  him.  Christian  theology  may  well  rely  on  authorities  that  see 
themselves as independent of Christian confession, but it cannot treat them as both independent 
and authoritative for its own purposes without compromising its basic confession. Thus it is 
always challenged to display, to itself and to others, the greater comprehensiveness of Christ, 
and thus the truth of its confession, in something like the manner suggested above. 
In speaking of the comprehensiveness of Christian claims for Jesus we have not been able to go 
very far without facing the fact that the claimed comprehensiveness is properly that of Jesus 
rather than that of the claims themselves. Those making such claims for Jesus place themselves 
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confess him as Lord, and in that confession discover our fallen creatureliness. We cannot, then, 
speak properly of the comprehensiveness of Christian claims without also addressing the non-
comprehensive nature of the claimants—their vulnerability as human beings. 
7.3  VULNERABILITY 
Compared to the situation in the discussion of comprehensiveness, the vulnerability of human 
discourse provides, or should provide, common ground among the four discourses. Lindbeck 
and  liberal  theology  with  their  anthropological  interests,  Christianity  with  its  doctrines  of 
creation and fall, and conservative theology with its commitment to Christian tradition, all have 
reasons for holding a robust appreciation of the vulnerability of human discourse. And they all 
do, to some extent, though there is an understandable tendency to note the vulnerability of 
positions other than their own. 
Lindbeck‘s  offering  is  both  insightful  and  contradictory  on  this  issue.  Speaking  mainly  of 
embodiment and sociality, he emphasised the quasi-transcendental nature of the linguistic and 
cultural contexts in which humans are formed as persons, and through which they engage the 
world.8 The cultural-linguistic proposal thus recognises that humans are situated in and formed 
by a priori contexts of language and practice. While religions are distinguished by their claims 
to  true  rather  than  merely  quasi-transcendence,  they  clearly  provide  a  priori  contexts  of 
language and practice by means of which their adherents engage the world.9 Appreciation of 
embodiment and sociality is evident in several aspects of Lindbeck‘s proposal. Firstly, religious 
affirmations are not sentences that exist independently of persons; they are affirmations made 
by particular persons in determinate contexts concerning the alignment of persons with ultimate 
reality. Secondly, the extent of such alignment cannot exceed the extent to which the affirming 
person‘s cultural-linguistic context is adequate to reality. Thirdly, as bodied beings humans are 
always located—spatially, temporally, historically, culturally, socially; they do not have, and 
cannot have, a non-contextual view of reality. Therefore the adequation to reality of cultural-
linguistic contexts cannot be demonstrated fully and finally, but only partially and provisionally 
in participants‘ success in living, that ‗success‘ being itself judged in a contextual manner. 
Lindbeck thus appreciates that, whatever claims may be made for the ultimacy of a religious (or 
any other) frame of reference, humans cannot simply adopt an ultimate frame and henceforth 
see  reality  in  its  terms.  Rather,  humans  always  begin  ‗in  the  middle‘—in  some  particular, 
proximate, non-ultimate context—and remain ‗in the middle‘ so long as they are bodied. In this 
sense,  religious  life  expresses  an  orientation  that  seeks,  in  and  through  proximate  reality, 
alignment of one‘s self and one‘s context with ultimate reality. Lindbeck‘s charge that modern 
theologies,  both  conservative  and  liberal,  insufficiently  appreciate  the  bodiliness  of  human 
knowledge is one that those approaches will do well to heed. Yet his own proposal has its 
‗intellectualist‘ weaknesses: it treats language and world as optionally separable rather than 
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essentially enmeshed, transposes doctrine into an ahistorical ‗grammar‘ of faith, and claims 
ecumenical neutrality by presupposing the meaningfulness of certain ideas. 
In contrast to its attention to finitude, Lindbeck‘s cultural-linguistic proposal says little about 
humanity‘s moral frailty. He presents the example of the crusader, whose violence falsifies his 
confession of Christ, to illustrate the importance of intrasystematic coherence;10 he makes no 
comment on the danger that faith may be coopted fo r the purposes of power. His ecumenical 
and religious neutrality relied on acritical acceptance of the possible truth of traditional claims 
for doctrine, rather than an appreciation of traditions‘ susceptibility to ideological distortion. 
While there is much to be said for listening charitably to one‘s conversation partners, who may 
at any time speak the divine word we most need to hear, a shared confession of Christ always 
implies a shared life in which worship of the triune God, prayer, the study of scripture, the 
confession of sins and table fellowship with Jesus ground our solidarity as redeemed sinners and 
our consequent responsibility to serve one another by offering encouragement, accountability, 
forgiveness, and healing for our shared witness to Christ.11 
Liberal theology, with its embrace of critical enquiry, has always appreciated the vulnerability of 
religious discourse, and indeed some who value the ‗liberal‘ name see openness to enquiry as the 
principal feature of a liberal ethos. My contention, however, is that, in view of Jesus‘ Lordship and 
an  anthropology  indicated  by  the  doctrines  of  creation  and  fall,  openness  to  critical  enquiry 
belongs to Christianity‘s ‗core business‘ and there is no need whatsoever for it to be imported on 
the basis of some ‗independent‘ authority. I emphasise that the issue here is not the importation 
itself but the basis on which it occurs. There is great need to attend to non-Christian discourses for 
their insights into the implications of human finitude and frailty. Indeed, Christian theology has 
learned  much  from  other  discourses  regarding  the  implications  of  what  it  sees  as  our  fallen 
creatureliness, and will continue to do so. Yet, so far as I am aware, there is nothing so learned, 
nor anything offered to be learned, that cannot be understood within the classic doctrinal loci of 
creation and fall. However much Christian theology may need to be reminded occasionally of 
things it should never have forgotten, or however much it may need to have its attention drawn to 
matters it had not considered, embrace of critical enquiry does not, of itself, imply or require 
assertion of an authority independent of Christ or even external to Christian tradition. Reliance on 
independent authority implies critique, but the implication is not reversible. 
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If openness to critical enquiry belongs to Christianity‘s ‗core business‘, then it should be ‗core 
business‘ for all who hold themselves accountable to the divine Word. That is, as mentioned 
briefly above, conservatives are obliged to embrace critical enquiry precisely because they confess 
Jesus as Lord. They are obliged to acknowledge their own human fallibility and attend to its 
implications and consequences. They are obliged to acknowledge the vulnerability of Christian 
tradition. I argued above that, in view of scripture‘s self-attestation as witness to Christ, they are 
also obliged to acknowledge scripture‘s vulnerability as witness. In short, for reasons that are 
deeply embedded in the Christian confession of faith, openness to critical enquiry should not 
provide any basis for distinguishing between liberal and conservative theological traditions, and 
this should extend to a considerable level of detail in view of a broadly shared appreciation of 
human finitude and frailty. Hence, to the extent that critical enquiry appears to be a distinctive 
feature of liberal thought, the immediate implication is that tradition-oriented theologies have not 
been as critical as their tradition calls them to be. It is for this reason that, while granting the 
importance of critical enquiry for the liberal tradition, I do not regard it as distinguishing feature. 
Christian tradition is vulnerable not because it is Christian, or because it is religious, but because it 
is tradition, i.e., because it is human. But any critique of it is also human activity, and therefore 
tradition-situated. All four ‗discourses‘ can agree on this, but they do not all meet the challenge of 
reflexivity that is intrinsic to any theorising about anthropological concerns. We have noted this 
several times in relation to Lindbeck‘s proposal, but he is not alone in being insufficiently aware 
of the need to bring his own standpoint within the argument. Lindbeck and McGrath rightly noted 
the inadequacy of conservative theologies that presume to state timeless truth while remaining 
blissfully unaware of the temporality of their statements. I have tried to show that a reflexively 
aware ‗conservative‘ theology can be far more robust (admittedly, at the cost of looking rather less 
conservative).  Liberal  theology,  too,  can  benefit  from  greater  reflexive  awareness.  Religious 
traditions are not peculiarly vulnerable because they are religious; they are vulnerable because 
they are human. Therefore liberals, like conservatives, need to embrace their own humanity and 
realise  that  no  authority  is  available  to  them  that  is  not  mediated  by  tradition.  Criticising 
Christianity from the standpoint of contemporary critical discourse is not challenging tradition by 
means of reason, but challenging one tradition of reasoning from the vantage point of another.12 
Like Christianity, contemporary critical discourse is embedded in particular forms of social 
interaction, buttressed by plausibility structures and institutional power. As it acknowledges and 
clarifies its own faith commitments and reflects on its own vulnerabilities its engagement with the 
tradition that gave it birth can only become more productive.  
7.4  CONFESSION AND CRITICISM 
It may seem that, unlike Lindbeck, I have little to offer as a constructive proposal—that, having 
found that Lindbeck‘s proposal does not offer a way ‗beyond‘ conservatism and liberalism, I am 
suggesting merely that Christianity necessarily combines conservative (confessional) and liberal 
(critical) elements. There is some truth in this, but it is also a misinterpretation. Christianity, by 
virtue of its intrinsic comprehensive claim, has no interest in combining or balancing the claims or 
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inclinations of other ideologies. It is interested, rather, in learning from their insights, healing their 
wounds, and showing how they find their true glory in serving Jesus to the glory of the triune God. 
Granted, the confession of Jesus as Lord exists historically as tradition, and so the granting of 
over-riding  priority  to  that  confession  can  be  seen  as  ‗conservative‘.  But  the  priority  of  this 
confession subverts conservatism as it is commonly understood, to the point where ‗conservative‘ 
ceases to be useful as a descriptor. Hence my view that Christianity does not have a preferential 
option for conservatism. Similarly, and again because of the priority of Christian confession, there 
is nothing especially ‗liberal‘ about a critical approach to theology (or, if critical thought is what 
one means by ‗liberal,‘ then Christianity is already intrinsically liberal), and this label, too, loses 
relevance. Hence my view that the distinguishing feature of liberal theology is not criticism, but 
the basis of its critique: the criterion or authority under which it operates. 
Thus,  in  a  sense,  Lindbeck‘s  insight  into  the  priority  of  confession  has  structured  the  whole 
discussion, and it has become clear that not only his proposal, but also the broad streams of 
conservative and liberal theology, face challenges in this regard. Since Lindbeck‘s proposal is the 
work of one scholar, it has been possible to show that this aspect of it is incoherent, but such firm 
conclusions are impossible in relation to entire theological traditions. Rather, I have indicated that 
conservative and liberal approaches each have grounds for acknowledging the priority of Christian 
confession, and each faces challenges in this regard depending on individual scholars‘ alternate or 
subsidiary commitments, and the ways in which they implement those commitments. 
I suggest that a confessional and therefore critical theological hermeneutic provides a consistent 
and  appropriately  reflexive  approach  to  the  issues  raised  by  Lindbeck  and  underlying  the 
subsequent debates, namely, the comprehensiveness of religious claims and the vulnerability of 
human discourse. To the extent that this hermeneutic is both thoroughly Christian and able to 
share in broad areas of contemporary non-Christian discourse it can serve, and in this thesis has 
served,  as  a  means  of  ‗intersystematic  reason-giving‘.  In  so  doing,  it  engages  the  inner 
commitments of both conservative and liberal approaches and suggests that, by following those 
commitments through the logic of comprehensiveness and vulnerability, and responding with 
confession and criticism, those approaches may better engage each other, and so draw closer 
together around the gospel. 
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